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Preface

This study represents an effort to pursue a regional analysis of
provincial politics during the early years of the French Revolution. I have
chosen for that purpose a comparative approach, focusing on Caen, a federalist center in 1793, and Limoges, a departmental seat that opposed the federalist revolt. There are two reasons for undertaking a comparative study.
First, examining two towns that were in many ways similar should make it
possible to determine what was unique to each town and to isolate the factors that led to their political differences. Second, the comparative method
will better explain regional variation in local responses to national events.
For the comparative method to succeed, of course, the cases being compared must be carefully chosen. Caen is an obvious choice-it
is the only
one of four centers of the federalist revolt that has not already been extensively researched. Since Series L in the departmental
archives has until recently remained virtually unclassified, little serious research has been undertaken concerning the Revolution in Caen.
Limoges meets the criteria for a second town in this comparison. First, it
was a Jacobin town. In the weeks following May 3 J, 1793, the Limoges and
Haute- Vienne administrators
were initially noncommittal
and then openly
hostile to suggestions from other departments that they join in a protest directed against Paris and the National Convention. Additionally, Limoges resembled Caen in size and administrative
function. Although Caen was

-xiv

PREFACE

somewhat larger than Limoges at the end of the Old Regime (Caen's population stood at just over 35,000 and Limoges' at approximately
22,000),
both
were among the thirty largest towns in France. Each town was the seat of an
intendancy and the site of the important regional courts. Neither town
hosted a parlemcnt, Caen falling in the jurisdiction of Rouen and Limoges
in that of Bordeaux. Limoges was a bishop's seat and Caen was not, that
honor falling to the nearby town of Bayeux. The Church must thus be said
to have been more important to Limoges, but both towns possessed numerous religious establishments. The role and fate of the clergy during the Revolution was much the same in the two towns. A more interesting contrast IS
the fact that Caen possessed a sizable Protestant minority, whereas Limoges
did not.
Each town was an important regional trade center, Caen dominating
Lower Normandy and Limoges doing likewise for the Limousin and the
Marche. Limoges lay on the crossroads between Lyon and La Rochelle, between Bordeaux and Paris. Caen bisected one route between London and
Paris, though war often disrupted trade between these two capitals. Because
of Caen's proximity to the coast, merchants there traded more actively in
international markets, though the Orne River and the port of Caen were not
capable of handling ocean-going vessels until the very eve of the Revolution.
Agriculture presented the greatest economic difference between the two
towns. Whereas Caen lay at the heart of a rich grain district, the area around
Limoges was hilly and rocky, very poor for cultivation.
This book is first and foremost a study of revolutionary politics, of what
molded and determined those politics at the local level. More than simply to
compare the local politics of two towns, however, my goal has been to establish the links between local and national political actors, between local and
national political issues. Although the nature of local politics tells us a great
deal about national political divisions, we need to consider social and economic factors to understand why local politics took the shape they did. Indeed, since I consider those factors to be primary, the manuscript begins and
ends with them. Chapter One establishes the economic context in each town
and also discusses urban geography and associational patterns among both
the social elite and the lower classes of Caen and Limoges at the end of the
Old Regime. Chapter Two explores the development of political alignments
and confrontations during the first three years of the Revolution. By 1793,
the local elite dominated the pOlitical arena in Caen, while in Limoges that
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arena was much more open and contentious. An examination of the events
of 17!l9 through 1792 sheds some light on how that contrasting situation
came to be. Chapter Three departs from the local scene to shift our focus to
Paris in 1792 and T 79 3, where an emerging political crisis was increasingly
drawing the attention of provincial leaders. My concern in that chapter is to
emphasize the ongoing political dialogue between Paris and the provinces
and the degree to which national and local issues were intertwined. Chapters Four and Five describe and discuss the federalist revolt and the subsequent repression and reorganization
of departmental
administrations,
stressing the themes established in Chapters Two and Three. Throughout
these chapters, the sections devoted ro Caen are somewhat lengthier than
those devoted to Limoges. This denotes no implicit judgment as to relative
importance but rather the simple fact that Caen produced a revolt, with the
resultant mountain of documentation,
while Limoges did not. Chapter Six
analyzes the social and economic factors that, in my view, explain the political differences already established. The Conclusion returns to the broader
context of French revolutionary politics in order to appraise the explanatory
value of the conceptual interpretations
offered by Albert Soboul, Edward
Whiting Fox, and Alexis de Tocqueville (discussed first in the Introduction)
and to ask whether a regional analysis can help us to understand the federalist revolt and the French Revolution.
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Politics in the French Revolution

Introduction

On June 2, 1793, surrounded by the menacing ranks of the
Parisian National Guard, the French National Convention proscribed and
placed under watch twenty-nine of its members. The forry-eight sections of
Paris, rallied by Robespierre and the Jacobin club, had revolted on May )1,
demanding the abolition of the Commission of Twelve (called in May to investigate the Commune of Paris) and the exclusion from the Convention
of twenty-four deputies. The proscription of twenty-nine Girondin deputies two days later marked the culmination of the May 3 I revolution and
was the breaking point in the eight-month political struggle between the
Montagnard
and Girondin factions. The Montagnards,
under the growing
leadership of Robespierre, emerged victorious and were to rule France until
Therrnidor,
But the political victory of the Montagnards came much less easily in the
departments
of France. Nearly fifty of the eighty-three departments
protested the proscription of the deputies. Many formed departmental committees of public safety to coordinate these protests. In some, constituted local
authorities convened primary assemblies. A much smaller number engaged
in violent resistance to what they considered an incomplete and unrepresentative National Convention. Indeed, not until October did the cities of Bordeaux and Lyon submit to republican troops, bringing the insurrection to
an end.
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As early as june, the provincial protests were labeled as manifestations
of
"federalism,"
and the scattered resistance was described as a "federalist" revol t. Jean julien of Toulouse opened his report to the Convention in early
October,
1793, as follows: "Citizens, the people have conquered, federalism
has expired, the misled departments have rallied to the Convention,
and to
indivisibility.'"
In this two-hundred-page
document, Julien detailed a welldeveloped
plot, extending back to at least January, I793, that he claimed
had united internal enemies of the Republic in an effort to undermine the
liberty won by the Revolution and deliver France to the tyrants whose
armies were then besieging the country.
The use of the label "federalist" to describe either the political intentions
of the Girondin deputies or those of the departments
that rose in their defense is problematical, but it has been adopted almost unquestioningly
by
historians of the Revolution. Thus, the uprisings in the provinces from June
th rough August, 1793, have collectively been termed the "federalist revolt"
and are generally understood to have been a reaction to the proscription of
the Girondin deputies.
Beyond this, however, lies considerable disagreement,
both with respect
to the nature of the division within the National Convention
and with respect to the character and significance of the federalist revolt. Historians
have, for the most part, addressed these two questions separately, choosing
to focus either on the Girondin/Montagnard
conflict in Paris or on one of
the provincial federalist centers.
Twenty years ago, Michael Sydenham published the first serious analytical treatment of the group of deputies that has come to be called the
Girondins.
In The Girondins, Sydenham carefully examines the political
history of the first nine months of the National Convention,
with particular attention to the political and social affiliations of alleged Girondin deputies (for example, which salons in Paris they attended),
and concludes
that no such political faction existed. He acknowledges
the existence of a
iVlontagnard faction but insists that one can go no further than this, that one
a ell' VISIonon
','
Iy b etween the Montagnards
I rest 0f tne
I
can establish
"
and tne
Convention.
The group traditionally called the Girondins
he argues was
nothing
more than a political myth created by a small g'roup of ja~obin
deputIes to advance their own political fortunes."
J, lean Julien (de Toul
"J
' ,
,
'.
"
"
.
. Ie surles 11 .. ' . '
ouse , /{ap/Jort fail au nom du Comito de Surveillance et de Suretc
Genera
I'
~( /l)mlslr~lioIlS rebelles (Paris, 179"), B.,M. Caen, Res. Fn, B404°'.
7
M .. Syucnham , The C"
ii
1
_-.
»trcnt dsn s (Lone OIl, 1961).
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Alison Patrick has directly challenged this view in her book, The Men
of the First French Republic. Citing voting records and speeches of the deputies, as well as their participation
in committees or on political mission,
Patrick asserts that one can indeed speak of a Girondin faction within the
Convention, identified primarily by its opposition to the growing strength of
the Montagnards.:'
If we accept the reality of a Girondin faction (and Patrick is very persuasive in her argument), the crucial question of what produced the political
division between the two factions remains. The traditional Marxist interpretation of the Revolution, expressed by such prominent French historians
as Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul, has associated the Girondins with
the haute-bourgeoisie,
specifically the commercial bourgeoisie, arguing that
their politics reflected their social and economic interests. In Soboul's words,
the Girondins "were passionately attached to the idea of economic freedom,
freedom to undertake trading enterprises and to make uncontrolled profits,
and they showed their hostility to economic regulation, price controls, requisitions, and the forced use of assignClts, all measures which were, by way
of contrast, strongly advocated by the sans-culottes. '''' The problem here is
that very few members of the National Convention can reasonably be defined as sans-culottes. Lawyers, landowners, and merchants predorninated
among both Montagnards and Girondins. A 1980 study contends that virtually no difference in social background existed between these two contending factions within the Convention.'
The relationship between the Girondin/Montagnard
conflict and the federalist revolt is an obviolls one. The Girondins are generally associated with
federalism, and it was undeniably the proscription of the twenty-nine deputies that sparked the provincial revolts in June, 1793· Lefebvre and Soboul
describe the provincial protest as a revolt of the commercial bourgeoisie
rising in defense of their economic interests. To quote Soboul again: "This
rising was essentially the work of the middle classes who dominated the departmental administrative organs and who were anxious about their property.": That the revolt was centered in such commercial towns as Bordeaux,
2

3. Alison Patrick, The Mell a/ the First French /(cpull/ic (J)altilllore, 197 ).
4. Georges Lefebvre, La Revo/utioll f'rmli,aise (Paris, 19 S I), '-7:\ -74; Albert Soboul, The
French tccuoluuon,
17/l7-.1 799, trans. Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (New York, 197 S),

276-77.
5. See Jacqueline Chaumie, "Les Girondins et les Cent .lours," Alii/ales
Reuolution Francoise, XLIII (197 I), 329-65;
Chaumie, "Les Girondins,"
60
(cd.), Actes du Colloque Cirondins ct Mcmtagnards
(Paris, 19Xo), 19- .
6. Soboul, The French Revolution, :,18.

ttistoriques
de la
in Albert Soboul

I
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Marseille, Lyon, and Caen is cited as evidence in support of this argument.
Although this interpretation
of the federalist revolt has not gone unchallenged, it has withstood criticism more successfully than the Marxist
analysis of the Girondin/Montagnard
conflict. That criticism has come from
two directions. Sydenham, though he has not looked closely at the provincial protests, has denied the relationship between federalism and the Girondins, arguing instead that the revolts were essentially royalist in nature. This
view must be dismissed, as Sydenham himself would now agree. Supporters
of the monarchy did indeed participate in the revolts, particularly in Lyon
and Toulon, but the principal aims and leaders of the movement were not
royalist. Issues other than the fate of the Girondin deputies combined to
motivate the provincial rebels, but the restoration of the monarchy was not
among them."
At the local level, one can discern two strains of scholarly interpretation of the federalist revolt. The greater number of studies have adopted a
sympathetic view of the federalist rebels, describing the proscription
of the
Girondin deputies as an illegal attack on the National Convention and interpreting the revolt itself as a legitimate effort to defend national sovereignty.
In this group, we can include Henri Wallon's two-volume survey of the federalist movement and Georges Guibal's work on Provence." Fewer studies
have taken the opposing view, implicitly accepting the proscription
of the
Girondins as an expression of popular will and describing the provincial
protests as an irresponsible action taken by local administrators
who failed
to heed the desires of their constituencies. Here we can cite Paul Nicolle's
study of the Orne and Daniel Stone's work on Rennes."
Few of these works, however, seriously consider the social basis of the fed7· Sydenham, The Girondins, 21. See also M . .J. Sydenham, "The Republican
Revolt of
1793: A Plea for Less Localized Local Studies," French Historical Studies, XI (Spring, 198 r ),
120-38. Despite Sydcnharn's legitimate objections to the term "federalist,"
I have chosen to
Use it in this book, both because it has been general practice for nearly two centuries and because I see no clear and satisfactory alternative. The label "republican"
could apply equally to
those who supported the May 31 revolution and those who opposed ir and thus would itself be
controversial. The label "provincial"
is less value-laden but also less discriminating,
and to
adopt it in this book would be a source more of confusion than of clarity .
. 8. H. Wallon, La Revolution du 31 mai et Ie [ederalisme en [793 (Paris, J 88(,); Georges
GUlbal, Le Mouvemenl [ederaliste Cit Provence en I793 (Paris, 1908).
9· Paul Nicolle, "Le Mouvernent tederalisrc dans l'Orne en 1793," Annates Historiques de
la i(evolution Francaise, XIII (1936),481-512,
XIV (1.937), 2J5-33,
XV (T938), J2-33,
289- 3 [3, 385 -4 10; Daniel Stone, "La Revolre federaliste it Rennes," Annalcs Histortques de
la Revolution Francoise, XLIII (1971),367-87.
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eralist revolt, a question that has been addressed by three more-recent studies. William Scott and Alan Forrest, writing about the early years of the
Revolution in Marseille and Bordeaux, respectively, each lend support to
the orthodox Marxist interpretation.
Both historians are cautious about
attributing too much to social and economic factors, but their conclusions
stress the dominant role played in local politics by the commercial elite of
these two federalist centers. Challenging the argument of Scott, and the interpretation of Lefebvre, is the unpublished dissertation of John Cameron,
Jr. In his study of Marseille, Cameron asserts that "there was little or no
economic or social difference" between the Marseille federalists and their
opponents and that the revolt of the sections in Marseille was essentially a
reaction against local terrorists, which intensified and broadened after the
June 2 proscriptions. 10
The social character of the federalist revolt thus remains as controversial
as the goals and motivations of its adherents. This controversy is in part a
product of the inherent weaknesses of local studies. The monographs cited
here do not give us a full understanding of federalism for two reasons: they
do not compare the situation in one area with that in other federalist centers
or, perhaps more importantly, with that in Jacobin towns; and they do not
establish firmly enough the relationship between local and national politics.
These works have advanced our understanding
of revolutionary politics in
various federalist towns, but the question still remains: What motivated certain towns to join in the federalist movement while others supported the
Montagnard Convention?
This question is firmly tied to the Parrick/Sydenharn debate regarding the
existence of a Girondin faction. Patrick herself suggested that a look to the
provinces might belp to elucidate the nature of the Girondin/Montagnard
conflict. I I Surely the character of local constituencies and the political situ aJ o. William
Scott, Terror and Repression in /{evolutiol1ary Marseille (London, 1973); Alan
Forrest, Society and Politics ill Revolutionary
Bordeaux (Oxford, 1975); John Burton Cameron,
Jr., "The Revolution of the Sections in Marseille: Federalism in the Department of the Bouchesdu-Rhone
in 1793' (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1971), :3·
I J.
Patrick, Men o] the First French Republic, '92. As if in response to Patrick's call, several
articles focusing on the federalist revolt have appeared in recent years. See 13illEdmonds, .. 'Federalism' and Urban Revolt in France in 179)," Journal o] Modem History, LV (March, 198 3),
22-53; and M. H. Crook, "Federalism and tl;" French Revolution: The Revolt in Toulon"in
1793," J-iistory, LXV (October, 19~O), 383-97.
For a recent attempt to analyze the differences
between Girondins and Montagnards
by focusing on national politics, see Patrice Higonnet,
"The Social and Cultural Antecedents
of Revolutionary
Discontinuity:
Monragnards
and
Girondins,"
English Historical Rcuieu/. C (J LIly, I 9H S), 5 13-44·
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tion in given departments should tell us something about the deputies who
represented them in Paris.
In his very sound article on federalism, Bill Edmonds focuses precisely on
local politics in particular cities (Lyon, Marseille, and Toulon) in an effort to
understand the character of the revolt. He makes three main points in his
analysis: first, that "violent shocks from outside combined with unusual
local circumstances" to trigger protest in the provinces; second, that a qualitative difference existed between federalist "protest" and federalist "revolt";
and third, that the revolts were principally "a defensive reaction against
Montagnard centralism" and not an aggressive assertion of provincial interests." I am in general agreement with the first two points, although where
Edmonds stresses local political conflicts, I would stress the interrelation of
local and national political issues as a fundamental aspect of the federalist
movement. Edmonds and I further disagree on whether one can discern a
"popular" component to the federalist revolt. Edmonds argues that the federalists enjoyed considerable popular support, whereas I maintain just the
opposite in this book. This disagreement is partly due, I think, to the fact
tbat Edmonds focuses his attention on Lyon, Marseille, and Toulon. I would
argue that Bordeaux and Caen are more representative federalist cities.
Edward Whiting Fox, in a very provocative book, has proposed a framework of analysis that may help resolve this multifaceted debate. He asserts
that the French monarchy, developing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was built on the administrative and agricultural towns of the French
hinterland. Fox argues that the commercial towns, principally the ports,
were not fully integrated in the new state-that,
in fact, there existed a selfcontained commercial society with its own distinct social system and values-and
that the dichotomy between the agricultural hinterland and the
commercial periphery came to a head during the Revolution. The confrontation came, as he sees it, during the drafting of the constitution
and
reached its crisis point in June, 1793. Fox suggests that "because this Federalist revolt against the Jacobin government was based mainly in port cities, it
seems plausible that it represented the last stand of the old commercial society against integration in the administrative state." U
Fox is not the first historian, of course, to utilize an interpretative frame12. Edmonds, "'Federalism'
and Urban Revolt," 53.
13· Edward Whiting Fox, History in Geographic Perspective:
York, 1971), 105.
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France (New

------------~~~~.~~-.~---.~~"~-------

INTRODUCTION

7

work stressing geography and the growth of the state. Alexis de Tocqueville
singled out state centralization
as the most fundamental
development of
the Old Regime monarchy, a development consolidated
by the Revolution and Napoleon. Tocqueville saw this centralization both as a cause of
the Revolution and as a reason for its failure. The aristocracy resented the
encroachments
of the crown on its traditional
prerogatives and consequently forced the convening of the Estates General. But once the Revolution erupted, the people, having for so long been ruled by a despotic state,
failed to responsibly exercise their newly gained political liberty. This is the
second major theme of Tocqueville's book: the conflict between liberty and
equality that the French people could not satisfactorily resolve. The French
people, Tocqueville felt, preferred legal equality under a dictator to political
freedom under representative
government. State centralization
under the
monarchy had in effect so stifled the Frenchman's capacity for political action that he was unable to accept, after 1789, the responsibility for selfgovernment."
This encroachment of the state, however, had not extended to the limits of
the kingdom's boundaries in 1789. T(xqueville distinguished between the
pays d'election and pays d'etat, observing that the latter enjoyed greater autonomy on the eve of the Revolution and presumably a greater propensity
for responsible self-government. Tocqueville said little about the respective
attitudes and experiences of the pays d'election and pays d'etat during the
turmoils of the Revolution itself. It requires but a moment's reflection,
though, to realize that the pays d'etat roughly equal Fox's commercial periphery, while the pays d'election match, on the map, the administrative hinterland that Fox describes.
The juxtaposition
of Fox's and T(xqueville's analyses yields a conceptualization in which state centralization
and commercial development are
the dynamic elements. Their interaction in late-eighteenth-century
France
produced a political confrontation
between the hinterland, already integrated in the centralizing state, and the commercially oriented periphery.
Clearly, economic and social factors remain important in [his analysis. Fox
posits the existence of distinct social systems and values in the hinterland
and the periphery, though he does not describe those social systems. In this
conceptualization,
the Marxist interpretation
is modified, not rejected. The
'4.

Alexis de l()Cqlleville,

The Old Regime and the French Revolution,

(New York, 1955). See especially

57-'oX,

trans. Stuart Gilbert

2[2-22.
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state becomes a more active agent than Marxists allow, and the unit of social analysis becomes regions, rather than classes, which have proved so
difficult to define in a precapitalist society such as eighteenth-century
France.
The federalist revolt provides an excellent context within which to examine the relationship between national and local politics, between Paris and
the provinces, between elected officials and their constituencies
during the
Revolution. All of these were highlighted during the three months following
the May 3 I -June 2 revolution of the Paris sections. More than previous
Paris revolutions, this outburst elicited an immediate and widespread response from the departments of France. Although the reaction proved to be
short-lived, for several weeks it was an intense expression of grievances
against Paris and the Jacobin minority, a reaction itself led by a relatively
small number of administrators, whose final victory would not corne until 9
Therrn idor.
The proscription of the Girondin deputies and the revolt that followed
came barely eight months after the National Convention had opened. Dissension and factionalism within the Convention marked this period. The
drafting of a new constitution, the primary task of this renewed legislative
body, was hopelessly mired in vituperative debate. Letters from the departments poured into Paris decrying this delay and calling for unity within the
Convention. The Girondin deputies, who formed a majority, first attempted
to break the stalemate not through compromise but rather by trying to silence their political opponents. Their two-pronged
effort failed on both
counts, first in the unsuccessful trial of Marat and then with the ill-fated
Commission of Twelve, formed to investigate the activities of the Paris sections and municipality. In the end, it was the Montagnards,
backed by the
Paris sections and finally supported by the moderate Plain, who carried the
day in early June. With the uprising of June 2, we see the resolution of a
political crisis that had simmered for two-thirds of a year.
It is because this conflict existed over such a relatively long period that the
revolt that followed its climax offers such an important insight into national
and local politics and the interrelation between the two. The federalist revolt
was not simply a protest of the proscription of twenty-nine deputies, though
this action did trigger the revolt. The provincial protest, which initially included nearly fifty departments, was more broadly directed against the dominance of Paris in national politics. Particularly offensive, and threatening, to
departmental administrators was the unprecedented political activity of the
Paris crowd. Both deputies and departmental administrators
talked in early
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1793 of shifting the Convention to Bourges, where the national representatives could deliberate in a calm and untroubled atmosphere, or of accomplishing the same goal by bringing troops to Paris to protect the Convention
from outside interference. Underlying these fears was the feeling that a fair
and Just constitution, the anticipated remedy for all France's ills, could not
be delivered under the intimidating surveillance of the Paris sections-certainly not by a legislature that had been stripped of twenty-nine of its
members.
The impatience for a new constitution and the apprehension about Parisian domination were not fleeting issues. They had preoccupied people in
Paris and the provinces for several months. Widely circulating newspapers
and journals reponed on events and spread rumors. Many of the deputies
maintained regular contact with their constituents by letter. The departments closest to the capital often sent their own delegations to the Convention to carry messages and then report back regarding conditions in Paris.
This volatile political atmosphere erupted into violent protest in the months
following the proscription of the Girondin deputies.
Historians have tended to exaggerate the scope of the federalist revolt, with
most estimating the number of protesting departments at roughly sixty. However, even with reliance placed primarily on the account of Henri Wallon,
whose sympathies lay clearly with the Girondins and federalists, it is evident
that only forty-seven departments
firmly protested by letter the May 3 I
revolution, while thirty-four either declared open support of the Moritagnard Convention or remained indifferent." A majority of the protesting departments took no significant action beyond the letter of protest. Most of
these had retracted their protests by late June or early July, after the new
1.5. Wallon, La Rcuoluticm du 3./ mai, passim. Th« Vendee and the Deux-Sevres were, of
course, engaged in royalist insurrection.
These two complete the total of eighty-three departments that existed at that time. Bill Edmonds and I differ somewhat in our categorization
of
federalist departments.
We both rely on Wallon to a considerable extent, and our differences
are thus indicative of the degree to which Wallon's often ambiguous characterization
of dcparrmental political postures requires subjective interpretation.
Sometimes Wallon is misleading.
Based on his work alone, one might well group the Haute-Vienne
with the federalist departments, as Edmonds does. I think this is clearly in error. After reading Edmonds' article I went
back through Wallon's analysis, department
by deparrrnenr, and made one or two adjustments
in my own breakdown.
Edmonds employs four categories for the federalist departments,
compared with my two, and identifies forty-three federalist departments,
compared with my fortyseven. Edmonds includes the Aisne, Haute-Saone,
and Haute- Vienne, while I do not; I include
the Alpes-Maritimes,
Cantal, Maine-er-Loire,
Marne, Meurthe, Puy-de-Dorne, and PyreneesOrientales, while he does not. Edmonds groups the departments
I have described as "engaging
in prolonged resistance" under two headings: "Contribution
to 'federalist' armed forces"; and
"Armed revolt." I include the Ain, Jura, and Morbihan, while Edmonds does not. He indicates
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constitution had been published. Only thirteen departments engaged in prolonged resistance to the Convention. The departmental alignment is given in
Table I and Map I.
The map shows that the departments supporting the Montagnard
Convention were located in the north and northeast. The departments protesting
the proscription of the Girondin deputies lay in the west, southwest, and
south. The four centers of prolonged federalist resistance-Bordeaux,
Marseille, Lyon, and Caen-were
all commercial towns in these peripheral
areas. The thirteen departments that engaged actively in the revolt were
clustered around those four centers.
A striking correlation emerges between the distribution of federalist departments and that of departments whose delegations to the Convention
were predominantly Girondin. Map 2 represents the political alignments of
the 1793 departmental delegations, as constructed
by Alison Patrick. It
shows that the departments of the southern, western, and coastal areas were
generally Cirondin, while the Montagnard departments
lay in the central,
northern, and eastern parts of France.
The geographical distribution of the federalisr/Girondin
departments and
the Jacobin/Montagnard
departments lends added weight to Fox's thesis of a
political split between the commercial periphery and the administrative
hinterland of France. There are exceptions to the pattern, however. Several important commercial towns-Rouen
and Nantes notable among them-did
not join in the federalist revolt. Several departments
of the hinterlandthe C6te-d'Or, the Marne, the Meurthe-did
not initially support the Montagnard Convention. Some departments that sent Montagnard
delegations
to the Convention-the
Cote-d'Or and the Sarthe, for example-still
protested the proscription of the Girondins. The reverse was true as well. The
Haute- Vienne and the Aisne, despite sending predominantly
Girondin delegations to Paris, supported the Montagnard Convention after June 2. Closer
scrutiny, then, is required before it can be determined whether Fox's thesis
remains as persuasive at the local level as it appears to be on a national scale.
that the Loire-Inferieure, Orne, and Sarthe contributed
troops to the federalists, while J am
quite cerrarn they did not. Finally, Edmonds includes the Vat among his departments
engaging
~n armed revolt, while I am inclined to consider resistance in the Var predominantly
royalist.
I hese are mostly, though not entirely, minor differences. We do not disagree substantially
on
the number of protesting departments or the geographic distribution.
I do not believe that our
differences can be resolved by reference to Wallon. Local archives and local histories will have
to be consulted.
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At this point, one encounters difficulties, for Fox does not elaborate on
the differing "social systems" that he claims characterized
the hinterland
and the periphery. A regional model may be a useful heuristic device in describing the political divisions within France during the Revolution, but for
a historical explanation of why those regions differed, one must descend to
another level. If Fox's thesis is generally accurate, then at the local level one
should be able to find a reflection of the administrative/commercial
dichotomy in social structures and to see the connections between those structures
and local politics.
Several factors merit attention as one searches for those connections. The
most obvious is the nature of the local economy in a particular town or area
and the social fabric that it produced. Additionally important at a time of
revolutionary upheaval are the patterns of sociability both within and between social groups. A number of questions are relevant to this issue. Was
the social elite cohesive or divided? Was the elite at odds with the lower
classes or linked to them through patron-client relationships? What agents
of sociability functioned among the lower classes under the Old Regime,
and what impact did this have on their ability to organize and express their
views after 1789? These factors varied greatly across France at the end of the
Old Regime, and if Fox's thesis is valid, one should see their influence on the
political divisions that emerged in the revolutionary era.
The relationship between social structures and political attitudes lies, of
course, at the center of controversy in historiography of the French Revolution. Marxist historians, particularly Soboul, have interpreted the events of
1789 as a "bourgeois revolution," a class struggle between the declining aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie. Critics of this "Marxist orthodoxy"
insist that 1789 was not a product of social tensions-that
far from being a
class struggle, it was instead a political revolution with social consequences."
This debate has principally focused on the causes of the Revolution, but it
clearly carries over into conflicting interpretations of the Revolution itself. It
is Soboul, again, who has made the most explicit argument with regard to
the relationship between political posture and social class. He identifies two
competing concepts of representative government in France during the
Revolution-one
popular and the other bourgeois. The outlines of these
two opposing political philosophies emerged clearly in 1792 and 1793. The
J6. George V. Taylor, "Noncapiralisr
Wealth and the Origins of rhe French Revolution,"
American Historical Reuicto, LXXII (J967), 469-96;
see also William Doyle's book, Origins
of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1980).
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Girondin deputies, Soboul argues, championed the concept of a truly representative government, along the lines of the English model, in which elected
deputies acted as the autonomous representatives of their constituents. The
Parisian sans-culottes, and the jacobin deputies to some extent, contended
that such an arrangement would impinge on the freedom, indeed the sovereignty, of the people and that deputies should serve only as "agents of the
people."
These two concepts carne into open conflict in 1793 when Marat and the
Paris sections demanded the recall of those deputies who had voted for a
referendum on the fate of the king. The Girondins responded by defending
the inviolability of elected deputies. The sans-culottes in turn insisted on the
right-in
fact, the responsibility-of
all citizens to vigilantly watch and review the conduct of their elected representatives. This confrontation
heightened in April and May with the trial of Marar and the formation of the
Commission
of Twelve. On June 2, I793, with the proscription
of the
Girondin deputies, the popular concept of representative government triumphed, at least temporarily. The sans-culottes consolidated their victory in
September, 1793, but then saw it institutionalized
in the revolutionary government of the year II and finally reversed by the reactionary regime that
followed Therrnidor."
The political conflict that raged in the capital during the early months of
1793 expressed itself in the provinces of France as well. In neither arena was
the debate over what the new regime in France should be a matter confined
to 1793. It began in 1790, as the first political clubs came together, and it
continued through the Directory. But the lines of debate were most clearly
drawn in the spring and summer of 1793, both within the National Convention and among the departments of France. It was this central issue that
brought national and local politics together.
Soboul's notion of "agent versus representative democracy" may nor be
the answer to the political riddle that the French Revolution in a sense represents. But it does offer a possible bridge between the impersonal level of regional analysis proposed by Fox and the personal level of popular politics as
acted out in the many cities and towns of revolutionary France. Both ideas
merit further study, and the federalist revolt provides an ideal context within
which to carry it out.
17. Albert

Soboul,

The Sans-culottes.

trans.

Remy Inglis Hall (Princeton,

T9S0),

106-18.
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One

Local Economy and Social Structure

Caen and Limoges under the Old Regime fulfilled similar
functions. Administratively and judicially, they were almost identical-each
was the seat of an intendancy, each supported important regional courts,
and neither played host to a parlement. Both towns enjoyed the privilege
of nominating mayors and electing municipal councils. Caen countered
Limoges' ecclesiastical prestige with an academic reputation-Limoges
was
a bishop's seat, whereas Caen boasted a university. Both towns served as important regional trade centers-Caen
lay at the center of Lower Normandy,
and Limoges dominated the Limousin and the Marche.
Looking more closely, however, one discovers fundamental differences in
the vitality of the two economies in the late eighteenth century. Rich and
productive farmland surrounded Caen. The principal crop, wheat, not only
fed the population in all except the leanest years but also produced a surplus
that helped finance a thriving textile industry early in the century and a shift
into varied commercial activity later, after competition had made local textiles less profitable. The move away from textiles came largely before the
1780s; so the I786 treaty with England, which created serious unemployment in many northern French textile towns on the eve of the Revolution,
did not seriously affect Caen. Even the poor harvests of I788 and 1789 did
not prove disastrous for Caen's economy.
Limoges, on the other hand, lay in a poor agricultural region. The rocky,
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infertile hills of the Lirnousin yielded rye, not wheat; and in harsh years,
most peasants were forced to supplement their diets with chestnuts. The region did support a modest textile industry, but the local economy in the
eighteenth century can best be described as depressed. The Revolution
brought little improvement. Five consecutive poor harvests racked the HauteVienne, beginning in 1788. Limoges itself suffered a serious fire in September, 1790, a crippling tragedy that was a portent of the economic hardship
that plagued the entire department throughout the Revolution.
The contrast in agricultural fertility carried over, though less dramatically,
into other economic sectors. Jean-Claude Perrot describes the half-century
between 1725 and 1775 as a period of commercial expansion that pushed
the population of Caen from 27,000 to 40,000, inspired an impressive wave
of road and building projects, and produced a level of urbanization in Caen
that "surpassed Paris, four large ports and several celebrated cities of the
interior." 1 The Limoges economy expanded, too, during the eighteenth century, but it built upon a weaker base. Georges Verynaud writes that by the
beginning of the century, "Limoges had become a poor city.":' Local industry was in decline, roads were in miserable shape, and the expense of recent
wars had overtaxed the population. The reign of Louis XV rejuvenated
somewhat the tired Limoges economy. Successive intendants turned their attention to improving the region's roads, and after 1725 a modest textile industry took root, employing one-third of the Limoges work force by midcentury. This growth was limited, however, and could not fully absorb the
considerable mendicant population that the cathedral attracted to Limoges.
The growth of the Caen economy, then, proved more dynamic than that
of the Limoges economy, but the character of that growth differed as well.
One cannot ignore the importance of the rich agricultural basin to the prosperity of Caen. Perrot has demonstrated a strong correlation between Caen's
economy and fluctuations in local wheat production and price. Increases in
production during the 17 30S enriched local farmers and depressed real rural
wages, thereby driving the surplus population to the city, where people
could find work in the flourishing artisanal trades financed by farm profits.'
Ironically, the agricultural sector later competed with the arrisanal industry
I. jean-Claude
Perrot, Genese d'une ville moderne : Caen au X VII F siecle (Paris,
11,951.
z., Georges Verynaud, Histoire de Limoges (Limoges, 197»),88.
3. Perrot, Genese d'une ville moderne, II, 801,948.
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that it had encouraged. Salaries for temporary work in agriculture, at peak
periods, generally exceeded those for urban labor, and it was difficult for
manufacturers to procure raw materials at the same time that labor was
available.
A combination of factors-the
cost of importing wool and cotton, the
high cost of labor, and competition from Upper Normandy-caused
a gradual shift within the Caen textile industry from wool production to linen and
finally to lace. The wool industry had gone into a steady, and sharp, decline
as early as 1740. Manufacturers
shifted their efforts to linen production,
which maintained its viability until 176o, when the Seven Years War triggered the gradual decline of the linen industry by disrupting the supply of
raw materials. Lace production began to grow around 1750, accelerated after
1762, and maintained a peak level from 1772 until the 1790S. A luxury fabric, lace enjoyed a wide market and could be produced by women and children at home without expensive machinery, thus reducing labor costs."
The period of decline in the main textile sectors coincided with the period
of Caen's greatest growth, 1725 to 1775. This apparent contradiction
is explained by a surge in trade activity after I750. Throughout the century, textile production tended to be dominated by merchants and speculators rather
than manufacturers. Linen production, in particular, became a speculative
and capitalistic activity, since much of the flax and all the cotton had to be
imported from outside of Normandy. Capital and commercial ties were necessary for the procurement of primary materials and, of course, the sale of
final products. This period also witnessed a shift in production from the city
to the surrounding countryside, as the putting-out system proved to be more
economical than urban production. Linen production in Caen peaked between 1720 and 1740, whereas rural production soared by 800 percent
from 1730 to 1760.5
On the eve of the Revolution, then, Caen was not predominantly
a textile
town. The makeup of the labor force reflected the city's diverse economy. To
be sure, textile manufacture employed nearly half of the labor engaged in
urban production (as opposed to service occupations), and between 1760
and 1792 the number of textile workers had nearly doubled (from 1,343 to
2,572, of whom 1,929 were salaried workers). However, the introduction of
4· lbid., I, 381.-438,
5· lbid., I, 4I7-2.L

II, 72.5-2.8.

LOCAL

ECONOMY

AND

SOCIAL

STRUCTURE

19

women and children into the lace industry accounted for much of this increase. The labor force as a whole, moreover, was diverse. Service workers
(including transport and commercial employees, servants, and day laborers
attached to commercial enterprises) comprised 60 percent of wage earners
in 1792. Wage earners represented just over 18 percent of the total population, and the textile industry employed just 30 percent of those wage earners. Compare this situation with that in the textile town of Elbeuf, where 56
percent of the population were wage earners in the 1780s and nearly all of
these worked in the textile industry." Caen, by contrast, had a relatively low
number of wage earners and a larger number of self-employed artisans,
shopkeepers, and merchants.
As textile production
became more competitive, manufacturers
who
could no longer compete in producing wool and linen turned to commerce.
Perrot emphasizes, time and again, the commercial mentality of the people
of Caen, Norman customary law regarding inheritance and division of property tended to impede capital investment (by failing to distinguish between
business capital and family capital) but in no way discouraged commercial
speculation. Lace was a commercial commodity par excellence-c-it required
little capital investment, it urilized cheap labor, and its market extended
from Paris and the Breton coast to the North Sea. During the 1760s, lace
making generated gross product of as much as four million liures per year
for Caen, an amount that outstripped by far the contributions of the other
textile branches and made lace making one of the leading sources of urban
wealth. In 1776, Caen boasted forty-six lace entrepreneurs,
a I 50-percent
increase since J750.7l'vlany lace merchants expanded their activities and became true negociants, dealing not only in lace but in other luxury commodities as well.
Between 1750 and 1789, production
in Caen increased only slightly,
while trade in and out of the city, by land and by sea, increased by 50 percent. The importance of commerce to the local economy is evidenced by the
size of the two regional fairs in the area. Since the 17405, the wholesale fair
at Guibray (held in August) and the retail fair in Caen (held in the spring)
had been the second- and third-largest fairs in France. The two fairs were
complementary
rather than competitive. Caen merchants controlled the
6. Jeffrey Kaplow, Elbeu( during the Revolutionary
Period: History and Social Structure
(Baltimore, '964), 67-69; Perrot, Genese d'une uille modcrnc, I, 2.65-7).
7· Perrot, Genese dune ville moderne, I, :;18-19, :; 5:\, .> 58, ';8 I, :;8 \", 410-.3 2., 5 I R.
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stalls at Guibray, located near Falaise, and that fair in particular attracted a
national clientele.'
Merchants from throughout northern France and as far south as Lyon attended both fairs. They offered goods ranging from drugs and spices to
hardware and textiles of all sorts. Horses and cattle were also sold in most
years. At mid-century, the volume and value of goods available at Guibray
tended on average to be twice as great as those of goods offered at Caen. As
the century progressed, that gap narrowed. In addition, after 1770, the Caen
fair proved generally more successful, for approximately
75 percent of the
goods brought to market there were sold, compared with 50 percent at
Guibray. This attests to the growing commercial dominance of Caen within
Lower Normandy."
The two fairs did show some decline in the latter part of the century,
brought on in part by improvements
in the national road network and
the increasing tendency of merchants to buy directly from producers. The
last outstanding year for the Caen fair was 1767, when goods valued at
8,853,000 liures were brought to market and sales totaled 6,946,000 liures.
By 1778, following a period of agricultural depression, those figures had
dropped to 5,719,000 and 4,191,000 liures, respectively. The last years of
the Old Regime were more prosperous, however, and the royal inspector reported particularly successful fairs in 1785 and 1787. The role of these fairs
in the regional economy would remain important well into the nineteenth
century. III
Two periods of war contributed to the commercial boom of the late eighteenth century in Caen. Both the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748)
and the Seven Years War (1756- 1763) closed the coastal shipping lanes and
forced trade within France to travel overland. Forced reliance on inland
routes inspired extensive road improvement efforts, particularly following
the Seven Years War. This improvement, in turn, facilitated internal trade
and further boosted Caen's commerce. By the 1780s, traffic was moving
daily between Caen and Rouen, Paris, Alencon, and Cherbourg. Perrot describes what he calls a "Building-Transport
cycle." Each period of national
road improvement was followed by major street renovation and building
8. lbid., J, 467-71, II, 72.9-48.
9· Ibid., J, 490. See also A.N. Fa l2.}2. (Foire de Caen), and Fa 12.35 (Foire du Guibray).
10. A.N. F" 12.32; Henri See, "Notes sur les Foires en France er parriculierernenr
sur les
Foires de Caen au XVII" siecle," Revue d'Histoire economique et sociale, XV (192.7), 366- 8 5.
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projects within Caen. Twenty-five streets were redone between 17S0 and
1789, and major construction projects on the docks, the fairgrounds, and
the grain market were carried out. Thus, the expansion of Caen's commercial role was primarily responsible for the rapid urbanization of the city. I I
Caen did not develop as a significant maritime port until late in the century. The larger part of Caen's trade went inland, for two reasons. One was
the improving condition of the royal highways. The other was the difficulty
of navigation on the Orne, which followed a meandering, silt-obstructed
route from Caen to the English Channel. This did not prevent Caen merchants, however, from casting longing glances toward the ports of England
and the North Sea. Between 1747 and 1782, the people of Caen sent twelve
petitions to Paris requesting that a major project be undertaken to make the
Orne fully navigable. The 1747 petition joined the signatures of fifty-six
Caen negociants with those of fifty nobles and seigneurs, who appreciated
that an upgrading of the port of Caen would enhance the possibilities of sell
ing their grain." The petitioners' dreams were partially realized in 178 S
with the completion of a canal straightening the course of the Orne and
making Caen accessible to small seagoing vessels. The renovations proposed
in these petitions, however, would not be fully realized until the Second Empire. Indeed, the persistent aspirations of the people of Caen for major port
status have consistently been thwarted, up to the present day, by the continued growth of Le Havre, Cherbourg, and Saint-Malo.
The aspirations of the people of Limoges were not so lofty. Limoges could
never become more than a regional center of trade, and its inhabitants
seemed to sense that. The surrounding region boasted no thriving agriculture that might generate profits for commercial speculation. The Vienne
River would never be navigable except for light boats and the occasional log
boom bringing wood to the city for construction and fuel.
The industry that had grown up around mid-century remained modest in
scope on the eve of the Revolution. Textiles continued to employ the largest
number of workers, approximately
30 percent of the total work force. The
Laforest fabrique alone, built in 176S, employed nearly 1,800 workers by
the late 1780s. The construction trades also provided work for a significant
number of laborers, both in Limoges and through seasonal migration to
Paris. The porcelain industry, which would make Limoges famous in the
11. Perrot, Genese d'une ville modernc, I, 452-61.
Ibid .. I, 25, II, 59B. For the 1747 petition, see A.N. F" 142B
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nineteenth century, was only in its infancy in the 1780S. Kaolin, the white
clay used in the manufacture of porcelain, had been discovered in the area in
the late 1760s. The Grellet brothers financed the first porcelain manufactory
in Limoges in 1771, employing about two dozen workers. By I783, with
Gabriel Grellet now in sole control, the enterprise was selling kaolin to
producers in Copenhagen, Amsterdam, St. Petersburg, Zurich, Paris, Marseille, and several other cities. In I784, Grellet sold the manufactory to the
king, and it became more or less a subsidiary of the porcelain works in
Sevres. Grellet remained as director, but business declined, perhaps because
of neglect on Grellet's part. In 1785 and 1786, the accounts showed deficits
of more than twenty thousand livres. The king dispatched royal inspectors
to ascertain the problem, and in April, 1788, Francois Alluaud replaced
Grellet as director. The business showed a brief resurgence, but then the
Revolution intervened, and by 1794, the fledgling porcelain manufactory
had virtually shut down. All three of these prominent commercial familiesLaforest, Grellet, and Alluaud-wouid
be influential in local politics during
the Revolution. 13
The Church, the royal administrative and judicial offices, and regional
commerce joined this modest industrial sector in supporting the town's
population. The local economy did improve over the course of the century
and, as in Caen, the face and shape of the city changed somewhat. But credit
for the urban renewal and road improvements that did take place after 1730
must go to a succession of ambitious intendants and not to the lethargic local
elite. The intendants Louis Tourny (1730-1743),
Anne Robert Jacques
Turgot (1761-1774),
and Marius Jean Baptiste Nicolas d'Aine (17751783) supervised the widening of roads, the demolition of the town walls,
and efforts to purify the water supply. They received minimal support from
the municipality, whose finances during this period have been described as
"less than brilliant." 14 As a result, local main roads still required work in
1789, and Limoges continued to enjoy a reputation as a filthy, unpleasant
city well into the nineteenth century. The walls, at least, had entirely disappeared by the 1780s.
'}. A.N. F" 1493 (I'orcelaines: manufactures
de Limoges et de Sevres, 1759-90); A.D.
Haute- Vienne, L 1240, [243 -44 (papers of the porcelain works, [790-94);
Henri Stein,
"Gabriel Grellet er la manufacture de porcelaine de Limoges sous la regne de Louis XVI," Bulletin de fa Societe Arcbcologiquc et Historique du Limousin, LXXVIII (1939),62-79.
For information on the Laforest textile factory, see A.N. F" 5 58 and R. Dauder, L'Urbal1is111C tl Limoges au XVII/" siecle (Limoges, [939),105.
T 4. Daudet, L'Urbanisme
a Limoges,
r 74.
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The Limousin simply was not a wealthy province, and nothing changed
that reality when a sizable portion of it became the Haute-Vienne in 1790.
Indeed, with the Revolution came one disaster after another. The treaty of
1786 had mild repercussions
in the Limoges textile industry, and 1788
brought the first of five successive poor harvests. In September, 1790, a serious fire ravaged a major section of Limoges. Throughout the Revolution,
the department turned to its neighbors and to the national government for
assistance in feeding its population. The departmental administration
concluded a particularly bleak economic report to the Legislative Assembly by
describing the Haute- Vienne as "one of the poorest and most unfortunate
regions of the Empire." 15
The Revolution, then, saw the economic contrasts between Caen and
Limoges increase. Caen's early shift from textiles into commerce spared it
the crisis suffered by other northern French cities after the 1786 trade treaty
between England and France. The fertile plains of Calvados rebounded
more quickly from the poor harvests of 1788 and 1789 than did the inhospitable fields of the Haute- Vienne. After an abundant harvest in 1792, the
infrequent shortages that recurred in Caen were caused only by the refusal
of farmers to bring their grain to market. Their reluctance grew after May,
1793, when the Convention
enacted the grain maximum. But it was not until the federalist revolt, when the central government prevented outside supplies from reaching Caen in the traditionally lean months on the eve of the
harvest, that the grain situation became truly threatening for the people
of Caen.
In the Haute- Vienne, on the other hand, grain shortages posed a persistent problem. In June, 1791, the city of Limoges owed up to 360,000
livres for grain purchases in 1789 and 1790 alone. The noble mayor of Limoges, Jean Baptiste Petiniaud de Beaupeyrat, who had commercial contacts and credit in all the large ports of Europe, had advanced two-thirds of
this sum;" Surrounding departments
provided a portion of the grain, but
purchases were also made in London, Hamburg, and Amsterdam. In No'5.

Leon jouhaud, La Rcuolution
Francoise en Limousin, pages d'histoire uccue, 1789(Limoges, 1947), 266. jouhaud
reprints the entire seven-page report on the economic
situation of the department.
16. Louis Guibert,
La Dette Beaupeyrat (Limoges, 1888). Peuniaud, son of a bourgeois
ncgociant who had acquired noble status for his son by purchasing the office of secretaire du
roi, was popular in Limoges when first elected mayor in L 7S~. He was reelected in 17~0, but
his popularity waned as he refused to join the jacobin club. His requests for repayment of his
loans were not popular either, and suspicions existed that he might have profited from the grain
deals. Not until IH26 was the balance of T.p,OOO livres finally repaid to the Beaupeyrar family.
1792
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vember, 179I, a public fund drive raised nearly 22,000 livres in loans for the
purchase of grain." Each year since 1787 had seen poor harvests, but 1792
promised to be more abundant. In October, however, the commissioners in
charge of subsistence reported to the departmental
administration
that the
situation had not improved. Spring frost and summer rain had ravaged what
they had hoped would be a good harvest. Fog in August and frost in midSeptember had hurt the buckwheat and chestnut crops. The chestnut trees,
traditionally the last resource during periods of dearth, had already been severely depleted by a freeze in 1789. The departments
of the Vienne, the
Charente, and the Indre, suppliers of past years, were short themselves that
year. Administrators predicted that the current harvest would feed the department only until February and that 600,000 quintals of grain would be
needed to sustain the population through the rest of the year. The outlook
for 1793 appeared bleak indeed."
The contrasting economic situations in the two towns were reflected in
their patterns of population growth throughout the century. Caen's population grew dynamically during its period of economic expansion,
1725
through 1775. In 1725, the town's estimated population stood at just over
27,000. By 1753, that figure had grown modestly to 32,000; and the census
of 1775, an accurate count, showed an impressive increase to 40,858 inhabitants, the high mark of the century. By 1793, after a period of econornic
stagnation and the disruption caused by the Revolution, the population had
dipped to 34,996. Immigration accounted for roughly 75 percent of the
population growth in Caen, with emigration responsible for virtually all of
the decline. Even during the unstable early years of the Revolution, births
exceeded deaths in the town. Between 1790 and 1793, when population declined by 2,799, there was a natural growth (births/deaths) of 1,2 II; 2,029
people moved into Caen, but 6,039 emigrated to the countryside,
other
towns, or abroad."
17· A.D. Haure-Vienne, L212 (correspondence,
municipality of Limoges), and L21\"-216
(f791 grain loan, Limoges).
[8. A.D. Haute-Vienne,
LS6 (Deliberations
du Conseil General du Deparrernenr
de la
Haute-Vlenne, 1792.-9:». See also Alfred Fray-Fournier,
Le Dep artement de la Haute-Vie/me,
sa (ormatiOIl territoria/e, son administration,
sa situation politique pendant la Revolution
(Lul1oges, 19(8), I, 297-99,
32.2.-27.
19· Perrot, Genese d'une ville moderne, I, 1°3-65.
The [72.5 and 1753 population
figures
were based on the gabelle rolls; in 1775, a role nominati] was compiled for half the town
(probably the crowded, central districts), while population
in the orher half was estimated
through a hearth count; in 1790, a head count was taken so that the five section boundaries
could be drawn lip; in 1793, a careful census was taken by municipal officials.
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In Limoges, the population remained near 20,000 inhabitants throughout
the century. The charity offered by the Church consistently drew the poor to
Limoges, especially in hard times, but this immigration never produced a
surge in population comparable to that experienced in Caen between 1750
and 1770. The general pattern of population movement in the two towns
was in fact reversed. Whereas Limoges attracted the poor during periods of
hardship, Caen's population grew during prosperous times and declined in
times of misfortune. This pattern prevailed during the early years of the
Revolution.
While Caen's population
dropped between 1790 and 1793,
Limoges actually grew from 20,1) 2 to 23,67 J inhabitants during those
years, despite a natural decline of 2,I 57.
That Limoges' inhabitants were in general poorer than those of Caen,
drawn to the town by desperate need rather than opportunity, is further evidenced by the number of "active" citizens in each town. In accordance with
the law of December 22, 1789, 1,43I of the 20,132 people of Limoges paid
sufficient taxes to enjoy the right to vote, whereas 3,566 out of 37,795 1I1
Caen enjoyed that privilege. The ratio of "active" citizens to population was
thus roughly 30 percent higher in Caen than in Limoges."
The dynamic population growth of Caen produced by 1789 an urban geography very different from that of Limoges. In the last half of the eighteenth century, Caen was beginning to assume the character of a modern
city, particularly in the social differentiation of its neighborhoods.
According to Jean-Claude Perrot, before 1770 the considerable numbers of immigrants into Caen tended to settle in the arrisanal and commercial center,
where they blended relatively quickly into the social fabric of the city.
Around that time, however, the central parishes reached their saturation
point, and a period of economic stagnation set in as well. Immigrants now
settled in the faubourgs, joined there by the marginal population from the
center, moving to the economically more diverse outskirts of town, where
rents were lower and where a garden plot or fishing could easily supplement
one's income. By I789, a circle of newer immigrants surrounded the band of
older immigrants closer to the center. The line of the demolished town walls
was replaced by an invisible boundary separating the prosperous, commercial central districts from the faubourgs, inhabited largely by the urban
poor. The faubourgs resembled small villages, very tightly knit and cornmu20. A.D. HaureVienne,
L229 (Recenserncnts,
mouvemenr de la population,
1788-96);
Verynuud, Histoire de Limoges, .1 22; Brochures Normandcs:
Caen SOliS fa Reuolntion, H.M.
Caen, Res. 1'11. Br. C226-(,4.
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nal, with a real sense of neighborhood
solidarity. The inhabitants
of those
outlying districts were never well integrated in municipal affairs, either before or during the Revolution."
In Limoges, there was no shift of population to the faubourgs during the
eighteenth century comparable to that in Caen. The town was physically
smaller than Caen, and the demarcation between center and faubourgs was
less severe. One reached the countryside more quickly walking from the center of Limoges, and the people of the faubourgs were thus in closer contact
with their "downtown" neighbors.
R. Dander, the principal historian of eighteenth-century
Limoges urbanism, writes that while gens de robe tended to live away from the artisanal
and commercial quarter, the social differentiation
of Limoges neighborhoods did not develop until the nineteenth century. Limoges neighborhoods
had grown up around corporations-butchers
lived on the rue Torte, tanners lived along the Enjoumard stream, and so on-and
these patterns persisted at the end of the eighteenth century. The social segregation that had
developed in Caen by the eve of the Revolution did not yet exist in Limoges."
The two towns also differed in the patterns of associational
life and sociability among their inhabitants. Of particular interest here are the Freemason lodges that attracted the elite of both towns and the penitent confraternities that flourished in Limoges but were absent in Caen.
Freemason lodges first appeared in both Caen and Limoges in the 1760s.
The idea that the Revolution grew out of a conspiratorial
Freemason movement has long ago been laid to rest. Several studies, however, have suggested
more subtle links between the social and cultural milieu of Freemason
lodges and the democratic currents of the Revolution;" It is not my intent to
consider the larger question of the impact of Freemasonry on the Revolution
but rather to examine Freemason lodges in Caen and Limoges as a locus of
social contact. From membership rolls of the various lodges, we can gauge
the extent to which the ties forged by Freemasonry carried over into political
rivalries during the Revoluuon.:"
2.1. Perrot, Genese d'une ville moderne,
16, 926.

a

I, .1"4-55, 267, 525, 11,605,62.2.,6)4-35,81

1-

22. Daudet, L'Urbanisme
Limoges, 56, 104.
23· See Maurice Agulhon, Penitents et [rancs-macons de l'ancicnne Provence (Paris, (968);
Raf~ Yechd-I-Ialevi, "La Sociabilire rnaconnique
er les origines de la pratique dcmocrarique"
(These de troisieme cycle, Ecole des haures etudes en sciences sociales, ] 98 r}; Lynn A. Hunt,
Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Reuolution (Berkeley, 191L,), Chap. 5; and Michael L.
Kennedy, The [acobin Clubs in the French Revolution: The First Years (Princeton, 1982).
24· Membership lists for Masonic lodges are located in the Salle des Manuscrits of the Biblio-
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The Freemasons of Limoges have a particularly interesting history in the
decade before the Revolution. In 1778, Petiniaud de Beaupeyrat, a wealthy,
noble merchant and future mayor of Limoges, sat as venerable of the only
lodge in Limoges, the Freres Unis. Four years later, an internal crisis developed within the Freres Unis, reportedly caused by Pierre Dumas, a young
lawyer. The lodge assigned Periniaud to investigate the matter, and his report resulted in Dumas' resignation and a splintering in the lodge. Dumas
and several others immediately formed a second lodge, La Clairvoyanre,
which in 1783 became l'Heureuse Reunion. Members of l'Heureuse Reunion included Francois Alluaud, a future Jacobin and Limoges district director in the 1792-1793
term; Pierre Deroche, a Jacobin and mayor of Limoges from 1792 through 1794; Jean Baptiste Audouin, future adjunct to
the minister of war, who regularly corresponded with the Limoges Jacobin
club from Paris; and Pardoux Bordas, one of two Montagnards
on the
Haute- Vienne delegation to the National Convention. All four participated
in steering Limoges and the Haute- Vienne away from federalism in 1793·
Dumas himself was a jacobin club member and sat on the departmental administration from 1790 until 1793. By contrast, the lodge of the Freres Unis
in 1788 included a number of future members of the Amis de la Paix, a monarchist club responsible for considerable turmoil in Limoges from 1790
through 1792. Thus, the split among Limoges Freemasons foreshadowed, to
some extent, the revolutionary
conflict between Jacobins and the Amis de
la Paix.
In Caen, on the other hand, all but one of the five lodges meeting in the
1780s placed members on one or more of the local administrations,
and
none was dominant in that respect. Far from quarreling among themselves,
the Caen lodges demonstrated
the compatibility and cooperativeness
that
characterized
the Caen elite during the Revolution. The apparent social cohesion of the Caen elite was further cultivated by the town's Academic des
theque Nationale. I found the rolls of five Caen lodges in FM' 189-90 and two Limoges lodges
in FM' 258- 59. I verified thar these were the only lodges in Caen and Limoges by consulting
Alain Le Bihan, Loges et Chap it res de la Grande Loge et du Grand Orient de France (Paris,
[967),54-55,
[04-10.\". The lodge names and dares of the membership rolls are as follows:
for Caen, Coeurs-s.ms-Fa rd (I 7S6), Constante Fabert ([ 7S9), Themis (171{5), Vraye Union er
de I'arnirie parfaitte (T781), and l'Union et Fr.rrernire
(1788, '790, 1792); for Limoges, La
Clairvoyanre,
which became l'Heurcuse Reunion in 1782 (1782, [785, 1788), and Frcres Unis
(T779, '780, [782,1784,
1788). See also Rene Norbert Sauvage, "La Loge macouniquc
Ia
Consranre Fabert a Caen, en '78\"," Memoires de i'Acadcmie Nationale des Sciences, Arts e/
Bellc-leurcs
de Caen (1918-20),397-406;
and La l'ran c-maconncrie Limousine, SOli passe,
son present, ses ambitions (Limoges, 1949), in the Bibliorhequc Narionale, 8°H. Piece 2255·
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to its meetings those men who sup-

ported Caen's urban development."
Associations in Caen, then, tended to bind the elite together, while in
Limoges the Freemasons had split into factions in the years before the Revolution. Among the lower classes of the two towns, however, quite the reverse
was true. There is no trace of an organized associational
life among the
menu peuple of Caen, particularly those who had settled in the faubourgs.
In Limoges, by contrast, virtually every adult male belonged to a penitent
confraternity.
Seven penitent confraternities existed in Limoges at the end of the Old
Regime. These lay societies, generally organized around a parish church,
drew their members from allieveis of society, from among the wealthy and
the poor, and offered to their members a rich associational experience. Each
confraternity elected officers, maintained a membership roll, recorded minutes of meetings, and made important contributions
to charity and public
assistance in the community, functions that by the eighteenth century had
superseded the confraternities'
original purpose as devotional and pietist
groups. Each confraternity met in a particular parish church, but the confreres were intensely insistent on their independence from both clerical and
civil authorities. After a period of decline in the late seventeenth century, the
confraternities rebounded strongly in the mid-eighteenth century, and on the
eve of the Revolution virtually every male head of a household in Limoges
belonged to a confraternity. The importance of these organizations
to Limoges' sociability is attested to by the fact that although they were suppressed by law in I792, they revived after the Revolution and by 1809 again
counted nearly four thousand members."
Maurice Agulhon has argued that these confraternities
left a substantial
legacy to the popular societies that formed during the Revolution;" The case
of Limoges is among the most striking. The Limoges Jacobin club held its
meetings in the former assembly hall of the penitents gris, used a method of
voting similar to that of the confraternity, and adopted a form of membership roll identical to that which the old confraternity had used. Jacobin club
2.5. Perrot, Genese d'unc ville modcrne, 11,693-94·
2.6. Louis Guibert, "Les Confreries de Penitents en France er norammenr dans le diocese de
Limoges," Bulletin de la Societe Archeologique
ct Historique du Limousin,
XXVII (1879),
5-'93·
27. Agulhon,

Penitents et Franc-macons,
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members urged their confreres to join the club and to donate chapel funds to
the patriotic contribution."
More importantly, the penitent groups created men who were accustomed
to associarional
life and inculcated values that would later be associated
with the Revolution. Louis Guibert writes that a cornmitment to equality
and fraternity was among the most salient features of Limoges confraternities. Agulhon suggests that many of these men became jacobin militants
after [789, although he does not go so far as to argue that a direct correlation exists between Jacobinism and confraternities.
In Limoges, where
nearly all men belonged to a penitent confraternity, obviously not all penitents became jacobins, No clear pattern emerges from the few membership
rolls that still exist, but the names of many men who were leaders in Limoges during the Revolution-s-Francois
Alluaud, Jean Baptiste Audouin, de
Chaise Martin (leader of the Arnis de la Paix), J. Petiniaud, and a number of
other Jacobin club leaders and municipal officials-also
appear as officers of
Limoges confraternities
in the decade before 1789.2"
One exception to the social heterogeneity of these groups was the confraternity organized around the parish of Saint-Pierre-du-Queyroix.
This
group distinguished
itself from other Limoges confraternities
in that its
membership seems to have been restricted to rich negociants and petty noble
[amilies.:" No membership list survives for the Saint-Pierre penitents in the
17805,
but there may have been some continuity between this group and the
Amis de la Paix.
Confraternities
did not flourish in northern France, and there appears to
have been no comparable
social association among the lower classes of
Caen. This may explain, in part, the weakness of the popular movement In
Caen during the Revolution. By contrast, the existence of confraternities
certainly contributed to the vitality of popular politics in Limoges in 1792
and 1793. There seems to have been a relationship linking the confraternities, the formation of the Jacobin club, and the later political divisions in
Limoges, even if the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. Clearly,
the penitent confraternities
and the larger question of the link between pat28.

lbid., 27Y-Xo; Guibcrt, "Le5 Confreries," 156-57.
Cuiberr, "Lex Contreries,"
19, Ill; A.D. Haute-Vienuc,
(;7:)1,13(;1,
I ('C; '4 (p.ipers
relarmg to penitent confraternities).
30. Michel Tinrou, "Reorganisation
de ]a confrcric ell! Saint-Sncremenr
de Suinr-Picrre-duQueyroix, en 17(,3," Bulletin de la Socict« Archeologiqt«: et Hisioriquc dn LiI1l()IISill.
XCVI
([969),141-50.
29·
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terns of sociability under the Old Regime and revolutionary
politics represent fruitful areas for future research.
The social fabric of the two towns had little effect on local politics under
the monarchy, because political activity itself was extremely limited. During
the Revolution, this would change. But the contrasting economic situations
of the two towns did have an impact on the character of their local governments at the end of the Old Regime, as it would in later years.
In Caen, the mayor, echeuins, and town notables defended local prerogatives vis-a.-vis the intendants and consistently protested royal encroachments. The substantial public works undertaken between I750 and 1789
were funded principally by local taxes (both from the city and the rich, surrounding farmlands), and not by the royal treasury. The situation in Limoges was nearly the reverse. The local elite took little initiative in public
improvement projects, largely because of the paltry state of municipal finances. They looked instead to the intendants for planning and to the royal
coffers for support."
The comparison here is strikingly similar to that which Tocqueville makes
between the self-reliant pays d'etat and the politically lethargic pays d'election," Tocqueville argues that provincial self-government had been eroded
in the pays d'election by the expanding monarchical bureaucracy,
leaving
those regions politically inert and dependent on the central government. The
economic disparity between Calvados and the Haute- Vie nne had produced
very different attitudes toward the central government.
The burgeoning
commercial community of Caen looked abroad, to foreign ports, for the
source of its vitality and resented the restrictions and impositions that ernaluted from the capital. Limoges, on the other hand, looked to Paris and Versailles for much-needed assistance during periods of hardship. These attitudes toward the state, developing under the Old Regime as well as under
the Revolution, would receive full expression during the chaotic months of
the federalist revolt.
3 r , Perrot, Genese d'une ville moderne, II, 578-85; Jean Yver, "Une Administration
municipale 'orageuse' a Caen a la fin de I' Ancien Regime: La Mairic de M. de Veridoeuvre,"
Memoires de [,Academie Nationale des Sciences, Arts et Belles-lettres de Caen (1931), 2.41-68;
Verynaud, Histoire de Limoges, 95 - 100; Dauder, L'Urbanisme a Limoges, 35, 88, 109.
32.. Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution,
2.12.- 2.1.

Two

Revolutionary

Politics Take Shape

The Revolution began in Caen much as it did in Paris, with a
storming of the most obvious and imposing symbol of the Old Regime. Built
in the eleventh century by William the Conqueror, the Chateau dominated
the landscape from its perch on a hillside above the city, as indicated in
Map 3. On July 21, 1789, probably inspired by news from Paris, a crowd
invaded the Chateau and armed themselves. They encountered no serious
resistance.
The significance of this episode lies less in the actual event than in the contemporary response to it. Two published diaries offer a unique insight into
public opinion in Caen during the Revolution. The diaries, printed side by
side in one volume, are made especially interesting by the contrasting social
backgrounds
of their authors. One, Pierre Francois Laurent Esnault, was a
bourgeois avo cat whose father and grandfather had been procureurs at the
bailliage court of Caen. Jean Jacques Victor Dufour, the other diarist, was a
gardener, an homme du peuple, as the editor describes him. Esnault wrote
his journal near the end of the Revolution (after 1795), and his accuracy
suffers for it. Dufour wrote his diary more or less day by day, which gives it
a more spontaneous,
but less reflective, flavor. The objectivity of both is
dubious, but they offer important and distinctly different contemporary
viewpoints. I
1. Georges
Lesage (ed.), Episodes de la Rcuolution a Caen racontcs par UII bourgeois ct Ul1
homme du peuple (Caen, 1926). For this chapter in particular, [ have relied extensively on these
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Esnault noted in his journal that the attack on the Chateau had reportedly
been inspired by Protestants, "men who sought to abolish the Catholic religion in order to establish their own exclusively, and to avenge the Bartholomew's Day massacre." The interpretation
here is definitely suspectthere is no evidence that Caen Protestants persecuted the majority Catholic
population at any time during the Revolution. But his comments do indicate
that Protestants were active in local affairs in Caen and that Catholics viewed
their political participation with some alarm. Indeed, the question of whether
Protestants could be elected as delegates to the Estates General had been a
matter of local discussion. Local electors appealed to Versailles for a ruling
before the issue was decided. In the end, the third estate bailliage assembly
chose as deputies two Caen Protestants, both of whom had ties to the commercial elite. The first was Michel Louis Lamy, a wealthy merchant; the second, Gabriel de Cussy, was a former directeur de La monnaie in Caen. The
relations between Catholics and Protestants were not volatile in Caen, as
they were in Nimes and Montauban, for example. The Protestant minority
did playa very important role in local affairs, however, and the disproportionate presence of Protestants among elected officials continued throughout
the Revolution.'
Victor Dufour had surprisingly little to say about the taking of the Chateau. He did note that only four days previously the duke of Harcourt, the
provincial governor, had positioned six cannons, four on the bridge of
Vaucelles and two in the Cours la Reine, and trained them across the river
on the faubourg Vaucelles (one of the poorest quarters in Caen) in case
of revolt. This observation is embellished by Esnault's comment that after
July 21, "honest and peaceful townspeople were alarmed to see arms in the
hands of immoral and unprincipled
people."? As further instances will
show, the elite of Caen wished that politics remain an orderly business, the
two sources for anecdotal and "public mood" material. 1() identify which diarist I am citing,
footnotes will henceforth refer to either Lesage (Esnaulr) or Lesage (Dufour).
2. Lesage (Esnaulr), t o. The translation
is mine, as it will be in all instances, unless otherwise noted.
3. Felix Mouriot, La Fin de l'Ancien Regime et les debuts de la Revolution dans la generatite de eaen, J 787-1790 (Paris, '9 J 3), 2.35. See James Hood, "Protestant-Catholic
Relations
and the Roots of the First Popular Counterrevolutionary
Movement in France," Journal of
Modem History, XLIII (june, [971.),2.45-75;
and Daniel Ligou, Montauban a la fill de l'Ancicn Regime et aux debuts de la Revolution, 1787-1794
(Paris, 1959)·
4. Lesage (Esnaulr), J 0, and (Dufour), 2.1. Esnaulr is dearly referring to the menu peuple
and those who would rouse them.
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that it not descend to the level of

public, popular contention.
The days following the storming of the Chateau continued to be unsettled, as the scarcity of grain provoked several disruptions at the market. A
more serious outburst of violence jolted Caen less than four weeks later. On
August 12, an angry crowd murdered the viscount Henri de Belzunce. A
young major in the second Bourbon infantry regiment, garrisoned in Caen,
Belzunce was described as handsome and spirited but arrogant and avowedly
royalist. He maintained a visible presence around town and, with an aide,
frequently provoked trouble at patriotic fetes. His actions, particularly his
open display of arms, became so offensive that the General Committee of
Caen (a temporary municipal council created in July, 1789) requested his
transfer. Belzunce refused to go. On August I I, he publicly promised to reward any of his soldiers who could strip the medals of Necker and the
Breton Union from the uniforms of a rival regiment. Belzunce himself led a
group of his men to perform the feat, brutally striking a soldier in the process and raising the ire of the townspeople against the young noble and his
regiment. Later that evening, one of his second lieutenants walked with four
or five other soldiers toward the bridge of Vaucelles. The lieutenant allegedly
fired on a sentinel of the bourgeois militia, who returned fire and killed him.
Scattered shots rang out through the night, and by morning the mood of the
populace had been raised to a fever pitch. An anonymous citizen sounded
the tocsin, and a crowd invaded the garrison, towing a cannon in its wake.
Members of the General Committee quickly intervened in an attempt to prevent violence, as Belzunce-who
was blamed for having provoked the incident-protested
his innocence and offered to appear at the town hall. With
that course of action agreed upon, the National Guard led him to the Chateau, there to be confined for his own protection.
Meanwhile, the provincial commander, perhaps unwittingly, sent orders
for the Bourbon regiment to leave Caen. Its departure alarmed and enraged
the crowd, which again went to find Belzunce. They marched him to the
Place Saint-Pierre, where a national guardsman struck him down as he made
an effort to flee. In the bloody scene that followed, his body was chopped
into bits and his head paraded about town.' According to the memoirs of
Frederic Vaultier, it was this sickening slaughter that stuck in the memories
\. Frederic Vaulrier, Souvenirs de I'insurrection Normande, dite du Fcdcralisme, en 1791,
avec notes er piece, justificative, par M. Georges Mancel (Caen, I SSB), 299-:>03.
Freder·ic
Vaulrier,
[usr seventeen years old in '7X9, completed his rhetoric studies at the University of
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of the people of Caen, and not the irresponsible antics of a young fool who
had antagonized
the "patriots" in town. No one ever came to trial for the
murder of Belzunce.
Three individuals stand out from the crowd for the noteworthy roles they
played during these few days. One was Jean Michel Barbot, who owned a
small tobacco shop in the parish Saint-Pierre." Although not directly implicated in the murder, he enjoyed a reputation as a popular leader, and some
accused him of instigating the attack on Belwnce. Barbot ran for the vicepresidency of his section in 1790 and was later president of the Carabor
club. A bully of sorts, he obtained for himself, by questionable means, the
position of clerk at the Tribunal of Commerce. Despite his poor reputation
in some quarters, his sway over the crowd was clear. Each day before his
shop he read aloud, often to large crowds, Le Courrier dans les Departements, a newspaper written by the future Girondin Antoine Joseph Gorsas.
Barbot frequented town hall, it appears, and often acted as a messenger or
town crier for municipal officials. He turned up at almost every important
event or crisis, though he never held elected office."
The two other figures exerted a more calming influence on the populace,
or at least tried to do so. One of them, Pierre Mesnil, was a wealthy Protestant merchant and a captain in the National Guard in 1789. Victor
Dufour remarked upon his efforts to protect Bclzunce from attack, describing Mesnil as "a very prudent and wise man." Elected to the district council in 1790, he became a departmental
administrator
in 1792." Fraucois Le
Carpentier, a teacher of philosophy at the college Dumont, also did what he
Caen in J793 and probably wrote his "souvenirs" of the federalist revolt around [840, after a
career at the University of Cacn. Georges Mnncel, who edited and annotated Vaulriers memo
oirs, gives no precise date for the completion of the manuscript, saying only that Vaulrier wrote
the account "over thirty years after the revoir." Thus, it could have been completed as early
as 1825. Vaultier died in 184J. The considerable volume of notes and documents that Mance!
has appended
to Vaulriers memoirs includes an account of the massacre. See also Extrait du
proces-uerhal
du Comito General et National de la uil!« de Caen, relatij« fa mort du Bclzunce,
S.M. Caen.
6. Saint-Pierre by at the heart of the main artisan quarter, in the most densely populated
part of Caen.
7· A.D. Calvados, 1.10125 (inrerrogarions
following the federalist revoir); A. C. Caen, D"
D2 (Deliberations
du Corps municipal cr du Consei] Gelleral de 1,\ Commune,
,8 fevrier
'790- 3 janvier '792 and 4 janvier '792- r I Germinal .m II); Lesage, (Esnaulr}, 18. Esnaulr
describes Barbor as an "hom me aussi laid ,\U physique que deprave au moral," his standard
criticism of those he disliked or of whom he disapproved.
8. A. D. Calvados, 1.,89 (Regisrre des arrcres du Conseil General e1u deparremcnr du Calvados, I [ aour '792- 26 iuiller '79 j ), 140 (Eglise de Caen, erar civil-Proresranr
declarations,
J78H); Lesage (Dufour), 22.
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could to prevent trouble. He did in fact avert serious bloodshed on the eve of
Belzunce's death when he defused a confrontation
between the Bourbon
regiment and a National Guard battalion. Respected for his fairness and
moderation, Le Carpentier served as an early secretary of the Jacobin club
and in 1791 was elected one of the town notables? All three of these men
later actively participated in the federalist revolt.
Suspicion of and animosity toward the nobility, at their most violent in
the Belzunce affair, were ever present in Caen. They received their next open
expression in October, 1789. Like most other towns, Caen had assembled a
bourgeois National Guard in late July, primarily for defense against the dangerous bands rumored to be roaming the countryside.
By August 7, the
guard had been formally organized into twenty-seven companies of one
hundred men each. But alongside this new force there continued to function
a company of "volunteers," whose existence the guardsmen vocally protested. Patriots considered the volunteers superfluous at best and a threat at
worst, for they were reputed to be armed and paid by the nobility. The General Committee made an effort to disband them on August 16 by prohibiting
the bearing of anTIS except by those on National Guard duty. This measure
proved largely ineffective; so on October 6, sectional assemblies voted formal\y to suppress the volunteers. The National Guard disarmed them without delay."
If tension between the second and third estates dominated the revolutionary period in Caen, the religious question must be said to have been second
in importance, though the two were clearly related. Felix Mourlot remarks
upon the division, perhaps even hostility, between the low and high clergy
on the eve of the Revolution. The latter felt that the king was tipping the
balance toward the lower clergy with regard to election procedures. Either
because of those procedures or by choice, the five bishops of Lower Normandy exerted little influence on the election of delegates to the Estates General. The first estate's electoral assemblies were the most tumultuous of any
of the three orders, and the clergy's elections in the bailliage of Caen were
the only ones "marked by a truly democratic character." The clergy sent
9. A. C. Caen, D1; Rene Norbert Sauvage, "Lcs Souvenirs de J.-B. Renee sur la Revolution
it Caen, 1789-93," Normannia, VI, (1933), 577·
1.0. Mourlor,
La Fill de l'Ancien Regime, 363; Lesage (Dufour), 2.3-2.4. One can appreciate
the nobles' fear that the bourgeois guard might not adequately protect their families and property against an angry crowd. They cannot have been encouraged by the frequent admonitions
to guardsmen, often publicly posted, that drinking was not allowed while on duty.
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mostly parish priests to Versailles, and Mourlot remarks upon the considerable sympathy between the lower clergy of Caen and the third estate. II
With the legislation of the constitutional oath, however, the clergy closed
ranks to some extent. Passed by the Constituent Assembly in July, 1790, and
signed into law by Louis XVI on August 24, the civil constitution of the
clergy reorganized the Church in france. The new constitution mandated
the election of clergy by electoral assemblies, limited the powers of bishops,
and required all clergy to swear an oath of loyalty to the nation, the king,
and the law, the same oath sworn by all elected officials. The Assembly
hoped to receive the approval of the pope, but when Pius VI remained silent,
a decree requiring immediate compliance with the law was passed and was
signed by Louis on December 26, 1790. The high clergy almost universally
opposed this new measure, but the low clergy was divided, with many following their bishops. By early I791, only seven bishops had sworn the oath,
and slightly more than SO percent of the lower clergy had done 50.'2
In Calvados, Bishop Cheylus refused to accept the oath and exhorted his
priests to do likewise. Many did, but the department was not among the
most refractoryso to 70 percent of the priests eventually swore the constitutional oath. I.l In Caen itself, however, only two of the thirteen parish
priests conformed to the new law, and a spirited public polemic ensued regarding the legitimacy of the civil constitution. Interestingly, the two priests
who swore the oath served the principal artisan and working-class parishes
in Caen, Saint-Pierre and Vaucelles." Only with difficulty were the eleven
refractaires replaced by constitutional
priests, as several of those initially
elected refused to serve. In February, 1791, the conflict spilled over into municipal politics when the mayor, Le Forestier de Vendoeuvre, resigned over
the issue of the oath. On January 13, he had delivered a lengthy discourse to
the municipal council attacking the civil constitution of the clergy and defending those who refused to take the oath. When it became clear that his
convictions were not shared by the councilor the majority of the public, he
resigned."
The resignation of Vendoeuvre brought a special election, and
11.
12.

1951),
I}.
14-

Mourlor, La Fill de l'Ancicn Regime, J X(,-91.
Jacques Godechor,
Les Institutions
de la France sous la Rcuoluticm

et l'Empire

(Paris,

224-2X.

Michel Vovelle, La Chute de la Monarchic, 1787-1792
(Paris, 1972),2.3°.
Brochures Normand.es: Caen so us la Revolution,
B. M. Caen, Res. Fn. Hr. CI8 2- 225·
15. A. C. Caen, D I. A copy of Vendoeuvrc's
discourse GIll be found in Pieces SIll' la normandie, B. M. Cacn, Fn. A<;(,2/1-14.
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the choice of a new mayor signaled a shift in Caen politics, as the people of
Caen once again demonstrated their aversion to the nobility.
Le Forestier de Vendoeuvre, seigneur of an estate not far from Caen, had
first been named mayor by Louis XVI in 178 I and had served for nearly
seven years. His term had been a stormy one, though. The king had showed
displeasure at the strained relations between Vendoeuvre and the intendant,
and the people had protested the mayor's excessive spending and autocratic
manner. His election in February, 1790, may have been due to his willingness to stand up to the king and the intendants in defense of municipal independence. But Vendoeuvre's inability to work with the elected notables
seems to have carried over into the revolutionary period.16
His successor, Pierre Louis Bonnet de Meautry, was, to be sure, a noble
and a chevalier de Saint-Louis. But if under the Old Regime there were a fair
number of bourgeois living nobly, then Bonnet de Meautry, by contrast,
must certainly be called a noble living poorly. His sentiments lay more with
the sans-culottes than with his fellow aristocrats. Very early, he ch-opped de
Meautry from his name; and in 1793, he would be the only Calvados deputy
to the National Convention to sit with the Montagnards.
Bonnet was a captain in the National Guard and in July, 1790, headed Caen's delegation
to the Festival of the Federation in Paris. I? Our bourgeois commentator,
Esnault, offers a clear indication of Bonnet's reputation among the high
ranks of Caen society: "One saw with profound sadness a gentleman of exemplary conduct, of unequalled generosity and charity, replaced by a man
who was reproached as being, for several years, at the head of biribi and
other games forbidden by the police, the only source of support which remained to him." 1" The political shift that began with the election of Bonnet
was confirmed in the November, 1791, municipal elections, which marked a
final repudiation of the Old Regime elite and nobility of Caen. Municipal
councils thereafter would be dominated by the commercial elite.
The election of Bonnet as mayor was soon followed by a change in the
local church hierarchy. The refusal of Bishop Cheylus to swear the constitutional oath made necessary the election of a new bishop. Gervais de la Prise,
cure of Saint-Pierre in Caen, was chosen by an electoral assembly and installed as bishop on March 16, 1791. Less than three weeks later, he re16. Yver, "Une Administration
municipale ~orageuse,'"
17- Mouriot, La Fin de l'Ancien Regime, exii.
IlL

Lesage (Fsnaulr}, 47·

24 T - 268.
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signed, citing the refusal of Cheylus to formally step aside as the reason
he could not, in good conscience, assume the episcopal duties. The electoral
assembly met again, more sparsely attended this time, and on April 18
elected Claude Fauchet on the third ballot. The choice was at first an unpopular one. Fauchet was not from Calvados, he had a reputation as a radical,
and the former bishop published a denunciation of his election. Cheylus' refusal to resign posed no crisis of conscience for Fauchet, though, and he arrived on May r 1 for installation. His compassion and eloquent oratory rapidly won him supporr.!"
The new bishop quickly assumed an active role in departmental affairs.
As early as June, his public criticism of two administrators made him again a
center of controversy. Fauchet apologized for his error in judgment, became
an active participant at Jacobin club meetings in Caen, and was soon elected
president of that body. In November, 1791, though still a controversial figure, Fauchet won election on the first ballot to represent Calvados in the
Legislative Assembly. He continued as bishop of the department and frequently communicated
with the Caen Jacobin club.
Fauchet remained an influential figure in local affairs. One of his vicars,
Chaix-d'Estanges,
became cure of the parish Saint-Etienne in Caen and was
later a leader of the federalist revolt. Gohier de jumilly, elected cure of the
parish Saint-Jean shortly after the bishop'S arrival, also supported Fauchet
and was active in the revolt. Faucher himself was among the twenty-two
deputies initially denounced by the Paris sections in April, 1793. Arrested
after the assassination of Marat, he came to trial with the proscribed Girondins and was executed in October, 1793 .2U
On November 5, 1791, the issues of religion and the aristocracy combined to produce the most dramatic incident in Caen's revolutionary history,
"I'Affaire des 84." On the preceding day, Bunel, former cure of Saint-Jean
and a refractory priest, had held a mass in the church Saint-Jean, in accordance with the law and with the permission of the constitutional cure. A large
number of nobles, resident in that parish, had attended the mass with their
19. Vaultier, Souvenirs, 78-S7; Lesage (Esnaulr), 55-57. See also Olwen Hufron, Baycux
in the Late Eighteenth Century (London, 1967), '73. Hutton writes that the failure of the Constituent Assembly to call a national church council to affirm the civil constitution
and confirm
the jurisdiction
of new bishops led to the resignation of Gervais de Ia Prise.
20. A. C. Caen, KI6 (Elections
a l'assemblee legislative, 1791); Vaulrier, Souvenirs, 83-87,
288-89; Lesage (Dufour), 76; Jean Chretien Ferdinand Hoefer, Nouuelle Biograpbie G';l1Crale, XVII (Paris, 1858-78),16)-65.
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servants. The latter had been rumored to be armed with pistols, and the
noblemen, of course, had worn their swords. The insolent tone of the servants had offended some "patriots" (as they were referred to in the municipal council report), but the mass had ended without incident, and Bunel had
announced another service for the following day.
It should be noted that the elected constitutional
cures were at this point
not very popular with the people of Caen. Their masses were not generally
well attended, and many people remained loyal to their old parish priests.
On October 8, I791, the departmental
administration
published an order
from the minister of the interior that declared refractory priests free to celebrate mass as long as they did not disrupt public order. Those attending the
November 4 mass clearly saw this order as a moral victory over the radical
elements in Caen, in particular the members of the Jacobin club. This attitude led to the taunts and insults that so offended the "patriots."
The municipality, fearing trouble, asked Bunel to postpone his mass. The
cure readily agreed, but his decision was not adequately publicized, and
a number of aristocrats assembled at Saint-Jean anyway. A group of concerned "patriots"
appeared at the church as well. The two groups exchanged words, minor scuffles ensued, and several shots were fired. Two
municipal officers arrived with two companies of National Guard grenadiers
and dispersed the crowd."] The municipal council immediately convened
with the district and departmental administrations
to consider security measures. As they deliberated, word came that a group of armed nobles and servants had gathered at the Place Saint-Sauveur, located in a well-to-do neighborhood near the Abbaye-aux-Hornmes
(where the municipal council met).
The combined administrations
sent a municipal officer to order the nobles
back to their regular companies. (The municipality had called all citizens to
arms when trouble first broke out at Saint-Jean, but they should have reported to their assigned National Guard stations.) For reasons that remain
unknown, the officer instead led them to the square in front of the town hall,
where they were questioned and disarmed. The search and interrogation
produced a letter that referred to a coalition of nobles, allegedly formed to
protect "persons and property." Presented with this evidence, the municipality ordered the arrest of those disarmed, as well as several others, mostly
aristocrats and wealthy bourgeois. A total of eighty-four men and women
21. Brochures

Normandcs:

Cacn sous la Revolution,

B. M. Caen, Res. Fn. Be. DI56-209.
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were jailed in the Chateau and their crimes reported to the Legislative Assembly.:" The three administrations,
meeting jointly, ordered all strangers in
Caen to report to the town hall to turn in their arms, forbade unnecessary
public assemblies, and authorized National Guard captains to search suspect houses for strangers bearing arms."
Several accounts of the affair, both contemporary
and secondary, illuminate the situation in the weeks preceding November 5. One local antiquarian
notes that since the beginning of the Revolution, the unsettled situation in
the countryside
had forced a considerable number of nobles to seek safety
in Caen, where they stayed with friends or in their own town houses. Lacking any occupation,
they closely followed public affairs and grew alarmed
at what they perceived to be an increasing disrespect for property (particularly their own) and public order. This led to the formation of committees
and proposals for reestablishment
of respect for the law. The meetings of
these committees were not unknown to the Jacobin club and the municipal
council, but tbey could not be legally prohibited. It is significant that the
Regiment d' Aunis, the only remaining military alternative to the bourgeois
National
Guard, was transferred from Caen on November 3, despite the
protests of the departmental
administration.
This may well have increased
the aristocrats'
apprehensions."
Our two contemporary
chroniclers, Esnault and Dufour, offer distinctly
different impressions of the episode. Esnault writes that the aristocrats and
wealthy bourgeois (les honnetes gens, as he calls them) feared the increasing
influence of the Caen Jacobin club and held secret meetings to plan strategy
and propose suitable candidates for the upcoming municipal elections. He
acknowledges
the lack of circumspection
of "les royalistes" and the brash
words of young nobles from out of town but insists that the gathering at the
22. The confiscated
letter began, "Lc desir de proreger les personnes er les proprietes. er Ia
necessite de reclamer I'execurion des loix a chaque instanr violees, onr provoque la reunion des
honneres gens." It went on, in sixteen articles, to describe the formation of committees to coordinate efforts to preserve order. The lerter identified by name two prominent nobles and spoke
of secret meetings in private homes. The municipality also claimed ro have found other letters.
My account of these two days relies primarily on Consultation
delibcree (I Paris pour les 8_1
citoyens dct enus dans la T(JUr de Cacu, dep uis lc _) noucntbrc J 79 J. a thirty-nine-page
report
prepared
for the Legislarive Assembly by three of Its members, Dcseze, Vulpiun, and De la
Malle. B. M. Caen, Res. Fn. llr. OJ 56-2°9.
23. A. C. Caen, DI.
24· A.N.,
Fl 3661 I Calvados
(rnosrty correspondence
to the minister
of the iurerior);
Bonne], "Communication
au sujer des trouble, de 4-.\ novembre, 1791," Bulletin de la Societe
des Antiauaires de Normandie, XLIX (I <;42-45),487-94.
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Place Saint-Sauveur was due to confusion and an honest desire to restore
order." Dufour describes this same group of upright citizens as a "compagnie noire" that wished to make a counterrevolution.
He says that 150
to 200 men assembled on the Place Saint-Sauveur
and that several people
had earlier been wounded near Saint-Jean. Another observer wrote two
days later that "the scene yesterday of which Mile
spoke to you was
crushing for the aristocratic party, which has grown insolent over the past
month."26
Whatever the truth may have been, and it remains elusive, the Legislative
Assembly agreed with Esnault. After three of its members had made a report
citing the municipality's call to arms and the lack of sufficient evidence of
conspiracy, the Assembly ordered the release of all but two of those arrested." The decision was not a popular one in Caen. The jacobin club and
the National Guard opposed it, and Louis Caille, a lawyer and president
of the club, proposed that the municipal and district administrations
petition the Legislative Assembly to retract the decree. The municipality and district rejected Caille's suggestion, and on February 3 at 2:00 A.M., the municipal officers, with the aid of a small guard, released the prisoners from the
Chateau. No trouble marred the release, though a small group of "enrages"
were rumored to have waited all night in ambush, fortunately at the wrong
entrance!"
Three significant observations can be made about this episode. First, it
was perceived by the people of Caen at the time as a "noble conspiracy."
Not all of those arrested were nobles-some
were bourgeois rentiers-but
the most prominent among them were of the nobility. The confrontation
thus heightened the tension between the second and third estates of Caen.
Second, no elected officials, either former or present, were implicated in the
affair. The controversy did not create any lasting political divisions, nor did
it embroil the local political arena. If anything-and
this is the third pointit strengthened the bonds of the local political elite in the face of a challenge
25· Lesage (Esnaulr), 69-7126. Lesage (Dufour), 78; a letter signed Loiseau, reprinted by Bonnel, "Communication
au
sujet des troubles," 490-92.
27. Consultation deliberec ii Paris. The prisoners were ordered released on the basis of what
today would be termed a technicality. The three deputies found that the arrests had been motivated by the discovery of the anonymous
letter. Since the National Assembly had declared
letters and personal correspondence
inviolable, the letter should never have been seized; and
there existed no other strong evidence against the accused.
28. A. C. Caen, D2; Lesage (Esnaulr), 8 I.
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from the old aristocracy and interference from the Legislative Assembly in
Paris. The municipal council had seen a threat to public order and had acted
resolutely to eliminate that threat. The evidence against the accused seemed
clear, yet the Legislative Assembly overturned the accusation and ordered
the release of the suspects. Here we see an early, albeit minor, confrontation
between local and national authority. This issue would assume greater importance by 1793.
Another crisis developed even before the resolution of the Affair of 84,
and it eventually led to a second brutal murder. As before, bourgeois animosity toward the nobility triggered the chain of events. At issue in this instance was the composition of the departmental Criminal Tribunal. The tribunals were created by the law of February 7, 1791, but because the law
required interpretation
and clarification, final enactment did not come until
nearly one year later. 29
The new court encountered opposition in many parts of the country. In
Caen, its installation was scheduled for January 23, 1792, but the National
Guard's refusal to participate forced the municipality to postpone the ceremony. The guard acted in support of the Caen Jacobin club, which had vehemently protested the jury list proposed by Georges Bayeux, the Calvados
procureur-general-syndic.
In a January 26 report to the minister of the interior, the departmental
directory described the disruptive events of the previous few days. On January 24, the day after the aborted installation, a delegation from the Jacobin
club, led by Chaix-d'Estanges
and Louis Cadle, invaded the directory's
chambers;'? The unruly group claimed that aristocrats outnumbered patriots
on the jury Jist and particularly denounced the inclusion of two university
professors who had signed a letter protesting the constitutional oath. In the
words of the directory report:
A voice was then raised and stated, "we will not permit on the Criminal Tribunal
a Boucher Deslongpars and a Deshameaux, who in the electoral assembly declared
1.9· Godechor, Lcs lnstituiions de 1<.1
France. 1 '9- 21.
A.N.,
F,6G 1 I Calv.ulos, A. C. Cacn, 1275 (Societe des Amis de '" Constitution,
1790-93);
B. M. COlen, Res. Fn, A 190oh. Unfortunately,
the registers
of the jacohin
club for
the period
before September,
'79" no longer exist. One assumes that they were clcstoyed hy
30.

frightened
club members
as the failure of the federalist
revolt became
apparent.
The information available
regarding
the club comes
from contemporary
account»,
some printed
declarations of the Jacobin
club (which often listed the current
president
and secreraries),
.md administrative
reports
and lerrers.
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themselves enemies of the bishop of Calvados"; and on the observation of the president that M. le Boucher Deslongpars had been named commissioner
to the Tribunal
by the executive power, M. Destanges stated that neither the King, nor decrees, nor
administrative bodies would oblige them to recognize persons who did not have their
confidence, and that the members of the Directory themselves, who currently enjoyed their confidence, would be frankly informed and not tolerated if they came to
lose that confidence."

A series of letters from the department president, Doulcet de Pontecoulant,
to the minister of the interior, Cahier de Gerville, elaborates on the evolution of the affair and its final resolution. Doulcet acknowledged that the jury
list, the root of the problem, was "veritablement
fort mauvais" and merited
change, but he noted the directory's reluctance to cede to popular demand
by changing it. He commented that Bayeux, by his support of the monarchy
and his aristocratic sympathies, had lost the confidence of citizens throughout the department and stood little chance of regaining it. In a second letter,
dated February 2, Doulcet sounded much more optimistic:
We are constantly gaining ground on the factious elements. We have pursued them
into a corner. Yesterday at the club, we won a complete advantage over them. The
Sllccess was almost entirely due to Bougon-Longrais,
our secretary-general,
who on
several occasions has had the honor to meet you in Paris. Caille was defeated, and to
such a degree that his brother in arms D'estanges felt compelled to abandon him and
even mount his carcass to complete his defeat.
At the end of the meeting I was elected President of the Club. I learned of it this
morning from a large number of good citizens of this town who had long since
ceased going there. They pressed me, they demanded that I accept; myself, I demanded that they attend meetings regularly, and I volunteered.
There is the battle
decidedly engaged and suffering a necessary fight to the death. Either we restore the
authority of the law in Caen, and respect for it in the Club, or we abandon ali, business and the country. E

Here we see a prime example of the legalism and the insistence on orderly
debate in the political arena that were the most prominent characteristics
of
the Calvados administration
throughout
this period. Despite the merits of
the Jacobin club protest, it had been lodged in an unruly and unsanctioned
manner, and to accede to the protestors' demands would, in the minds of the
administrators, have clearly established a disastrous precedent.
31. A.N., F »u Calvados .I. (personnel and tribunals).
32... A.N., F" 366I I Calvados, Chaix-d'Esranges'
name is spelled in at least three different
ways III the documents. He was reportedly born Chaix-de·St.·Ange,
and changed his name to
Dcstangc Or d'Estanges at the time of rhe Revolution (Vaulrier, Souvenirs, 288).
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Doulcet wrote again to the minister one day later and reported that he
had just presided over a peaceful Jacobin club meeting attended by more
than two thousand people. In subsequent letters, he suggested to the minister that an example be made of Chaix and Caille, but soon he moderated his
opinion, noting that the two men continued to exercise "a prodigious influence over the people of the faubourgs" and that the authorities should proceed with a prosecution only if they could be assured of success. To accuse
the two leaders of lese-nation before the Legislative Assembly, and then see
them acquitted (as Doulcet thought probable), would only make them
popular heroes. He observed that Fauchet, then a deputy to the Assembly,
had himself written to the jacobin club urging it to join with the municipal
council in demanding an annulment of the entire jury list. With respect to
any prosecution, Doulcet thought the municipal council to be hesitant because of the powerful influence of the club and considered the departmental
directory unwilling to risk its current good standing with the populace. Several municipal officials did resign in the wake of the controversy, citing violation of the law and the inability of the council to deliberate free of the
club's overriding influence, but their colleagues exhorted them to retract
their resignations. In the end, only one followed through on his action."
No prosecution resulted from this affair, and Doulcer's victory over his
"factious" opponents appears to have been short-lived. Less than two months
later, Caille again sat as president of the Jacobin club, and in November,
I792, he was elected procureur-syndic
of the district (an ironic position for
one who had been accused of flouting the law and public authority!). Chaixd'Estanges continued to hold forth from the pulpit of Saint-Erienne. The departmental directory did dismiss the two professors from the jury list but
made no further concessions, and on February I I, the Criminal Tribunal
was finally installed."
Despite the apparent victory of Louis Caille and the jacobin club, this episode marked an important shift in Caen political life. Since late I790, the
Jacobin club had acted as an independent agent in Calvados politics-attempting to influence local elections, supporting Claude Faucher, urging
prosecution in the Affair of 84. What Doulcet and other administrators
objected to in February, 1792, was the extralegal manner in which the club
33. A.N., F',66J'
Culvados, and r;'I> II Caivados I; A. D. Calvados, 1.10052 (documents
pertaining to the installation of the Criminal Tribunal).
34. A. D. Calvados, LJ il6 (Transcriptions
des procesvcrbaux
des deliberations
du conseil
general du district de Caen, 15 juilletl79015 janvier 179,); A. C. Caen, D I.
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acted, riling the populace in support of its demand. Doulcet sympathized
with the club's objection to the jury list but would not tolerate the popular
tumult that accompanied it. In the following weeks, Doulcet appears to have
succeeded in bringing the Jacobin club under control. Although Cadle returned as president, the club did not henceforth exercise the independent
influence that it had had to that point. The local administrations
now dominated political affairs. By 1793, the Jacobin club would be playing only a
secondary role in Caen politics.
For Georges Bayeux, however, the trouble had just begun. Intimidated by
the public outcry directed against him, Bayeux excused himself from departmental meetings and retreated with his family to their country home. On
February 13, the departmental
directory informed Bayeux that calm had
been restored and that nothing should prevent his return to duty. Several
weeks passed before he heeded that call, and his relationship with his colleagues clearly deteriorated. He soon accused several members of the directory of misallocation of funds, and they in turn redirected the accusation
against Bayeux. On May I, 1792, five Calvados deputies to the Legislative
Assembly wrote to the minister of the interior requesting that at the first opportunity he rid their department "of one of the most perfidious enemies of
the republic," namely Bayeux. They charged that he had led the departmental administration to take illegal actions and was contributing to a disruption of public order." The Legislative Assembly opened an investigation, but
with no immediate result. Bayeux's sympathy with the monarchy was well
known, and it is probably no coincidence that only two days after the monarchy fell, he was arrested and charged with communicating
with emigres,
as well as complicity with the ministers Armand Marc Montmorin
and
Claude Antoine Valdec de Lessart, themselves suspect after August 10.
Bayeux was imprisoned in the Chateau, and his wife traveled to Paris to
plead his case to members of the Assembly. Their investigation of his papers
produced no conclusive evidence, and on the night of September 5, she returned to Caen with an order from the Comite de surveillance et de sicrete
general for his release. The procureur of Caen refused to act alone, though,
and an old friend and municipal official, Jean Lasseret, offered no help. The
mayor, Auvray de Coursanne, insisted on consulting the municipal council.
The council took no action that night, while the news of Bayeux 's ordered
35. A.N., pi }66J'
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release spread throughout
town. The following day, Auvray went to the
Chateau to release the prisoner, accompanied by several officials. Instead,
the citizens on guard arrested and imprisoned them. Not until late in the afternoon did the National Guard secure the freedom of Bayeux and the others.
Realizing his still-precarious
situation, Bayeux headed toward the Abbayeaux-Homrnes,
meeting place of the departmental
and municipal councils,
accompanied
by a National Guard escort. Just short of their goal, on the
Place Saint-Sauveur (the same spot that had spawned the Affair of 84), they
encountered an unru Iy crowd. Members of the administration,
clearly concerned for Bayeux's safety, soon arrived on the scene but could not prevent
the shot and blows that killed Bayeux. The National Guard stood helplessly
by as his head was cut off and paraded around town, the same fate that had
befallen the unfortunate Belzunce."
Madame Bayeux demanded the arrest and prosecution of her husband's
murderers, but to no avail. A number of rumors circulated during the weeks
following the tragedy. One of these suggested premeditation
on the part
of the National Guard, charging that the guardsmen had intentionally led
Bayeux through the Place Sainr-Sauveur with the knowledge that a crowd
awaited him there and that he would be attacked. The area could have been
avoided by means of an equally direct route from the Chateau to the Abbaye. The guard was also criticized for its failure to protect Bayeux after the
situation had clearly become dangerous. 17
A second rumor accused Jean Charles Hippolyte Bougon-Longrais,
the
young secretary-general
of the department, of conspiring in the murder of
Bayeux. Bougon was an active and respected figure in public affairs from the
very start of the Revolution. He sat on the first comite reuolutionnaire in
Caen; and in late 1'789, when he was only twenty-four years old, he was one
of two emissaries sent by the municipality to the Constituent Assembly to
solicit the establishment of a caul' superieure in Caen. IX An auocat by profession, Bougon was elected procureur of the commune in February, 1'79°, but
could not accept the post because of his youth. One year later, he became
secretary-general
of the departmental
administration.
Named accusateur
public by an electoral assembly in April, 1791, he was again disqualified
36. A. C Caen, D2. See also Vaulrier, Souvenirs, 2<)0-9'>; ,1n£1 Les;lgc (Esnaulr), <)0-<)2.
37· Lesage (Esnault), 92 .
.}S. A. C. Caen, II (Deputation
;J Versailles de Sigllard d'Ollifieres er de BougouLongr.us,
17il9-<)0).
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because of his age." Respect for Bougon's abilities was often grudging, as
more than a few people resented his ambition and egotism. One contemporary observer, noting the popular suspicion of Bougon after the murder of
Bayeux, commented on the young man's character: "M. Bougon-Longrais,
a
young lawyer, born in Caen, was a self-conceited,
proud, vain, and presumptuous fellow, all based on very superficial talents, but which he believed to be at least equal to those, infinitely more substantial, of his benefactor [he suggests that Bayeux had obtained the post of secretary-general
for
Bougon], against whom he was animated by the basest jealousy and the
blackest ingratitude.":" A more charitable biographer dismisses the suspicions as unfounded, claiming they were probably inspired by Bougon's
known friendship with Fauchet, who had long been a detractor of Bayeux.:"
Whatever Bougon's motives or involvement, no serious investigation was
mounted against him. Indeed, he succeeded Bayeux as procureur-generalsyndic and went on to play an influential role in departmental
politics.
In the controversy surrounding the Criminal Tribunal, as well as during
the Affair of 84 in November, 1791, the Caen jacobin club played an important role. Officially called Les Arnis de la Constitution,
the society was
formed in late 1790 and immediately contributed several pamphlets to the
debate over the constitutional oath of the clergy. Early presidents of the club
included Jean Baptiste Lomont, deputy to the Legislative Assembly and
Convention; Bonnet de Meautry, also a deputy to those assemblies; and
Pierre Jean Leveque, president of the departmental council in 1793. But undoubtedly the most influential leader of the Caen Jacobins was Bishop
Claude Fauchet, despite the fact that he did not arrive in the department
until May, 1791. Under his leadership, the activism of the club increased.
The coalition of nobles that surfaced in November had allegedly been formed
to prevent the manipulation of municipal elections by the increasingly active
jacobin club. Barely two months earlier, six members of the departmental
directory had appealed to the Constituent Assembly and the minister of the
interior for permission to shift their meetings to the nearby town of Bayeux,
citing the intimidating presence of the club in Caen and warning that "ar39. A. D. Calvados, Lro058 (correspondence
to departmental
administration);
A. C. Cacn,
K35 (Procureur de la Commune, 1790-an
III).
40. Sauvage, "Les Souvenirs de j.-B. Renee," 598.
41. Jeanne Grall, "La rres courte carriere d'un procureur general syndic, Bougon-Longrais
(1765 - I 794), procureur general syndic du Calvados," in Droit priue et institutions regionales:
Etudes historiques orrertes a [can Yver (Paris, 1976), 335.
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bitrariness, insubordination,
and despotism, as much popular as military,
threaten to subvert everything." The minister responded by letter on August 26, acknowledging
their "alarming position" but stating that he could
not authorize the transfer of their meetings to another town."
It was during this period that the split between the Jacobins and the
Feuillanrs occurred in Paris. The regional paper printed in Caen, Affiches,
Annonces et Avis Divers de La Basse-Normandie,
announced the split in its
issue of July 24, 1791. As a sidelight, the editor included the following tidbit: "It is rumored in Paris, that M. Robertspierre is crazy: this opinion appears to be generally held; people are only divided as to the date of this unfortunate event: several persons place it rather early." One month later, the
paper reported that the Jacobins were prevailing in their struggle with
the Feuillants, with more departmental societies affiliating with the former
than with the latter." Tbe Caen club broke communication
with the Paris
jacobins, favoring the Feuillants, but shortly reestablished ties with the
jacobins. Esnault suggests, probably exaggerating, that Faucher changed his
mind on the matter and that this was the deciding factor."
The club's decision to continue its affiliation with the jacobins undoubtedly contributed to the increasing opposition to the club among "les honneres gens" of Caen. The Affiches, clearly catering to the aristocracy and
wealthy bourgeois in its editorial policy, joined in the attack on the Caen
jacobins, A series of articles in October asked the rhetorical question, What
is a club? Responding that it was a group of men assembling to discuss and
deliberate on affairs of state in order to influence public opinion, the editor
concluded that all clubs were therefore useless and dangerous. "Do we not
already have a National Assembly? Do we require several?" The clubs may
have begun with good intentions, but vanity now reigned among them. They
misled rather than enlightened."
The problem came to a head in February, 1792, when the club opposed
the newly constituted Criminal Tribunal. We have seen in the correspondence
of Doulcet his concern for the threat to public order and lawful government
and the temporary departure of Louis Caille from the club. Doulcer's elecA.N., P 366, I Calvados (Letters of August 21 and August 2.6, T79l).
43. Affiches. Annonces et Auis Divers de la Basse-Normandie.
July 2.4 and August z
179',
A. D. Calvados.
44· Lesage (Esnaulr), 65.
45. Affiches, Annonces et Auis Diucrs de la Basse-Normandie,
October 9,1\, and ,6, '79',
A. D. Calvados.
42.

t ,
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tion as president raised hopes of a moderating trend, but no significant shift
in club attitudes occurred at this time. If anything, the club's ties to the Paris
jacobins grew stronger. Robespierre apparently made some public defense
of the Caen Jacobins, and the club sent the following appreciative address to
him on March 7, 1792:
GREETINGS

TO T1-IE INCORRUPTIBLE

ROBESPIERIU:

The Society of Caen knows that the father of patriotisrn was at his post when it
was necessary to defend his children of Calvados, hounded by srylcrs of calumny; she
knows it ... and comes silently to add a palm to his civic crown.
Robespierre, this name that makes glory, this name that brings fear into the hearts
of tyrants, will be the watchword that will rally us to fight them.
We do not pretend to render that name more celebrated in making this address:
the undertaking was beyond our powers; it is only the precious token of our gratitude and the particular tribute of public esteem."

By the end of the year, however, the Caen jacobins had reversed their
position and broken with the parent club. In the wake of Bayeux's murder
and the September massacres in Paris, the Caen club repudiated the excesses
of the Paris Jacobins. Louis Caille was very likely instrumental in this switch.
Sent by the club to Paris in january, 1792, Caille had argued with Robespierre and developed a dislike for the Paris leader. He is known to have been
friendly with the Girondin deputies, particularly the Marseille delegation,
led by Charles Jean Marie Barbaroux.:"
Even more important, however, was the influence of the Calvados deputies to the Convention. We have here a clear example of the channels of communication between Caen and the capital regarding issues of local, as well
as national, importance. Late in 1792, the Caen Jacobin club wrote to the
Calvados delegation soliciting advice as to whether it should end its affiliation. In a letter written by Lornonr and signed by the other deputies (with
the exception of Bonnet), the delegation firmly recommended
that the club
break with the Paris Jacobins. By January, [793, it had done precisely that.
In doing so, the Caen Jacobins not only severed their ties with the parent
46. Vaultier, Souvenirs, J 22.
47· "I.e Federalism« dans lc Calvados,"
Anualcs du Centre Regional de Recherche et du
Dcrcumentation l'cdagogiques
de Caen, Service Educatif Nouvelle Serre, Dossier 3 (Caen,
1977), A. D. Calvacios. This is an edited collection of twenty documents,
including biographical information on several federalist leaders, compiled by M. O. and J. Mace, J. Grall, A. Parmentier, and E. Gaurier-Desvaux.
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club but demonstrated
their esteem for the Calvados ccmueniionnels, most
of whom supported the Cirondins."
Even as it broke with the Paris jacobins, however, the Caen jacobin club
was clearly in decline. Few members attended meetings. Those who did reportedly spent the time singing patriotic songs, for lack of more serious business.:" The decline of the Caen Jacobin club can be attributed in part to the
growth of another club, the Carabors. The precise origin of this group is not
certain, but it apparently had its roots in the people's militia that formed in
the summer of 1789. Primarily artisans and small shopkeepers who had
armed themselves in the raid on the Chateau, the members of this militia
were exuberant in their newfound role but found themselves relegated to the
lower ranks after the official organization of the National Guard. In order to
preserve something of their elan and rapport, they formed a group and
called themselves the Carabors, a derogatory derivation of caporaux (corporals). The Carabors made the jump from obscure fraternity to documented
club on February 10, 1793, when fifty of them assembled on the Place de la
Liberte, formerly the Place Royale. It is interesting that tbey chose this
square, fronted by the homes of wealthy negociants, rather than the Place
Saint-Sauveur
or the Place Saint-Pierre. Two days later, they assembled
again, with a banner, arm bands, and a prods-verbal
of their previous meeting. They vowed to accept only recognized republicans in their society and
swore "to maintain the Republic-one,
indivisible, and popular-liberty,
and equality; to observe the laws that had these principles as their foundation; and to exterminate all those who wanted another government." They
proclaimed their morro to be, "Execution of the law, or death."")
48. I found neither the letter from the club nor the deputies' reply in any of the archives I
consulted, They are mentioned, however, in ;1 l-cbruury r 2, 17;13, letter from Bonner de Menutry to an unidentified friend in Caen. He noted his refuS<11to sign the letter authored hy l.ornonr
and said that he had written his own letter to the jucobin club on January 1, '7;1" in which he
recommended
that they not break relations with rhe Paris club. He received no reply. He remarked, in closing, that he had heard rhnr the Caen club was languishing and [r orn rhis presumcd rh.u his friend no longer attended. Bonnet's letter can be fonnd in A. C. Cacn, 127), and
is reprinted in Vaulrier,
Souucnirs, J 2.1.-23.
49. Lesage (Esn.iult), '02.
50. See Vaulrier, Souuenirs,
9-",
'26-.17; Charles Renard, Notice SII?" lcs Carabot s de
Caen (Caen, T858), located in B. M. Caen, Res. l-n. Ilr. C, '5-,68:, and Georges Maned, LI
Societe des Carabots (Caen, ,857). Georges Lefebvre noted rhur since the fifteenth century,
rural hrig;1ncls had been known as caralrots in Picardy and Normandy.
Neirher Vaulner nor
Renard mentions this possible derivation of the club name, but Mancel dismisses it ent irely, See
Georges Lefebvre, The Great Fear o] 178'}, rrans. Joan White (New York, ''In), 25·
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It is difficult to say much about the Carabot club, because it left little trace
of its existence. Aside from the proclamation
issued on the date of its foundation and a proposal that it presented to the departmental
administration
during the federalist revolt, no documents relating to the club have survived
in the archives. No membership list exists. But the date of the club's official
foundation (in early 1793, when "anarchism"
and "factionalism"
in Paris
and the Convention were being widely denounced by departmental
administrations and popular societies) and the stress on respect for the law in both
the motto and the oath suggest that the Carabots were moderates who did
not support Jacobin radicalism. They maintained an active and public presence, though, and apparently made respectable citizens somewhat uneasy by
bearing arms. Both Esnault and Vaultier report that the Carabots soon
eclipsed the Jacobins in popularity and influence."
Nowhere in the documents, however, do the Carabors ever appear in an
adversarial relationship with the local administrations.
Indeed, several departmental administrators were reportedly members of the club, which often
acted as an unofficial arm of the administration.
On March 3, 1793, when a
group of young men disrupted army recruitment, the Carabots sounded the
alarm and assisted officials in restoring order. Occasionally, club members
were overzealous in their actions-on
April 20, the municipal council sent
several men to head off a group of 150 armed Carabots on their way to Argences in search of grain. But officials often turned to them for manpower to
assist with recruitment, grain requisitions, and transport. On March 12, a
Carabot accompanied Louis Caille to Evrecy on official business, and on
May 19, the departmental administration
assigned the Carabors to inspect
foreign mail. Departmental and municipal officials even called on Carabots
to carry out occasional domiciliary searches in the spring of 1793. In April,
Bougon-Longrais, on mission to Paris, closed a letter to two colleagues by
embracing in spirit "you and all the faithful ca rabotx.T"
This limited evidence suggests that the Carabot club acted as a client
group of the departmental administration
and probably of the Caen merchant elite. Certainly, many of the artisans and shopkeepers who made up
the club's membership depended on the wholesale merchants for their live5 l. Lesage (Esnaulr), J 01.; Vaultier, Souvenirs, 136 .
.52. Lesage (Esnault), 103; A. D. Calvados, Lr ooz a (loose minutes of departmental
administr.uiou meetings, L793), LLOl5 L (papers pertaining to llougon), :lnd L10529
(Bougon's letter
to departmental
administration,
April 12, .1793).
.
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lihood and did business with them on a regular basis. Their choice of the
Place de la Liberte as a meeting place suggests a clientage relationship, as
does the fact that one of the Carabot leaders, Jean Michel Barbot, was chief
clerk at the Tribunal of Commerce. The Carabot club definitely enjoyed a
more collaborative relationship with the departmental administration
than
did the jacobin club, which the Carabots now replaced as the most active
Caen popular society. It is also significant, particularly given the evidence
suggesting a clientage relationship between the club and the Caen commercial elite, that the ascension of the Carabots came just months after the merchant community had achieved its greatest representation on the Caen municipal council.

In Limoges, there was no Chateau to be stormed, and the Revolution

there
began much more quietly than it did in Caen. On July 26, 1789, the tricolored cocarde made its first appearance
in a demonstration
directed
against the nobility, and several days later the Great Fear brushed Limoges,
but nothing of truly dramatic proportions occurred. Shortage of grain had
forced municipal control of bread prices since 1788, and in August, 1789, a
patriotic committee formed to aid in the provision of the city. For the next
year, the search for grain remained the predominant
issue facing local
authorities."
No significant disruption upset the customary pattern of Limoges life until the night of September 7, 1790, when a fire blazed through the quartier
Manigne in the heart of the city. The fire raged out of control until early
morning, destroying 160 houses and leaving 800 families homeless. The National Guard and the Royal-Navarre regiment valiantly fought the fire and
prevented loss of life, but the town hall lacked the financial resources to help
those whose property had been destroyed. The entire department lay exhausted after two years of dearth, forcing the administration
to ignore legal
restrictions and tap the caisse des domaines for emergency funds. Departmental and municipal officials appealed to the king and the Constituent As53. Two books provide good general accounts of the early years of the Revolution ill Limoges. They are jouhaud,
La Reuolution
Francatse en Limoustn, and Veryuaud, Hiscoire de
Limoges. See Lynn A. Hunt, Reuolution and Urban Politics ill Provincial France (Stanford,
[978), T 36, for a map detailing the formation of municipal committees in the major towns in
France in 1789. In Caen, the committee replaced the old council and remained in power until
new elections in February, 1790. In Limoges, the committee functioned alongside the Old Regime municipality
until that dare.
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sembly, but aid from those sources covered only one-twentieth
of the need.
The Limoges Jacobin club wrote to the Paris Jacobins and other provincial
clubs about the terrible misfortune.
The clubs responded generously; assisted by a benefit performance
of the Theatre Francais, they raised over
eight thousand livres to assist the fire victims, still only a pittance in the face
of enormous destruction. With other private donations and the help of neighbors and relatives, the people of Limoges managed to overcome this tragedy,
but economic hardship would burden them for several years to COlne.54
Only three months after the fire, political controversy erupted in Limoges.
It centered around the founding of a new club, Les Amis de la Paix, organized to balance the influence of the previously established Societe des
Amis de la Constitution, the Limoges Jacobins. It appears that the results of
the municipal elections in November, I790, inspired the formation of the
Amis de la Paix. Eight out of twelve of the municipal officers elected were
members of the jacobin club, and moderates alleged that the Jacobins had
achieved these results by limiting the number of electors. The number of
voters was indeed much lower than in the previous election, though the impact of that decline is unclear."
The founders of the new club proclaimed in a pamphlet their intention to
arouse civic responsibility in order to increase voter turnout. The social attitudes, and perhaps an indication of the social status, of the Amis are
revealed in the pamphlet's reference to "the crowd scarcely capable of examining the truth," which had allegedly been swayed by the Jacobin club
propaganda. In a similar observation, this time with respect to the nearby
rural inhabitants, the pamphlet described "those people of the country54· Alfred Fray-Fournier,
Le Departement
de la Haute- Vie/me, I, ',2.0- 2.2., and Le Club des
[acobins de Limoges, 1790-9,) (Limoges, 1903), 27; Jouhaud,
La'i?evolution
Francaisc en
l-imousin, 36. See also Kennedy, Thejacobin Clubs in the French Reuolution, 128.
55· Leon [ouhaud, in La Reuolution Francaise en Limousin, claims that all but one of the
municipal officers were jacobins, but four names do not appear on either of the membership
lists I have found, so I arn reluctant to accept his statement. It is difficult to assess the importance of the low voter turnout. A comparable
drop in numbers occurred in Caen between the
loebruary and November, '790, elections, so perhaps the trend was general. Roland Marx has
noted a similar decline in voter participation
for Alsace. In Strasbourg (Bas-Rlun), the turnout
declmed from 6, percent in January, '790, to 2.1 percent in November,
'79' (he has no figures
for November, I790), In Colmar (Haur-Rhin),
81 percent of the electorate voted in January,
'790;:37 percent in November, '790; and only '4 percent in November,
'79[. Sec Roland
Marx, Recherches sur la vie politique de I'Alsace prereuolutionnaire
et rcuolutionnaire
(Str.isbourg, (966), 56-62, In Limoges, voter turnout remained low in '79', when the moderates
made a recovery; so low turnout in j 790 can hardly explain the election results for rhar year.
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side ... simple and credulous, who know not how to distinguish the truth
from the coarsest seduction."'"
The Amis de la Paix first met on December I I, 1790. There was initial
widespread skepticism regarding the intent of the new club, bur publication
of its prospectus quieted those doubts somewhat. In this document, the
Amis professed their desire for open discussion, obedience to the law, and
respect for the new constitution.
In an obvious challenge to the exclusivity
of the Jacobin club and the Societe Patriotique et Litteraire, a club composed
of individuals too young to join the jacobins, the Amis made membership
fees low and declared their meetings open to the public. The other two clubs
soon followed suit, and all seemed resigned to a period of intense, but peaceful, competition for members.
The Societe Patriotique was the first to abandon the status quo of uneasy coexistence. In a December 29, 1790, meeting, the Societe Parriotique
charged the Amis with the instigation of public quarrels, in cafes and on
street corners, between its own members and members of the other two
clubs. Those present voted to avoid public confrontation
but to bring all
grievances to the attention of the society. '7 The Jacobin club, too, intensified its campaign against the Amis de la Paix. As early as December 13, the
Jacobins had granted the right to all national guardsmen to attend meetings
in full uniform, a clear attempt to recruit new members. Pierre Dumas, club
member and captain in the guard, soon led his company to join the Jacobin
club en masse.
Both the municipal and departmental
administrations
at first refused
to consider the squabbles between the Arnis and the other two clubs. As
Jacobin club membership grew, however, the issue came again before the departmental
administration,
introduced
by the procureur-general-syndic,
Pierre Dumas, who was also, of course, a Jacobin club leader. In an undated
December letter addressed to the municipal council, the jacobins expressed
their concern over reports of a nationwide conspiracy and rumored Arnis de
la Paix involvement. They noted that clubs with similar names had caused
trouble in Nimes, Nancy, Brest, and Lyon." On December 28, Dumas remarked on the coincidence of recent public disruptions in Limoges with the
56. Exposition
de la conduit.e ct des princtpcs de la Societe des Anlis de la Paix (January,
179 J), A. D. Haute- Viennc, Ul T2; hereafter referred to as Exposition.
57. A. D. Haurc-Vicnne,
1.81 I (Societe Patriotique
er Lirreraire, proces-verb.iux).
sS. Fray-Four niet, Le Club des [acobins, 20.
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formation of the Amis. He moved that the club be instructed to dissolve and
its members to join the Jacobin club in order to avert serious trouble, and
the motion was easily passed by the departmental
directory, the district directory, and the municipal council.
The Amis protested this decision. They charged first that the local councils were biased, claiming that of the thirty-nine members of the departmental directory, the district directory, and the municipal council, at least
twenty-three belonged to the Jacobin club;" They also defended their club's
attention to legal requirements and noted that the Jacobin club had been
founded six months before the Constituent Assembly legalized political associations. They vowed to continue their respect for authority by complying
with the dissolution order. However, instead of dissolving their club, the
Arnis proposed an affiliation with the Limoges Jacobins in order to retain an
element of autonomy. The Jacobin club rejected the proposal, refusing to
affiliate with any group not already recognized by the Paris Jacobins. The
Amis stood fast and defended their right to assemble by noting the continued existence of the Societe Patriotique et Litteraire. Faced with an apparently unresolvable conflict, the municipal council ordered the suspension of
the Amis de la Paix on December 30, 1790. Not wishing to serve as a pretext
for the continued resistance of the Amis, on January I the Societe Patriotique sent delegates to the Jacobin club to request a union of the two popular
societies. Unification took place two days later. The Amis de la Paix was
dissolved, and its suspension soon became official. 60
There are obvious parallels between this episode and the Affair of 84 in
Caen, The members of the Amis de la Paix, like the Caen coalition, were
seen as "enemies of the constitution and troublemakers
seeking to return
France to the Old Regime."61 Unlike the Caen coalition, however, the Amis
were not predominantly
nobles. There were nobles among the members,
to be sure, but the officers of the club included Ardant-Dupicq,
a negociant
and municipal officer; Lambertie, a lawyer; Petiniaud de Juriol, a noble
negociant, and Fournier Lejeune, a lawyer. Many of the Amis were wealthy
59· I do not know how they arrived at these numbers. Counting ten departmental
directors,
including the president and procureur-gencral-syndic,
six district directors, including the president and procurcur-syndic,
and thirteen municipal officials, including the mayor and procureur, I total twenty-nine, fifteen of whom were members of the jacobin club. This is still a
majority, but not quite as overwhelming as twenty-three of thirty-nine.
60. A. D. Haure-Vienne, L8II and L812 (documents pertaining to the Arnis de la Paix).
6 r , A. D. Haute- Vienne, L8 J 2 (jacobin club address).
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bourgeois, including Louis Naurissart, directeur de La monnaie and future
mayor, four negociants, two rnarchands, and two clerks. At least eight of
the Arnis were municipal notables in the '790-1791
term;"
The lack of full membership rolls for the Amis de la Paix makes a detailed social comparison with the Jacobin club impossible. But in general, it
is fair to contrast the haut-bourgeois character of the Arnis with the moyenbourgeois character of the Jacobins, who also admitted a considerable number of petit-bourgeois
artisans and workers into their ranks. It seems probable that the movenne-bourgeoisie dominated the jacobin club until at least
the year II, though there is some disagreement on this question. Alfred FrayFournier has argued that the intellectual superiority of the bourgeoisie
allowed it to maintain control of the club throughout its existence. Another
local historian, however, insists that in 1792, "the bourgeois element was
overwhelmed by an influx of workers and artisans.":"
It may well be that the better-educated
bourgeois were able to dominate
the Jacobin club with eloquent oratory, but a membership list prepared in
the year III shows that artisans and workers constituted the single largest
occupational
group in the club almost from the date of its foundation.
Adopting Leon Jouhaud's dividing line and comparing members who joined
the club in 1790 and 1791 with those who joined from 1792 through 1794
yields several interesting observations. first, of the 419 members listed, 72
percent joined in 1790 and 179 I. In that group of 303 individuals, artisans
and workers accounted for 37 percent, professionals for 21 percent, and
merchants for 18 percent. The remaining 24 percent was distributed roughly
among lawyers, landowners, military men, and others (students and bourgeois sans hat). In the period 1792 through 1794, the percentage of artisans
and workers did increase to 44 percent, while the percentage of professionals and commercial men declined to 17 percent and I J percent respectively; but none of these changes are drastic. Moreover, only 116 men joined
the club during this later period. Thus, if workers and artisans can be said (0
have overwhelmed their bourgeois colleagues in the club, they had done so
as early as 1791. It seems more likely that Fray-Fournier's assessment is cor62. Exposition;
Deliberations
de la Munici/wlitc
de Limoges (November,
1790), lI. M.
Limoges. No membership
list for the Amis de b Paix exists. However, a petition to the king
prepared in April, 1791, bears the names of 208 citizens of Limoges, most of whom were likely
members of the club, which reportedly numbered JOO members before its dissolution.
63. Fray-l-ournier,
Le Club des [acobins, x; JOllhalld, La Rcuolution
Francaise en Limousin, S S·
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rect, but clearly the Limoges jacobins could not ignore the viewpoint of the
town's petty bourgeoisie and workers, or at least did not choose to do SO.';4
The abolition of the Amis de la Paix did not bring an end to the opposition between its adherents and the Limoges Jacobins. A number of events
combined to maintain a tense situation in Limoges through May, I791. The
new legislation regarding the organization
of the Church provided one
source of friction. The antipathy between the supporters of the new and old
regimes was exacerbated by the controversy surrounding
the civil oath of
the clergy. As in the case of Caen and Calvados, Limoges registered a lower
rate of acceptance of the oath than did the Haute- Vienne as a whole. Sixtyfive percent of the parish priests in the department swore the oath, while in
Limoges only five of twenty-three priests, or 22 percent, did SO.,,5
The most ardent defender of the oath was a professor of theology and
former Dominican priest named Jean Foucaud. One of the founders of the
jacobin club and very active in its affairs, Foucaud delivered an address on
January 13, 1791, in which he established a theological foundation for the
civil constitution;"
He later published a tract based on this speech, which
four professors of the Limoges college, all of them ecclesiastics, publicly attacked. They charged Foucaud with a fraudulent interpretation
of Church
doctrine. This produced something of a public scandal, which was aggravated 011 February 2.5 when the four professors, who had refused to swear
the oath, disrupted the installation of their replacements.
The municipal
council responded with an order forbidding any unauthorized
public assembly of more than three people, temporarily restoring quiet to the town.?"
That peace remained a fragile one, though, made tenuous by the emergence early in the year of a new armed force, a company of dragoons. Technically an adjunct to the National Guard, the company was formed by the
most active members of the Amis de la Paix. The requirement that each man
in this mounted cavalry unit provide his own equipment
effectively re. 64· A. D. Hautc-Vienne,
LSI} (Societe I'opulaire, an Il l rnemberslup lisr). The list does nor
Include the unknown number of individuals who were expelled before the year "' and may
therefore exaggerate slightly the artisan/worker
predominance.
Each entry on this roll includes
rhe member's name, age, place of birth, occupation
(before and during the Revolurion),
residence, and date of admission to the club.
65· , am indebted to Professor Timothy Tackett for these figures. They are based on the
research of Paul d'Holiander,
working in France on a these de troisicmc cycle.
66. Fray-Fournier,
Le Club des [acobins, 2467· A. D. Haure-Vienne, Lx 12 (response of the municipal officers to the petition to the king
of the former Amis de ia Paix).
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stricted membership to the wealthier segment of the population. Two of the
wealthiest men in town, the future mayor Louis Naurissart and the aristocratic president of the departmental admmistration, Jean Baptiste Petiniaud
de Beaupeyr at, donated some of the equipment. The officers of the RoyalNavarre regiment generously offered to train the dragoons, whose frequent
banquets were often flavored by royalist songs. Enrollment in the elite company reached nearly four hundred.'"
Barely ten days after the municipal council had banned public assembly,
an incident occurred that would lead to the abolition of this new armed
corps. On March 8, a small group gathered on a Limoges street corner and
burned a copy of the Arnis de la Paix prospectus. An outraged notable (in all
likelihood, a former Amis) reported this to the municipal council as a violation of the February 25 decree against public crowds and demanded that
action be taken against those responsible, including the president and secretaries of the Jacobin club, who he claimed had incited the incident. The
council, sparsely attended, did issue a decree of accusation, but without the
necessary formal indictment from the municipal procureur. This forced a
reconvening of the full council, which was evenly divided between adherents
of the jacobins and of the former Arnis, The vote on the issue deadlocked
eleven to eleven, with Jean Baptiste Nieaud, the mayor, inclined to cast the
deciding vote in favor of the Jacobin club, which he had helped to found.
Before he could do so, however, the eleven moderates (three officers and
eight notables) walked out of the meeting and refused to attend future sessions. All eleven were former members of the Arnis de la Paix.
As this crisis developed within the municipal council, agitation began
once again on the streets of Limoges, melding political and religious issues.
Supporters of the traditional clergy circulated a petition calling for the reinstallation of the refractory cure of the parish Saint-Michel, as well as the
four college professors. Their efforts produced a number of public disputes,
and four petition gatherers were finally charged with undermining respect
for the law. The municipal council deplored this divisive situation, which it
attributed to the continued provocations of the former Arnis, the efforts of
refractory priests and the college professors, and the formation of the controversial dragoons. An assembly of National Guards, meeting on March 29,
supported the position of the municipal council but laid responsibility for
liB, Jouhaud,
La Reuolut icin l-rancaisc ell linurusin, 7')-X 1; I.con jouh.rud,
tionaux {l Limoges, auant la Convention (Limoges. 1040),4.')-47.
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the current troubles explicitly on the existence of the company of dragoons.
The guardsmen blamed the dragoons for a number of recent duels, legally
prohibited, and two public brawls during the previous weeks. The municipal council, itself under public attack, appealed for help to the district administration, which in turn appealed to the departmental
directory. The directory responded by ordering the convocation of sectional assemblies so
that active citizens might calmly discuss their differences, an action that municipal officials feared would exacerbate, not resolve, the current difficulties.
Nonetheless, sectional assemblies were scheduled for April 4.
On the eve of those assemblies, armed groups gathered on Limoges street
corners. Small bands of uniformed dragoons moved about town taunting
their Jacobin opponents as tensions once again reached a dangerous level.
The mayor responded to the immediate threat by ordering the National
Guard to disband the armed groups, and in this manner, calm was restored.
But with regard to the larger problem of political polarization, the municipal council, still meeting without its moderate members, remained tentative
and unsure. Once again, it appealed to a higher authority, this time directly
to the departmental administration,
requesting postponement
of the sectional assemblies and suspension of the dragoons. The departmental council
approved the former request and ruled that the municipality itself had the
authority to order the latter action. On April 6, the municipality issued that
order, instructing the dragoons to rejoin their regular National Guard units.
Few of them returned to the National Guard, but the company of dragoons
was effectively dismantled."
In a later report, the municipal council charged that the former members
of the Amis de la Paix, deprived of their armed company, now turned to the
Royal-Navarre regiment for support. Most of the soldiers in this regiment
were German, barely conversant in French and not well loved by the populace, despite their valiant efforts at the time of the Limoges fire. With the
demise of the dragoons, the Royal-Navarre increased its nightly patrols. It
was not long before an incident occurred; but only insults, and no blows,
were exchanged. Still, the Royal-Navarre commander, Montigny, ordered
his men henceforth to patrol with charged guns, prepared to meet force with
force. The municipal council considered this an entirely unwarranted
response and warned Montigny that he would be held responsible for any
69. A. D. Haute- Vienne, Lk
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trouble. Montigny refused to retract his order and doubled the patrols. On
April 19, six municipal officers, plus the mayor, signed an order referring the
entire affair to the National Assembly and requesting the transfer of the
Royal-Navarre
regiment. Seven notables objected that the full council had
not been consulted, but the officers ruled that this was not required for
a simple police matter. Several former Amis appealed to a rump session of
the departmental
directory, meeting without three of its members and the
procureur-general-syndic,
and secured a request to the minister of war for
postponement
of any transfer. However, the full directory, with its Jacobin
members in attendance, soon reversed this decision. Both factions now decided to take their case to the highest authority. The former Arnis and their
supporters drafted yet another petition to the Constituent Assembly, which
was countered by a petition written by Jacobin club members.
The petition of the former Amis claimed that the National Guard was to
blame for the recent troubles, that the April 19 municipal order had been
illegally drafted, and that the municipal council had lost the confidence
of the populace. More than two hundred people signed this petition. The
jacobin club countered that the Amis de la Paix supporters were a collection
of former nobles and wealthy individuals who sought to protect their own
interests by undermining the Revolution, that the dragoons and the RoyalNavarre regiment had served those interests, and that the municipal council
had acted responsibly and constitutionally
throughout the affair. More than
four hundred residents of Limoges signed the Jacobins' petition. The name
of Leonard Gay-Vernon, recently elected bishop, headed the list of signatures, which also included the names of a number of municipal and district
officials. The minister of war did order the transfer of the Royal-Navarre
regiment, but not before a May 16 brawl had left several national guardsmen
seriously injured."
The departure of the Royal-Navarre
regiment brought an end to the
armed confrontations
on the streets of Limoges, but it did not resolve the
opposition between moderates and radicals in local politics. Indeed, Amis de
la Paix supporters regained control of the municipal council in the elections
of late 1791. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Caen, where there
was no prolonged struggle for control of municipal politics. The challenge
70. A. D. Haute- Vicnnc, L8 I 2 and 11K 1o , (Pamphlet
relarif au con flit opposanr la municipalire de Limoges au regiment de dragons, [79 I). See also jouhaud,
Les Cordes nationaux,
45-47·
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to the "patriot party" came largely from the nobility, and as nobles emigrated or withdrew from public life (as most did), the issue became moot.
Local elections in Caen were relatively uncontentious,
and the local political
elite was remarkably unified. In Limoges, on the other hand, the conflict between the Arnis de la Paix and the Jacobins had fractured local unity and
created an intensely politicized atmosphere by the end of 179 I. The transfer
of the Royal-Navarre may have defused the potential for violence, but in essence it removed from the scene only pawns in the political conflict. The former Amis continued to be active in local affairs, and the erstwhile dragoons
remained available, though unorganized. The confrontation
between radicals and moderates never produced the sort of violent and deadly dash that
Nimes had witnessed in 1790, but the tension lay always just below the surface. Most importantly, as in Nimes, Marseille, and Lyon, this political rivalry brought artisans and workers firmly into the political arena, as the
bourgeois leaders of the Jacobins and of the Amis sought support among
the sans-culottes. In Caen, by contrast, the popular classes remained on the
fringes of local politics.
The election of a constitutional bishop in February, 1791, contributed to
the tense situation in Limoges. The bishop's palace was located there, and
we have already seen evidence of the public controversy in the city over the
civil oath of the clergy. The choice of Leonard Gay-Vernon as the new
bishop introduced to public prominence a fervent Jacobin who would exercise a strong influence on local affairs throughout the Revolution. GayVernon, born into a Saint-Leonard family "de petite noblesse," had most
recently served as cure in Compreignac,
a town of about two thousand
people roughly fifteen miles north of Limoges, where he had been elected
mayor in 1790. His election as bishop came on the third ballot, and then
only by a slim margin over the Abbe Gouttes, a delegate to the Constituent
Assembly. The former bishop, Duplessis d' Argentre, denounced the election
of Gay-Vernon and called on all priests to reject his leadership."
Gay-Vernon was affiliated with the Limoges Jacobin club almost from its
creation and became president not long after his election as bishop. His
brother, Jean Baptiste, was also a priest and a member of the dub. The new
bishop named his brother an episcopal vicar, and in 1792, the latter was
elected to the departmental administration.
When Gay-Vernon left for Paris
in late 1791 as a delegate to the Legislative Assembly, he remained in con7'· Fray-Fournier,
Le Depnrtemeni
Francaisc en Limousin, .12.4- I 26.

de la Haute- v icnne, II, 16(,; jouhaud,
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stant contact with his brother and the Jacobin club. One departmental administrator attributed to the bishop "the greater number of the troubles that
afflicted the Limousin ....
He became the motive force behind all the intrigues and follies of the c1ub."72 The influence of Gay-Vernon on attitudes
in Limoges cannot be denied. In April, 1794, he estimated at 380 the number of letters he had already sent to the Limoges Jacobins. We will see that
his letters were not ignored.73
The civil constitution of the clergy remained a divisive issue in Limoges
through the summer of J 79 I. On August 6, the departmental directory, with
Petiniaud de Beaupeyrat as president, provisionally suspended a law of june 1
that called for the creation of four parishes in Limoges. The directory complained that the proposed parish lines, drawn lip by the district (allegedly
under pressure from Bishop Gay- Vernon), were haphazard and irrational. A
crowd gathered in front of the departmental meeting hall to protest the decision. Petiniaud felt morally compelled to resign rather than revoke the suspension, leaving that action to the remainder of the departmental directory.
In the minds of Limoges moderates, Petiniaud's resignation represented the
hounding from office of a man of substance and integrity, a leading figure of
the traditional elite who linked, by virtue of his title and commercial activities, the second and third estates. For Petiniaud's detractors, his resignation
marked another victory for Limoges jacobins."
Despite the apparent victory of the Jacobin club over the Amis de la Paix
and the radicalization
of the municipality, the Limoges moderates rallied
their forces to make a comeback in the fall of 1791. In early November,
Louis Naurissart,
directeur de la monnaie, was elected mayor; and the
newly elected municipal council was dominated by wealthy negociants, including Petiniaud de Beaupeyrat as a notable. It is difficult to pinpoint the
reason for this turnaround,
but the Limoges sans-culottes had a simple explanation. A letter written by members of the z.nd Battalion of HauteVienne volunteers, sent from their camp in Villers-Cotterets
to the Jacobin
club in Limoges, clearly expresses their suspicion of vote buying:
Permit us to offer you our felicitations on the good fortune that our town will
enjoy under the paternal government of Naurissart, Marc Dubois and other excellent citizens, whom an infernal cabal has kept from official position up to this
72.. 1'. Granet, "Extraits du journal de Gcnebrias
Historiques dtt Limousin, IV (f H92), 3 H2.
73. Fr.ry-Fournier,
Le C/1Ib des [acobins, xx.
74. A.N., F' .\697 (report of the departmental
August,
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time ....
We are sure that aristocrats,
swindlers, refractory
priests, speculators,
nuns, and prostitutes have sung a Te Deum, as thanksgiving,
for so happy an
event ....
As for those indignant patriots, perhaps they made a long face, but what
does it matter?! They have dominated too long! Moreover, most of them have no
money and cannot buy the votes of active citizens. All irony aside, brothers and
friends ... we view the counter-revolution
as accomplished
in our town. But please
caution our rich municipal officials and their promoters that they respect our families, or else we will come and give them a lesson that will long be spoken of; and
we will not take twenty days to make the trip to Limoges, as we did to come to
this place."

One sees that the Limoges patriots at least had a sense of humor, but the
situation for them was a serious one. In a response to the z.nd Battalion, the
Jacobin club admitted that its meetings were now sparsely attended and that
emigres were boldly returning to their homes. Revolutionary
fervor seemed
to have waned.
Louis Naurissart had been mayor of Limoges before, from December,
1780, until August, 1784. He had been a third-estate delegate to the Estates
General, where his efforts on the finance committee had eventually procured
300,000 livres in aid for the Limoges fire victims. In March,
179 I, he had
resigned as deputy after a public furor in Limoges over his allegedly poor
attitude and his conservatism. His hotel in Limoges was one of the most stylish in town, and in 1788, he completed construction
of a luxurious rural
chateau. "He loved to play the grand seigneur, protecting the arts, the artists, and the comedians. He truly had the temperament of an aristocrat, enjoying, moreover, the fortune necessary to maintain a role conforming to the
tastes of the haute-bourgeoisie. "7(' His rudeness and inability to manage
crowds proved serious liabilities during his second tenure as mayor.
A challenge to the Naurissart mayoralty came in February, 1792, barely
three months after the elections. The trouble was occasioned by the return
to Limoges of two commissioners, Ganny and Begougne, sent by the municipality to take delivery of grain purchased the previous fall in Vatan and
Chateauroux. The two, members of the Jacobin club, had nearly been killed
in Chateauroux
during a riot aimed at preventing the removal of the grain.
They returned empty-handed,
despite the fact that the grain had allegedly
75· The letter is reprinted in jouhaud, La Revolution Francoise en Limousin, 100-101.
76. Ernest Vincent, "Souvenirs de la Revolution: Les tribulations
d'un ancien maire de Limoges," Le Populaire du Centre (October, 1958). Vincent wrote a series of historical articles
for this newspaper, which have been clipped and filed in the library of the departmental
archives.
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been paid for by the previous commissioners, Mallet and Garraud. Denunciations of the municipal council abounded. Citizens of Limoges demanded
a public accounting of the mission, which Ganny and Begougne were willing to give but which the municipal council apparently opposed. The departmental administration
initially ordered that the report be given behind closed doors, fearing for the safety of those who rnight be implicated.
Jacobin supporters decried this precaution as an effort to protect Mallet and
Garraud.
Two days later, on February 26, the mayor and several municipal officials
reported to the departmental
directory that a crowd planned to escort
Ganny and Begougne to town hall the next day on "a chariot of triumph."
They feared a riot. The directory issued orders to National Guard commanders to select twelve men from each company for the protection of the departrnental and district directories and the municipal council. They also
ordered two gendarmerie brigades to form mounted patrols for crowd control. It soon became clear, however, that the National Guard was divided
over the issue and itself posed a threat to public order. The departmental
and district directories met the next afternoon in emergency session and
read a petition from Ganny and Begougne describing their dilemma: if they
reported in public, they would violate an order; and if they did not, they
would be accused of duplicity, and their lives would be in danger. As the
administrators
discussed the situation, a group of armed national guardsmen invaded the meeting hall, and a spirited crowd gathered in the courtyard. The administrators
refused to continue in the presence of armed men
but finally agreed to a semipublic hearing the following day.
Naurissart did not attend that hearing, announcing by letter that the current threat to his safety prevented him from attending. Begougne reported
on the two commissioners'
recent mission, recounting the dangers they had
encountered. He mentioned three letters that he and Ganny had sent to the
Limoges municipality. All three had gone unanswered, greatly discrediting them in the eyes of the Chateauroux
officials. A report from Garraud
and Mallet was read as well, increasing the tumult in the hall. Begougne
responded bitterly to that report, denouncing its authors and the mayor.
At this point the National Guard brought laurel crowns to Ganny and
Begougne, which they graciously accepted. They called on the crowd to respect property and the law and suggested that Mallet and Garraud be given
until April I to either deliver the grain or rerum the money. The crowd
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seemed satisfied at this and moved off to pay visits to the homes of Mallet,
Garraud, and Naurissart, where they contented themselves with obtaining
drink and a small amount of grain;"
On February 29, a letter arrived from the Indre administration,
stating that the situation had been resolved, that calm had returned to Chateauroux, and that the grain would eventually be delivered. It is difficult to
assign responsibility for this colossal mix-up, but Naurissart must be criticized for his failure to respond to the commissioners'
three letters, barring
the unlikely possibility that he received none of them. The mayor apparently
failed to respond to another letter as well, this one from a farmer in a nearby
village, who claimed he had written to Naurissart offering to supply Limoges with all the grain it needed. He was very surprised at receiving no
response, since he had previously supplied tbe town and had shown he could
be trusted." The best that can be said of the mayor is that he failed to diligently carry out his responsibilities in this instance. Perhaps he was hoping
to favor friends in the merchant community
with contracts for the procurement of grain. Clearly, there were those in Limoges who suspected such
manipulation
at the time, but there is no hard evidence to demonstrate
collusion.
Naurissart informed the town council on February 29 that the threat to
his personal safety would prevent him from attending meetings in the foreseeable future. He promised to remain in regular communication,
so as not
to abandon completely his duties, and to keep the council informed of his
address in Paris." His letters soon ceased, however, and by August, the departmental administration
had dismissed Naurissart for failure to perform
the functions of his office.
This episode marks the return of the Jacobin club to a preeminent position in Limoges politics. Its demands for a public accounting had prevailed
in February. In August, following the toppling of the monarchy in Paris, the
Limoges sections refused to adjourn after electing a new mayor until a complete renewal of the municipal council had been carried out. Voters chose a
new council, with eleven of the thirteen officers Jacobin club members, and
77. A. D. J-LllItc- Vienne, L 197· This dossier contains a departmental/noces-verbal
ing the events of February 24 - 29,1 792.
7H. A. D. Haute- Vienne, LH 50 (March
12., 1792,
statement
of M, Lafleur,
Marcheval).
79. A. D. Haute- Vienne, Lg 50 (Na urissurt letter of February 29, 1792).
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that even more dearly

An understanding
of the events and personalities of the early years of the
Revolution is essential to a full appreciation of the developments of 1793.
During those two or three years, revolutionary politics took shape in the
towns and cities of provincial France. This period marked a transition from
the politics of the Old Regime, restricted in terms of both access and authority, to the more open and responsible politics of the new regime. It was a
period of flux, because the new regime remained in a process of definition.
Traditional elites either faded from the scene or were thrust from it, to be
replaced by new elites. In both Caen and Limoges, those new elites took it
upon themselves to define and control the local political arena. As we have
seen, members of the elite in Caen proved much more successful in that
effort than their counterparts
in Limoges.
In neither city, however, was the struggle for political power a particularly
bloody one. From 1789 to 1792, both Caen and Limoges experienced a controlled popular fervor and tumult that only rarely erupted into violence. In
Caen, the murder of Belzunce and the later killing of Bayeux were looked
upon with shock and dismay by the generally law-abiding populace. Even
among the sans-culottes, as far as we can tell, neither act was trumpeted as a
noble blow for patriotism, though the bulk of the populace dearly perceived
both men as enemies of the Revolution. The Affair of 84, rife with the potential for bloodshed, was controlled by the municipal authorities. Even later,
during the Terror, those accused would suffer no more than imprisonment.
In Limoges, the 1790 fire and the more serious grain shortage may have
subdued the crowd and helped prevent popular violence. Or perhaps his own
prudence allowed Naurissart to escape the fate of Bayeux and Be1zunce. Certainly the situation during that episode was as delicate as any that Caen
experienced.
Religious divisions produced by the civil constitution of the clergy increased the political tension in both departments. Difficulties were greatest
in the two chefs-lieux, where the controversy brought the resignations of Lc
Forestier de Vendoeuvre and Petiniaud de Beaupeyrar. The election of conRo. A. D. Huurc-Vienne,
1.1 Hz. (August N, 1792, letter (rom Limoges citizens to dcparrmenral administration),
and L44 I (documents pertaining ro municipal elections and personnel).
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stitutional bishops in each case delivered to office dynamic individuals who
went on to play important roles in local politics. Both Gay-Vernon and
Faucher maintained an active interest in, and influence on, local affairs after
their departure to Paris; and it is significant that in I 793, one supported the
Montagnards
while the other allied himself with the Girondins.
These two men provide examples of the ties that developed between Paris
and the two towns in the years before I793. Other deputies, as well, actively
corresponded
with their friends and former colleagues back home. These
personal links were very important, and official and institutional
ties were
also influential. The departmental
administrations
were, of course, in frequent contact with the various ministers in Paris. The jacobin clubs exchanged letters with the mother club in Paris and with affiliated clubs in
other towns, thereby creating a national network capable of mobilizing political action. The break between the Caen and Paris jacobins was thus a
crucial development, eliminating an important outside input into local political attitudes. Newspapers provided a final important source of information from Paris. Neither the regional paper in Caen nor that in Limoges
offered more than brief reports from the capital and other major cities. But
we have seen that in Caen, Le Courtier dans les Departements was regularly
read to public gatherings. Bougon-Longrais
had first ordered the Gorsas
paper for the municipal council on his mission to Paris in early I790. The
Jacobin club in Limoges also received the Gorsas journal but canceled its
subscription
in December, I792, dissatisfied with the moderate tone that
Gorsas had adopted."
Other differences between Caen and Limoges were of a more fundamental
importance. In Calvados, a strong nobility remained active in local politics
in I789 and I790, and when in 1791 the nobles saw their position seriously
threatened, they mounted an effort to restore it, unsuccessful though it was.
In nearly every serious confrontation
in Caen between I789 and I792, it
was an aristocratic action, or a perceived threat from the aristocracy, that
was the instigating factor. For the people of Caen, the Revolution very
clearly pitted the third estate against the vested interests of the aristocracy.
In the Limousin, on the other hand, the aristocracy was not a dominant force in 1789. Although some nobles occupied positions of power,
most disappeared from local administration
in the 1790- 1791 term. AntiJ

81. A. C. Caen, II; Fray-Fournier,
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aristocratic sentiments were sometimes displayed, but these were secondary
to the conflict between haut-bourgeois and moyen-bourgeois
elements. According to Fray-Fournier, the dynamic aspect of the Revolution in Limoges
was "I'idee bourgeoise centre l'idee dernocrarique.":"
This analysis seems
appropriate. in a forecast of nineteenth-century
politics, we see in Limoges
the haute-bourgeoisie
seeking a restricted electorate and limited popular
participation, while the moyenne-bourgeoisie
sought a broad-based, broadly
participative democracy. By 1793, the latter would triumph. The Caen bou rgeoisie, more cohesive than the Limoges elite, proved more successful in limiting the political activity of the popular classes, first by bringing to heel the
Caen Jacobins and then by supporting the Carabots, a much more moderate
and quiescent group.
in Limoges, the central social conflict occurred within the political arena,
disrupting and dividing the municipal administration
of 179 I - 1792. The
bitter struggle between the Arnis de la Paix and the Jacobin club embroiled
the municipal council. The Jacobins not only prevailed as the dominant club
in Limoges but gained control of the municipal council in 1792. In Caen, the
fundamental
conflict pitted wealthy bourgeois merchants against the nobility, a group in the process of being excluded from political participation.
This conflict erupted most often on the edges of organized politics, with
little real impact on them, and allowed the haute-bourgeoisie
to remain virtually unchallenged in political office until after the federalist revolt.
The nature of the political arena was thus radically different in these two
towns when the federalist revolt erupted in 1793. In Caen, the commercial
elite dominated the municipal council and, along with the departmental administration, controlled local politics. in Limoges, the commercial elite had
been forced from office by an active and powerful Jacobin club, which at
least to some extent represented the interests of workers and artisans. The
club and its supporters would assert themselves again in 1793 to steer Limoges away from the federalist camp; but in Caen, Jacobin forces had long
since been neutralized.
82. Fray-Fournier,

Le Club des [acobins, xi.

Three

Crisis in National Politics
I792-I793

On August IO, I792, in a successful version of the aborted
June 20 uprising, the drama of the Revolution shifted from the chambers of
the Legislative Assembly to the streets of Paris. Headed by the MarseIlle
(ederes and contingents from several other towns, some twenty thousand
men assaulted the Tuileries palace, forcing the king to flee to the Assembly,
where ultimately he would be suspended from office. The attack climaxed
several months of antiroyalist agitation in the forty-eight sections of Pans
and heralded the fall of the monarchy in France. I
Albert Soboul has written that the six weeks following August TO profoundly affected the course of the Revolurioa: The collapse of the monarchy
alone would justify such a claim, but three further developments confirm the
verity of this statement. First among these was the creation on August JO of
the Insurrectionary Commune in Paris. This semilegal body grew out of the
correspondence committee of the forty-eight sections, which had played a
prominent role in organizing the assault on the Tuileries and constituted en
permanence a central organ of the Paris sections. Moderate deputies in the
Legislative Assembly accused the COlTIlllUne of "dictatorship
and the usurpation of power," but radical deputies came to its defense, lauding the patriotism of the common people. The opposition between the revolutionary
I.
2.

George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revo/ution
Soboul, The French Reuolutio«, 259.

(London,

1959),

1.0l-1

05.

.

CRIS.IS

IN NATIONAL

POLITICS

71

Commune and the Legislative Assembly evolved into Parisian antipathy toward the Girondin deputies in the National Convention and remained a crucial component of national politics over the next nine months.'
The second important development was the August I I decree of the Legislative Assembly calling for the election of a National Convention.
Although the Convention's principal mandate was to draft a new constitution,
it came to exercise powers more extensive than those of the Legislative Assembly. Within four days of its convocation, the Convention had abolished
the monarchy and proclaimed a republic. Thereafter, it assumed a legislative, executive, and judicial role and ruled France for three full years,
longer than either of its predecessors.
Finally, the September massacres in the prisons of Paris confirmed in the
minds of most Frenchmen an unsavory image of the Parisian crowd. The
provinces, too, despaired over the failing war effort and experienced the hysterical fear of counterrevolution
that inspired the September massacres. In
Limoges in mid-July, an angry crowd had beaten to death the Abbe Chabrol
just after the declaration of fa patrie en danger. Chabrol had refused to relinquish weapons in his possession to army volunteers. Georges Bayeux was
murdered in Caen even as the prisons were being attacked in the capital. But
the atrocities in Paris defied comprehension,
and the September 3 circular
sent by the Commune to the departments, allegedly written by Marat in justification of the executions, earned for Parisians the label of anarchtstes and
for its author a reputation as the leading buueur de sang."
The nature of the August 10 revolution made the calling of new elections
a delicate task for the Legislative Assembly. In the days immediately following August 10, the deputies issued a number of circulars explaining the tumultuous events of that day and outlining recommended procedures for departmental electoral assemblies. These circulars addressed two principal
concerns. The first was to maintain the authority of the Assembly during the
interim period until the Convention could be opened. The suspension of the
king, and the very calling of elections, implicitly called into question the Assembly's legitimacy. Sovereignty now lay, some said, with the people; and to
avoid dissension and potential chaos, the deputies adopted a cautious tone
}. Ibid., 259-60.
4· Rude, The Crowd ill the French Reuolution,
from that letter: "et sans doure 1<1 nation eutiere ...
sairc de salur public."
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assemblies

took the form of rec-

ommendations
rather than decrees.
The second concern, more important in the context of this study, was the
question
of how to describe the events of August 10. Acknowledgment
of the
predominant
role of the Paris Commune would further undermine the authority
and leadership of the Legislative Assembly. In addition, such an account
might fuel counterrevolutionary
sentiments in the country. The first
attack
on the Tuileries, on June 20, had elicited a wave of protests from departmental
administrators,
many of whom remained monarchist in their
sympathies.
Even within the Assembly, there were those who feared and resented the growing militancy of the Paris sections. To credit the Paris Com[nune with the fall of the monarchy might have deepened the divisions in
both the Legislative Assembly and the nation at large. In its Exposition des
MotifS, the Assembly therefore focused on the actions of the king, its own
determined
opposition to his intransigence, and the final provocations that
had brought about the spontaneous uprising of the people, including the
(idires. The report never mentioned the Insurrectionary Commune.'
_
Late in August, the jacobin club of Pans Issued a Circular of Its own. I'he
Tableau comfJarati( des sept appels norninaux (eV.-10 aout 1792, a SUIllmary of the voting on the most important issues debated in the Legislative
Assembly,
was intended to inform electoral assemblies of the voting records
of those deputies who might be considered for reelection. The suspension of
the king, the continuing problem of emigres and refractory priests, and the
lagging
war effort all had combined to produce a mood of antiroyalism in
much of the country. The Tableau comparati] identified those deputies who
had voted in support of the monarchy in the Legislative Assembly and recrnmended that they not be reelected. The circular reached barely half of the
~lectoral
assemblies, and as most of these convened on September 2, it arived in many cases too late to be considered. Its effect is difficult to meal'
e but in all of France, only one deputy who had consistently supported
s~~ :nonarchy on the listed votes won reelection. This deputy, interestingly
r noUgh, was Pierre Francois Henry-Lariviere,
a lawyer from the district of
~alaise
in Calvados and a future supporter of the Girondins. Alison Patrick
ibutes his reelection to the fact that officials 111 Bayeux the site of the
attr
..
. .'
.
.
calvados
electoral assembly, deliberately delayed prmnng and circulating
the

Tableau."
5·

6.

p;ltrick, The Men of the First French Republic, 150- I 5r ,
thid., 145-4g,
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The election of deputies to the Convention proceeded in two stages. Primary assemblies met in late August to choose departmental electors, who in
turn elected the deputies. Despite the recent declaration of universal male
suffrage by the Legislative Assembly (eliminating the category of "passive"
citizen), few voters turned out. Nationwide, as few as 20 percent of eligible
voters participated
in primary assemblies. Given the existing political climate, it is possible that monarchists chose to stay away from the assemblies;
certainly, the exigencies of the harvest reduced participation;
and resentment over the constitutional
oath may have had an adverse effect. Despite
the small turnout, there is little evidence that a republican minority or the
popular societies unduly influenced either the primary or the electoral assemblies. Most of the latter met in small towns, not in the departmental
chefs-lieux where popular societies exerted their greatest influence."
Electoral assemblies were held during the first two weeks of September,
and the majority were carried out in orderly and expeditious fashion. Some
took as little as four days to complete their task. Others turned their attention to local affairs as well and met for two weeks or more. Of the 750 deputies elected, 20 I had been members of the Legislative Assembly; only 83 had
been representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Outnumbering
both these
groups combined were the approximately
300 deputies whose only political
experience was in local administration.
Thus, while electors preferred candidates with some political experience (fewer than 10 percent had none whatsoever), previous national office was not always the best recommendation.'
The men chosen in those elections would guide France for the next eight
months, and many would remain in office for three years. The most active
among them would function as interpreters of the political climate in the
capital for their constituents. Their correspondence
constituted an important link between national and local politics during the turbulent period
leading up to the revolution of May 31. Indeed, local perceptions of events
in Paris strongly influenced provincial responses to the proscription of the
Girondin deputies. It is therefore essential to understand the composition
and character of the delegations sent to the Convention from Calvados and
in these votes, bur the record shows that he was absent for all but two of the votes and voted yes
on the impeachment
of Lafayette. Still, his record in the Convention
puts him clearly in the
royalist camp.
7· lbid., 152-55.
8. l/)id.,170-TL,
229- 30. Patrick and Godechot,
in Lcs lnstitutions de la France, disagree slightly in their estimates of deputies who had experience in local politics. I have therefore
adopted the approximate
figure of 300.
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the Haute-Vienne, as well as the lines of communication
that developed between them and their constituencies. Such understanding
brings into clearer
focus the process by which the crisis in national politics of winter and
spring, 1793, had become a nationwide crisis by the summer of that year.
In Calvados, the electoral assembly convened on September 2 in the town of
Bayeux. Although this episcopal seat was located less than twenty miles
from Caen, the political attitudes of its citizens were more conservative than
those in the departmental chef-lieu. Throughout the Revolution, Bayeux remained a royalist and aristocratic stronghold of the department.
Claude
Faucher, upon his arrival in Calvados as the newly elected constitutional
bishop, found the town to be decidedly inhospitable. In July, 1791, Faucher,
along with his vicar-general, Chaix-d'Estanges,
stood as defendants before
the Bayeux district tribunal for having allegedly changed two Bayeux street
signs from "Louis XVI" and "Place Royale" to "Fauchet" and "Parjure." It
is scarcely credible that Fauchet would have committed such a frivolous indiscretion, but the charges do illustrate the chilly reception the new bishop
received in Bayeux. In any case, a general amnesty granted by the king on
September 15,1791, reprieved both men."
It is impossible to assess the effect of the location of the assembly on the
election results. Certainly, it did remove the assembly from the direct influence of the Caen Jacobin club; and the reluctance of the Bayeux authorities
to publish the Jacobin Tableau comparatifhas
already been noted. But one
can say little more.
Doulcet de Pontecoulant, whom we have already encountered in the affair of the Criminal Tribunal, presided over the assembly. Doulcet, who held
the title of count, was born in 1766 into an old noble family, originally of
Savoy, which had held the seigneurie of Pontecoulant since the eleventh century. He had risen to the rank of lieutenant in the army and had founded the
Jacobin club in the district seat of Vire, near the family estate in Conde-surNoireau, south of Caen. In 1792, he served as president of the departmental
administration.1o
The electoral assembly chose another familiar figure, Bougon-Longrais,
then secretary to the departmental council, as its secretary, but illness forced
Bougon to cede his place to Louis Jean Taveau, a departmental
adrnin9. Lesage (Esnaulr), 65-6X; Hufton,
r o. A. D. Calvados, F2.080 (Nouvelles

Bayeux in the Late Eighteenth
Acquisitions).
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istrator from Honfieur. Bougon's absence from the Bayeux assembly, and his
presence in Caen, may have fueled the public suspicion regarding his role in
the murder of Georges Bayeux, the procurer-general-syndic
whose aristocratic jury list had attracted such vehement criticism.
The assembly session itself proceeded uneventfully, with no serious disruptions or disputes. But news of trouble in Caen interrupted the proceedings on September 6. Several Caen municipal officials had been imprisoned
temporarily in the Chateau after ordering the release of Georges Bayeux.
The assembly sent a delegation (including Jean Michel Barbot, the future
president of the Carabot club) to assist in calming the angry crowd in Caen.
They succeeded in securing the release of the municipal officials but could
not prevent the death of the unfortunate Bayeux."
The assembly had already completed the election of deputies to the Convention when this disruption occurred. Table 2. lists the delegates from Calvados, with their occupations, districts, and previous political experience.
Several important characteristics
of the delegation merit comment. First,
none of the Calvados delegates were political novices. All but two, Fauchet
and Dubois Dubais, had previous political experience in local administration-eight
had served as municipal officials, one as a district administrator,
and five on the departmental
council. Several had served at more than one
level. A second notable feature is the experience of these deputies in national
assemblies. Only one of the thirteen Calvados deputies, de Cussy, had been a
member of the Constituent
Assembly, a proportion
corresponding
very
closely to that in the Convention as a whole. But whereas 2.7 percent of all
deputies to the Convention had been delegates to the Legislative Assembly,
six of the Calvados deputies (46 percent of the delegation) had been members of that body. We have seen that one of them, Hcnry-Lanvierc,
had compiled a voting record that should have assured his rejection by the voters.
Finally, the delegation, in its geographic distribution, represented the entire
department.
All six of the districts were represented, and no district sent
more than three deputies. Three of the deputies, Lamont, Bonnet, and de
Cussy, had personal experience in Caen municipal affairs. Five others had
spent substantial time in the chef-lieu as departmental administrators
or, in
the case of Fauchet, as bishop and president of the jacobin club.
II.
A. D. Calvados, L.0074 (Elecrions et .icrifs 1790-92.),
and Ll012.4 (doclllllenrs pertaining to repression of the federalist revoir). Harbor's role in the incident was detailed in a '79}
letter from his wife 1:0 Robert Linder, then on mission to Caen, pleading for the release of her
husband.

TABLE

2

Calvados

Deputies

Name
(in Order of Election)
-----

to the National

Occupation

Convention

District

---------------

------

Faucher (Claude)

bishop

Bayeux

Dubois Dubais' (Louis
Thibaut)
Lemont (Claude Jean
Baptiste)

cavalry captain

Lisieux

procureur du
roi a la rnonnaie de Caen

Caen

lawyer

Falaise

Henry-Lariviere
Francois)

(Pierre

Bonnet de Meautry"
(Pierre Louis)

military

Vardon (Louis Alexandre Jacques)

lawyer

Falaise

Doulcet de Pontecoulant (Gustave)
Taveau (Louis Jean)

army
lieutenant
negocianr

Vire

Jouenne du Longchamp (Thomas
Francois Ambroise)
Dumont (Louis
Philippe)

doctor

Lisieux

lawyer

Vire

directeur de la
rnonnaie de
Caen

Caen

de Cussy' (Gabriel)

Previous Political
Experience

officer

Caen

Pont
I'Eveque

Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
departmental
adrninistrator (1790-1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
municipal procureur
(1790-1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
mayor (179")
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
municipal official
(1790)
departmental
adrninisrrator (1790-1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
departmental
adrninistraror (1791-1792)
municipal official
(1790-1791 )
departmental
adrninisrraror (1791 -1792)
municipal official
(1791-1792)
district administrator
(1790-1791 )
departmental
adrninistraror (1791-1792)
Constituent Assembly
member (1789- J 791)
municipal official
(1791-1792)
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(continued)

Name
(in Order of Election)

Occupation

Previous Political
Experience

District

Legot (Alexandre)

lawyer

Falaise

Philippe-Delleville
(Jean Francois)

lawyer

Bayeux

"Member

POLITICS

municipal
official
(1791-1792)
municipal
official
(1791-1792)

of the nobility.

Sources: A vartety of biographical
and administrative
the Calvados Depa rrrnenral
Archives.

records

from

the

Revolution

located

in

In addition

to the thirteen deputies, the assembly elected five suppleants
unable to fulfill their duties. The first of these was
Pierre Jacques Samuel Charry l'aine, a Protestant negociant from Caen.
Chatry had been active in municipal politics since J789, first as a member of
the Caen General Committee and then as municipal officer and notable. In
November, 1791, he declined election as mayor of Caen, arguing that it
would undermine public welfare for a Protestant to serve as mayor at a time
of considerable public ferment over religious opinions. One year later, his
younger brother, Jean Louis Isaac, declined the same post because of his
conflicting position as a departmental administrator. Both held local public
office in 1793 and played leading roles in the federalist revolt. Charry never
took a seat in the Convention; but he was elected to the Council of Elders in
year VII, moved on to the Legislative Corps the following year, and was
eventually named to the Legion of Honor. 12
Little is known about the circumstances in which the Haute- Vienne electoral assembly met. The department was one of only four that did not send a
full account of the proceedings to Paris. 1.1 Nor does a prods-verbal
from the
assembly exist in the departmental archives. The absence of a detailed report
suggests that the proceedings were uneventful. The assembly, which met in
Dorat, was presided over by Pierre Dumas, an avocat from Limoges and
then president of the Haute-Vienne Criminal Tribunal, as well as a departmental administrator.
Michel Lacroix, a district official from Bellac, acted
to replace any deputies

12. A. D. Calvados,
L, 0074; A. C. Caen, D I (Delibcrunons
du Corps municipal
er du Conseil General
de la Commune,
I H ft,vrier
'790-:> janvier
1792), [h (4 janvier '792- I I Germinal an II), K:J4 (Mairie
I 790-an
II).
'3· Patrick,
The Mel/ oftb« lirs! French Republic, 14'.
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Convention

District

(Michel)

notary

Bellac

Lesrerpr-Beauvais
(Benoist)
Bordas (Pardoux)

lawyer

Dorar

lawyer

Saint- Yrieix

bishop

Limoges

Faye (Gabriel)

doctor

Saint-Yrieix

Rivaud du Vignaud

military officer

Dorat

avocat au

Limoges

Gay-Vernon
(Leonard)

J

(Francois)

Soulignac (Jean
Baptiste)

parlernenr

Previous Political
Experience
district procureursyndic (1790-1792)
Constituent
Assembly
member (1789-1791)
departmental
administrator (J 790-1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
municipal official (1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
departmental
administrator (1790-1791)
Legislative Assembly
member (1791-1792)
municipal official
(1791-1792)
district procureursyndic (1790-1792)

.r Member
of the nobility.
Sources: Alfred Fray-Fournier,
Le Departemcnt
de la Haute- Vie/me, sa formation territoriale,
SOli administration,
sa situation politique pendant la Revolution
(Limoges, 1908), I, 112- 38;
and a variety of biographical
and administrative
records from the Revolution located in the
Haute-Vienne Departmental
Archives.

as secretary. The Haute- Vienne elected seven deputies to the Convention,
listed in Table 3.

as

Some interesting contrasts between the Haute- Vienne delegation and that
from Calvados are discernible. The most obvious is in the size of the two
delegations-the
Haute- Vienne sent seven deputies, while Calvados sent
thirteen. Three factors determined this: the size, population, and taxes of
each department. Nearly all departments were the same in area, but the "active" population of Cal vados nearly doubled that of the Haute- Vienne, and
Calvados inhabitants paid nearly three times as much in taxes. 14
. 14· Jacques Poucher, Statistique Elernentaire de la France (Paris, ,80\"), '"48-49,153-54.
Each department
measured 2.88 lieues carrees. Calvados numbered just over 60,000 actifs,
compared with approximately
34,000 in the Haute- Vienne. Calvados
was the fifth most highly
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Like the deputies from Calvados, the Haute- Vienne representatives all
had experience in local administration.
The difference here lay in the level of
administration-the
Calvados deputies more often had served as municipal officials, while those from the Haute- Vienne had more experience in district administration.
Experience in departmental
administration
was approximately the same-five
deputies (38 percent) from Calvados and two
deputies (29 percent) from the Haute- Vienne had been departmental
administrators. Experience in national politics was also similar. One HauteVienne deputy had sat in the Constituent Assembly, and three (43 percent)
of the deputies had been members of the Legislative Assembly, a proportion
almost identical to that in Calvados, and significantly above the national
average.
The most striking contrast between the two delegations concerns geographic representation.
We have seen that the Calvados deputation fairly
represented the entire department and that a majority of the deputies had
had some contact with Caen affairs as municipal or departmental officials.
In the Haute- Vienne delegation, however, two districts-Saint-Leonard
and
Saint-Junien-sent
no deputies to the National Convention. If one considers
the three suppliants as well, two of the districts were overrepresentedDorat, where the electoral assembly met, and Bellac. Five of those elected,
fully half, came from this less agitated part of the department.
Whereas
the district of Limoges was well represented-two
deputies and one suppliant-the
town of Limoges was not. Two of the deputies had been departmental administrators
and had therefore spent some time in Limoges. Jean
Baptiste Soulignac had been a district administrator,
but only Gay-Vernon
had been a municipal official in Limoges. Moreover, Gay-Vernon served on
the council of la Cite, the smaller, ecclesiastical section of town that had
been absorbed into Limoges only in November, 1791, just as he left for the
Legislative Assembly.
Overall, two salient characteristics of these delegations to the Convention
should be emphasized. First, the electors in both departments appeared satisfied with the performance of their representatives to the Legislative Assembly. Each department reelected nearly 50 percent of those deputies, and the
two delegations reflected no significant change in political attitudes. The
majority of each would support the Girondins in 1793. Second, whereas
taxed department
in France (combining the contribution mobiliere and the contribution !()/Icierei. Comparing
population with tax load, one sees that Inhabitants of Calvado-, also paid
proportionally
higher taxes than inhahir.uu» of the Haute- Vicnne.
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Caen was well represented among the Calvados deputies to the Convention, the Haute- Vienne delegation included only one deputy who can truly
be said to have represented Limoges, the most important constituency in the
department.
The deputies who gathered in the National Convention on September 20,
1792, faced an extremely important issue-one
that remained largely unresolved over the next eight months. The question of what form the French
state would assume loomed in the trial of Louis XVI and even more explicitly in the debate over a new constitution.
From the day of their arrival in Paris until the end of january, the deputies
devoted most of their energy to the gathering and evaluation of evidence, the
debate over the legitimacy of a trial before the Convention, the actual trial of
Louis XVI, and the final vote on his sentence. This period was a painful and
difficult one for the deputies, who were only too conscious of the gravity of
the judgment that they were called upon to make. They voted not only on
the fate of a king but on the fate of the French republic."
Even after the execution of the king, however, the Convention was unable
to make progress on its primary task. The drafting of a new constitution,
necessitated by the fall of the monarchy, had been the explicit reason for the
calling of the Convention. Exhaustion from the ordeal of the trial may partially explain the deputies' inactivity on this project, but another factor must
also be considered. The growing divisions within the Convention
made
agreement on any important issue virtually impossible. Marie jean Antoine
Condorcet presented his proposal for a constitution to the Convention on
February 15, but no consensus formed in its support. Sitting with Condorcet
on the Constitutional
Committee had been Armand Gensonne, Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud, Jacques Pierre Brissot, and jerome Petion, all associated
with the Girondin faction, and the constitution proposed by Condorcet reflected their views. It would have increased the power of government ministers, at that time predominantly Girondin, and strengthened the role of departmental administrations.
The Mountain attacked the document for its
failure to guarantee political equality and for its excessive federalist tendencies. A stalemate developed that lasted until after the proscription
of the
Girondin deputies."

J

T5· See Daniel P. Jordan, The King's Trial: Louis XV] us. the French Revolution (Berkeley,
979).
16. Sydenharn,
The Girondins, .r49~5I; Godechor, Les Institutions de la France, 275~8J.

CRISIS

IN NATIONAL

POLITICS

81

The trial and execution of the king did not produce much reaction in either
Calvados or the Haute- Vienne. For an explanation of this, we must look back
to the weeks following the unsuccessful June 20 attack on the Tuileries palace. That violent demonstration
by the Paris crowd had elicited nearly universal protest from departmental
administrations.
The directory of the Calvados administration
drafted a letter to the Legislative Assembly on July 2, 1792. In it, the directors lauded the courage of
Louis and the dignified character of the legislators but denounced the factious elements in Paris and stressed that "the French Nation is not in one
faubourg of the capital, in one town, in one department; she is in the union
of all citizens; she is essentially in that honest and good people that loves
liberty, searches for peace, and requires order." The administrators
closed
their letter with an emotional appeal: "We are taking this opportunity to
express to you our feelings. It is finally time that the reign of anarchy cease,
that the Revolution end! The Nation has said: I want to be free, and she
was; she says today: I want calm and order, and she will obtain them; her
will is pronounced." 17
This address reveals sentiments that had already appeared in Caen political life and that would continue to characterize the political attitudes of the
town and the department throughout the following year: the conviction that
the nation was embodied not in the capital but in all French citizens; a denunciation of factious elements; a demand for respect for the law; and finally, a desire for an end to anarchy. The praise of the king, however, and
the call for an end to the Revolution were expressions that would become
unacceptable after the [ournee of August 10 and even more so by January,
I793. That so many such addresses reached Paris in July very likely contributed to the Convention's decision of October 19 calling for the complete renewal of all departmental administrations to purge the royalist element from
these councils." Voters in Calvados reelected none of the seven departmental directors who had signed the July letter. The eighth director, Philippe
Dumont, was elected to the Convention but felt obliged to defend his reputation in an April 28, 1793, letter to the president of the Calvados administration, in which he denied having supported the July address. Dumont
observed that although he and Gustave Doulcet, former president of the department and now also a conuentionnel, had been present at the July 2
[7. A. D. Calvados, Lr ooz y (documents pertaining to departrnental
an II).
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meeting, they had not signed the letter and had in fact argued against it. The
taint of that ill-considered expression of support for the king clearly was not
quickly forgotten.
The Haute- Vienne directory also protested the outrage of June 20 in a
letter to the king. There, however, the backlash was more immediate. The
Limoges Jacobin club denounced the directory's letter at a July 16 meeting,
and on July 27 the club drafted its own letter to the Legislative Assembly
demanding the dismissal of the four directors who had signed the letter
to the king. Joseph Durand de Richemonr, president of the department
and one of the signatories, was one of the founders of the Jacobin club and
was generally popular in Limoges, but he only regained favor after a public
apology. The departmental administration
provisionally replaced the other
three, granting them leaves of absence. None of the three won reelection in
November. I')
The purge of royalist sympathizers from departmental
administrations,
plus the general shift in political attitudes, guaranteed that there would be
few official protests of the king's trial or fate. In both Caen and Limoges, a
solemn mood greeted news of Louis' execution, though in later years patriotic fetes celebrated the anniversary of the king's death.
A greater concern in the early months of [793 was the continuing dissension within the Convention and the growing war crisis, which additionally
hampered efforts to draft a constitution. France had been at war with Austria since April, 1792; and on February I, 1793, only one week after the
execution of the king, the Convention declared war on Great Britain. By
March 7, France had declared war on Spain as well, thereby sowing the
seeds of the First Coalition. Now faced by a more formidable array of enemies, the French armies were also plagued by insufficient provisions and
dwindling numbers. Many volunteers returned home after a single campaign, and by February the army had dropped from 400,000 to 228,000
men. A new requisition of 300,000 soldiers, ordered all February 24, did
not go smoothly. The crippled French army suffered repeated setbacks in a
March campaign into Holland. ln Paris, news of the defeats aroused the
people's patriotism and brought the creation of the Revolutionary Tribunal.
But at the front, fortunes did not improve. Troops under General Charles
Francois Durnouriez, the architect of the Belgian campaign, suffered decisive
I y. l-ruy-I'ournier,
Le Club des [acobins, 61 -67; A. D. Haute- Vienne,
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defeats at Neerwinden and Louvain on March 18 and 2 I . Durnouriez struck
a bargain with Frederic Cobourg, the Austrian commander, agreeing to lead
his troops in an attack on Paris and the Convention to restore the monarchy
under the constitution of 179 L. General Durnouriez
arrested four deputies
sent by the Convention to dismiss him and turned them over to the Austrians. His troops refused to follow him in his treason, though, and in early
April, Dumouriez fled to the safety of the Austrian lines."
Compounding the problems of a failing foreign war was the real threat of
civil war. The British and Austrians were, of course, eager to aid and promote internal attacks on the new regime. But the conscription of 300,000
men, ordered on February 24, was equally responsible for the troubles that
grew in March and April. In the Lozere, the requisition of men revived royalist insurgency behind the leadership of Charrier, a former member of the
Constituent Assembly. Panicky officials in a neighboring department wrote
to the Convention of "a terrible insurrection" and the "massacre of all public officials.":" The most serious revolt, however, occurred in the Vendee.
Bands of peasants, led by nobles and refractory priests, coalesced into a
force large enough to threaten Nantes. At one point, the counterrevolutionaries crossed the Loire to the north, briefly taking Saumur. The Convention, in response, raised a large army, principally composed of volunteers, to
put down this challenge to the Republic. The revolt could not be contained
until October, 1793, and then only temporarily. During the intervening
months, the Vendean counterrevolution
had a profound effect on other departments in western France.
The conscription of 300,000 men provoked resistance in both Caen and
Limoges. On March 3 in Caen, a volatile situation developed on the prairie,
located at the western edge of town. The previous evening, the municipality
had received a hint of the impending trouble in an unsettling letter from one
Louis Bellissent, who claimed he would rather die than join the army. Early
on March 3, a group of women marched to the town hall and demanded the
aid that had been promised to the wives and children of volunteers who had
already been away at the front for months. The news of an additional military requisition did not raise the spirits of these disgruntled women. As they
protested before the town hall, another group of people, some reportedly
armed, gathered at the prairie to resist the recruitrnent. Esnault described
20.
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the group as "young bachelors" anxious to avoid military service." Another
contemporary observer, himself arrested in the confusion later that day, described those resisting recruitment as coming from "classes that did not
share the principles of the Revolution.":" The Carabots reported this unruly,
unpatriotic gathering to the municipal council, which sent several of its
members to disperse the crowd. They failed in their efforts and, at 6:00 P.M.,
gave way to the National Guard, which surrounded the prairie and arrested
some 230 people. Most were released after questioning, but some thirty resisters remained in detention until April ro. Bonnet (of Calvados) and Jean
Michel DuRoy (of the Eure), representatives on mission, ordered their release, citing their youth, the fact that no arms had been found, and the subsequent fulfillment of the recruitment quota. Similar incidents occurred in
other parts of Calvados throughout March, but all were minor. The final
recorded episode came late in the month, when the district directory ordered
the Caen municipal council to arrest a soldier who had been seen in town
wearing a uniform sporting epaulettes made of spinach;"
Trouble arose in Limoges as well. In contrast to the innocuous character of the March 3 troubles in Caen, though, resistance to recruitment in Limoges developed along lines reminiscent of the conflict between the jacobin
club and the Amis de la Paix. Unofficial word of the military requisition arrived on March 5, and a group of 150 young men gathered in the former
church of the Augustins. They asked the municipal council to send a commissioner to preside over the meeting but were refused on the grounds that
the meeting was unlawful, as it lacked prior authorization.
Temporarily befuddled, the delegation to the council left. In the hours that followed, messengers shuttled back and forth between the Augustins and town hall. Those
assembled insisted that authorization
was not required, while the council
cited the disruption of public order in demanding their dispersal. Finally, a
report that "aristocrats"
were present at the Augustins, trying to prevent
young men from volunteering for the army, spurred mayor Deroche and two
municipal officials to successfully break up the meeting.
Around three o'clock the next day, however, four members of the Jacobin
club reported that a new gathering of young men had formed, composed of
"former dragoons, amis de la paix, or individuals who had continually
22. Lesage (Esnaulr), J 03.
23. Sauvage, "Les Souvenirs de J.-B. Renee," 600.
24. A. C. Caen, D2 and 129 (Affaire du Cl mars J 793).
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manifested uncivic opinions." The sizable group had already disrupted public order. The council ordered two companies of grenadiers and chasseurs to
disperse the crowd and arrest the leaders ("les presumes coupables"). Those
arrested included Pierre Balezy, a former notable, and Laforest cadet, both
associated with the Amis de la Paix, along with a number of servants from
some of the prominent Limoges households." There is no evidence that
those arrested were ever brought to trial. Balezy, for example, was continually under suspicion during the following summer but suffered only provisional house arrest because he worked as a teinturier dyeing uniforms for
the army."
Of greater consequence to the Haute- Vienne than the general military
requisition, however, was the call for volunteers and supplies to combat the
Vendean rebels. Revolt had erupted early in March, and on the seventeenth
of that month a special courier from the Charente arrived in Limoges to inform the departmental
administration
of insurrection in the Deux-Sevres,
the Vendee, and neighboring departments. Pardoux Bordas (of the HauteVienne) and J. Borie (of the Correze), representatives on mission, arrived the
same day, sent by the Convention to supervise recruitment. Their work in
the department
proceeded uneventfully, unusual in that elsewhere these
early recruitment missions often inspired resentment. Recruitment for the
army of the Moselle, the general destination of Haute- Vienne volunteers,
went reasonably well, slowed only by the short supply of arms in the department. By March 18, Limoges had already filled its contingent, although
some scattered resistance to recruitment persisted in rural cantons.
In addition to its quota of 3,539 men for the regular army, the HauteVienne also sent, between March and June, more than 2,000 volunteers
to the rebel departments in the west. On March 22, the departmental
administration informed the Charente officials that 300 volunteers had left Limoges for Niort on March 18 and that 800 others had probably by then left
from other parts of the department. Two hundred twenty-five soldiers from
the Correze had also passed through Limoges on their way to Niort. Three
days later, in a letter to the minister of the interior, the departmental council
revised upward to 2,000 its estimate of Haute- Vienne volunteers on their
way to the Vendee.
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istration).
2.6. A. D. Haute- Vienne,
surveillance).

1.[97

(report

of the municipality

L849

(list of suspects

in Limoges,

to rhe deparrmcurul

prepared

admin-

by the comitc de

86

PROVJNCJAL

POLJTICS

IN THE

FRENCH

REVOLUTION

The departmental administration pursued its efforts to assist in the battle
against the Vendee rebels with considerable zeal. In mid-March, it ordered,
at the urging of Limoges Jacobins, a special tax on rich aristocrats and
bommes suspects, to be levied according to known or presumed wealth. The
tax became a donation after Bordas and Borie ruled that no existing law
would justify a compulsory tax.
Over the next two months, four additional pleas for help reached the
Haute- Vienne from the Vendee and Deux-Sevres, On each occasion, the department responded by raising additional forces. Departmental
administrators spoke stirringly in public session of the responsibility of all citizens
to defend the Republic. On May 13, the administration
ordered that all National Guard officers down to the grade of sous-lieutenant prepare to depart
for Poi tiers, an action that earned an honorable mention for the HauteVienne on the floor of the National Convention."
By the last week of May, reports were so alarming that the administration
called a general alert in the department and issued orders for the raising
of yet another force to march to Poitiers. When a courier arrived from the
Cantal on May 3 I, reporting news of a serious revolt in the Lozere, the
Haute- Vienne could send nothing but gunpowder. The next day, however,
good news from Niort allowed the departmental
council to countermand
the order for additional troops to go to Poitiers. Instead, it instructed volunteers to remain in their district ehefs-lieux until further notice."
The impact of the Vendee revolt on political opinion in the Haute- Vienne
must certainly have been considerable. The department had sent both men
and supplies to combat the rebels, and reports of this counterrevolutionary
challenge to the Republic roused the patriotism of administrators
and citizens alike. In the midst of its fourth consecutive year of dearth, the department saw its traditional sources of grain to the west and northwest, the
Charente and the Vienne, threatened by the rebel forces. But it would be an
exaggeration to say that the Vendee revolt was the decisive factor in turning
the Haute- Vienne away from the federalist movement. The department's
manpower had been strained but not exhausted; five hundred to eight hundred troops remained at the ready in district chefs-lieux on June 1. In July,
the department could muster additional troops to send to the Vendee, and
27· Rcimprcssion de l'Ancien MUllileur, XVI, )52. (session of l\I1:Jy 9, '79,).
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Limoges could raise a force to repel the advancing Bordeaux federalists.
Those troops could have been used in a march on Paris, and we will see that
the departmental administration
considered that option in early June.
In Paris, the deputies were preoccupied by more than the demands of
war at home and abroad. In April, 1793, the Convention easily passed a
Girondin-supported
proposal for the impeachment of Jean Paul Marar, A
Jacobin circular, signed by Marar, "urging the departments to recall their
unworthy representatives,"
inspired the impeachment motion, but the real
reasons for Marat's indictment lay in his defense of the September massacres, his inflammatory
rhetoric, and his continued championing of the
Paris crowd." Marat's April 24 acquittal before the Revolutionary Tribunal
represented a victory for the increasingly militant Paris sections and a further blow to the weakening Girondin majority in the Convention.
A more direct attack on the independence and influence of the Paris Commune followed on the heels of Marat's acquittal. In the session of May 18,
Marguerite Elie Guadet alleged that an insurrection against the Convention
was being planned within Paris and proposed the dissolution of the Commune and the transfer of the Convention to Bourges. Taking a more moderate course, the deputies ordered the creation of a Commission of Twelve to
investigate the situation in the capital. Girondin deputies and their supporters dominated this committee, which included not a single Montagnard. On
May 24, Louis Francois Sebastien Viger reported to the Convention that the
Commission of Twelve had found evidence of a planned insurrection. On
that same day, Jacques Rene Hebert, the procureur of Paris, was arrested for
publishing a denunciation of the Girondins in the Pere Duchesne.
Over the next two days, a parade of delegates from the sections appeared
before the Convention to protest Hebert's arrest. Far from modifying its action, however, the Commission ordered additional arrests, and debate in the
Convention reached a fever pitch. Late on the night of May 27, after many
of the moderate deputies had retired, the Montagnards secured the dissolution of the Commission of Twelve and the release of the prisoners. But the
Girondins refused to accept defeat by political maneuver and contested this
decision on the following day. In a very close count, with over one hundred
abstentions and many Montagnards
on mission in the departments,
the
Convention voted to reinstate the Commission. Three days later, the Paris
29.
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sections revolted, shifting the arena of contention from the Convention itself
to the streets and thereby assuring the final defeat of the Girondin leaders."
The trial of Marat and the controversy surrounding the Commission of
Twelve highlighted the two fundamental
tensions that underlay national
politics throughout this period: dissension within the National Convention
and apprehension over the excessive political influence of the Paris crowd.
These tensions were acutely felt in the capital; but the provinces, too, appreciated the threat that they posed for the young republic. These two issues,
more than any other, generated an active correspondence
between deputies
in Paris and their constituents in the departments.
A division between moderate and radical deputies had already become
apparent during the last months of the Legislative Assembly, but the revolution of August IO produced a renewed commitment among the legislators to
work together and overcome their differences for the sake of national unity.
This uneasy truce lasted into September but crumbled almost as soon as
the Convention met. As early as September 25, Jacques Brissot and Pierre
Vergniaud accused Robespierre and other Montagnards of complicity in the
September massacres." In late October, Jean Baptiste Louvet denounced
Robespierre in his celebrated speech before the Convention, often described
as the opening salvo in the Girondin/Montagnard
conflict." Throughout the
next two months, the diatribe continued against Robespierre, Marat, and
Danton, who allegedly formed a triumvirate intent on establishing themselves as dictators. These personal attacks solidified the opposition between
Montagnards and Girondins. Many provincial Frenchmen associated the
Montagnards, and in particular "the triumvirate," with the excessive political influence of the Paris crowd and the threat of anarchy that it represented.
News of developments in Paris reached the provinces through both official
channels and letters from individual deputies to friends and administrators back home. As already noted, Bishop Gay-Vernon of Limoges corresponded regularly with the Jacobin club after his election to the Legislative
Assembly and then to the Convention. Claude Jean Baptiste Lomont, one of
Calvados' deputies to the Convention, remained in close contact with his
constituency in Caen. Lomont (born Dobiche de Lomont) had been procureur du roi (1 fa rnonnaie de Caen before the Revolution, a position that
3D. Ibid., 116- [8; Soboul, The French Revolution,
T73-77·
3 I. Sydenham,
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would have acquainted him with Gabriel de Cussy, former directeur de fa
monnaie and another of Caeri's deputies to the Convention. Lemont had
been elected to the departmental administration
in 1790, had joined the directory, and had presided over the Caen Jacobin club in April, 1791. In the
fall of that year, he had been elected to the Legislative Assembly. He appears
to have been the deputy to whom the municipal council of Caen most frequently turned for assistance in its dealings with the national government.
Lemont's earliest letters of record date from the last months of the Legislative Assembly. He addressed many of them to Pierre Jean Leveque, a doctor in Caen, a prominent municipal official, and a personal friend. The two
corresponded
frequently over the next ten months, both on personal and
official business. This liaison is particularly
important because Leveque
would be elected a departmental
administrator
in September, would eventually become president of the administration,
and in June, [793, would be
one of the leaders of the federalist movement in Caen.
Much of the correspondence
between Lornont and officials in Caen dealt
with routine administrative affairs-requests
for public works funds, official
appointments,
and taxation questions. As the situation in Paris grew more
unstable, however, letters focused more often on political matters. On August 7, the municipal council forwarded to Lomont a petition addressed to
the Legislative Assembly from the Caen sections demanding the suspension
of Louis XVI. The deed had been accomplished, of course, before Lomont
could deliver the petition. U
On September I I, in the wake of troubles in both Paris and Caen, Lornonr
wrote directly to Leveque. He graciously acknowledged his election to the
Convention and requested clarification of the circumstances of the murder
of Georges Bayeux. He made reference to the massacres in Paris and commented that "the people of Paris and Versailles have bestowed an air of justice to the vengeance that they exercised upon the prisoners: there is a sort of
Court Martial which pronounces a preliminary verdict, but in Caen nothing
at all like that, people say.":' This was clearly a mild appraisal of the September massacres; but only one month later, Lomont showed more emotion
in describing the dissension that had quickly developed in the Convention.
In another letter to Leveque, he wrote: "The enemies of order have long been
uniting to sow and support suspicions of the best patriots. Buzot, Brissor,
Faucher, Guadet, Vergniaud, etc., whose patriotism equals their talents, are
". A.C. Cacn, 01.
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each day slandered by a handful of men who are as spiteful as they are despicable. And their efforts will be futile: Marat, their writer, is currently
loathed, even though the Jacobins of Paris (I speak only of thirty or so leaders) never cease praising him."'s
Gabriel de Cussy seconded Lemont's opinion in a letter to the municipal
council on October 3 I. He requested that the council read in a public meeting Jean Baptiste Louvet's recent discourse to the Convention denouncing
Robespierre. De Cussy assured the people of Caen that the majority of Parisians were good citizens but noted the presence in the Convention of a handful of scoundrels. He suggested that a departmental
guard, sent to Paris,
might be necessary to expel them."
De Cussy's letter is an interesting one, raising both the idea of expelling a
small group of troublemakers from the Convention (a fate that he himself
would suffer ten months later) and the possibility that a departmental guard
might assist in that task. The Calvados administration
had already supported the latter proposal in a letter addressed to the Convention two weeks
earlier, perhaps the first call from the departments for the creation of such a
guard. On October 21, Philippe Dumont informed the departmental administrators that their letter had been well received by many deputies but that
debate had resulted in a tabling of the question:'? In the following two
months, factionalism persisted in Paris, and talk of raising a departmental
guard to protect the Convention continued. Finally, on January 2,1793, the
departmental administration
wrote to the Convention offering to send a
force from Calvados. The most important passage declared:
You are described as exposed under the axe of the executioner; Paris, the cradle of
Liberty, is full of conceited and bloodthirsty agitators: they want to interfere with
your opinions: cruel and cowardly men are preaching carnage. Well! the citizens of
Calvados are roused. Impatient, they are eager to sign their names in the civic registers; they want to depart, to avenge your threatened Liberty, the debased Sovereignty
of the People, and to render Paris worthy of her glory; they will support the work of
their Representatives, OR THEY WILL DIE! The fire that inflames them will spread
to all Departments, and the French Senate will soon enjoy, despite those who defile
its meeting place, the calm necessary for the formation of good laws. HI
35· Ibid., letter of October 5,1792..
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The council attached to this letter a previous order regulating the formation
of the proposed departmental force and calling on volunteers with valid certificats de civisme to enroll at the secretariats of their district directories.
A January 4 letter from the Calvados delegation to the departmental
council confirmed the administrators'
fears. Signed by all thirteen Calvados
deputies to the Convention, the letter spoke of a "parti desorganisareur"
in
Paris and of threats of anarchy and claimed that "Pache himself, the Minister of War, is very suspect to the true friends of the Republic." Despite these
misgivings, the deputies expressed confidence that the patriotic majority of
the Convention would continue to predominate."
Sentiments similar to those in Calvados prevailed in the Limousin. On
January 17, following the example of the nearby Correze, the Haute-Vienne
administration voted to announce to the Convention that the entire departmental force was prepared to march to Paris to ensure the integrity and security of the Convention. The administration
ordered all national guardsmen to make ready, with each soldier to receive thirty sols per day while 011
duty. The decree invited individual citizens to go to Paris as well. Two days
later, the departmental council wrote to the Convention denouncing the factions and anarchy that threatened the deputies and informing them of the
Haute-Vienne's actions:
At the cry of danger that surrounds you, all of the Citizens of the departments arc
roused and, from all points of the Empire, their innumerable legions await but the
signal of the law to throng to your meeting place; because you IllUSt finally be free,
and such is the formidable crisis into which events have drawn you that you cannot
be so without surrounding yourselves with a departmental
force powerful enough to
assure the success of your labors, to annihilate the factions and dispel the anxiety of
your constituents.
Hasten therefore to organize that tutelary force that should S;1Ve
Liberty; all of the Citizens of our department, a n x ious to cooperate in Its formation,
fervently appeal for the order to come to your defense.'"

At subsequent meetings, the departmental council received numerous addresses from other departments asserting the need for departmental guards
in Paris to protect the Convention. On February I r , the adminisrrarion
ordered all public officials to swear an oath, recently sworn and circulated
by the council of the Haute-Loire, declaring anathema all "Kings ... Tyrants
Dictators ... triumvirs" and promising to defend the liberty,
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equality, and sovereignty of the people, as well as the unity and indivisibility
of the Republic."
Although neither Calvados nor the Haute- Vienne sent a departmental
guard to Paris, other departments did. Both Finistere and the Bouches-duRhone, at the unauthorized bidding of their deputies A. B. F. Kervelegan and
Charles Jean Marie Barbaroux, sent forces that had arrived in the capital by
December, 1792.42 By February, as many as twelve thousand soldiers had
gathered in Paris. The Convention hotly debated the question of calling
troops to the capital and on January 13, 1793, adopted a plan for a formal provincial force to protect its meeting place. But Jean Baptiste BoyerFonfrede raised questions about the efficacy of such a plan, and the deputies
ultimately rejected it. On March 5, the Convention went one step further
and ordered the troops already in Paris to return to the defense of their departments." Departmental forces did not therefore remain in Paris. The debate of the question in the Convention and the de facto presence of troops in
the capital for at least three months, however, established an important precedent for the following summer.
Correspondence
between the capital and the provinces increased during
April and Mayas the trial of Marat and the formation of the Commission of
Twelve raised tensions in Paris to a critical level. As early as April I, Gabriel
de Cussy complained to the Caen municipal council of the insults and
threats that he and his colleagues endured and expressed his hope that
"abominable traitors" masquerading
as patriots would soon be expelled
from the Convention.
De Cussy wrote again the next day, describing the treason of Durnouriez,
the agitation of the Paris sections, and his own fearlessness before death. He
denounced Danton and Marat by name. Less than two weeks later, he exultantly reported the decree of accusation against Marat and reviled those
who defended that "cruel and cowardly instigator of pillage and assassinations." Once again, he castigated the insolent and insulting Parisian
crowd, which had taunted him and three others as they left the assembly hall
that day."
4'. A. D. Haute- Vicnne, L57·
42. Sydenh.un, The Girondins. '94.
43. tbid., '33, '53· See also Wallon, La Rcuolution rllI.3) mai, 1,7.,-8"
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Alarmed by these reports of factionalism and anarchy in Paris, the Calvados departmental and Caen district administrations
met together on April
19 to petition the Convention:
"Save yourselves, and you can save us! Such
is the cry of France; will it not have been heard? Representatives of the
People, we will tell you the truth: your divisions create all of our misforrunes. It is a Marat, a Robespierre, a Danton, who always occupy and agitate you, and you forget that an entire People suffers, worries, and awaits the
solace of Laws." They went on to speak of the glory of France, of the one,
great family that the nation should be, of the need to ignore disorganizing
factions; and they closed with the following paragraph:
Elected of the people, you know it, France is not in Paris; she is formed by eightyfour Departments;
if in one you are insulted, in another you will be respected,
obeyed: there you will find a shelter from the furor and the plots of rascals; there you
will enJoy your rights and Liberty; there you will live among the French, Republicans, brothers who will know how to ward off from you daggers and assassins. But
before leaving the first cradle of Liberty, make a final effort; brave the storms; spurn
the rumors of a few careerists; punish the conspirators; work to give sage Laws to a
great People; save your country; obtain happiness for your fellow-citizens; above all,
make yourselves respected; and if a few scoundrels again lift their blasphemous
voices, think of us, speak, and you shall be avenged."

In this address, one hears echoes of earlier messages to the Convention:
the complaint against dissension; the denunciation of Marat, Robespierre,
and Danton; a plea for the "solace of Laws." There remains hope that the
Convention can rise above its disagreements to carryon its work, but there
is the hint, again, that the Convention should be moved elsewhere and the
promise to avenge the deputies if they should be attacked. Seven of the Calvados deputies wrote to the department lauding the letter and requesting
additional copies to meet the enormous demand from other departments
and popular societies. They reported a slight improvement in the situation
in Paris."
The amelioration
of affairs in Paris proved illusory, however. In early
May, Jean Baptiste Lomont wrote twice to his friend Leveque, first on May 3
and again on May 10. He reiterated the praise of the Calvados delegation
for the department's letter of April 19, but he also wrote of "the atrocious
calumnies that people continuously heap upon the best deputies," of the
threats that continued to hang over their heads, and of his fear that the Re45. A. D. Calvados, L [0024 (Proces-verbaux
till Conseil General ell! dcparrerncnr).
46. A. D. Calvados, LIO 125 (documents pertaining to feder.ilism, letter of May 6, 179.1,
signed by Dumont, Philippc-Dellcville,
l.omonr, Legot, Vardon, and Faucher).
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public might break into a thousand pieces. He remarked that he had encountered several of his "concitoyens"
from Calvados in Paris. BougonLongrais, the procureur-general-syndic
of the department, visited the capital
in May; and Jean Adrien Lasseret, then a notable of Caen, had visited in late
April, carrying a message from the municipal council to the Convention.
While cautioning that circumstances might change quickly, Lomont closed
his May 10 letter with an expression of guarded optimism."
In subsequent letters, Lomont grew more pessimistic. On May 13, he
railed against Bougon, with whom he said he had been "intimately tied ...
since the dawn of the revolution." Bougon, upon his arrival in Paris, had
been accused by DuRoy (a Montagnard deputy who had been on mission to
Caen in March) of having authored the Calvados letter of April 19. Bougon
denied all knowledge of the letter and, after having read it, went so far as to
say that he did not support it. This greatly dismayed the Calvados deputies.
Although Lomont charitably blamed the incident on Bougon's youth and
inexperience, he could not help but question his principles. He assured
Leveque that the entire Calvados delegation, except for the Montagnard
Bonnet, continued to struggle for the principles of the Revolution and would
die, if need be, for the liberty of France."
Lomont next wrote to Leveque on May 15, after the Convention had received a May 10 letter from the departmental administration.
The administrators had denounced, without blaming either Montagnards or Girondins,
the continued factionalism within the Convention and had once again implored the deputies to put aside their differences and get on with the business of drafting a constitution.
Lomont was clearly disappointed
in this
letter. He wrote: "It seems, my dear fellow-citizen, that the more audacity
the rascals show, the more the Calvados administration
controls its vengeance and minces its words. I am a frank and plainspoken republican; I do
not know, myself, how to speak with Economy. Your last address did not
compare with the one before. Your last address speaks redundantly of passions, of rivalries, of the hatreds that trouble the peace amongst us, or
speaks incessantly of our divisions, etc." This, said Lornont, was not acceptable; it was not precise. Factions did not exist within the Convention. One
faction alone troubled the peace, and this was the Mountain. Lomont sug47. A. D. Calvados,
4X. A. D. Calvados,
carriere d'un procureur

L'02.76 (Leveque correspondence).
L, 0 ')4 (documents pertaining to federalism);
general syndic," .13ll.
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gested more verve, a bolder tone in future letters and referred to the previous
day's letter from Bordeaux as a model: "You will see, dear comrade, the address of Bordeaux-compare
it. Simply compare your two addresses and decide for yourself. If I am wrong tell me your opinions as frankly as I tell you
mine. Above all believe that my sincere devotion will end only with the life
of your friend." Here, Lomont was virtually instructing Leveque and the
Calvados administration
on the proper manner in which to write an effective letter to the Convention."
Lomont sent his final letter of record, dated May 21, from Buges, where
he was on mission to supervise the production of assignats. He expressed
longing to return to Paris, where he could better defend the Republic with
his life, and insisted that the attacks on individual deputies amounted to no
less than attacks on the national sovereignty.
News of the Convention's tumultuous session of May 27 produced one
final protest from Calvados before the drama in Paris reached its climax.
This letter surely proved more pleasing to Lemont than did the address of
May 10. The administrators
reported the outrage of the people of Caen at
reports of the disorderly May 27 session of the Convention and promised a
departmental force to protect the national representatives. They concluded
the address with a stern warning: "All the Departments, we have no doubt,
will follow this example, and soon you will be surrounded by an imposing
Army that will know how to make you respected. We declare a war to the
death against Anarchists, Proscribers, and Factionists, and we will not put
down our arms until we have returned them to oblIvion."'"
The months of April and May in the Haute- Vienne did not bring the flurry
of correspondence
that marked this period in Calvados. On March 19, the
department had sent to the Convention a message in which it pledged its
efforts against the Vendean rebels and expressed its confidence in the Convention. Its one veiled criticism lay in calling for the rapid completion of a
constitution that would unify the country." Efforts to ready men and supplies to send to Niort and Poitiers occupied the next eight weeks. There is no
49. A. D. Calvados, 1.10276. This message is strikingly similar J() two letters sent to the
Bordeaux Popular Society 011 May 4 "lid 5 by Pierre Vcrgui.iud. who implored his constirucnrs
to protest to the Convention 311d to come to the aid of their legislators. Lornonr's counsel to
Leveque suggests that Vergniaud'« entreaty was successful. For Vergniuuds
letters, set.' F. A.
Aulard, }{cC/;cil des Iletcs rill Comitt: de Sahli Public aucc la Correspondance
,,(ririelle des reprcscntants ell mission (Paris, ,89'), IV, '96.
50. A. C. Cacn, 134 (Adresses er depur.uions ,]1" Convention}.
5'· A. D. Haure-Vienne,
1.57.

/
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record of further correspondence to or from the capital until the last week in
May, when the situation in the Convention was becoming critical.
An explanation for the relative silence of the Haute- Vienne administrators
during this period lies not only in their preoccupation with the Vendee revolt
but also in the evolution of the attitudes of Limoges Jacobins during the first
few months of 1793. Whereas the Caen club had broken its affiliation with
the Paris Jacobins, the Limoges Jacobin club maintained its ties. But relations between the clubs in Limoges and Paris were marred by some stormy
periods. On January 16, 1793, the Limoges club voted to draft a letter to the
Convention in support of the Rodez club's petition requesting the expulsion
of Marat from the Assembly. One week later, the club sent another address
denouncing the factions in the Convention. It also voiced support for the
Girondin minister Jean Marie Roland. On February 24, a letter arrived from
the Paris Jacobins announcing the impending arrival in Limoges of Xavier
Audouin, a native son who had recently relocated in Paris. The letter chided
the Limoges club for not writing more regularly. Audouin-who
had just
married the daughter of Jean Nicolas Pache, the former minister of war and
recently elected mayor of Paris-arrived
in Limoges the next day. Club
members questioned the recent behavior of the Paris Jacobins, particularly
their attacks on Condorcet, but Audouin defended the Paris club and the
people of Paris and offered to act as a special intermediary between the citizens of Limoges and higher administrative authorities. The club voted to reestablish correspondence with the Paris club and in subsequent months received regular letters from Audouin as well.
On March 18, Pardoux Bordas, an Haute-Vienne deputy to the Convention, passed through Limoges on a recruitment mission. He, too, talked with
club members and stressed that though the Convention might occasionally
appear divided, the great majority of deputies worked for the public good
and were united in their votes on important matters."
Reassured by these two visitors about the patriotism of the Paris club and
the spirit of the Convention, the Limoges Jacobin club grew more radical in
the weeks that followed. On April I, still receiving the moderate Gorsas
journal despite having canceled its subscription, the club voted to burn the
most recent issue and send the ashes to Gorsas (who had once been a corresponding member of the Limoges club). On April 10, after some debate, the
52.. Frny-Fournier,

Lc Club des [acobins,
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vention: "Paris is excellent and the intriguers and malcontents
will lose
themselves in the crowd." He did not deny the existence of conspirators but
expressed confidence that good citizens would be vigilant. He concluded, "I
applaud the zeal of the deputation, but I do not share its opinion of the
present circumstances. The diversity of sentiments proves that with the same
desires one can employ different means in order to arrive at the same goal. ",;"
The Limoges Jacobins, heeding the words of Gay- Vernon, issued a denunciation of the letter from the rest of the delegation.57 But despite the arrival
of an additional note from Bordas (who had also signed the earlier address),
which dismissed "Ies menaces exagerees" and advised calm and restraint,
the departmental administration, on May 30, drafted its strongest protest of
the factions and dissension within the Convention.
The administrators
stated their hope that the Convention would finally have "vanquished the
monster of disorganization, of anarchy, and of civil war." They denounced
the scoundrels who talked of proscribing deputies, asserting that they spoke
for all the people of the Haute- Vienne."
Although the Haute- Vienne council did not go so far as to pledge a "war to
the death," as administrators
in Calvados had done, its May 30 message
constituted a strong condemnation of the divisions and legislative paralysis
that had developed in Paris in the previous months. Similar protests came
from departments all over France. Indeed, the federalist revolt in June could
be seen as the culmination of this long-term concern-as
a simple, and final,
reaction to the proscription of the Cirondin deputies. On the other hand,
many of the departments that sent protests to the Convention between January and June, like the Haute- Vienne, acquiesced in the revolution in Paris
that confirmed the supremacy of the Montagnards.
The divergence of departments'
reactions to the June revolt can be attributed in part to the composition of departmental delegations to the Convention and to the communication
networks that developed between the
deputies and their constituents. The delegations of Calvados and the HauteVienne both overwhelmingly supported the Cirondins in 1793. But whereas
in Calvados the sole Montagnard deputy was the disreputable former noble
Bonnet de Meautry, who wrote only occasionally to his constituents
in
5(" Ibid,
57· Fray-Fournier, Lc Club des [acobins,
5H, A. D. Haurc-Vienne, L391 (Adrcsses

I,
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Caen, the Haute-Vienne Montagnards
Gay-Vernon and Bordas maintained
regular contact with Lirnoges (almost incessant contact, in the case of GayVernon) and consistently downplayed the divisions in Paris. By contrast,
Lemont and de Cussy grew increasingly adamant in their denunciations of
the factious Montagnards
in April and May and exhorted the people of
Caen to prepare for action.
The mediating role of the Limoges Jacobins also must be stressed, particularly in contrast to the negligible role of the Caen club. In Calvados, nearly
all correspondence from deputies in Paris went to local adminisrrations or to
personal friends, such as Leveque, who were also officials. The Caen Jacobin
club had broken its ties with the Paris club and in 1793 fell into decline. The
Limoges club, though, despite some temporary disillusionment
with the
mother society, maintained an active correspondence
both with the Paris
jacobins and with Gay-Vernon and Xavier Audouin. This introduced to
Limoges, and to the Haute-Vienne, a point of view to which Caen was little
exposed. The people of Caen heard frorn their trusted deputies nothing
but woeful reports and urgent alarms. Gay-Vernon counseled the Limoges
Jacobins to ignore the well-intentioned,
but exaggerated,
reports of the
other Haute-Vienne deputies, and the club faithfully carried that message to
the local administrations.
It is important to note, however, that influence flowed not only from Paris
to the departments
but in the other direction as well. The departmental
alignment in June, 1793, was not determined by instructions from deputies
in Paris. The strength of the Jacobin club in Limoges gave Gay-Vernon a
hearing in that town that he might not otherwise have enjoyed. Bonnet de
Meautry had no comparable base of support in Caen, and this limited his
influence. Gabriel de Cussy grew virulent in his denunciations of the "scoundrels" within the Convention and his calls for retribution, but he was encouraged in his statements by the strong expressions of concern and protest
issued by authorities in Caen. The call for a departmental
guard for the
Convention came first from the Calvados administration
and then from
de Cussy.
A clear and consistent pattern emerges from the various protests and petitions registered by authorities in Calvados over this period. As early as July,
[792, the Calvados administration
had denounced anarchy and factionalism,
called for respect for the law, and particularly insisted that the nation resided not only in Paris but in all the departments of France. These themes
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were reiterated in all of the letters and protests sent from Caen to Paris over
the next ten months: in October, in January, in April, and again in May.
Calvados denounced factionalism and the excessive influence of Paris more
frequently and consistently than any other department.
In April, that aggressive posture earned the praise of moderate deputies in the National Convention. In June, it would lure to Caen many of the proscribed Girondins,
anxious to find a secure haven from which to continue their struggle with
the Montagnarcls.

Four

The Provinces Respond
June, I793

The crisis within the National Convention reached its peak at
the end of May, 1793. The heated session of May 27 ended with a late-night
vote disbanding the Commission
of Twelve. But the following day, the
Girondin deputies attended in greater numbers, and the Convention voted
to reinstate the Commission, although the Montagnards
succeeded in preventing a full report of the Commission's findings. Nonetheless, this turn of
events provoked the Paris sections into renewed activity. The Cite section
called on all sections to send representatives the next day, May 29, to meet
at the Eveche. That assembly became the Central Revolutionary Committee,
a reincarnation of the insurrectionary
Commune that had been so important
in the [ournee of August 10, 1792.
On that same day, Robespierre addressed the Jacobin club of Paris, delivering a speech that has been generally interpreted as a call to insurrection.
Mobilization continued in the sections, and on the afternoon of May 3 I, a
peaceful crowd surrounded the Convention. Representatives
of the Commune delivered the sections' demands: the abolition of the Commission of
Twelve, the proscription
of twenty-four deputies, and the creation of an
armee reuoiutionnaire. Girondin leaders countered this move by calling for
an investigation of the brewing insurrection. After considerable discussion,
this motion was carried. But Vergniaud, trying to secure the Girondins' temporary advantage, failed in an effort to lead his supporters from the hall.
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Returning within minutes, he interrupted Robespierre, who, in a dramatic
moment accused Vergniaud and called for his impeachment.
The Montagnards now took the offensive, and the session concluded with the final suppression of the Commission of Twelve.
Two days later, on June 2, the Convention again found itself surrounded,
this time by eighty thousand armed national guardsmen led by Francois
Hanriot. The crowd once more delivered a demand for the proscription of
the deputies, and on the floor of the Convention a proposal calling for the
resignation of those accused met with failure. Marie Jean Herault-Secheiles,
showing great courage, led the deputies out into the crowd, attempting to
break the ring that surrounded them. The guardsmen stood their ground,
however, forcing the legislators to return to the chamber. There, the deputies passed a decree ordering the provisional arrest of twenty-nine of their
colleagues, as well as two ministers. Most prominent among them were the
well-known deputies Vergniaud, Brissor, and Buzot, along with Barbaroux,
Corsas, Cuadet, and Valaze, Also placed under guard, for his role on the
Commission of Twelve, was the Calvados deputy Henry-Lariviere, I
The proscription of the Cirondin deputies produced an immediate, but
varied, reaction in the departments of France. Many departmental administrations protested this violation of the nation's representatives, a few lauded
the Montagnard
victory, and the remainder maintained a generally silent
neutrality. (See Table I for a breakdown of the protesting and non protesting
departments.) Only a handful of departments engaged in prolonged resistance to the Montagnard Convention. That resistance centered geographically around the cities of Bordeaux, Caen, Lyon, and Marseille.
It is beyond the scope of this study to deal broadly with the federalist
movement, but in order to place events in Caen and Limoges in a chronological context, Table 4 charts important developments in the several federalist
centers. In both Lyon and Marseille, moderate elements in sectional assemblies had overturned radical municipal councils in April and May, 1793,
and the federalist movement in those two cities grew out of their local political conflicts. Those conflicts in turn had been partially fueled by the meddling of Montagnard representatives on mission in local political affairs. In
Lyon and Marseille, then, one sees in accentuated form a feature that characterized the federalist movement throughout
France: a combination
of
local and national grievances that produced a revolt: against Paris.
r. Soboul, The French Revolution,
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In all four cities, local officials, principally departmental
administrators,
guided the organization of resistance to the National Convention, the outlines of which took shape during the first two weeks of June. Departmental
forces assembled to march on Paris in all four cities. The federalist movement had disintegrated in Caen, Bordeaux, and Marseille by late July or
early August, although Jacobins did not resume control of Bordeaux politics
until late September. The federalist movement in Lyon gradually assumed a
royalist character and only succumbed to republican forces on October 9,
after a bloody two-month siege of the city.
The federalist revolt is a complicated historical event, varying both in intensity and in character from one region to the next. The revolt in Caen did
not achieve the intensity or violence that it achieved in Lyon or Marseille,
either in the rebellion itself or the repression that followed. In that respect,
however, it was more the rule than the exception if one considers the federalist movement nationwide. As a guide to the character of the movement as
a whole, federalism in Caen is particularly revealing because the rebels
there, not only from Calvados but from other Norman and Breton departments, annunciated very clearly the aims of their rebellion and the grievances that had given rise to it. Study of the revolt in Caen, then, should yield
considerable insight into the nature of the federalist movement. Comparison
with Limoges will help to clarify why the revolt took root where it did.2
In Limoges, news of the events of May 27 through June 2 did not produce
the heightened emotions and dramatic response that it would evoke in Caen.
No special assemblies convened, and no urgent messages were sent to Paris.
The departmental administration did express its concern over the proscription of the deputies, and it gave a sympathetic hearing to messengers from
the C6te-d'Or who urged provincial protest. But letters from the deputies
Gay- Vernon and Bordas, plus energetic input from the Limoges municipality, the jacobin club, and officials in other districts, deterred the administrators from taking strong action. By the end of June, the department f-irmly
2. In writing this chapter, I relied primarily on archival materials,
principally series L in the
departmental archives of Calvados and the Haute- Vienne. For Caen, however, three published
accounts were of great value in reconstructing
the events of the revolt. See A. Goodwin, "The
Federalist Movement in Caen during the French Revolution,"
Bulletin of the [ohn Rylands Lil7rilry, 42 (March,196o),
3 I 3-45; Jeanne Grall, "Le l'edcralisme: Eurc cr Calvados," Bulletin
de la Societe des Antiquaires de Normandie, LV (1959-60),
':l3 - S 3; and Vaulrier, Souvenirs.
Vaultier, a professor at the University of Caen, served as secretary of one of the Caen sections
III '793.
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supported the Montagnard
Convention; and by the end of July, the administration, along with the citizens of Limoges, stood ready to turn back the
march of the Bordeaux force toward Paris.
The Limoges jacobin club appears to have been the first local body to receive word of developments in Paris. This in itself is significant-the
radical
jacobin club, not the more moderate departmental officials, first reported to
the people of Limoges the Montagnard victory in the National Convention.
Events in Paris therefore received a favorable interpretation.
The journey
from the capital to Limoges took longer than that from Paris to Caen-four
days by coach instead of two. But as early as June 3, the jacobin club read a
letter from Xavier Audouin announcing that the people of Paris had risen
and that great measures would soon be taken. The next day, Jean Baptiste
Gay-Vernon, a departmental
administrator,
read (() the club a report frOI11
his brother, the bishop. The assembly listened with great satisfaction to details of the current situation in Paris and unanimously voted its support of all
measures taken by the Mountain. The members also sent a message to the
bishop, thanking him for his regular bulletins, "without which the club
might have been misled by the false reports that troublemakers never cease
to spread." One club member, reflecting on the recent events, concluded that
they had turned entirely to the profit of liberty and equality. The meeting
closed with the reading of an address from the Convention and the decrees
of May 3 I and June J, which reportedly produced great joy among those
present.'
Up to this date, there is no evidence that the departmental administration
even discussed these reports from Paris. On june 4, the Haure-Vienne council drafted an effusive address to its constituents, lauding their patriotism
and sacrifices in sending volunteers to the Vendee and urging them to pull
together in difficult times. The following day, the order of business changed
after two messengers arrived from the Cote-cl'Or bearing an urgent message.
In a decree dated May 30, the Cote-dOr
proposed that the departments
unite in sending an address to the Convention based 011 the principles of
unity and indivisibility of the Republic, of the inviolability of national deputies, and of freedom of opinion. The message would state that the departments were prepared to rebel against any despotic authority that violated
3. l-r.ry-Fournier. Lc Club dcslacobins, 1"\:'.-.,3. I' r.iy-l-ouruier has compiled here a summary of the minutes of the Limoges club's Illcetings. The origlllal registers have smce dIS;lPpe.ired from the departmental
archives.

---_ ___.....-........
.
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these principles. Commissioners from all the departments of France would
deliver it to Pa ris, along with a fraternal message to the Parisians.
The Haute- Vienne administrators adopted the proposal after a brief discussion. The decree, it must be remembered, had been drafted in the Cote.
d'Or before the proscription of the Girondin deputies. It did not propose
active resistance to the National Convention; indeed, it offered no explicit
course of action but rather espoused laudatory general principles and was in
fact quite similar in tone to the message that the Haute- Vienne administration itself had sent to the Convention on May 30. The council named two of
its members to carry the Cote-dOr message to the Dordogne and the Correze and to inform those departments of its own adhesion.'
Francois Mathieu-Lachassagne
relayed this message to the Dordogne,
where officials in Perigueux gave him a warm reception. The department
volunteered its support and sent its own messengers on to four other departments. The Correze, however, received Jean Baptiste Gay-Vernon less favorably. Officials there observed that events had changed since May 30, that the
proposals of the Cote-d'Or could well produce a schism and federalism
among the departments, and that the Convention was and should remain
the only center of unity for France. They rejected the proposed address and
sent a letter to the Convention denouncing the Cote-d'Or and the HauteVienne, a gesture that caused considerable embarrassment
and difficulties
for the Haute-Vienne in the following month.'
Little occurred in Limoges with respect to the national crisis until June I I,
when two important letters arrived. The first came from four of the HauteVienne deputies, Faye, Lacroix, Rivaud, and Soulignac. Relatively subdued
in tone, the letter congratulated the administrators for their addresses to the
Convention of May 23 and 30 but made only veiled comments regarding the
situation in the capital. The deputies wrote that those proscribed were demanding to hear the charges "that should have preceded and motivated their
arrest." They also made a cryptic reference to the good citizens of Paris,
whom they hoped would finally "tire of seeing themselves moved in a sense
contrary to their own sentiments and to the public interest, and would surrender themselves to public indignation and the glory of the laws.":' This
4· A. D. Haute-Vienne,
L57 (Deliberations du Conseil General,
Core-dOr
address is reprinted ill Fray-Fournier,
Le Deparlemelll
2.12~
l4.

ianvier-juiller
17~n). The
de fa Haute- Vie;lI1e, II,

5· 1\. D. Haute- Vienne, L, 8, (papers of the departmental
council, correspondence).
6. A. D. Hnute-Vienne,
L'74 (departmental
correspondence
with deputies to the Convennon).
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was far from a call to arms, but censorship of letters leaving the capital (to
which they referred in the letter) may have made the deputies reluctant to
express themselves more strongly.
The Haute- Vienne administrators
responded to the deputies two days
later. They noted that one paragraph had been scratched out and thus rendered illegible and further complained that a more detailed letter, to which
the deputies had alluded in a postscript, had never arrived in Limoges.
Nonetheless, the officials assured their representatives that they remained
loyal republicans and desired only an end to factions and agitators and a
speedy completion of the constitution."
The second letter to arrive on June II came from Gay-Vernon. He described the "moral insurrection" that had occurred in Paris as a reaction to
the slander that had been heaped on that city. He predicted that the Convention would now accomplish more in fifteen days than it had in the previous
eight months. "The country is all, and individuals are nothing," he asserted,
citing Lafayette and Dumouriez as former heroes who had proved to be traitors. The departmental administration
as a whole, however, was not on the
best of terms with Gay-Vernon, and its reply to the other four deputies suggests that it did not find completely convincing the bishop's reassuring account. Still, the administrators
drafted a suitably ambiguous answer to GayVernon calling, as had he, for prosecution of all traitors who plotted against
liberty and equality."
The Limoges Jacobin club, on the other hand, appeared persuaded by
Gay- Vernon's regular bulletins. In addition to his first letter, the one received
on June 4, the club received letters from the bishop on June 7 and June 13
and another note from Audouin as well. Inspired by these reports and by
rumors of protest in other departments, the priest Foucaud proposed that an
address be sent to affiliated clubs. He presented a draft on Juneq,
which
the club quickly adopted. In stirring language, Foucaud lauded the patriotism Paris had displayed in its recent defense of the Revolution: "But your
deputies have written that they are not free?" he asked rhetorically, answering that Louis XVI had made the same allegation and that Dumouriez, too,
had questioned the Convention's freedom. As for the deputies' arrest, "We
await in silence the terrible judgment that will soon be pronounced. If they
are innocent, we will rejoice with display; but if they were guilty, dear friends,
7. A. D. Haure-Vienne,
8. A. D. Hnute-Vienne,

L ,9' (correspondence).
1."'74 and L'4'
(correspondence

of the dep.urmentnl

directory).
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could republicans dare to regret it?" For those who proposed a march on
Paris, Foucaud suggested the Vendee as a more appropriate gathering place.
The Limoges Jacobin club remained loyal to the Convention, he added, and
looked to it for guidance and a new constitution. ,)Jean Baptiste Gay- Vernon
presented this address to the departmental directory, which refused to discuss it, but the departmental committee of public safety, composed of members from all three administrations,
endorsed it without reserve. II)
Two days later, the Jacobin club received another letter, this one from
five of the Haute- Vienne deputies: Rivaud, Soulignac, Faye, Lacroix, and
Lesterpt. Four of these deputies (all except Lesterpt) had already written to
the departmental administration,
and the letter to the jacobins expressed
many of the same sentiments as the earlier message. The deputies' views
found a hostile audience among the members of the Jacobin club. Offended
by the deputies' moderation and their alarm at the events of June 2, the
Jacobins denounced them in a letter to the Convention (resulting eventually
in their arrest) and expelled Faye and Soulignac from the club. If there had
been any doubt about the Jacobin club's attitude toward the May 3 I revolution, that doubt was now erased. Given the enormous influence of the Limoges Jacobins, both in the local administrative councils and on the local
populace, the posture of the club with regard to the new regime in Paris
must be considered a critical factor in steering the Haute- Vicnne away from
the federalist movement."
On June 17, the Haure-Vicnne administration
clarified its own position
under the watchful eyes of the Limoges municipality and Jacobin club. During the previous ten days, the departmental council had seemingly paid no
attention to the crisis in Paris or the projects of other departments.
It had
devoted its meetings to the routine business of recruitment, grain supply,
and fugitive emigres. But on June 17, two commissioners arrived in townone from Lyon and one from the jura by way of Lyon. The council convencd a special meeting, inviting district and municipal officials to attend,
along with delegates from the jacobin club. The messenger Tardi spoke first,
setting the record straight on recent events in Lyon. Then Gauthier, the Jura
commissioner, read a joint address from the Rhone-er-Loin- and the Jura to
9· Fray-Fournier,

l.e
Most deparnncnrs
the inspection of foreign
agents of foreign powers.
I r. Fray-l-ounuer,
Lc
10.

Club des [acobins, J)4- 3R.
formed comrnittees ,.,f public safety in April, '79'), assigning to them
mail and the surveillance of suspicious individuals who might be
Club des [acobius,

I,'S.
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the Haute- Vienne. It called for an assembly of suppleants to the Convention,
much as tbe Cote-d'Or bad earlier proposed, but further recommended the
raising of departmental forces and the designation of centers of communication around the country to coordinate the provincial efforts. These regional
centers would report to a central spot such as Bourges, where the Convention, or its suppliants, would be gathered. This plan, they insisted, did not
favor schism or federalism but, in fact, supported the very opposite.
Yet the plan represented a qualitative step beyond the C6te-d'Or proposal, to which the Haute-Vienne administration
had adhered just twelve
days earlier. The Jura address spoke not of general principles but of concrete
action in response to the proscription of the Girondin deputies. The assembly entered this address in the record, after which an unidentified member of
the departmental committee of public safety rose to speak. These men, he
said, had arrived in Limoges that morning and had been brought to his committee by a municipal officer who had questioned their passports. The two
bad initially claimed to be headed for Bordeaux on personal business, but a
search of their papers had produced copies of a plan listing departments that
might be induced to join the projects of Marseille, Lyon, and Bordeaux. Furthennore, their speech to the assembly made it clear that the jura and the
Rhone-et-Loire believed that the Convention was not free, despite tbe Convention's statements to the contrary and the fact that a majority of the deputies continued to deliberate in Paris. This member suggested that the proposals carried by the commissioners were more likely to cause trouble and
sow civil war than to repair imagined wrongs and moved that the department take steps to halt the proposals' propagation. The jacobin club delegates added their voices to this opinion and called for the arrest of the two
commissioners.
A long discussion ensued. The opinions of other departments were introduced, including the response of the Seine-et-Oise to a similar entreaty from
the Ille-et- Vilaine. The Seine-et-Oise administrators
had rejected that entreaty, stressing the danger of schism within the Republic and the continued
threat of internal and external enemies. After considerable discussion, a
council member stepped forward to concur with the department's
confidence in the wisdom and freedom of the Convention, which would soon deliver a new constitution. He moved that in response to the two commissioners' proposals a departmental declaration be issued recognizing the liberty of
the Convention and the legitimacy of all its decrees since May 3 J . He further
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argued that to arrest the two would be pointless, because "people everywhere know their rights and know how to maintain them." The assembly
applauded loudly and adopted the proposed course of action unanimously."
The two commissioners quickly left town and apparently went on to the
Gironde, for five days later, on June 22, a special courier from Bordeaux
arrived in Limoges, urging essentially the same measures that the HauteVienne had already rejected. A special assembly convened the next morning and voted to release the courier with his passport. Messages addressed
to the Creuse and the Correze would be returned to Bordeaux, along with a
note stating that "pressing circumstances do not permit the Department of
the Haute- Vienne to accede to the requests of the Gironde." Although
clearly unwilling to join the protesting departments at this point, the HauteVienne administration
remained characteristically
cautious in its actions
and pronouncements. Ll
Elsewhere in the department, reaction to the news from Paris was mixed.
Pardoux Bordas, a deputy to the Convention from Saint- Yrieix, wrote to his
district on June 2. He, like Gay-Vernon, sat with the Mountain; and in his
letter, he spoke of the calm determination of the Parisians, of their devotion
to liberty and respect for property even in the face of provocation, and of the
"moral insurrection" that had taken place in the capital. A decree of accusation against conspirators within the Convention would soon be passed, he
said, although Brissot and others had reportedly already fled. Bordas counseled his constituents to take up arms and continue surveillance of conspirators at home.
Officials in Saint- Yrieix did not share Bordas' political views, and they
interpreted his letter as evidence that a schism had developed within the
Convention. Tbe Saint- Yrieix Popular Society expelled Bordas from the club
and on June 7 convinced the district to send a message to the departmental
administration suggesting that a delegation to the Convention call for primary assemblies to elect a new Convention. 14 The departmental administration, which at first ignored this proposal, expressed its firm disapproval on
June 24 but adopted no stronger measures, since Saint- Yrieix had taken no
further action. The only other district to take a position was Saint-Junien,
t z., A. D. Haure-Vienne,
Li7.
'3. Ibid.
[4· Fray-Fournier, Le Dcpanement de la Haulc-v ienne, II, 2ls;Johannes
Planradis,
tation autonomistc de CUlCl1llC ct le mouucment [ederalistc des Cirondins en Limousin
1793 (Tulle, 1908), 102.
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which on June 22 berated the administration
for having adopted the Coted'Or proposal without first consulting district councils. IS
Deputy Gay-Vernon soon added his own reproach for the department's
error in judgment on that occasion. By June 19, word had reached Paris of
the Correze denunciation of the Haute- Vienne's actions. Gay-Vernon wrote
to the department that he was confident of the administrators'
pure intentions but hoped that they had by now seen the error in their action. He did
not share the views of the other five deputies-for
him, and he hoped for the
department,
principles were more important than individuals. Ten days
later, the bisbop scolded the departmental administrators
more sharply. He
lamented that they had violated their duty and responsibility by sending a
deputy to the Correze with the Cote-d'Or proposal. He bemoaned their
feebleness, saying he preferred strong and decisive men to those who claimed
to believe in the freedom of the Convention and then did nothing to protect
it from federalist plots. He felt they should have arrested the commissioners
from the Jura and Lyon (a course of action that Limoges Jacobins had urged
at the time), and he exhorted the administrators to be more diligent and energetic. The bishop closed by announcing that the new constitution would
soon arrive. II,
Official notification of the constitution's completion reached Limoges on
July 2, and on July 4, the three administrative
corps, meeting together,
issued a declaration to their constituents. They recalled that for six months
they had been imploring the Convention to complete the constitution. Now,
at this difficult time, it was imperative that all citizens rally to the Convention and reject the federalist projects that threatened to divide the country.
The administrators
called on their constituents to gather in primary assemblies to consider and vote on the new constitution, delivered by their legislators after much debate and sage deliberation."
Pierre Philippeaux, a representative on mission, formally delivered the
constitution one week later, and voters throughout the department quickly
approved it. But Philippeaux also brought grave reports from the Vendee
and made an impassioned plea for renewed efforts to combat the rebels. The
deputy asked that the Haute- Vienne send a contingent to join a gathering
force in Tours. Despite their concern about the department's depleted man15. Fray-Fouruicr.
Le Dcpartement de fa Haute-v ienne. II, :'.25·
l6. A. D. l-laute-Vienne, LI74 (letters ofjune '9 and 2.8).
'7. A. D. Hautc-Vienne,
L57. The address is rep rimed in l-rny-Fouruier,
de fa Haute- v iennc, II, 2:'.9- :\"0.

Lc Dcp art ernent
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power, the administrators
unanimously voted to mount and equip a fiftyman cavalry corps. Expenses would be paid by a levy on the rich. IN
As if this new strain on the department's resources were not enough, the
administration
soon received word that the National Convention had refused to allocate badly needed funds for the hospital in Limoges. GayVernon wrote on July 19 that the department's failure to punish more severely the messengers from Lyon and the .Iuta, as well as the Saint- Yrieix
officials, had caused this adverse decision. He blamed the departmental administrators for not heeding his advice but promised to see the minister of the
interior about securing the funds. The other deputies, too, pledged to do what
they could.
While awaiting resolution of this matter, the department received word
from Toulouse that forces from Bordeaux were marching toward Paris and
would pass through Limoges. Alarmed at this news, the authorities in Limoges united with the Jacobin club on July 23 to draft an appeal to "our
brothers of Bordeaux." Announcing their recent acceptance of the new constitution, they implored the people of Bordeaux to do the same and to seek
solutions to their grievances in that document rather than in actions that
could only lead to civil war."
A special courier from the Correze arrived one week later with news that
the Bordeaux volunteers had not turned back. The Correze stood ready to
block their path and asked the Haute- Vienne to join it. Eager to show their
devotion to the Convention and the Republic, the administrators
replied
that they were of like mind and would, if necessary, send forces to unite with
those of the Corrcze. The arrival on August I of the deputy Baudot raised
patriotic spirits in Limoges to an even higher pitch, and the administration
ordered the Limoges National Guard and all able citizens to prepare to take
to the fields with guns, pitchforks, pikes, scythes-anything
that would
serve as a weapon-in
order to prevent the Bordeaux forces from entering
the department."O
Fortunately for the people of Limoges, the Bordeaux volunteers had gone
no further than the borders of their own department before hearing that the
forces from Normandy had been routed. They immediately turned back for
18. A.
'9· A.
20. A.
and 1. I '0

D. Haure-Vienne.
l.\7.
D. Haute- Vicnne, l.z.o; (correspondence
with the department of the Gironde).
D. Haure-Vienne,
LSH (Deliberations
du Conseil General, juillet-decernbre
T79:;),
(Baudot mission).
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their homes and had, in fact, probably dispersed even before Baudot arrived
in Limoges. More good news reached the town in early August. The hospital
funds had been withheld because of a misunderstanding,
and the minister of
the interior would soon release nineteen thousand lu/res for the aid of Limoges orphans."
Between early June and late July, the Haute-Vienne administration
had
shifted from hesitant disapprobation
of the May 3 I revolution in Paris to
firm rejection of the federalist entreaties issued by authorities in Lyon and
Bordeaux. The department had reaffirmed its patriotism and dedication to
the Republic and for that reason largely escaped the repression that followed
the collapse of the federalist movement.
The departmental adrninistration had taken no active steps to join a march
on Paris, but its support of the Cote-d'Or resolution constituted an implicit
recognition that such a measure might be necessary. In the following weeks,
three factors combined to steer the department away from the federalist revolt. First were the roles of Gay-Vernon, Bordas, and Xavier Audouin, all of
whom reassured the people of Limoges that the Convention continued to
deliberate in freedom and that May 3 [ had been a victory for liberty and
equality. This by itself would not have been enough. Gay-Vernon did not
enjoy universal respect among departmental
administrators,
and the other
five Haute-Vienne deputies sent more alarming reports of the situation in
Paris. The Limoges Jacobin club, however, had confidence in the bishop and
exerted considerable pressure on the departmental administration,
both by
regular attendance at general council meetings in June and July and because
a considerable number of club members served as administrators.
The municipal council, too, helped curb any departmental tendencies toward federalism by strongly protesting the administration's
support of the Cbte-d'Or
resolution. Finally, the counterrevolutionary
crisis in the Vendee and the
precarious economic situation that prevailed in Limoges and the HauteVienne as a whole made resistance to the National Convention an unattractive option.
Whereas the Haute- Viennc's reaction to the Montagnard victory was slow
and hesitant, the response in Calvados was swift and resolute. Even before
the Paris sections mobilized on May 3 J, authorities in Cacn had taken de2.1. A. D.
[uly 30,

I
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cisive measures to protest and counter the political shift that began in the
Convention on May 27. News of the May 27 dissolution of the Commission
of Twelve arrived in Caen within two days.
The most likely carrier of this report was Antoine DeVic, procureur of the
municipality. DeVic had been sent to Paris early in May to request an advance on the proceeds from the sale of national lands, which would relieve
the penury of the caisse des billets de confiance in Caen. He returned to
Caen in time for an evening session of the municipal general council on May
28.22 Traveling by coach from Paris to Caen generally required two days, but
it is possible that De Vic, bearing urgent news, left Paris on horseback after
the May 27 evening session and arrived in Caen late the following day.
Other possible sources of information include the several deputies who
maintained regular correspondence with officials in Caen. That one of these
deputies may have relayed the report is suggested by an account in the Affiches du Calvados. In its issue of] une 2, that journal stated that news of the
dangerous situation in the Convention had arrived in Caen on May 29,
though it did not identify the source, which may have been a letter or even a
Parisian newspaper. The journal also reported that on the same day the jacobin club, in a well-attended session, had petitioned the departmental
directory to convene section assemblies in Cacn."
It was neither the departmental administration
nor tbe municipal council that convoked section assemblies in Caen, however; it was Louis Caille,
procureur-syndic of the district. Caille had been active in local affairs since
early in the Revolution, particularly in the Caen Jacobin club, which he had
helped found and over which he later presided. After a trip to Paris in early
1792, where he met Robespierre, he encouraged the Caen Jacobins to split
with the Paris club. Caille was first elected to public office in September,
1792, when he was named procureur-syndic.
Acting in that capacity, he
issued two orders on May 30. The first ordered that the municipal council,
given the danger to the patrie, convoke the sections in extraordinary
assemblies. The second directed the municipal council to call a special meeting to
consider what measures to adopt.':
22.
mune),
23·
24·

A. C. Caen, D2 (Deliberations
du Corps municipal er du Conseil General de ln ComMay 4 and May 28, 1793.
A((iches, AI1I1()IIces et Avis Divers de la Bassc-Nonnandie.Y
UIlC 2., r 79 .3, A. D. Calv.idos.
A. C. Caen, D2, May 30,1793.
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The municipal council met at ten o'clock that evening and immediately
sent three delegates to the district and departmental administrations
to request postponement of section assembly meetings so that bell-ringing, which
might alarm the countryside and jeopardize the following day's market,
could be avoided. (Despite the previous year's good harvest, grain was again
in short supply in Caen.) Given the seriousness of the threat to the Convention, however, the superior authorities denied the municipal council's request. Even as the messengers returned to town hall, church bells rang out,
and the assemblies began to gather. Each of the sections sent delegates to the
departmental meeting hall later that night, where they joined representatives
of the three administrative
corps. This assembly drafted the final address
sent by Calvados to the National Convention. The assembly also voted to
form within the department, principally in Caen, an armed force to march
to the aid of the Convention and issued an order inviting all good republicans to enroll at district che[s-lieux, It called on all the departments of
France to adopt similar measures.
Two decrees of the Convention, registered by the departmental directory
only one day before, may have impressed upon the assembly the gravity of
the situation and convinced local authorities of the legitimacy of their actions. The first of these decrees, issued May 18, had established the Commission of Twelve, "charged with investigating all internal plots against liberty,
and against the national representation."
The second, dated May 24, placed
under the safeguard of good citizens "la fortune publique, la Representation
nationale, et la ville de Paris." 25 These decrees made it clear that a threat to
the nation existed and that all citizens had a responsibility to resist that threat.
10 carry their address to the Convention, the assembly chose ten of its
members, representative of the administrations,
sections, and popular societies that were present. Most prominent in that delegation were Pierre Jean
Rene Lenormand, then president of the departmental
administration,
and
Louis Caille, from the district directory." The contingent left the following
2.5. A. D. Calvados, L16) (Registre des proces-verbaux
des seances du Direcroire du Departernenr it Caen, 16 mars 179,-10 septernbre [793); J. B. Duvergier, Collection complete des
Lois, Decrets, Crrdonnances, Reglcments, Avis du Conseil-d'Etat
(Paris, 1834), V, 294; Reimpression de l'Ancicn Moniteur, XVI, 464-71.
26. A. C. Caen, 134 (Adresses er deputations it I" Convention, janvier-mai
1793). Also ineluded in the delegation were Antoine Nicolas Marie, from the municipal council; another
Lenormand,
representing
the Carabots,
Legagneur, probably representing the [acobin club;
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day (minus one delegate, Legagneur, who had fallen ill) and arrived in Paris
on June 2. In addition to the formal statement drafted by the assembly, they
took a brief address reminiscent of previous calls for unity and a new constitution. But the changed circumstances they encountered in Paris prompted
them to compose a more forceful discourse, which began as follows:
Rep resen ta ti ves,
You have just heard the Address sent to you by our Fellow-citizens at the time of
the events of May 27. That which they feared has occurred, and other measures
should be and will be employed. We have been the witnesses of new attacks upon
liberty, by which a Faction has succeeded, through misleading armed Citizens, in
proscribing thirty-four of your Colleagues and three Ministers, in placing them
under arrest, and in temporarily dissolving the National Representation,
which cannot exist without freedom of opinions. We would sacrifice our personal safety, even
our lives, in order to complete the honorable Mission entrusted to us by our Constituents. The right that we exercise is a sacred right: Force can violate it; but it cannot prevent such attacks from becoming known in the Departments;
they are already
known in the Department of Calvados, From the banks of the Rhine to the Pyrenees,
there is universal indignation, and its weight will crush the new Tyrants;"

The delegation closed its address by pledging that armies from throughout
the country would soon join the majority of peace-loving Parisians to deliver
the Convention from oppression, thus preserving the unity of the Republic
and showing to all of France the true meaning of patriotism.
Unfortunately, the delegation did not gain admission to the floor of the
Convention and therefore never delivered this message. The commissioners
stayed on in Paris for several days, occasionally venturing out onto the
streets but passing most of their time in the company of the Calvados deputies to the Convention. They left the capital on June 6, making stops in
Evreux and Lisieux on their way back to Caen.
Several interesting letters arrived in Caen while the commissioners were
carrying out their mission to the capital. Gustave Doulcet de Pontecoulanr,
former president of the Calvados administration
and now a deputy to the
and Chappes, Ferer, Levasnicr, Mauger, and Tahourer, representing the five sections of Cnen.
Two local hisrorrans, Georges Mance] and Charles Renard, have suggested that l.enormand.
presidcnr of the deparrmcntnl adnnnisrr.irion
, and Lcnorrnand,
president of the Carabots, were
one and the same. All the evidence I have seen, however, including two different Lenormand
signatures on a key insurrectionary
declaration, suggests that there-were two men of the same
name, unrelated as far as I know, who played leading roles in the revolt.
27· B. M. Caen, Fn. Ih634. Reprinted in Vaulrier, Souvenirs, '74-7.1.
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Convention, wrote the first of these. His letter, though undated, bore the
heading "Sarnedy, ~l 7 heures du soir," and its tone clearly indicates that it
was written on Saturday, June 1. Addressed simply to citoyen Lenormand,
president of the Popular Society, at Caen, it read:
Our dangers are by no means past, my dear fellow-citizen; the tocsin rings; the
call to arms is sounded; and we are informed that Marar and the Revolutionary
Committee of the Paris Commune have decided to renew the disturbances, and to
continue what they call the insurrection
of the people until the twenty-two, the
twelve, and lsnard are indicted.
[ repeat that which [ told you this morning, that which [ will write to you in all
possible ways until you acknowledge
the receipt of one of my letters, that having
neither crime nor weakness to reproach me, [ await death without fear; that I leave
to posterity the task of defending
my memory; and that [ bequeath my vengeance to
my constituents and to all the true republicans of france.
Your fellow-citizen and brother,
Gustave Doulcet "

Doulcer's despair and resignation are clearly registered in this letter. But
more than that, he suggests that his letters were being prevented from reaching their destination, he asserts that he was guilty of neither crime nor weakness, and he implores his constituents to avenge the injustice being perpetrated on him and his colleagues.
Two days later, the nine commissioners sent to the capital wrote a note to
the general assembly that had dispatched them. They announced the proscription and arrest of the deputies and described the public turmoil in Paris.
They assured the Caen assembly that the majority of Parisians did not support these "scenes d'avillissernent"
and passed on the current rumor that a
great deal of money had been distributed to incite the people against the
deputies. They wrote of the general indignation of the other departments
and urged even greater fortitude in the face of this grave danger to the
Repuhlic."
One of the nine, Antoine Nicolas Marie, exhibited a calmer attitude in a
brief letter he sent on June 6 to Jean Le Goupil Duclos, mayor of Caen. He
opened, "Do not worry on our account," related the commissioners' intention to address the Convention, and closed with the observation that "Paris
28.

Brochures Norman des: Cacn SO/IS la Rcuolution,
c:. Caen, ':15 (Revolution du :I 1 mai 17Y')·

2Y· A.

II. M. Cacn, Res. FIl. Br. D 1 s6- 20Y·

~.
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is tranquil in appearance, and we count upon the friendship of our fellow
citizens." Marie expressed none of the alarm or exhortation contained in the
previous letter."
The gravity of the situation in Paris, however, was confirmed in a letter
dated June 8, sent from the deputy Lomont to Pierre Jean Leveque, who had
replaced the absent Lenormand as president of the departmental
administration. In the letter, Lomont lauds Leveque's character and warns him of
the need for renewed patriotism:
Brother and friend,
Your tactfulness and exquisite honesty have earned my esteem beyond all expression; may your fellow-citizens always do you the justice that you deserve! I have not
replied to your excellent letter of the seventeenth, because I was at Buges acting as
the Convention's commissioner
to the paper factory
there. But how times have
changed since that period! We must close ranks if we are to triumph over the enemies
of the country! No more small measures, or the liberty with which brave republicans
should perish will be finished.
I will say no more to you; you know what is happening ... courage, and again
more cou rage!
Greetings and good health,
Lt
I send this to your home: the secrecy of the mails is violated with impunity,
etc. ... by not including your official title in the inscription it will be less suspect
(this letter) and more likely to reach you."

Again, we see expressed the fear that the mails were being searched, with
Lornont even so cautious as not to sign his full name.
In spite of the alarming news that continued to arrive from Paris, business
went on much as usual in Caen during the first week of June. Both the municipal and district councils, as well as the departmental
administration,
concerned themselves principally with ensuring an adequate grain supply.
On June 2, Bougon-Longrais,
the procureur-general-syndic,
scolded the
comite de subsistance for its slow enactment of the maximum on barley, rye,
and oats. That same day, Bougon noted the importance of maintaining correspondence with the representatives on mission to the r ath Military Division, commanded by General Felix Wimpffen and headquartered
in Bayeux.
Two days later, the council sent two of its members, Pierre Mesnil and
Barnabe Cauvin, to warn the two representatives on mission of a possible
30. Ibid.
31. A. D. Calvados,

/

L[02.76 (Leveque correspondence).
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arms shipment from England to the Manche coast and to invite them to confer with the Calvados administration.
The two representatives,
Charles
Rornme and Claude Antoine Prieur (of the C6te-d'Or), arrived in Caen on
June 5 and met with all three of the local administrations.
They engaged in
an amicable discussion regarding issues of military defense and grain supply
and left the next day for Bayeux."
On june 7, the departmental
directory read two decrees of the Convention into the official minutes. The first, dated May 3 I, announced the suppression of the Commission of Twelve. The second, dated june 1, contained
an official account of the events of May 3 I, stressing that debate continued
freely within the Convention and that only liberty had triumphed by that
grand [ournee. II
Caen remained calm until Saturday, June 8, when the nine commissioners
returned from Paris. At this point, the sequence of events becomes somewhat clouded. At least three versions exist of the twenty-four hours that culminated, early on june 9, in a declaration of insurrection.
The following account is the one most strongly supported by the record.
The precise time at which the commissioners arrived in Caen is not known;
but late 111 the morning or early in the afternoon, the departmental council
convened a special session, inviting members of the district and municipal
councils, members of the civil and judicial tribunals, and delegates from the
sections of Caen. At this meeting, one of the nine commissioners,
Dom
Mauger, a former Benedictine monk recently appointed physics professor at
the University of Caen, delivered their report.
According to the commissioners' account, they had arrived in the capital
on Sunday, june 2, only to discover that the sections of Paris had already
risen. They had met, as they entered the city, an unnamed Calvados administrator returning to Caen, who had told them that the Commission of
Twelve and twenty-two others would soon be arrested. Reaching the heart
of Paris late that night, the nine had passed TOO,OOO armed men with cannons trained on the Convention. On arriving at their hotel, they had learned
the details of that day's events. They had been told of a man, posing as a
municipal officer, who had roused the faubourg Saint-Antoine that morning, of the bravery of the deputies as they marched into the crowd, and of

2

32. A. D. Calvados, Lioobis (Consei! Gem'r,,1 du D~p"rtement, proces-verbaux
[uin 1.793-, I iuillet 1.793)·
33. A. D. Calvados, L[(;5; l{eill1pressioll
de I'Al1cim MOl1ilcur. XVI, )40.
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Marat leading a band of paid scoundrels. The Cirondin deputies had reportedly been proscribed under the threat of the men and cannons of Hanriot.
The following morning, Mauger continued, they had visited a few of the
Calvados deputies, as well as Petion, Jean Denis Lanjuinais, Barbaroux, and
Valaze, all of whom had described the commissioners'
mission as pointless.
The deputies had cited the example of the commissioners from the Seinelnterieure, who had been battered and spit upon in the Convention.
Undaunted, the delegation had gone on June 4 to visit the deputy Vardon,
where they had again encountered the majority of the Calvados representatives. The nine had decided to send six of their lot back to Caen with a
report, leaving three in Paris to deliver their message. Just then, a deputy had
burst in with news of an order for the arrest of those in Paris who had not
supported the .Iune 2 insurrection. Ten thousand people had already been
jailed, he had claimed, and an arrest order had been issued for the commissioners from Caen. Faced with this great peril, all nine had decided to remain in Paris and to go to the Convention the next day!
This they had done, only to be told that the Committee of Public Safety
now dealt with petitions such as theirs. Custave Doulcet had tried unsuccessfully to gain them admission to the assembly. Discouraged, they had left,
followed through the streets by "groupes de furieux." The nine had departed Paris late that afternoon "under the eye of a thousand spies," who
had followed them to the edge of town.
Arriving in Evreux on June 6, they had met a man named Beaumier who
had allegedly been paid 3,600 livres by Joseph Carat, the minister of the
interior, to sound out the departments of Lower Normandy. Beaumier had
told the nine of Carat's plan to become dictator. After peace had been restored and the Cirondins eliminated, Carat, presumably in league with
Robespierre and Mann, would fix a "maximum des proprietes" at 6,000
livres annual revenue. The domination of Paris would be assured. Shocked
by this tale, the delegation had turned Beaumier over to the Eure authorities.
That evening, they had met with a Eure general assembly, which, they reported, had already taken insurrectionary measures. The commissioners had
stopped the following day in Lisieux, where they had also met with local
authorities, and had traveled directly from there to Caen on June 8.·3'1
34· A. C. Caen, 136 (Insurrection er acres des administrations
insurgees, mai=juillcr
1793).
A major portion of the commissioners
report is printed in the notes to Vaultier, Souvenirs,
J 70-73.
The true status of Heaumier is unclear. He was apparently a commissaire obseroatcur
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Mauger's report made a strong impression on the assembly, and Leveque,
now president of the departmental administration, proposed an oath declaring eternal war against agitators, rebels, and the rnaratistes who divided the
Convention. All those present swore the oath, "with all the energy and enthusiarns of which a free people is capable." The minutes of the meeting and
the report were ordered printed and sent to all departments and to the sections of Paris. As the meeting drew to a close, those present voted to convene
section assemblies that evening. The assemblies would be visited by departmental administrators
and by members of the commission to Paris. It was
further agreed that future departmental meetings should include the district
and municipal councils, along with the tribunal, section, and club representatives who had attended this session. This marked the first instance during
the Revolution in which meetings of the Calvados administration
were in
any sense opened to the public. JS
In this version of the events of June 8, the report of the commissioners sent
to Paris plays a central role. The report could hardly have been more inflammatory--it
spoke of spies and armed legions in the capital, recounted the
abuses and threats suffered both by the commissioners themselves and by
the Calvados deputies, and told of secret agents roaming the provinces, sent
by men who hoped to rule over France as dictators. The people of Caen now
had direct confirmation of the woeful tales that the Calvados deputies had
told in recent letters.
That this report embodied a degree of exaggeration IS hardly surprising. Some evidence suggests, though, that not all of the commissioners to
Paris viewed the situation so urgently. Nicolas Marie's early letter to Le
Goupil Duclos described the capital as calm. Another of the commissioners,
Guillaume Feret, testified after the revolt that the armed soldiers he had seen
in Paris were patrolling the streets peacefully. Feret had never visited the
capital before, and a bad leg kept him in his hotel room during the entire
stay. He later claimed that Rene Lenormand, Louis Caille, and Dorn Mauger
had made nearly all of the decisions for the group, had arranged their meet-

2.,

for the deparuncnr of Paris in May, 1793, and wrote 1"0 Cur.u on May
requcsriug employment in his service. There is no record that Carat g:lve him such a nusxion, and Pierre Caron
does not list him as one of Carat's agents. BeaUlnier's run-in with the Cacn commissioners lhd
create problems for another C,lrat agent, I:louisset, who was dcr.rincc] and har.isscdiu Calv.idos
as he passed through on his way to i.\rirrany ill June. See Pierre Caron, Rapnorts des Agell/s du
Millis!re de l'Lriterieur dans les d';I}(IrIl'lIlell/s
(I 7'J) =an I I) (Paris, '9 I,), I, ,oH- 109·
35. A. D. Calvados, L, eobi«.
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ings with deputies, and had taken responsibility for drafting the report." If
Feret can be believed, and he admittedly was writing in his own defense,
both the trip to Paris and the later report were managed by men already
predisposed to insurrection; in that case, the representatives of the Caen sections made very minor contributions to both the mission and the report.
Frederic Vaultier gives an account in his Souvenirs that minimizes the importance of the commissioners'
report, suggesting instead that the section
assemblies declared their insurrectionary
intention on June 8 before hearing
from the men sent to Paris. He seems to ignore the fact that earlier that day
Mauger had read the report to the special session, which section representatives had attended, but his chronicle of the events of that evening is interesting in other respects. As secretary of the section Liberre, Vaultier received
an address that a prominent citizen wished to have read to the section assembly on the evening of June 8. This citizen insisted on anonymity, and
only after Vaulrier himself had taken credit for the address did the assembly
allow him to read it aloud. He did not reprint it in his memoirs bur described it as written "in a most pronounced spirit of insurrection." Those in
attendance greeted the speech with acclamation, and the section declared
itself in insurrection "en principe." Liberte sent Vaultier to deliver his address to the other sections in order to secure their adhesion. Only when he
wrote his recollections, over thirty years later, did he identify the true author
of the speech as Pierre Jacques Samuel Chatry l'aine."
It is possible that Vaultier is indulging his memory to gain his own small
bit of revolutionary glory. But despite the absence of strong corroborating
evidence (which, given the nature of the episode, one would hardly expect),
this account sounds plausible, and we cannot dismiss it out of hand. Charry
did, in fact, live on the Place de la Liberre and would have been a member of
Vaultier's section. It has already been pointed out that he had played an active role in municipal politics since 1789, first as a member of the Caen General Committee and then as a municipal officer and notable. He belonged to
a wealthy, commercial, Protestant Caen family. In J793, he held public
office as a notable and as president of the Tribunal of Commerce. Although
clearly influential in local affairs, Chatry preferred not to exercise a prorni.,6. A. D. Caivados, l.r o •.,6 (documents penaining to federalism).
This information is COilrained in a letter (bred March. 0, J 794, sent by Feret to the representatives
on mission Bouret
and Frem.uiger.
37· Vaultier, Souvenirs, J 2- '3·
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nent leadership role. In 1791, he declined election as mayor because he felt it
would be imprudent for a Protestant to hold that position at a time when
religious opinions were a political issue. Drafting an inflammatory speech
and then giving it to Vaulrier to deliver would have been consistent with his
sense of discretion, with his concern for political affairs, and also with his
later, active participation
in the revolt."
In addition to this circumstantial
evidence, Vaultier's story is partially
supported by Jean Baptiste Leclerc, a departmental administrator in 1793·
Interrogated in August, after the revolt had failed, he acknowledged that he
had accompanied several of the commissioners who bad been sent to Paris
as they reported to section assemblies on the night of June 8. Leclerc noted
that people in the sections were already calling for revolt and that the section Liberte, in fact, had declared itself in insurrection before the commissioners arrived. This confirms Vaultier's recollection of the sequence of
events, though not the role of Chatry. Yi
A final possible amendment to the official record of the events of June 8
accords a position of prominence to the Carabot club. One of the commissioners to Paris, Lenormand (not Rene, but a second Lenorrnand), had been
sent explicitly as a representative of that club, and the delegation may have
included other Carabots as well. Georges Mancel, in his notes to Vaultier,
claims that on their return from Paris two of the commissioners reported
immediately to their fellow Carabots. Taking the initiative, the club sent
twelve of its members to the assembled authorities with a petition, proposing that all Calvados deputies to the Convention be recalled; that local authorities recognize no measure issued by the Convention, or by the "socalled Executive Council," after May 27; that a court be created to judge
rnaratistes and other "Iactieux"; that the Calvados authorities create a cavalry force of two hundred men for public security; and finally, that all couriers sent by the Convention be arrested and their packets seized, inspected,
and burned. The fact that a general assembly adopted several of these measures early on the morning of June 9 supports the veracity of this account. 10
The meeting of June 9 was of singular importance for two reasons. First,
on that morning, the people of Caen confirmed their intention to pursue an
38. A. D. Calvados,
(Mairie, '790-<1n II).
39. A. D. Calvados,
40. A. D. Calvados,
Carabot petition in the

Lro074

(Elections

er aetifs,

'790-92);

A. C. Caen, Dr, D2, and K34

Lro rz c (interrogations
of federalist suspects).
L10T36; Vaultier, Souvenirs, 138-39. The handwritten
Calvados archives is undated.
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insurrection against the Montagnard
Convention. Second, more than any
subsequent event or action, the oath sworn on June 9 and the assembly's
decision to arrest and imprison the deputies Romme and Prieur would provide damning evidence against the Calvados federalists after their revolt
collapsed.
A variety of documents enables us to reconstruct the events of that day
and identify the leading figures in the drama. From the official proces-uerbal
of the June 9 meeting, we learn that representatives from all of the local administrations, courts, and clubs attended the session. However, many who
might have come stayed away. Only thirteen of thirty-seven departmental
administrators were present, though this was not unusual. Early in the year,
as many as thirty administrators
had attended council meetings with some
regularity; but in recent weeks, attendance had never reached even 50 percent. Caen district officials showed slightly greater diligence-seven
of the
thirteen council members were present at the meeting. Surprisingly, the
Caen municipal council had proportionally
the fewest representatives in attendance. Of the forty-four current council members, only ten were present.
Although eight of the fourteen officers carne, both the mayor and the procureur were absent.
Pierre Jean Leveque presided over the assembly, which began with a discussion of proposals made by the sections and the popular societies. Those
present unanimously declared themselves in a state of insurrection and resistance to oppression until that time when the Convention should recover its
liberty. Two messengers from the neighboring department of the Orne reported that the administration
of that department was preparing an armed
force and called on Calvados to do likewise. This proposal was referred to a
committee. Then, in its most decisive action, the assembly named Lenormand (not Rene, but the second Lenorrnand) and a few of his fellow Carabots to go to Bayeux to arrest the two deputies Rornrne and Prieur. They
were to bring the two back to Caen, where they would be held in the Chateau as hostages against the safety of the deputies arrested in Paris. An additional messenger traveled to the neighboring department of the Manche to
request its support for the Calvados position.
Acting on the recommendations
of the Carabots, those assembled ordered
the postal service to redirect to the Calvados administration
all letters addressed to the representatives on mission. All local payeurs generaux were
instructed to disburse no funds whatsoever without an order from the de-
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partmental or district directory. The assembly also ordered that all munitions and military convoys intended for the coast be held in Caen (so that
the populace would not be disquiered l). General Wimpffen, commanding
the r ath Military Division, was invited to Caen to confer with officials. The
session closed with the appointment of a provisional insurrectional committee, composed of one representative
from each local corps: Rene Lenormand, from the departmental
administration;
Louis Caille, from the Caen
district council; Samuel Charry l'aine, a municipal notable; Pierre Michel
Picquot, the public prosecutor for the Criminal Tribunal; Pierre Costy, a
judge on the district tribunal; Francois Anne Pierre Tabourer, from the section Liberte; Francois Le Carpentier, a municipal notable representing the
jacobin club; Jean Michel Barbot, from the Carabor club; and Charles
L'honore, a judge on the Caen Tribunal of Commerce."
There is much, however, that the official record omits or distorts. For one
thing, it exaggerates the single-mindedness
of those present. The procesverbal records the unanimous declaration of a state of insurrection, followed
by the signatures of all those present, as well as the names of a number of
other officials who signed at a later date. But some of those present opposed
this declaration-in
particular, Robert Tirel, an homme de loi and district
director. Tirel questioned the advisability of insurrection and especially objected to the proposal to arrest Rornme and Prieur. However, the assembly
shouted him down and passed a clause that labeled as suspect and traitorous
anyone who refused to support and sign the declaration of revolt. The heated
emotions, fueled by the report from Paris, clearly made public opposition to
the insurrection a dangerous proposition.
A number of individuals claimed in their interrogations, perhaps for reasons of self-preservation,
to have been intimidated into signing the June 9
minutes. One of these was Gilles Fleury, a saddle maker and town notable.
He, too, claimed to have opposed the arrest of the two deputies. He had
been shouted down along with Tirel and had signed the proces-uerbal out of
fear for his safety; he said. At a meeting eight or nine days after June 9, the
deputy procureur had observed that the menacing clause rendered the deliberation of June 9 legally null. Those present had voted to strike it from the
record, and the offending words had been scratched from the original minlites. Fleury claimed in his interrogation to have argued that since some had
4'. A. D. Calvados, L Ill9 (Regisrr« des .ureres du Conseil
vados, II aour 1792.-26
[uillcr 1793).
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signed under coercion, the questions and orders should be reopened for discussion. This motion had been quickly dismissed, but two days later Fleury
had discreetly scratched out his signature in the presence of the secretary."
The official record also leaves unexplained the curious absence of the
Caen mayor from the June 9 meeting. Again, it is the later interrogation
transcripts that provide information. Le Goupil Duclos claimed that work
had detained him at the town hall on June 8 and that he therefore had not
been able to attend the section assemblies or hear the report from Paris. He
had gone to the Abbaye-aux-Hornrnes,
where the departmental council met,
at nine o'clock that evening, stayed until midnight, and returned home when
informed that a general meeting would not be held until the following morning. The next day, he had been astounded to learn that the meeting had convened at 4 A.M.! It appears that the mayor of Caen, who remained aloof
from the revolt throughout June and July, was not absent by choice on the
morning of June 9 and that this critical meeting took place at a most unusual
hour. Indeed, the time may have been largely responsible for the generally
low attendance at the meeting.":'
The assembly met again that evening to prepare further for resistance
against Paris. The session had scarcely opened, however, when HenryLariviere and Gorsas, two of the proscribed deputies, arrived in the hall.
Each addressed the assembly, and those present were "seized by horror" at
their description of events in Paris. The assembly ordered that the bulletin of
the Convention no longer be printed and further voted to disregard all orders
issued by the Convention after May 27 and to suspend all correspondence
with the Executive Council. It invited the other five districts of Calvados to
send representatives to Caen and voted to form five committees, each to be
composed of five members;" One committee was assigned to draft an appeal
to the citizens of Calvados to volunteer for a departmental force to march to
42. A. D. Calvados, LIOl 25 and I,l89. The incident involving Tire! was attested to, under
interrogation,
by Leclerc, Fleury, the departmental
administrator
Cauvin, and Le Goupil
Duclos, the mayor of Caen. The original minutes of the meeting do show the controversial
clause, barely legible, to have been crossed out. The signature of Fleury is also faintly visible.
43· A. D. Calvados, LI0125 (interrogation
of Le Goupil Duclos). Mancel, in his notes to
Vaultier's memoirs, reports the time of the meeting to have been 2 A.M., hardly a more hospitable hour. If this was indeed the correct rime, it would seem even more likely that Le Goupil
was deliberately misled when told at midnight that the assembly would take place the next
morrung.

44· The five committees were comitc de resistance a l'oppression, comite de militaire, comite des finances, comite des subsistances, comite de redaction et de correspon dance.
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Paris. In addition, the delegates voted to name sixteen commissioners to
travel in pairs to the sixteen surrounding departments to invite them to join
Calvados in selecting a town from which a central committee could direct
their efforts."
Late in the meeting, two messengers from Evreux arrived to inform Calvados officials that the Eure was organizing in protest. These men announced that they had passed through Lisieux, where officials and citizens
were prepared to enroll in a departmental
force. Inspired by this news, Rene
Lenorrnand, Adrien Thiboult, Louis Caille, and Antoine Nicolas Marie immediately stepped forward as the first volunteers for the Calvados bartalion." The session closed with an order that each district council open registers for the enrollment of volunteers.
New developments followed in quick succession during those hectic days.
Before going on, we would do well to briefly assess what had occurred thus
far. In the span of two days, the department of Calva dos, principally the
chef-lieu of Caen, had shifted from a state of concern and alert to one of
open insurrection. Emotions had run high following the report of the commissioners returned from Paris and had been heightened by the words of
Gorsas and Lariviere. Fateful steps had been taken in the decisions to form a
departmental force and to arrest the deputies Rornme and Prieur. A general
assembly (composed largely of departmental
administrators
but including
representatives from the district, the municipality, and the sections and clubs
of Caen) had been formed to coordinate resistance efforts. But one must
question, particularly in light of later events, the extent of popular support
for these actions, even at this early, exhilarating stage of the revolt.
Virtually all of the men named to the provisional insurrectional committee had extensive experience in local administration.
Administrators
with
clear ties to individuals in Paris had played the most active roles to this
point. Rene Lenorrnand, president of the department from January through
May, came from the same area as Doulcet de Pontccoulant and maintained
45. The deparrmcnts
to be visited were the Eure, Scinc-lnferieure.
Sonune, Orne, Snrrhc,
Indrect-Loire,
Maycnnc, Maine-er-Loire,
Eure-er Loir, Loir-cr-Cher,
Munche, lllc-ct- Vil.unc,
Cotes-du-Nord,
Morbihan, Finisrere, and Loire-luferieure.
The commissioners were not narned
until the following day.
46. l.enorm.md was a departmental
udrninisrrator.
Adrien Thiboult was also a departmental administrator,
representing
Lisieux, who thus might have been expected to step forward.
Cadle, of course, was procurcur-s yndic, and Antoine Nicolas Marie was a Caen notable.
Lenormand,
Cadle, and Marie were three of the nine cornmissioners
who had just returned
from Paris.
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contact with the deputy; Leveque, the newly elected departmental president,
regularly corresponded with the deputy Lomont; Cadle, a district administrator, had traveled to Paris in January, 1792, to seek information regarding
the split between Feuillants and Jacobins and since that time had reportedly
maintained regular communication with several of the Girondin leaders, especially Barbaroux; Chatry l'aine, who perhaps played a key role with the
volatile speech delivered by Vaultier to the Caen sections, was a notable and
had previously served for two years as a municipal officer; and Marie, sent
to Paris as a commissioner and one of the first to volunteer for the departmental force, sat in 1793 as a Caen notable.
The one exception to this pattern is the second Lenorrnand, a member
of the delegation to Paris and later of the group sent to Bayeux to arrest
the two deputies, who can only be identified as having been president of the
Carabots. This group constituted a potential source of popular input to the
general assembly, but it is difficult to estimate the size of the Carabor membership. Vaultier says that it grew after May 3 I, but he also suggests that the
new members (he mentions General Wimpffen by name) already held positions of authority and may have joined in order to exercise a more direct
influence over the club." As for the sections, another possible source of
popular input, no record of their regular sessions during this period exists;
therefore, we do not know the attendance at the meetings of June 8, nor do
we know if they continued to meet throughout the revolt. It should be noted,
however, that the church bells, the regular means of summoning citizens to
these assemblies, were not rung on the evening of June 8 for fear that ringing
them would alarm the countryside. In addition, these meetings were held
late at night, an inconvenient time for many, as was the early morning hour
of the important general assembly on June 9. Finally, both Esnault and
Dufour, the diarists, noted a general lack of public enthusiasm among the
people of Caen during this period for the protest being marshalled against
Paris and the Montagnards."
On june 10, Lenorrnand and the Carabots returned to Caen with their
prisoners, Romrne and Prieur. The two deputies appeared before the general
assembly, where Leveque assured them of the Calvados citizens' respect for
their persons and office, while declaring the assembly's determination
to
47· Vaultier, Souvenirs, ')7.
4B. Lesage (Esnaulr), r o S, and (Dufour),
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hold them as hostages for the arrested representatives in Paris." Delegates
from Bayeux accompanied the Carabots and reported their city's adherence
to the state of insurrection. Six more departmental officials and one district
administrator stepped forward to enroll in the departmental force, and the
assembly ordered the Caen National Guard to gather that evening so that its
members could volunteer for the force as wel 1.",
A more important meeting of the general assembly took place that afternoon, with General Wimpffen in attendance. The general swore his devotion
to the insurrection and requested that military supplies intended for the
coast be allowed to continue to their destination. The assembly willingly
granted the request. Although Louis Cadle questioned the dependability of
Wimpffen and the advisability of his appointment
as commander of the
rebel forces, the matter was quickly passed over. Wimpffen's royalist sympathies and later recalcitrance in leading the march on Paris supported, in retrospect, Caille's reservation.
The assembly then ordered the reconvening in Bayeux of the administrative council of the r ath Military Division, composed of five commissioners
from neighboring departments. The council was to commence making plans
for raising an army to march to Paris. This order is noteworthy, for it was
the first action by Calvados officials that could be interpreted as a direct reaction to a recent order from the capital.
Since early in 1793, the Calvados administration
had expressed its concern to the minister of war, the minister of the interior, and the Convention
regarding the need for stronger defenses along the Channel coast to repulse
a possible attack from England. Some local officials, no doubt, recalled the
frequent British attacks, and the consequent disruption of commerce, during
the Seven Years War (1756-1763).
The declaration of war against Britain
on February 1, 1793, increased the current danger, and one week later the
departmental council wrote to the minister of war to request that WimpHen
be assigned to command the troops of the t ath Division, also known as the
Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg. The minister acknowledged the request
4'1. A/fiches. AIl/TOIlLeS ct Avis Divers de la Bassc-Normandic.
June '5, '7'13" A. D.
Calv.idos.
50. A. D. Calvados, L 18". The deparnucnr.tl offici;)ls were Jean Charles Hippolyte BougonLongrnis; Pierre Mesnil , a Caen merchant; Jean Jacques Pcrir, a mcrch.rnr from F"Lllsc; Je;1I1
Baptiste Leclerc. a illge de [raix from Cambrcmer;
Nicolas Lenoblc I'ain«: and GCflll;II'~
Dubosq, president of the Crjmin.il Tribunal, origin;dly from Vireo The district official was Rene
Francois Lahaye, a propcr ry owner and former mayor of the sillall town of Audricu.
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but took no immediate action. II The administration
apparently then sought
the intervention of Fauchet, who wrote to Calvados on February 24 that the
Executive Council had decided to transfer Wimpffen to the r arh Division.
Delays followed, however, and the Calvados authorities remained dissatisfied with the defense of their coast. On April 7, the departmental
council sent Bougon-Longrais to Paris to press more forcefully their demands for
a stronger defense before the Executive Council and the Convention.52
Whether as a result of this mission or not, the manpower of the 14th Division increased in April, and in mid-April, the Convention issued an order for
the creation of an administrative council attached to the [4th Division. This
council, to be headquartered
in Bayeux, was to be composed of one representative each from Calvados, the Manche, the Orne, the Eure, and the
Seine-Inferieure. The Calvados administration
named Andre Bresson as its
representative, and he left Caen to assume his position on April 18. Finally,
on May 15, the minister of the interior, Carat, confirmed the appointment
of Wimpffen as commander of the r ath Division.':'
It must have come as a rude surprise to the Calvados authorities, then,
when Romrne and Prieur arrived on mission from the Convention in late
May and, as one of their first actions, ordered the dissolution of the administrative council in Bayeux. Deputies on mission were to assume its former role, and the representatives of the five departments would now become
a committee of correspondence
with no deliberative powers. After struggling for half a year to secure an adequate defense, local officials now saw
full control of the Cherbourg army returned to the central government,
which had seemingly ignored for so long the threat to their coast. The Convention's decision at this time was probably motivated by a distrust of General Wimpffen, whose royalist sympathies were well known. Wimpffen expressed his disapproval of this action to the representatives on mission; but
on May 27, the administrative council held what it believed to be its final
session." On June 10, however, with Remme and Prieur safely in custody,
the Calvados general assembly restored the council to its former powers.
The following day, the general assembly adopted another measure directed against the capital. It ordered the suspension of all transport to Paris
of "denrees de premiere necessite," principally foodstuffs. The municipality
51.
52.
53·
54·

A.
A.
A.
A.

D.
D.
D.
D.

Calvados,
Calvados,
Calvados,
Calvados,

LI05.s0 (documents
Lr65.
L105)0.
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enacted this order immediately, and goods destined for Paris were stopped in
Caen to be stored in the former house of the Carmelites. Two considerations
inspired this action. The first was long-standing resentment of the capital's
voracious appetite for both food and tax revenues. One finds expressions of
this resentment throughout provincial France, not only in Caen. The second
was the current shortage of grain in the Caen market, a problem since early
spring. In the minds of many people in Caen, the shortage could be attributed to the export of grain to Paris (though it was more likely due to the
reluctance of local farmers to send grain to the market, despite an abundant
harvest)."
On June 2I, the mayor of Paris, Jean Nicolas Pache, sent a letter to the
Caen district council protesting the boycott on goods to the capital. Pache
wrote eloquently of the threat of anarchy that this might pose, of the aid it
would give to Cobourg and Brunswick, and of the sacrifices already made
by Parisians for the liberty of the nation. He implored the people of Caen to
send a prompt disavowal of this barbarous project. Three days later, the
general assembly replied, noting its affront at Pache's decision to send his
appeal only to the district council-an
obvious attempt to sow division
among the local authorities. The assembly's letter spelled out the usual grievances against factionalism in Paris and the violation of the National Convention and reiterated the determination
of Calvados citizens to resist oppression and dictatorship. But it also bitterly denounced the parasitism of Paris:
Do you wish continually to mislead us with trivial phrases, when they are contradicted by the facts? As if it were nor sufficiently notorious that, under the plausible
pretext of supplying the city of Paris, you have wickedly exceeded the bounds of prudence with the criminal intention of reducing a generous and magnanimous people
to famine ....
Does the administration
of the Department of Calvados not have reason to wonder at the reproach directed against it by the municipality of Paris, when, from all
parts of France, objections ring out over the enormous sums that the Commune has
swallowed up through the squandering of monsters who have embezzled from the
public Treasury.

The Calvados assembly further accused the Paris municipality of paying the
instigators of the recent disruptions and charged that the Parisian battalions
55. A. D. Calvados, L 189; A. C. Caen, [h. See also A. D. Calvados, L I 92:\. In mid-April,
the Calvados cornite de surcte general had investigated an allegedly illicit shipment of foodstuffs to Paris. Members of the committee observed that while such a shipment could not possibly benefit the well-provisioned
capital, ir had appreciably harmed Caen.
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sent to combat the Vendean rebels had in fact gone to aid the revolt and
spread chaos. The assembly had no intention of moderating its position, and
the boycott remained in effect until early july."
Fortunately for Paris, the efforts of Calvados to blockade the capital did
not receive universal support. The northwestern departments in Lower Normandy and Brittany joined in the boycott, but grain continued to travel up
the Seine from Le Havre and Rouen. Still, by early July, the bakers of Paris
were in serious straits; and on July 14, Pache wrote a confidential letter to
Robert Linder and Jean Michel DuRoy, representatives on mission who had
been sent by the Convention to pacify the Norman departments. He begged
them to make their first priority the reopening of trade routes, so that grain
from that region could again reach the capital. Pache stressed the gravity of
the situation by reminding the two representatives that famine in Paris might
bring the downfall of the Republic. Indeed, the boycott on grain appears to
have been a far more potent weapon than the small armed force that the
Calvados rebels eventually sent toward Paris.'?
During the second week of June, officials in Caen proceeded to consolidate their organization and to seek wider support for the insurrection. On
June II, the same day the grain boycott began, the general assembly made
appointments to the five committees created on June 9. Twenty-one of the
twenty-five appointees already held official positions at the departmental,
district, or municipal level; thus, the appointments
preserved the predominant role played by elected officials in leading and organizing the revolt.
These committees, under the supervision of the general assembly, would
guide the local revolt for the remainder of June.
To generate support for the resistance effort, the assembly prepared an address to the citizens of Calvados. It began by denouncing as a fabrication the
recent proclamation of the National Convention that reported the freedom
of that body and the tranquility of Paris. It recounted the terrifying scene
that the Calvados commissioners had encountered in the capital and called
all citizens to arms so that Calvados might join the other departments
in
defeating this assault on the nation's sovereignty. Despite this bellicose appeal and the supposed gravity of the threat to the nation, the general assembly promised that not a drop of blood would be shed, since the majority of
56. A. D. Calvados, L 10 134 (addresses and proclamarions
during the federalist revoir).
57· A. D. Calvados, 1.10119 (Lindet mission, correspondence).
See also Goodwin,
"The
Federalist Movement in Caen during the French Revolution," especially pages ,>27-43·

THE

PROVINCES

RESPOND

135

oppressed Parisians would welcome their liberators with open arms. The
reputation of the brave Norman warriors was already intimidating the new
tyrants in Paris."
The general assembly also sent letters and messengers to surrounding departments. The first of these went to Rouen, for the importance of securing
the support of the Seine-Inferieure was clear. With grain supplies running
short, Caen would be turning to Le Havre for emergency shipments. Rouen,
located on the Seine, could easily block supplies traveling up the river to
Paris and would be a vital component of any blockade effort. Moreover,
long-standing ties, both commercial and juridical, joined the capitals of
Upper and Lower Normandy. Thus, as early as June 9, the members of the
general assembly sent a letter to Rouen explaining to the departmental
council their alarm at the violation of the Convention, their determination
to resist oppression, and their declaration of insurrection. They expressed
hope that the Seine-Inferieure would support their actions and requested the
shipment to Caen of any available grain. Finally, they informed the Seinelnferieure that they had ordered the arrest of Rornme and Prieur, referring to
the deputies as "Proconsuls Nationaux."
Despite their own misgivings regarding the recent turn of events in Paris,
the administrators
of the Seine-Inferieure were not prepared to follow the
drastic steps marked out by their counterparts in Calvados. In a return letter
dated June 18, written after the officials in Rouen had conferred with a messenger sent by the Calvados general assembly, the Seine-lnterieure administration maintained that officials in Caen had exceeded their legal powers in
ordering the arrest of Rornme and Prieur and in freezing public funds. As
administrators,
they could register their disapproval through letters of protest, but the constitution would not justify the arrest of national representatives or the rejection of the authority of the Convention. In sum, the SeineInferieure administrators
viewed the Calvados actions as a more serious
threat to order than the violations they sought to remedy." The attitude of
the Seine-Inferieure administration
illustrates the dilemma facing provincial moderates. Although they deplored events in Paris, their own commitment to constitutional
legality prevented them from taking decisive action,
,<)

58. A. D. Calvados, l.1 8'). A signed copy of the address, dared June 10, '79:;, can also be
found in dossier L. ro I ·H.
59. A.D. Calvados, L,01H·
60. The main portion of this letter is reprinted in Manee1's notes to Vnulrier, Souvenirs,
'92-')3.
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lest they be guilty of precisely the transgression of which they accused the
Montagnards.
The general assembly enjoyed greater success in securing the support
of other departments. The Eure and the Orne, of course, had already sent
messengers to Caen declaring their intentions. On June 12, sixteen commissioners left Caen to visit other neighboring departments
and inform
them of Calvados' actions. Most of those chosen were minor figures, representatives from the Caen sections and clubs, but the assembly named several familiar officials to visit key departments.
Louis Caille and Chaixd'Estanges left for the Manche, which had expressed some apprehension
over the arrest of Rornrne and Prieur, and for the llle-et- Vilaine, where delegates from other Breton departments were known to be already gathering in
Rennes. Bougon-Longrais departed for the Seine-Interieure and the Somme,
while Lenorrnand, the Carabot president, and Caille le jeune journeyed to
the departments of Finisrere and the Cotes-du-Nord.
On that same day,
Charles Francois Duharnel-Levailly,
a departmental
administrator
from
Bayeux, informed the assembly that urgent business required his presence
in Bordeaux, and he was delegated to carry news of the insurrection to
the lndre-et-Loire,
the Indre, the Haute- Vienne, the Dordogne, and the
Cironde.:"
In Caen, the general assembly began preparations for the formation of a
departmental force. On June 14, it ordered a contingent of four hundred
infantrymen with two cannons, one caisson, and a half company of cannoneers sent to Evreux to be put at the disposition of that department. Soldiers were to be drawn from Caen, Lisieux, and Falaise. Two days later, with
the Caen contingent still incomplete, the military committee ordered the
Lisieux and Falaise troops to leave as a vanguard, to be followed on June 19
by a full company of two hundred from Caen. The departmental
officials
Lenormand and Mesnil accompanied the vanguard as civil commissioners.
Officials instructed the chef de legion in Caen to fill the ranks of that company from the National Guard. Even this did not suffice to complete the
company, however; and on June 19, the general assembly ordered the sounding of a call to arms after that day's parade, to attract more recruits. Those
who signed up were to prepare to leave on Friday, June 21.
The Carabots appeared in the June 19 parade, fully armed and prepared
6 r . A. D. Calvados, Lr89. The diligence with which Duhamel performed his mission
open to question. I found no record whatsoever of his stopping in the Haute- Vienne.
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march toward Paris. This public demonstration
as well as an assurance
from the general assembly that the wives and children of those who volunteered would be protected by the authorities, may have helped to generate
enthusiasm. Yet the contingent was finally filled only by the conscription of
five men from each company of the Caen National Guard. In a town of
roughly thirty thousand, it had taken a full week to assemble two hundred
volunteers for this venture. Finally, on June 22, the company embarked 011
the road to Evreux, led by a departmental banner entrusted to the Carabots
and the Jacobin club. The Caen volunteers took as their motto that of the
Carabot club: "L'execution de la loi, ou la mort." The departmental administrators Leveque and Bougon accompanied the contingent.
The addition of the 6th Battalion of Calvados volunteers, previously assigned to combat the Vendean rebels, boosted this small force. Lieutenant
Colonel LeRoy appeared before the general assembly on June 20 to report
that his battalion, fighting alongside "Parisian brigands," had grown disillusioned and dispirited. Fearing desertion, LeRoy had ordered his men back
toward Calvados, They now awaited new orders in Alencon. The assembly
could scarcely ignore this stroke of good fortune and ordered the battalion
to proceed immediately to Evreux.:"
For the first Caen force, however, problems continued. Only hours after
the troops had left the city, the newly appointed quartermaster,
Edouard
LeGrix, clashed off a letter to Pierre Jean Leveque. The departmental treasurer, St. Firmin, had refused to release funds for the supplies and lodging of
the troops on their route to Evreux. LeGrix wrote that the assembly, "disorganized, so to speak," had put off until the following day a resolution of the
problem. The quartermaster
was therefore trapped in Caen waiting for
funds. LeGrix advised Leveque to conceal the present predicament from the
troops, in order to avoid hostile rumors. He also noted the recent arrival in
Calvados of copies of the new constitution.>'
The general assembly resolved the temporary crisis the next day by ordering St. Firmin to disregard prior obligations and normal procedures and to
release the money immediately to LeGrix. To discourage similar recalcitrance in other quarters, the assembly issued an order requiring all civil, judicial, and military officials in Calvados to swear an oath, pledging to:
"maintain with all one's power liberty and equality, to uphold the unity and
to

62. Ibid.
65· A. D. Calvados,

L I 0276 (Leveque correspondence).
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indivisibility of the Republic, to wage war against tyrants and anarchists, to
not lay down arms until the National Convention is free and France avenged
for the attacks committed against the sovereignty of the people." ,.4
During this same period, the third week in June, the officials who had
gathered in Caen took steps to more actively involve the rest of the department in the revolt. On June 18, the general assembly convoked all cantonal
primary assemblies for the following Monday, June 24- These assemblies
were to swear the oath of loyalty cited above and to elect one delegate apiece
to join the assembly in Caen. This order produced mixed results. The district
council of Falaise refused to call primary assemblies until a second, more
sternly worded, order was sent to the district officials. Scattered reports filtered in of individual cantons' refusing to proceed as ordered. But many assemblies did meet, and on June 25 and 26, some thirty-seven cantonal delegates appeared before the assembly for ratification. The enthusiasm of these
new delegates, however, appears to have been short-lived. No record of attendance exists for the general assembly, but it voted on July 3 that those
members wishing to be absent must present their reasons to the comiu: de
salut public. The assembly also ordered district councils to invite cantons to
choose substitute delegates to confer with primary delegates, so that one of
the two would always be present. Furthermore, some cantons had still not
elected any delegates. On July 9, the assembly instructed district officials to
forward the names of individuals who were obstructing the convocation of
primary assemblies. Primary assemblies never convened in Caen, since section assemblies had already sent delegates to the general assembly."
The general assembly also took steps to increase the size of the departmental force. As reports came in of the creation of volunteer forces in other
departments-ranging
from the Gironde and the Bouches-du-Rhone
to
Finistcrc, Morbihan, and the llle-et- Vilaine in Brittany-it
became clear
that Calvados would have to bolster the 400-man vanguard that had left for
Evreux on June 22. Thus, on June 27, officials called for more volunteers to
march to Paris. The assembly proposed to raise a force of more than 1,000
men, with Caen furnishing 405 volunteers and the other major towns providing the remaining 600 in proportion
to their population.
Companies
were to be formed immediately and made ready to leave for Evreux by July 4.
Although people of the countryside would not be asked to join, because of
64· A. D. Calvados, Lr S9 (minutes of June 2.), 1793).
65· A. D. Calvados, L 189 and L J 60ter (Asscmblce Gcneral« des aurorites
unies au chef-lieu du dcparrernenr,
r juiJicr J 793 - 26 juillet r 793).
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the upcoming harvest, they could do so if they wished. All volunteers would
be paid forty sous per day. Once in Evreux, volunteers could terminate their
service with one month's notification. The force, whose only objective was
to "cooperate with our brothers, the good citizens of Paris, in restoring the
freedom of the National Convention," could not be required or ordered to
perform any other service. Although the general assembly ostensibly issued
this order, only departmental officials signed it."
Again, as with the formation of the vanguard, this appeal for popular support of the patriotic insurrection against the new tyrants in Paris did not
receive an enthusiastic response. On July 2., because of resistance to recruitment, the assembly ordered all able-bodied men under the age of fifty who
did not have young children to join the force, adding that those who refused
would be fined and imprisoned in accordance with the law of April 19,
1793. This order was posted in Caen on July 4, over the objection of the
mayor, Le Goupil Duclos. But according to Victor Dufour, most people still
refused to enroll.:"
To overcome this apathy, officials scheduled a public parade and review in
Caen for Sunday, July 7. Music, speeches, and a parade of the National
Guard regaled a sizable crowd. After the festivities, General Wimpffen, accompanied by members of the insurrectionary
assembly, passed before the
ranks and called forward those who had volunteered to march to Paris. Seventeen brave Normans stepped forward-a
very disappointing response."
One day later, whether because of objections to the illegality of requiring
citizens to enroll in the force or because of apprehensions
that reluctant
"volunteers" would damage troop morale, General Wimpffen, with the approval of the assembly, rescinded the order constraining all able-bodied citizens to join the force. All those whose health or business might impede their
wholehearted participation in the campaign could retire, as could those who
simply regretted having joined. Battalion leaders were instructed to dismiss
those men whom they considered unfit.?"
Even if the majority of Calvados citizens refused to believe that the recent
(,(,. A. D. Calvados, LI X9; Brochures Norniandes: Cacu SOliS fa f{euoful.;o/l,
B. M. Caen,
Res. FII. Br. C9Xo.
(,7. Lesage (Dufour), 120; see A. C. Cacn, 142 (L'Armee Liberarricc, mai-Juiller
179.,) for a
copy of the decree.
(,8. Vnulrier. Souvenirs, 23 - :'-4. Charlotte Corday, a native of Caen, is reported ro have
been in attendance on this occasion, and it has been suggested that it was this pathetic response
to the federalists' call to arms that convinced her to go to Paris and do her own pan 111 combating the anarchists.
69. A. D. Cnlv.idos, L 160[er (rninutes of July s, 1793)·
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events in Paris posed a threat to their life and liberty, the members of the
general assembly remained convinced of the rectitude of their actions. Early
in June, letters demanding a protest of the proscriptions had arrived from
many departments, giving the impression of nationwide support for a march
to the capital. Most of these departments, of course, took no further action,
but this would not be apparent to authorities in Caen until much later.
A more important factor in encouraging the insurrectionary
attitude of the
general assembly was the almost continuous stream of proscribed deputies
into Caen in the weeks after June 8. Every two or three days, a new Girondin
face appeared in town. By mid-July, at least eighteen deputies had reached
Caen, and most remained there until the end of the month. The first to arrive were Henry-Lariviere and Gorsas, who attended the evening session on
June 9. Three days later, Francois Buzot, Jean Baptiste Salles, and Denis
Toussaint Lesage arrived, followed on June 15 by Barbaroux, Bergoeing,
J. P. Duval, and]. C. G. Lahaye. Gabriel de Cussy, who may have encouraged his colleagues to choose Caen as a refuge, reached Caen on June 18
and announced the imminent arrival of several more. The rest were somewhat tardy, but Guadet and Louvet appeared on June 26, Petion on June 28,
Lanjuinais on June 30, and Kervelegan on July 2. E. Mollevaut, former
president of the Commission of Twelve, arrived on July 4, and Gaspard
Severin Duchatel straggled in six days larer.?"
Vaultier discounts the influence of these deputies on the atmosphere in
Caen, insisting that they kept to themselves and did not attempt to incite the
population. Certainly, the miserable turnout on July 7 for the volunteer
force indicates that their presence was not profoundly felt. But most other
evidence suggests that the deputies were fairly active during their stay, even
if their efforts did not produce an outpouring of support. ].-B. Renee noted
in his recollections of the Revolution that "the arrival of these representatives, the eloquence of most of them, and principally that of Buzot, the
famous lawyer from Evreux, and of Barbaroux,
the young and brilliant
70. A. D. Calvados, L rH9· Vaultier list, four other deputies (Bouridoux, Giroust, Val.idy,
and Meillan) but excludes Duval, Lahaye, and Lanjuinais. Boutidoux did reach Caen but was a
former cons/itt/tint, not a conuentionnel, Mancel, in his notes to Vaultier's memoirs, disputes
the presence of Cirousr, Valady, and Meillan. Vauitier, however, claims to have become personally acquainted with Valady, and it would seem reasonable to accept his word in at least this
case. The official prods-verbal
records rhe arrival of Guadet on June 2.6 "with several of his
colleagues," and it is possible rhar the four deputies mentioned
by Vaulrier arrived in this
group. Louvet is mentioned by name later in the June 2.6 minutes. See Vaulrier, Souvenirs, [8,
63, 208-2.09.
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Marseille orator, redoubled the ardor of the [ederes." 71 Nearly all of the
fugitive deputies did address the general assembly, and several appeared in
that forum on more than one occasion.
The reasons that the deputies chose Caen as their refuge are probably several. Vaultier suggests that de Cussy urged this option upon his colleagues,
and that is certainly possible." It is also clear that after the arrival of the
Caen commissioners in Paris on .June 2, the Girondin deputies believed that
considerable support for their cause existed in Caen. Over the past eight
months, the Calvados authorities had been extremely vocal in their calls for
an end to factionalism and for respect for the Convention. The reaffirmation
of these sentiments by the June delegation made Caen a more promising
haven than, say, Rouen, Caen was reasonably close to Paris-an
easy twoday journey-and
near the sea, should more drastic flight become necessary
(though it is clear that very few of the deputies seriously considered this option). The deputies sought, more than their own personal safety, a base from
which they could continue their fight against the Montagnards and the centralist tendencies fostered in Paris. Twice in the past six months-first
in
March and again in June-the
Parisian presses of Gorsas and other moderate journalists had been attacked and ransacked. The proscribed deputies
and their supporters needed a hospitable location from which they could
publicize their opinions and appeal for help.
This they found in Caen. The town warmly welcomed the deputies, and
the authorities put at their disposal the Hotel de l'lntendance for the duration of their stay. On June 28, the general assembly even voted that each
conuentionnel in Caen be paid from the departmental
treasury his usual
monthly indemnity. Messages from Petion and Barbaroux to their constituencies were printed and distributed at departmental expense. Buzot arrived
in Caen with his own compte-rendu of the events of May 27- 3 I, and other
deputies brought official papers from the Commission of Twelve. The deputies entrusted these papers to the general assembly for verification and publication. When Gorsas and Guadet delivered particularly stirring speeches to
the assembly on June 26, these were ordered printed and circulated. Buzot's
appeal for an armed force to be sent to Evreux, delivered to the general assembly on June 21, offers another example of the active efforts of the deputies to encourage resistance to the Montagnard Convention. The mayor, Le
7l.
72.

Sauvage, "Les Souvenirs de .f.-B. Renee,"
Vaulrier, Souvenirs, 17.
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Goupil Duclos, whose support of the revolt was at most lukewarm, insisted
in his later interrogation that he had never aided or consulted the proscribed
deputies, that he in fact had hated to see them in Caen and had been convinced that they were misleading good citizens with their speeches and
writings."
Further support and encouragement
for the Calvados insurrection came
from representatives
of the Breton departments
who were gathering in
Rennes. One of the early decisions of the general assembly in Caen had been
to consult with other departments regarding the choice of a central town
from which their efforts of resistance to oppression could be directed. The
assembly named commissioners
to visit these departments,
and Antoine
De Vic and Maurice Renouf la Coudraye, a Caen juge de paix, left on june 12
for Morbihan and the Loire-Inferieure.
They passed through Rennes on
their route toward Nantes, and DeVic wrote back to Caen on june 19 of the
decision made by authorities there to form the Central Committee of Resistance to Oppression."
A special courier from Rennes delivered DeVic's
letter to Caen, bearing an additional announcement
that this committee
would convene in Caen. Two commissioners from each of the five departments-Finistere,
Morbihan, Cotes-du-Nord,
Loire-Inferieure,
and llle-etVilaine-would
shortly depart for Calvados. The general assembly ordered
copies of both of these letters sent to the Orne, the Eure, the Manche, and
the Seine-Inferieure, hoping that this news might encourage the latter two to
lend their support to the insurrection."
The Central Committee began to assemble in Caen during the last week of
june. The first to arrive, on june 23, were two delegates from the Mayenne,
a department that had not even sent representatives to Rennes. Two commissioners from the Maine-et-Loire arrived on june 26, joined the next day
by commissioners from the Cotes-du-Nord.
Delegates from the other four
departments that had been represented in Rennes arrived in short order. No
official record of the Central Committee's meetings exists, but the minutes of
the Calvados general assembly indicate that the first session took place on
june 28.'" In addition to the departments already mentioned, the Orne and
73· A. D. Calvados, LlS9 and LJOI.2.5 (interrogation
of l.e Goupil Duclos).
74· A. D. Calvados, Lr o rj a (addresses and proclamations
during the federalist revolt).
75· A. D. Calvados, L189. The Central Committee, after it convened in Caen, continued to
woo the Seine-Inferieure,
but autborities in Rouen persisted in their conviction that it was beyond their authority to declare the department in revolt. The Manche wavered throughout June
and July but never became actively involved in the revolt.
7(,. 1\. C. Caen, 1,13 (Mission Linder, Outlot, DuRoy, er Bonnet).
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the Eure sent delegates. The Calvados general assembly named Louis Caille
and Samuel Chatry l'aine as its representatives to the committee, thereby
bringing to ten the number of departments joining that assembly. Of these,
however, only seven truly supported the insurrection. Administrators in the
Orne soon withdrew their commitment to the movement, while the Loirelnferieure and the Maine-et-Loire
were absorbed in the battle against the
Vendean rebels."
The convocation of the Central Committee altered somewhat the situation in Caen. That body now took responsibility for propaganda efforts,
drafting letters to other departments, proclamations to the nation, and messages to the citizens of Paris. It also undertook to coordinate the forces gathering to march to the capital. Very soon after the committee had first met,
word arrived from officials who had remained in Rennes that the Illc-etVilaine volunteers would soon arrive in Caen, that the Morbihan troops
would leave the next day, and that a battalion from Finistere would depart
on July 3. A contingent from the Mayenne was also reportedly in transit.7x
This news certainly inspired greater optimism than did the size of the Calvados force at that time.
Without complete documentation
from the Central Committee meetings,
it is impossible to say much regarding the committee's internal organization;
but the majority of letters and statements that it issued bore the signatures of
L J. ROUjOLlX(a departmental
administrator
from the linistcrc}, as president, and Louis Caille, acting as secretary. The most important of the declarations issued by the committee was a twenty-seven-point
program outlining the grievances of the federalist rebels and their proposals for the
reorganization of political life in Paris. This program was debated in Rennes
from June 19 to 2. 3, but it was not officially printed until after the committee
had convened in Caen, and it seems certain that it received the approval of
departmental representatives there who had not been present in Rennes. Its
importance lies in the fact that it represents the views of a region, not just
one department, and that it reveals something of the fears and resentments
that inspired the federalist revolt.
The declaration was divided into four sections. The first, which addressed
the role of Paris in national politics, included the following notable pro77. For an account of the fede ralisr ucriviry in rhe Orne, see Nicolle, "Lc Mouvcmenr feder·
aliste dans l'Orne en 1793," XIII (19.1 6), 4 X I - 5 I 2., X IV ( I \J) 7), 2. 1 5 -}.\, X V ( 193 S), 12-\3,
28')-313,385-410.
78. A. D. Calv.idos, 1.101:,4 (letter dared June 30, 179}).
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posals: that a constitutional
decree establish a departmental
guard for the
national assembly; that the proscribed deputies be returned to their functions; that the comites reuolutionnaires in Paris be abolished; that the sections of Paris no longer be permitted to meet en permanence; that the Revolutionary Tribunal be suppressed; that the Commission of Twelve be reinstated;
that the assassins of September 2 be prosecuted; and that the Jacobin and
Cordelier clubs of Paris be abolished. These proposals would have done
away with organizations and measures that became the order of the day during the Year II.
The second section concerned the powers and responsibilities of the National Convention. It suggested that the Convention itself be limited to the
role of a legislative assembly; that the Committee of Public Safety be deprived of its dictatorial powers; that the deputies sent on mission to the armies and the departments be recalled to their posts in Paris; and that the
Executive Council be given sufficient authority to run the government.
Turning to issues of finance and the treasury, section three demanded that
a commission formed of capable men be charged with examining the acCOunts of former ministers and the Commune of Paris, researching the
source of the huge fortunes that had blossomed since August 10, 1792, and
restoring order to national finances; that no more funds be advanced to the
municipality of Paris from public funds and that Paris be required to pay its
back debts; and that there be no more assignats created and that a means be
found to diminish the number in circulation.
A final section addressed the need for a constitution and for a renewed
commitment to national unity. It called for a constitution to be issued within
two months after the Convention had regained its liberty; for the laws that
had not been freely enacted to be submitted for debate once again; and for
primary assemblies to be convened to elect new legislators if the divisions
and animosities within the Convention could not be overcome. A postscripted article demanded the prompt reorganization
of the Paris National
Guard, with care taken to appoint officers who had not been leaders on May
7Y
3 1. (Appendix I gives a complete list of the Central Committee's demands.)
This petition is noteworthy for several reasons. Much of what it expresses-the
suspicion of the municipality of Paris, the demand that the in.. 79· IJrocl~ures Normandes:
Caen so us la Revolution,
B. M. Caen, Res. I'll. Br. B2634. See
alsoJeanne Grall, "La France au lendemain du ) I mai I793 " Bulletin de la Societe des AntiqUlI1res de Normal1die, LV (1959~6o), 5I3~24; for a summ~ry of this declaration.
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tegrity of the Convention be respected, and the wish that a constitution be
quickly prepared-is
reminiscent of previous statements from Calvados. The
demands for suppression of the revolutionary committees, the section assemblies, and the two most radical Paris clubs show a strong preference for
"representative"
democracy, a political vision that had already triumphed in
Caen a year and a half earlier. But there are new elements here as well, such
as the call for abolition of the Jacobin club, the demand that the powers of
the Committee of Public Safety be limited, and the insistence that representatives on mission be recalled. Most interesting of all is section three, which
proposes an investigation of recently created private fortunes, an end to the
use of national funds for Parisian expenses, and a reduction in the circulation of assignats. These are economic issues, not explicitly political issues,
and they give an indication of the social background of the federalist rebels.
They did not belong to the popular classes, the laboring poor, the sansculottes-no
demand is made for more stringent enforcement of the maximum. These were wealthy landowners and merchants, exasperated with the
inflation and the worthless assignats. They were suspicious of fortunes that
bad been made during the Revolution, and they were tired of paying taxes
for the support of Paris radicals.
This last grievance, in particular, is consistent with previous Calvados
protests and witb the general resentment of the undue influence of the capital. In another declaration of its objectives, the Central Committee made
clear that it intended to punish the usurpers in Paris. It accused them of
nepotism and corruption; of bungling the war effort; of supporting Pache,
who was monopolizing grain supplies at the expense of the departments; of
insulting public justice in the trial of Marat; and of supporting the power of

Paris."
Yet for the citizens of Paris, the officials gathered in Caen expressed nothing but compassion. In one of its final proclamations, addressed to all Frenchmen, the Central Committee stressed the peaceful intentions of the troops
headed toward the capital but issued a subtle warning:
The departmental
force that is progressing toward Paris does not go in search of
Enemies in order to fight them; it goes to fraternize with the Parisians, it goes to
make an impression on the Factious elements by its firm and tranquil countenance; it
goes to strengthen the tottering statue of Liberty. Citizens, who will see pass within
your walls, into your Hamlets, these friendly Armies, fraternize with them: do nor
80. A. C. Caen, 1:\6 (Insurrection

er acres des administrarions

insurgecs,

mai-juiller

1795)·
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allow bloodthirsty Monsters to settle amongst you, with the aim of stopping those
Armies in their march: do not allow mobs to form at the dismal sound of the tocsin;
mingled in amongst our Enemies, we will not be able to distinguish YOLI. H'

The arrival of the Central Committee in Caen brought a reorganization of
the Calvados general assembly. Up to this point, the assembly had been a
rather ad hoc organization dominated by departmental and district officials,
but now it became a more formal body, incorporating the cantonal delegates
who arrived at the end of June. On July 1, to permit departmental
administrators to return to their normal duties, the assembly elected new officers
and appointed new committees.
Chaix-d'Estanges,
the former vicar of
Fauchet and now cure of the parish Saint-Etienne, was elected president. As
vice-president the assembly chose Charles Debaudre, a priest from Bayeux
who may also have been a supporter of Fauchet. <2 Dom Mauger, one of the
nine commissioners to Paris, became procureur-syndic
until that position
was abolished as superfluous. Nicolas Marie Quetil de la Porerie, a clerk for
the department and president of the section Union in Caen, was elected secretary; Mariette, another priest from Bayeux, was chosen as his assistant. It
is curious that at least three of these five officers, and possibly Dom Mauger,
were clergymen who had been in some fashion affiliated with the deputy
Claude Faucher;"
The newly constituted general assembly issued the order threatening jail
terms for those who refused to join the departmental
force. On July 1, it
decreed that departmental administrators who failed to appear at their posts
within three days would be declared traitors to the cause, denied their salaries, and replaced." The assembly further attempted to consolidate its power
and generate popular support for its cause by calling for the confiscation of
~I. A. D. Calvados,
1. ror 35 (documents pertaining to federalism). This declaration
was
issued 011 July 5, as the deparrmenral
forces were preparing to leave Caen for Evreux.
82. Debaudre arrived as a delegate to the General Assembly onjune L). He is identified as a
priest by Hufton, Bayeux ill the Late Eighteenth Century, 197.
S,. This is interesting in light of Olwen Hufton's claim that Faucher, during his brief time in
Calvados, attempted to carve out his own local power base. This is clearly supported
in the
religious sphere by Fauchet's ordainment
of several hundred allegedly ill-prepared
priests in
Calvados. Bur while the bishop was certainly active in political affairs, there is little evidence of
a conscious effort to place his supporters in political office. Hufton describes Chaix as Faucher's
mouthpiece in rhe Caen jacobiu club, which is entirely possible, and Faucher was apparently on
good rcrm-, with Louis Cadle and Bougon-Longrais.
This hardly constitutes a power base, however, and I would nor describe Faucher as rhe dominant figure in Cnlva dos politics. Cadle and
Bougon, themselves, were ar least as ambitious as the bishop. Sec Hufron, Baycux ill the Late
Eighteenth Century, llio-Y5.
1i4· A. D. Calvados, Lr oorer.
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newspapers opposed to the principles of the insurrection and by issuing its
own journal, the Bulletin des Autorites Constituees. Nine issues of the Bulletin appeared between June 25 and July 17, with 1,500 copies of each issue
printed in Caen and distributed throughout
the department. The journal
summarized the proceedings of the general assembly, recorded news from
Paris, and printed addresses from other towns and departments.
Its first
issue reported that sixty-nine departments supported the protest movement.
The journal gave the most optimistic account possible of resistance to Paris
in an attempt to encourage support within the department and counter the
Montagnard propaganda emanating from the capital."
After July 1, departmental officials played a much smaller role in the general assembly, perhaps worried by the recent decrees of dubious legality but
perhaps also chastened by the Seine-Inferieure's suggestion that they had exceeded their authority by declaring the department in a state of insurrection.
Each new committee included one departmental
official, but the administrators could now argue with some justification (and they did precisely this
after the revolt had collapsed) that the general assembly reflected the wishes
of the people through the delegates they had chosen in primary assemblies.
It is important to remember, however, that primary assemblies never convened in Caen, at least not until after the revolt.
The departmental directory now began to meet more frequently in order
to deal with affairs that had gone largely unattended since the first of June.
But the administration
was understaffed, since many clerks had apparently
been persuaded by the arguments of elected officials and had left for Evreux
with the departmental
force. The leaders of the council were also absent.
Lenormand, Leveque, Mesnil, each of them a director, and Bougon-Longrais,
the procureur-general-syndic,
had left for Evreux with the departmental
forces, along with the administrator Thiboult.
Mindful of the need for leadership in Caen, the general assembly ordered
Leveque and Bougon to return to their administrative duties on June 27,
"considering that much business remains stagnant at a time when it is essential not to add to the number of malcontents." The general assembly sent
another appeal to Leveque on July I, insisting that "the sections, the dragoons of Calvados, the carabots, the popular societies, all of your constitu85. A.C. Caen, 137 (Blllletill des autorites constit.uccs, vols. 2.-,), jllin-illiller
179:\)·The
missing copy can be found in B. M. Cacn, Res. Fn. B402.. All nine issues were collected, edited,
and published by Charles Renard in I X75. The issues arc numbered but not generally dated,
and tbe precise date of publication is therefore difficult to ascertain.

148

PROVINCIAL

POLITICS

IN THE

FRENCi-J

REVOLUTION

ents are clamoring for your presence." The next day, Benard, secretary of
the department, sent Leveque a list of the new general assembly officers and
pleaded, "Come to our aid, the sections are mutinying. We are in need of
prudence and foresight. Even to the degree that one possesses the one and
the other, it remains to be feared that we will not be able to preserve the
"8(,

peace.
Leveque and Bougon, however, considered their efforts more urgently
needed in Evreux, where they and their colleagues were struggling to maintain the wavering support of the Eure administration.
They refused to return
to Caen, and some people in Caen endorsed that decision. Chatry l'aine
wrote to Leveque on July 6 that although the cornmmissioners'
talents
would be of greater use in Caen, to return at that difficult time would serve
as a pretext for "les malveillants" to prevent other citizens from marching to
Paris. These types had done all they could in recent days to do precisely that,
but happily without much success, wrote Chatry.
That the "malcontents"
and "troublemakers"
ultimately prevailed is
amply evidenced by the seventeen volunteers who stepped forward for the
public inspection on July 7· This miserable demonstration,
however, was
not reported to the commissioners
in Evreux. On the contrary, Charles
Cailly, a member of the general assembly correspondence
committee, wrote
to the civil commissioners in Evreux on July 8 that the previous day's recruitment effort had been a complete success: "Yesterday's maneuvers of the
Caen national guard have produced the most favorable effect. There is a
constant procession of citizens coming forward to join. There is reason to
hope that the battalion will be more than full." Cailly went on to report,
erroneously, that Rouen now supported the insurrection,
a development
that would have alleviated the pressing grain situation. Authorities had already been forced to release military supplies in order to feed the population
of Caen. Cailly also noted that Louis Caille had departed for Evreux, with
Dom Mauger replacing him on the Central Committee of Resistance to
Oppression. Xl
The arrival in Evreux of contingents from other departments soon reinforced for the Calvados commissioners the optimism engendered by Cailly's
misleading letter. On July 3, a battalion from the llle-et- Vilaine reached
Cacn and proceeded to Evreux. The Morbihan contingent arrived in Caen
86. A. D. Calvados,
87. Ibid.

L10276.
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on July 8, followed the next day by a company of 200 from the Mayenne.
Reinforcing these troops were two regiments of cavalry from the army of the
14th Division-the
dragoons of the Manche and the chasseurs of La Breteche-v-fortuitously
under the command of Wimpffen. All of these had congregated in or near Evreux by July 10. Vaultier estimated their total number
at 1,900-400
cavalry, 900 Breton troops, and 600 volunteers from the
Eure and Calvados."
The arrival of these troops in Evreux presented problems along with
promise. They had to be housed and fed, and the populace of the town
showed signs of growing restive and disenchanted with the movement. This
attitude worried the Eure administrators,
whose resolve may have been
maintained only by the enthusiasm of the Calvados commissioners. Jean
Capdeville, one of Garat's agents in the departments, wrote in a report that
Bougon-Longrais presided over the administrative assembly in Evreux. Capdeville, sent with copies of the new constitution, addressed the assembly and
tried to explain that the Convention was working diligently and had drafted
a constitution that would unite the country. But Bougon and Lenormand
dominated the proceedings and persuaded the officials to arrest Capdeville
and send him to Caen. Two Eure administrators
spoke to the agent later,
expressing their regret at the actions of the assembly, which they claimed to
be under the sway of the Calvados commissioners."
Lack of military leadership was another grievous problem for the insurrectionary force. On July 10, urgent letters went from both Leveque and the
military committee in Evreux to General Wimp£fen, who remained in Caen.
Leveque wrote that there existed neither harmony nor a plan of defense in
Evreux: "Send to us, therefore, in the name of God, the one and the other;
or provisionally authorize someone, with sufficient military talents, who
could direct the military operations. Moreover, your presence is indispensable in order to organize the public forces that are here." The committee's
letter emphatically seconded Leveque's plea: "We have men, but without a
leader. Much courage, but nothing to direct it. If you delay any longer to
88. A. D. Calvados, L189; Vaulrier, Souvenirs, 19, 61. Many estimates made at the time
were wildly inaccurate, ranging from a low of five hundred [():1 high of five thousand. Vaultiers
figure is supported by both the deputy Louvet and the representative on mission Lindet. Volunteers from the Finistere, numbering several hundred, did not reach Caen unril July 1} and never
went on to Evreux.
89. Caron, Rauports des Agents du Ministre de l'Lnt.crieur, I, 180-l90· See also Leon
Dubreuil, "Evreux au temps du federalisme," Reuolution Francaise, LXXVIII (192.5), 32.2.-2H.
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send someone who can conduct in a prudent and active manner the military
operations, the goal will be missed."
Wimpffen responded immediately by sending General Joseph Puisaye to
command the troops in Evreux. Puisaye arrived on July 10 and within two
days had prepared to mobilize his forces. Given the crumbling of what little
popular support had once existed in Caen, plus the disorganization
and confusion rampant in Evreux, it is hardly surprising that the march of the federalist forces toward Paris would culminate quickly in a total fiasco.
On arriving in Evreux, Puisaye consulted with the Calvados commissioners, and they agreed on the need to secure Vernon, strategically located
on the route to Paris. Reports had come in that the Convention was sending
Parisian battalions to repel the departmental
forces, and Vernon would be
a vital link in the defense against such a charge. Word had also been received that Bonnet de Meautry, the lone Calvados deputy who sat with the
Mountain, had been sent on mission to undermine the revolt. On July 7,
Lenormand forwarded news to Caen of six other "rnaratistes," allegedly
posing as haberdashers and peddlers, on their way to Normandy
under
orders of the Executive Council. He provided more detailed descriptions for
two of these imposters. The first, Dufour, aged between thirty and thirtyfive, stood five feet three inches tall, had black hair and a long nose, and was
pockmarked
and toothless. The other, named Le Cinque, was big and
around thirty years of age. Lenormand urged renewed vigilance so that these
troublemakers might be apprehended. 'il
Puisaye, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy of the Calvados 6th Battalion, decided to gather his forces in Pacy-sur-Eure on July 12, electing to lay
over one night before moving on to Vernon the following day. Colonel
Alexandre Puisaye (no relation to the general) headed one of the contingents, along with Leveque. LeRoy, of course, commanded his battalion, and
Bougon and Caille led tbe largest segment of the departmental
forces. The
'I{)

yo. A. D. Calvados, l.i o rj o (documents pertaining to federalism). There is some irony in
the phrasing of the committee's plea. In April, after Wimpffen's assignment to Calv.idos had
been unofficially confirmed but before steps h.id been taken for the actual creation of the Cher
bourg army, the department complained to the Convention that it now had a general, but no
men for him to lead.
9!.· A. D. Calvados, LIOT25
(documents pertaining to federalism). This carton contains
two letters, among other documents, the first of which, dated ./uly 5, was anonymous and unaddressed. The second letter, sent hy l.enorrn.md to COlen, paraphrased
the information contained
In the first, except that Lenorrnand embellished the descriptions somewhat. Dufour, in addition
to being pockmarked and toothless, became skinny, ugly, and dirty. And I.enormand had somehow learned that Le Cinque was not only big but also married and jealous!
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troops began their march at I J :00 A.M. on July 13 and within a short distance encountered the Parisian lines. According to Puisayc's report, he sent
out a herald and trumpet to deliver a message, and the Parisians opened fire.
Vaultier, who had volunteered for the Caen contingent, recorded a different
version of the first encounter. In his account, the troops lay bivouacked in a
field near the chateau of Brecourt when a round of fire whistled through the
trees over their heads. Only the apples suffered.
Which version one chooses to accept is of little consequence. Puisaye's bestows more honor on himself and his troops; Vaultier's adds a touch of comedy. They agree, however, on the events that followed. A few more cannon
shots rang out before both sides turned on their heels and beat a hasty retreat, the Calvados volunteers once again in the vanguard! Puisaye claimed
that he tried to rally his troops to retake Pacy-sur-Eure but that only the 6th
Battalion responded, hardly enough for a counterattack.
The troops retreated to Evreux, but Puisaye despaired of holding even that position. Wishing to avoid bloodshed and pillage, he ordered a retreat to Lisieux. Only on
reaching Lisieux, on July I7, did Puisaye learn that the Mayenne battalion
and the llle-et-Vilaine troops had been willing to stand and fight. The Breton
soldiers, in fact, expressed considerable disgust at the lack of discipline
among the Norman volunteers. Yet one can understand the reaction of the
volunteers, who had repeatedly been told that they were on their way to the
capital to "fraternize" with the Parisians. Apparently only the generals and
the Calvados civil commissioners realized that some kind of battle was likely
to occur. And when the battle came, one participant
recalled, BougonLongrais in particular, along with Puisaye, favored a full retreat."
The July 17 issue of the Bulletin des Autorites Constituees described the
Vernon fiasco as "one of those accidents so common at the beginning of a
campaign." Although leaders of the force had thought it prudent to retreat
to Lisieux, they would undoubtedly soon be back in Evreux." Such was not
to be the case. General Wimpffen met the retreating force in Lisieux and
immediately conferred with the Calvados civil commissioners. On July 18,
he sent a letter to the general assembly in Caen conveying the corn missioners' sentiments that a policy of conciliation and negotiation should now
92.. Vaultier,
Souucnirs, 22-1..)"; Brochures Normandes:
Cacn SOUS la Revolution,
13. M.
Caen, Res. Fn.I}r. C3'5-36X
(Puisuyc's report to the general assembly in Cacn); Rene Norbert
Sauvage
(ed.) , Lc Fcdcralisme en Norniandie:
[ournal du qunrt.icr-mnitrc du (,,' bataillon his
des uolont aircs du Caluados (CaCH, 1 Y09), (" -67·
~n. A. C. Caen, 1:17 (Bulletil1 des aut.orites const.ituecs, no. 9)·
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be pursued. The Breton battalions' clearly stated intention to return to their
departments may have assisted the commissioners
in reaching that conclusion. Wimpffen, for his part, felt that the Central Committee of Resistance
to Oppression should make the final decision, but he reaffirmed his commitment to defend the region with all the means at his disposal."
Wimpffen's ambivalence throughout the revolt was undeniably an important reason for its ultimate failure. The general had been enthusiastic at the
start-when
called to Paris by the minister of war on June 23, he had replied
that he would come to the capital only at the head of sixty thousand Normans. But his actions as commander of the federalist forces did not match
his rhetoric. Vaultier blamed Wimpffen's procrastination
for the poor turnout of volunteers at the July 7 ceremony, and it is hard to understand why
the general did not go himself to Evreux to take charge of the troops. Perhaps he recognized the hopelessness of their cause. After the force had retreated to Lisieux, Wimpffen still made little effort to salvage the situation.
Instead, he proposed to the fugitive deputies that they negotiate with England and perhaps seek refuge there. Louvet and several other deputies had
felt all along that Wimpffen's sympathies lay with the royalists, probably an
accurate appraisal. 95
In Caen, a reassessment of the situation now took place. Two undated
proces-uerbaux suggest that support for the revolt within the Jacobin club
had dissipated by this date. As early as mid-June, the Jacobin club, at that
time presided over by the district administrator
Henri Michel Saillenfest,
had warned the departmental administration
of the danger that the Parisians
might misconstrue the intentions of the "federes" marching to Paris. The
club suggested that a circular be prepared to make clear that the Norman
volunteers wished only to fraternize with their Parisian brothers, a gesture
that the general assembly did indeed make shortly thereafter."
By July, open dissension had erupted within the club regarding the role of
the departmental force. Four sheets of handwritten minutes are all we have
to reveal the attitudes of club members during this period, but they are illuminating. These notes record the proceedings of two jacobin club meetings during the first week of July. At the first meeting, a member raised the
94· A. D. Calvados, L1OI}6 (letter ofjuly 18, 1793); Vaultier, Souvenirs, 2.6-27 .
Bulletin des autorites constituees, no. I, B. M. Caen, Res. Fn. B402, for
W"npffen's letter to Paris; and Vaultier, Souuenirs, 33 -41, for excerpts from Louver's memoirs.
96. A. D. Calvados, 1..10134 (letter of june 16, 1793).
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complaint that in recent days, decisions had been taken that ran counter to
the views of a majority of the members. The minutes do not identify those
decisions; but in response to the complaint, the club voted to nullify the actions of the previous day and henceforth to hold at least three public meetings per week. The mmutes give the impression that those public meetings
would reevaluate club positions taken in recent weeks.
The next day, a noisy club meeting resumed this discussion, with Louis
Caille and Chaix-d'Estanges
now in attendance. Chaix accused Charles
Pierre Marie Aubin, the current club secretary, of having urged people to
boycott the march on Paris. Aubin defended himself, arguing that an armed
march on Paris would be the equivalent of fratricide. But Chaix and Caille
carried the day. The meeting deteriorated into recriminations against Mar at
and the Mountain, but not before an oath of loyalty to the revolt had been
sworn, with those refusing the oath to be expelled from the club."
The jacobin club made no public declaration when the revolt began to
disintegrate later in July (at least, no record of one exists), but it is clear that
two factions had developed within the club: one group opposed to the
march on Paris, led by Aubin, Francois Outin, jacques Caroger, and Louis
Guillaume Harfort, all of whom would be named local officials after the revolt collapsed, and another group, dominant in June and early July, led by
Louis Caille and Chaix-d'Estanges.
On july 19, volunteers arrived in Caen from the town of Vire, joining the
Finistere battalion that had arrived earlier in the week. But this was not
enough to counter the serious misgivings that now began to plague even the
two insurrectionary
assemblies. On July 20, the Central Committee proposed that primary assemblies be called to consider the new constitution.
Perhaps the committee members hoped that the people would reject it, but
only weeks before, the committee had forbidden even the publication of this
document. The Calvados general assembly hesitated to call primary assemblies and decided instead to consult the Caen sections as to whether the sections should discuss the constitution or reject it out of hand. Delegates from
the general assembly addressed the sections on the following day, in each
case taking great pains to emphasize that the assembly had always acted on
the express wishes of the people. One cannot avoid the impression that the
administrators
were belatedly trying to remove responsibility from their
97. A. C. Caen, 1275 (Societe Populaire).
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own shoulders. Indeed, the general assembly requested copies of the sections' proces-uerbatcx in order to show that it had only acted on behalf of its
constituency.
The sections of Caen no longer unanimously supported the insurrection,
as they had on June 8. Three of the five sections quickly voted an end to their
state of insurrection and demanded distribution of the constitution. The section Civisme went so far as to recall its delegates to the general assembly.
The two sections that decided to maintain their resistance were the section
Union, dominated by the eloquent Chaix-d'Estanges,
now president of the
general assembly; and the section Liberte, the wealthiest section in Caen,
which housed within its limits the majority of Caen's merchants and hautebourgeoisie. Benard's letter to Leveque had suggested that support for the
insurrection was seriously breaking down as early as the first week of July,
but these votes marked the first overt opposition to the march on Paris
among the sections of Caen."
On the days on which the sections deliberated, July 20 and 21, the procureur and the mayor of Caen, DeVic and Le Goupil Duclos, urged the municipal council to consider the new constitution. Both delivered impassioned
speeches defending the pure intentions of those who had at first supported
revolt but arguing that the time had come for unity and that the new constitution would provide a rallying point for all Frenchmen."
Despite these voices of moderation and conciliation, no consensus could
be reached in the general assembly. It tabled Le Goupil's proposal that a mediator be sent to Paris, as well as a motion for the release of Romme and
Prieur, who had been held in isolation in the Chateau since June 13. The
general assembly's resolve to maintain its insurrectionary
stance may have
been weakened, however, by the increasingly precarious grain supply in the
Caen market. On july 23, armed soldiers removed from the meeting hall an
unruly crowd demanding grain, and the assembly prudently closed the market for that day. The people of Caen, so long passive in the face of exhortations to revolt, were now growing restive.
By this time, volunteers from the departmental
force were returning to
town, bringing stories of a Parisian army intent on pillaging Caen and guillotining [,400 people (the precise figure no doubt lent some veracity to this
tale). On July 24, Wimpffen appeared before the assembly to discuss the
98. A. C. Caen, LIS (Retracrarions
99· A. C. Caen, 02.
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situation. After hearing the general, several members proposed that the city
be declared in a state of siege, with Wimpffen in charge of preparing a reasonable defense. The motion passed, and tents for the troops began to go up
on the plain of Ivry, straddling the road to Paris.
Happily, this new hysteria proved short-lived. On that same day, the Central Committee issued orders to the Breton battalions for an immediate departure to Rennes, where the committee would reconvene. In addition, local
authorities in Caen one by one retracted their support of the insurrection.
The minister of the interior, Garar, had just sent a decree promising clernency to those administrators
who retracted their declarations of insurrection
within three days. The first to do so were the Caen district officials, claiming
that they did not seek to profit by the amnesty but hoped to avert the disastrous consequences of a siege. The municipal councillors soon followed suit,
putting their signatures to a statement almost identical to the mayor's speech
of July 21.
The next day, July 25, the general assembly summoned both the municipal and district councils. Finding itself isolated and exposed by virtue of
those councils' retractions, the assembly denounced them for their cowardly
and traitorous acts. Council members defended themselves in various ways.
Le Goupil Duclos ignominiously suggested that the municipality had retracted because of "the insidious pressure and influence of the district,"
which had not even consulted Louis Caille! Two district administrators
offered only feeble excuses, but the assembly could do little to punish them.
Both Caille and Chaix-d'Estanges
gave accounts of thei r conduct and received the approbation of those present, after which the assembly moved that
the sections of Caen be convoked to freely decide on a course of action.'?"
There is no record of the sections' deliberations, but on July 26, both the
general assembly and the united administrative and judicial corps of Calvados issued formal retractions of their insurrectionary
declarations. Both
statements stressed that the resistance to Paris and the Convention had been
the mandate of the people, that the people's concern had been for the liberty
and unity of the nation, but that smce the new constitution promised a
sound basis for a free and republican government, the time had come for an
end to dissension. Only twenty signatures appear on the general assembly's
retraction, evidence that many of the nearly fifty delegates who had arrived
in late June had long since returned to their homes. Fifty-five judges and ad'00.

II. D. Calvados,

L,k9,

Lr oorer, L\X7, alld 1'0',5;

A. C. Cae,."

r».

156

PROVINCIAL

POLITICS

IN THE

FRENCH

REVOLUTION

ministrators signed a separate retraction. The Caen district officials signed
only their own statement. 101
With this, the federalist revolt in Calvados came to an end. The Central
Committee of Resistance to Oppression and the Breton battalions left for
Rennes. The fugitive Girondin deputies, disguised as volunteers, accornparried them. On July 29, Romme and Prieur emerged from the Chateau,
Rornrne having completed during his detention the revolutionary calendar,
perhaps the most lasting product of the revolt. Several of the compromised
local officials went into hiding in the Calvados countryside. For most of the
people of Caen, however, nothing remained but to wait for the representatives on mission and their "army of pacification."
The lack of popular support for a protest directed against Paris and the
Montagnard Convention doomed the revolt in Calvados to failure from the
beginning. That reality plagued the federalist movement not only in Caen
but in Bordeaux and Marseille as well. Departmental
administrators
instigated the revolt in Calvados and remained its staunchest partisans throughout June and July. A departmental official, Rene Lenormand, led the mission
to Paris in early June. Departmental
officials dominated the general assembly during the crucial weeks in which the revolt developed. And when the
focus of the revolt shifted to Evreux, Calvados departmental administrators
took full responsibility for the coordination of the volunteer forces and the
preparation of a march on Paris.
In many ways, the revolt in Calvados was an exercise in deception and
self-delusion. Samuel Chatry helped to instigate resistance with a speech that
he insisted be delivered anonymously. Section assemblies convened late at
night on June 8, and the crucial general meeting of June 9 began at 4:00 A.M.,
a most inhospitable hour. Those who favored the declaration of insurrection
and the arrest of Romme and Prieur shouted down the reasoned objections
of Tirel and Fleury, threatening them with arrest as traitors. Others who
would later oppose the revolt, such as Antoine DeVic and Mayor Le Goupil
Duclos, were absent from that meeting. Leaders of the revolt led volunteers
for the departmental force to believe that they marched to Paris only to fraternize with the Parisians, a replay of the 1790 festival in which federes from
the provinces gathered in the capital to celebrate the fall of the Bastille. The
101. 1\. D. Calvados,
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first shots fired on July 13 disabused the volunteers of that naive notion, and
the revolt promptly crumbled.
The failure of the revolt, then, can largely be explained by its lack of
popular support. A secondary factor was its complete disorganization. The
ostensible leader of the march on Paris, General Wimpffen-a
reluctant
commander at best-would
probably have been more comfortable in a plot
to restore the monarchy than in a movement to defend a moderate republic.
Lenormand, Leveque, and Bougon-Longrais
possessed little military acumen and were ill prepared to cope with the problems of supply, morale, and
discipline that beset the rebel troops. It is notable, though, that local leaders,
and not the fugitive Girondin deputies, took responsibility for leading the
march to Paris. This underscores the regional grievances that constituted
such a large part of the motivation for this insurrection.
But why, if popular support was weak, did resistance in Caen progress as
far as it did? This question can best be answered by a brief comparison of the
situation in Limoges with that in Caen. The Haute- Vienne administrators,
too, showed an inclination in early June to join with other departments in
protesting the proscription of the Girondin deputies. The factors that turned
them away from revolt simply did not exist in Caen. The Montagnards had
no influential advocate in Caen comparable to Bishop Gay-Vernon in Limoges. The bishop, and Xavier Audouin as well, bombarded Limoges with
letters assuring the people that Paris remained calm and that May 3 I had
been a victory for liberty and equality. Bonnet de Meautry, the Calvados
deputy who sat with the Montagnards,
did not enjoy a broad base of support in his home town and, moreover, did not correspond diligently with his
constituents. Instead, it was Lomont, Doulcet, and de Cussy, supporters of
the Girondins, who kept the people of Caen informed of developments in
Paris and exhorted them to rise in protest.
As already noted, the letters of Gay-Vernon alone would not have turned
the Haute- Vienne away from the federalist movement. The strength of the
Limoges Jacobin club, along with the activism of the municipal council,
guaranteed that the bishop's reports would not fall on deaf ears. The Jacobin
club in Caen had long since broken ties with the Paris Jacobins and no
longer represented a potent force in Caen politics. In any case, the club followed the leadership of Louis Caille, who, by virtue of his eloquence and his
ties to the deputies Faucher and Barbaroux, prevailed in July over dissident
voices within the club. Those who spoke against the march to Paris-e-Aubin,
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Outin, and Caroger~could
boast of no ties to national figures, nor did they
hold official positions. As for the other popular group in Caen, the Carabot
club, we know little about its membership. At no time in I793, however, did
the club appear in an adversarial relationship to local authorities, and it supported the revolt from start to finish. Evidence suggests that the Caen municipal and district councils did not enthusiastically support the revolt, but both
appeared intimidated by departmental
officials (as well as by Caille and
Chaix-d'Estanges),
even when it became clear that the revolt had failed. In
sum, no organized group, either official or popular, opposed the decisions of
the Calvados departmental administration.
The Vendee revolt, which may have deterred Haute- Vienne administrators from joining in resistance to Paris, could be more easily ignored by officials in Calvados. To Calvados, the Vendean rebels did not pose an immediate threat. They did threaten the Haute- Vienne, whose source of grain stood
jeopardized as the rebels moved south toward Poitiers. The Haute- Vienne
sent roughly two thousand soldiers to battle the counterrevolution
in the
west, whereas the sole Calvados battalion sent to the Vendee returned in
June, disgusted by the lack of discipline displayed by the Parisian "brigands"
and prepared to join the volunteers in Evreux.
Finally, the demands of the Central Committee of Resistance to Oppression make it clear that more was at stake in June, 1793, than the proscription of the Girondin deputies. The Haute- Vienne stood dependent on the
central government for grain supplies and hospital funds. Calvados and the
Breton departments, by contrast, had blockaded Paris, attempting to deprive
the capital of grain. They denounced the domination of Paris in national affairs and complained about inequitable taxes and inflationary assignats. By
joining the federalist revolt, Calvados asserted its regional independence and
protested the excesses of centralized government.

Five

Repression and Reorganization

Repression of the federalist revolts marked the beginning of
the Terror in revolutionary France. The severity of repression varied from
department to department, just as the revolutionary tribunals, in the long
term, dispensed their cruel justice in selective fashion. In Lyon, where resistance to the Convention continued until October, the representatives on
mission Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois and Joseph Fouche oversaw the execution of nearly 2,000 people between November, 1793, and April, 1794. The
Revolutionary Commission in Toulon sentenced 282 people to death from
December, 1793, through January, 1794, and roughly 800 people were shot
without trial after the royalist revolt in that city collapsed. Repression also
struck hard in the Finistere (destination of the Girondin deputies who fled
Caen in late July), with departmental administrators the principal victims of
the guillotine. For the most part, however, the repression was moderate, and
few federalists paid for their mistakes with their lives. In Bordeaux, despite
the Military Commission's reputation for vindictiveness, reprisals for federalist actions proved restrained. Just over 300 people died on the guillotine,
and while many of these were wealthy lawyers, merchants, and professionals, the Military Commission did not single out leaders of the revolt for
vengeance. Even fewer were executed in Marseille, where local Jacobins
spared a number of wealthy merchants eventually brought to justice by representatives on mission. The Revolutionary Tribunal in Marseille sentenced
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286 people to death between August, 1793, and April, 1794. Nowhere,
however, did the repression of federalism adopt as mild a tone as in Caen.
Only two federalists were executed, neither of them solely for his role in the
revolt, and most escaped even the imprisonment
suffered by a number of
Calvados officials. I
In the late summer and fall of 1793, the necessity of rallying the protesting
departments to the National Convention was as important a task as punishing those who had rebelled. For this reason, the Committee of Public Safety
adopted the attitude that the citizenry was largely blameless for its reluctant
participation
in the revolt: administrators
had intentionally
misled those
who joined departmental forces in Caen, Bordeaux, and Marseille. The new
constitution would demonstrate to all Frenchmen that the Convention continued to deliberate freely, no longer plagued by the factionalism and bickering that had troubled its sessions before May 3 I. Punishment would be reserved for those administrators who had neglected their responsibilities and
exceeded their authority by calling for revolt. The Convention gave even
those officials an opportunity to retract their insurrectionary
declarations,
and those who did so at an early date were often allowed to retain their positions. Representatives on mission dismissed others and ordered the arrest of
some. But very few came to trial before revolutionary tribunals.
Punishment and replacement of individual officials soon gave way to more
fundamental reorganization. Nationwide, roughly two-thirds of the departmental administrations
had protested by letter the proscriptions of June 2,
and in those areas where significant resistance had developed, departmental
officials had taken the lead. On November 18, 1793 (28 Brurnaire II), in
order to prevent a recurrence of provincial opposition to the Convention,
Jean Nicolas Billaud- Varenne called for a limitation of the powers and political influence of departmental councils. The Convention incorporated this
proposal in the law of 14 Frimaire II (December 4,1793),
which suppressed
the general councils, presidents, and procureurs-generaux-syndics.
Only the
departmental directories remained intact, with their functions now explic1. See Donald
Greer, The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution
(Cambridge,1 935); R. R. Palmer, Tu/clue Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror ill the French Reuolulion (New York, 1966); Richard M. Brace, Bordeaux and the Gironde, 1789-1794 (Ithaca,
J 947); Alan Forrest, Society and Politics in Revolutionary
Bordeaux (Oxford. 1975); Aurelien
Vivie, Histoirc de la Tcrreur a Bordeaux (Bordeaux, ,877); C. Riffarerre, Le Mouvenlent antitacobm et antiparisien a Lyon et dans Ie Rhone-et-Loire
en [793 (Lyon, I9I2); and William
Scott, Terror and Repression in Revolutionary
Marseille (London, '973).

REPRESS10N

AND

REORGAN

IZATION

161

itly restricted to administrative
matters. The new law also suspended local
elections, with vacancies to be filled by appointments
made by representatives on mission. This same law increased the responsibilities of district
councils, which had in general shown themselves to be less "moderate" than
departmental administrations
and more steadfast in their loyalty to the National Convention. These councils now assumed responsibility for the enactment of all new laws and would report directly to the Committee of Public
Safety through appointed agents nationaux, not to the departrnenta I directory, as before."
It is the first phase of this reorganization that primarily concerns us herethe dismissal of suspect officials and their replacement by men thought to be
more republican in their political convictions. In Calvados, this process extended to virtually the entire departmental administration and the Caen district and municipal councils. Those officials most active in the revolt went to
prison, where they remained for periods ranging from four months to nearly
a year. The purge of officials in the Haute- Vienne, on the other hand, was
much more selective. The representative on mission Jacques Brival left the
Limoges district and municipal councils nearly intact and dismissed only a
handful of departmental administrators.
The details of the repression are important not only as a means to identify
the federalist administrators
and their replacements but also-through
interrogations,
statements, and letters-as
a means to examine further the
character of the revolt. In their interrogation statements and petitions for
clemency, many of those arrested in Caen presented extensive defenses of
their actions and outlined what they considered the reasons for the revolt.
Most stressed the good intentions of the people of Caen and the misinformation that had led them astray. Also illuminating are the orders issued by the
minister of the interior and the Committee of Public Safety and the reports
of their agents sent out into the departments.
As with our chronicle of the revolt itself, we begin by examining Limoges,
where only a few administrators
were purged from office. Representatives
on mission arrived in Limoges with little fanfare or advance notice, but as
elsewhere in France, they made an impact on the shape of local politics. The
National Convention sent Jacques Brival (() the Haute- Vienne, specifically
2.
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ordering him to Chateauponsac,
le Dorat, Saint- Yrieix, and Limoges but
granting him broad discretion with regard to other towns he chose to visit
and measures he found necessary to employ. Brival made brief stops in Chareauponsac and Lussac, replacing the entire municipal council in the first
and only a few officials in the second. At Ie Dorat, he replaced two members
of the district administration
and suspended Jacques Lesrerpt (brother of an
Haute- Vienne conuentionnel, Benoist Lesterpt-Beauvais,
who had come
under suspicion) from his position on the district tribunal.
On August 28, Brival reported to the Committee of Public Safety from
Saint- Yrieix, in many respects the primary target of his mission. The SaintYrieix district council's letter of June 7, cailing for the election of new deputies to the Convention and the dispatch of departmental delegations to Paris,
had elicited the disapproval of the departmental
administration
and earned
a denunciation on the floor of the Convention. Now those officials would
pay the price for having spoken so freely. Brival suspended the entire district
and municipal councils, with the exception of three individuals, as well
as the district judges and the municipal juges de paix. In consultation with
the local Jacobin club, he replaced these officials with more reputable
republicans.
From Saint- Yrieix, Brival went directly to Limoges, where he again faced
the need for a selective purging of the administrative and judicial corps. The
departmental
administration,
though it had never actively supported the
federalist movement, had wavered briefly, and that weakness required a
remedy. Accordingly, Brival dismissed four departmental
officials: Joseph
Durand de Richernont, president of the administration;
Jean HugonneauSauvot, a member of the directory; Charles Cantillon-Tramont;
and Pierre
Mourier.:' Of the four, only Durand can be said to have been dismissed because of his conduct in June and July. The Limoges comite de surveillance
described his conduct during that period thus: "he did not show himself to
be a partisan of the Mountain, and his weakness very nearly proved disastrous for the department." 4 In addition to his indecision in J LIne, Durand
one year earlier had signed the departmental
letter protesting the June 20,
1792, attack on the Tuileries. This apparent sympathy for the king now re3· A. N., AI" II r6g, dossier I:;H3. This file contains several letters from Brival to the Committee of Public Safety written during August and September, '7\1:1.
4· Fray-Fournier,
Le Dep artcment de la Haute- v iennc, I, 102.
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turned to haunt him, and it seems to have been this offense for which the
Committee of General Security ordered Durand's arrest and transfer to Paris
on March 3J, 1794 (II Germinal II). Durand never came to trial, but he
remained in La Force prison until after Therrnidor, 5
Hugonneau-Sauvot
had also been implicated in the affair of the June,
1792, departmental
letter but at that time had managed to exonerate himself. It seems likely that this affair was once again the source of his problems,
for within three months Brival restored Hugormeau to his previous position.
There is little evidence to suggest reasons for the dismissal of CanrillonTrarnont and Mourier. Brival gave no explanation for their suspension from
office. Cantillon-Trarnonr's
attendance at council meetings had been sporadic, but this was hardly exceptional. In May, 1793, he had led a contingent of volunteers to the Vendee, a demonstration of patriotism that scarcely
could Justify Brival's action. As for Mourier, his responsibilities for supplying wood to the naval shipyards may have conflicted with his duties as an
administrator. It lS also possible that personal animosities between these two
men and Limoges Jacobins led to their dismissal.
To fill the vacated positions, Brival named Jean Baptiste Gay-Vernon
president of the administration
and promoted Francois Hilaire JevardatGrandchamp
to the directory, thereby rewarding two of the staunchest
Montagnard
supporters on the departmental
council. Beyond this, Brival
made few changes. He named replacements for the district administrators
Jean Boyer and Alexis Villestivaud, having previously appointed those men
to replace dismissed judges. Three new faces soon appeared on the municipal council, but these substitutions were due to the transfer or retirement of
councillors. The National Convention directly ordered an additional change
in the Haute- Vienne administration-the
suspension and arrest of Francois
Mathieu-Lachassagne
for impeding recruitment and criminally corresponding with emigres. Lachassagne spent several months in a Paris prison but
returned as a departmental official after Thermidor."
In mid-September, Antoine Joseph Lanot joined Brival on mission to the
Haute-Vienne and the Correze. The two deputies continued to purify district and municipal councils, but their attention now turned more closely to
military recruitment and the suppression of "religious fanaticism." Both
)_ A. D_ Haure-Vienne,
1.8)1 (orders of the Cornire de Siirere Cenerale).
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tasks went well. In late November, Lanot reported that people were flocking
to the Temples of Reason (this may have been an exaggeration)
and that
each department had furnished two thousand volunteers for the army."
A local incident produced the final displacements in Limoges politics in
the summer and fall of 1793. It involved three of the most prominent figures from the early years of the Revolution-Jean
Baptiste Petiniaud de
Beaupeyrat, Louis Naurissart, and Pierre Dumas. Dumas had been procureur-general-syndic of the department in the 1790 - I 79 I term, had briefly
served as president of the Haute-Vienne in November, 1791, and since that
time had sat on the departmental council. On July 3, 1793, however, he resigned that post because of his responsibilities as president of the HauteVienne Criminal Tribunal (the law of June 14 rendered the two positions
incompatible).
Petiniaud and Naurissart had been at the center of political conflict in
Limoges since 179 I and were reputed to be the leaders of the "aristocratic"
faction in the town. Charged now with materially aiding emigres, the two
appeared before the Criminal Tribunal in July. Dumas, scrupulously honest
by all indications, presided over the preliminary review, which quickly concluded with the dismissal of charges against both Petiniaud and Naurissart.
The two had clearly sent money abroad, but Dumas felt compelled to point
out to the jury that the offenses had been committed before such correspondence had been outlawed. This acquittal by virtue of legal technicality infuriated Limoges Jacobins, who charged Dumas with favoring aristocrats and
the public prosecutor with incompetence. Both men eventually lost their
jobs, dismissed in September by Lanot and Brival, and Dumas went to
prison late in 1793. The district comite de surveillance said of Dumas that
though he stood on good terms with Limoges sans-culottes, he had lately
fallen under suspicion. Dumas had joined in founding the Limoges Jacobin
club and had been an early supporter of the Revolution, "but full of ambition and anxious to please all parties, he had eventually all but deserted the
club and was suspected of favoring aristocrats in the exercise of his official
duties." 8 The Jacobins eventually came to his defense, however, and Dumas
left prison in February, 1794, only to be arrested two months later by order

L

7· A.N., AF 1I '71, dossier 139~, piece 30, l.anor letter of 3 Frunaire
793) sent to the Committee of Public Safety.
.
8. A. D. Haure-Vicnne, L143.

1I (November

2.3,

REPRESSION

AND

REORGANIZATION

165

of the Committee of General Security. Transferred to Paris, Dumas sat in
Saint-Lazare prison until November 21, 1794 (1 Frimaire III)."
The charge that Dumas "favored aristocrats" appears entirely unfounded,
particularly with respect to Petiniaud. The two had been enemies since
1782, when Petiniaud orchestrated Dumas' expulsion from a local Freemason lodge. In 1790, Petiniaud had opposed Dumas' election as procureurgeneral-syndic and then his election as president of the Criminal Tribunal.
As Dumas later observed in his own defense, he had every reason in the
world to convict Petiniaud but refused to subvert the law."
The mission of the deputies Lanot and Brival produced no drastic changes
in the Haute- Vienne. The Limoges municipal and district councils, both of
which had actively opposed the federalist tendencies of departmental officials, remained virtually intact, and the district council now enjoyed a certain precedence over the diminished departmental administration.
The arrival of Brival and Lanot did, nonetheless, bring a temporary end to the
long-running battle between moderates and radicals in Limoges. The elections of 1792 had given the upper hand to the latter, and their advantage
was now strengthened. In September, the deputies named a local comite de
surveillance, which immediately arrested a number of former members of
the Amis de la Paix. Few former Amis remained in office in August, 1793,
but many were prominent Limoges citizens who were now subjected to
close surveillance, even prison, because of their past association with the
moderate club. The ascendancy of the Montagnards in Paris thus strengthened the hold of Limoges jacobins on departmental politics.
In examining the repression in Caen we begin not in August but in mid-june,
when the minister of the interior, joseph Garat, sent his first agents to Normandy and when the Convention first denounced the Calvados federalists.
On june 13, 1793, the National Convention issued a decree of accusation
against the administrators
and other officials in Calvados who had signed
the june 9 order for the arrest of the two representatives on mission, Romrne
and Prieur. In August, this decree would serve as the core of an indictment
against seventy-three administrators, judges, and representatives of the Caen
9. Fray-Fournier,
Le Dcpnrtemcni de la Haute- Vie/me, II, 307- 309.
See La Franc-maconncrte
Limousine, SOil passe, SOil present, ses ambitions,
theque Nationale, SOH. Piece 2255.
10.

. .
in the I),blio-

./
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sections and clubs who had adhered to the June 9 order. Most of these men
eventually went to prison, but probably only a handful of officials in Caen
knew in June of the decree of accusation. After June 8, the departmental directory refused to register or announce any orders or laws issued by the Convention, and only at the end of July did the Calvados directory lift that ban.
The Convention issued two more decrees directed against the federalist
rebels. The first concerned General Felix Wimpffen. On June 26, the Committee of Public Safety received the letter from Wimpffen in which he pledged
to come to Paris only at the head of sixty thousand men. Bertrand Barere
read this insolent letter to the outraged deputies, and after some debate
(there were those who wished to place a price on Wimpffen's head), the
Convention voted a decree of accusation against the general and dismissed
him as commander of the Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg.
During that same session, Robert Lindet introduced a measure relative to
all administrators who had signed insurrectionary
orders. Linder, who had
been in Lyon during the first two weeks of June, argued that the majority of
citizens and administrators
were good republicans, regrettably misled regarding events in Paris and the freedom of the Convention. Now that sufficient time had passed for the facts to become known, however, an administrators who had given orders to arm the people against each other, who had
intercepted official correspondence,
or who had spread spurious reports regarding the Convention ought to be called on to retract publicly those statements within three days or be declared traitors. The Convention quickly
adopted this proposal, with the three-day period to begin on publication of
the decree. As Lindet hoped, retractions quickly followed in many departments. In Calvados, the decree did not become publicly known until July 20
or 21, at which time, as we have seen, the Caen district council hastily revoked its adherence to the declarations of June 8 and 9. II
These three decrees comprised the official punitive measures directed
against the rebels in Calvados. More positive steps were taken as well. Early
in June, the Convention prepared an official account of the events of May 3 I
through June 2, stressing the cooperation of the Central Revolutionary
Committee and the people of Paris in the cause of liberty, unity, and the indiII.
For the text and discussion in the Convention of these three decrees, see Rcimpression
de lAncicn Moniteur, XVI, 641 (session of June rj , '791), and 755 -7)7 (session of June 2-6,
1793)·
.
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visibility of the Republic. More importantly, the Convention moved quickly
to satisfy the year-long demands for a new constitution. On June 10, Jeanbon Saint-Andre addressed the deputies: "It is time to prove to the departments that the unity and the indivisibility of the Republic are the fundamental dogmas of the constitution;
it is the constitution that will call back to
their duties all constituted authorities." 12
Reports from representatives on mission to the departments reinforced
this call time and again. From Brittany, the deputies P. M. Cillet and Antoine Merlin wrote to the Committee of Public Safety on June [2, warning it
of the impending general assembly in Rennes and observing that "it would
seem simple to us to avert the consequences that might follow such an extraordinary measure, if the Convention turns without delay to the constitution." Robert Lindet, while still on mission in Lyon, wrote succinctly on
June 15: "Publish a constitution." U The Convention did precisely that.
Marie Jean Herault-Sechelles began his report on the newly drafted articles
during the session of June 10, and after two weeks of discussion and revision, the deputies approved the constitution on June 24· Two days later,
C. Lacroix (of the Marne) underlined the importance of this document:
"When the constitution is presented to the people, they will abandon those
who have misled them and will rally around this Palladium of liberty." 1,1
To present the constitution to the people in those departments where the
local authorities could not be expected to cooperate, the minister of the interior, Carat, commissioned fifty-two agents to travel incognito, distributing
copies as they went. He assigned no fewer than seven of these fifty-two
agents to Calvados and the surrounding departments.
Another group of agents sent by the minister of the interior was in the
field at this time. As early as January, 1793, Garat had expressed dismay at
the lack of means for surveillance of the departments and had warned the
Executive Council and later the Committee of Public Safety of internal enemies who threatened the Revolution. The Executive Council authorized
Carat to assign seventy-two agents, whose mission would be secret, to visit
the departments and report back to Paris on political and economic conditions. Although the plan was never fully implemented, Carat named thirty'2. lbid., 6oX.
'}. Aulard , Recueil des Actc: du Comite de Salut Public, IV, H2., )7S·
'4. Rcimprcssion de lAncicn MOl/itellr, XVI, 7)6.
..'
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six agents in May and June, and two of these "observers"
journeyed to
Calvados."
One of the first of these agents to be named was Perrin de Sainte-Emmelie,
sent in late April to observe the Channel coast. Still on mission when the
revolt broke out, Perrin wrote from Valognes (in the Manche) on June I I,
reporting to Garat that public rumor blamed the recent conduct of Rornrne
and Prieur for the extreme measures taken by the Calvados authorities. A
letter written four days later amended this report, declaring that the actions
of the people of Caen grew largely from their resentment that the r arh Military Division headquarters had not been established in their city. One may
doubt that the location of the headquarters
in Bayeux rather than Caen
could have caused such hard feelings. Romme and Prieur's order dissolving
the administrative council attached to the 14th Division may well have engendered considerable resentment among local authorities, however. Additional rancor may have been caused by the dismissal from office of several
minor officials ordered by the two deputies late in May. I;;
No other secret agents sent reports from Normandy during the month of
June. The second observer sent to Calvados, Le Grand, was appointed on
June 29 and arrived near Evreux just after the rebel forces had been routed
on July I}. Le Grand wrote to Garat on July 16, describing the disorderly
retreat of a force that he estimated at two thousand men. He mingled with
the soldiers and heard a number of them complain "that they had been deceived by their leaders as to the motives of their gathering and that they
would now return to their homes." He considered it unlikely that the rebels
would be able to rally their forces. Le Grand followed the volunteers to
Lisieux and wrote on July 20 that three hundred more had recently deserted,
muttering as they left "that they believed they were going to the federation
in Paris, and not to do battle." Wimpffen reportedly still hoped for re15· Caron, Rapports des Agents du Ministre de l'Interieur, I, iii-xxv. Caron describes these
agents as coming from the liberal professions for the most part. That they were sent to gather
more than political information is suggested by the fact that each was given copies of Arthur
Young's Voyage ell France and Adam Smith's Recherche sur la nature et les causes de la richesse
des nations and told to study and be inspired by them. Carat was clearly interested in gathering
information on commerce, agriculture, and industry from throughout
France, and some of the
published reports deal with those subjects.
[6. Ibid., II, 303-304; A. D. Calvados, LlO024 (departmental
administration
procesverbal, May 27, 1793). Several Cacn citizens protested their dismissal from office at a May 27
departmental
council meeting. 1 found no other reference to these dismissals, suggesting that
those affected held minor posts.
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inforcements, but Le Grand counted more leaving than arriving and wrote
that outside of Caen no support for the revolt could be found in Calvados."
This news must have been heartening indeed compared with the pessimistic reports sent to Paris just one week earlier by representatives on mission. On July 3, the Convention had empowered the deputies L. Le Cointre
and Pierre Louis Prieur (of the Marne), already in Normandy, to take all
measures necessary for the suppression of the rebels in the Eure and Calvados. This authorization
proved to be of little value, since authorities in
Calvados had kept a close watch on the two deputies and in late June had
peacefully escorted them out of the department. '" On July 4, the Committee
of Public Safety received news of the march of forces from Eure and Calvados
on Paris and began taking steps to resist that march. The Committee assembled an army composed of Parisian battalions (soon christened the "army
of pacification" by the people of Evreux) and on July 9 sent Robert Lindet, a
member of the Committee, and Jean Michel DuRoy to the Eure for one last
try at averting the confrontation through mediation and conciliation. I"
The July 13 skirmish at Vernon signaled the failure of these efforts, and
early reports to Paris did not make clear the disarray into which the rebel
troops were falling. Linder's brother, Thomas, wrote to him from Paris almost daily, relaying the concern felt in the capital over the situation in Normandy. On July 15, he advised Lindet against pursuing a strategy of conciliation, observing that the Normans had shown their true colors by attacking
the Parisians at Vernon, and warned him that to enter Evreux ahead of the
army would be both dangerous and unnecessary."
Robert Lindet worried about the liability posed by the Parisian battalions
almost as much as he felt reassured by the protection they offered. In an
undated letter to Jean Baptiste Noel Bouchotte, the minister of war, he complained: "The composition of our small army is disquieting. The chasseurs
have the worst reputation and merit it. We receive serious complaints about
them. The hussars are also, by their conduct, a continual source of alarm or
indisposition."
Lindet reported that the troops mistreated the people of the
countryside and spread panic faster than the representatives could inspire
'7. Caron, Rapports des Agents du Mil1islre de l'lntcricur, II, '92-95.
,8. A. D. Calvados, L r 89 (Regisrrc des arretes du Conseil C2ncral du dcparremenr du C31vudos, II aour 1792-26
juillet '793). On June 27, the Calvados general assembly ordered two
of its members to accompany Le Cointre and Prieur, then ill Vi rc, out of Calvados,
'9. Aulard, Rewed des Act.es du CO/l11le de Sa/til Public, V, 165-66.
2.0. A. D. Calvados,
L 10122 (Linder personal papers).
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confidence. The arrival in Evreux on July 24 of Xavier Audouin, the erstwhile resident of Limoges who now served as adjunct to the minister of war,
helped to resolve this problem. Lindet himself had requested Audouin's presence. The two of them, in conjunction with General Sepber (commander of
the Parisian troops), instituted strict regulations forbidding harassment of
the countrypeople and managed to restore discipline to the five-thousandman arrny.:"
Despite Thomas Linder's misgivings, Robert Lindet and his fellow representative on mission, DuRoy, entered Evreux without incident and by July
[8 could report that no rebel forces remained in the department of the Eure.
Anxious not to lose their temporary advantage by allowing Wimpffen time
to regroup his soldiers, Robert Lindet appealed to Paris for an extension of
the two representatives' powers so that they might press on into Calvados.
This authorization reached Evreux on July 21 along with Pierre Louis Bonnet de Meautry, who had been dispatched by the Committee of Public Safety
to assist DuRoy and Lindet in Calvados. The Committee sent Bonnet de
Meautry, a Calvados deputy to the Convention and former mayor of Caen,
because of his familiarity with the local citizenry.
As the representatives prepared to move on to Lisieux, their primary concern remained the reputation for pillaging and disorder that preceded the
"army of pacification." Several of Carat's secret agents, now in Calvados,
reported the common fear that the army had been sent to slaughter everyone. Etienne LeHodey wrote to Garat on July 29 that the March 29, 1793,
census decree calling for the posting at each house of the names, ages, and so
on of all residents had been libeled in Calvados as an order of Marat, issued
so that some night all those older than sixty or younger than ten could be
killed in their sleep. The agents tried to reassure those they met and, in fact,
had some success in allaying the people's fears. One agent, Guillaume Delabarre, visited Lisieux posing as a cattle merchant, an appropriate disguise
in that rich grazing region. He met some of the Norman volunteers in the
cafes and, after listening to their complaints about the deceptions of their
leaders, urged them to support the Convention and abandon Wimpffen. He
reported that many did so. The agent Heudier, sixty years old and a native
of Calvados, arrived in Caen on July 20, allegedly on matters of business (a
plausible story, since he was a wine merchant). He stayed with relatives,
which strengthened his cover, and told everyone he met that local adrnin2.1.

A. D. Calvados,

L 10

I 19

(Linder correspondence).
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istrators bad misinformed the public about events in Paris and had prevented messengers from the Convention from reaching them. All of these
agents also distributed the new constitution, a measure made doubly important because the Central Committee of Resistance to Oppression (the coordinating body of the assembled protesting departments) had reportedly begun to spread false copies.:"
The role of Carat's secret agents during this period was a very important
one, too seldom noted by historians. At least in Normandy, they quietly and
effectively acted as ears and eyes for the representatives on mission, who
never could have gained access to the people with whom the agents mingled.
These men also disseminated information
favorable to the Montagnard
Convention, allaying the fears and suspicions of the people they met. They
thus functioned successfully (the best among them, anyhow) as intermediaries between officials of the state and the people of the towns and countryside. Without that mediation, the task of the representatives on mission
and the "army of pacification" would have proved much more difficult.
After the rout of the federalist forces, the representatives
on mission
quickly took steps to reorganize their forces, to influence public opinion,
and to make clear the purpose of their expedition. They secured an order
from the minister of war, Bouchotte, bringing the Cherbourg army and the
Parisian volunteers under the sole command of General Sepher, thereby
boosting troop morale and reducing dissension between the two general
staffs. 10 counter the propaganda in the newspaper being issued by the authorities gathered in Caen, Lindet obtained a printing press and commenced
publication of the Journal de CArmie des Cotes de Cherbourg. The first
issue appeared on July 28 in Evreux. The press moved with the troops, and
the [ournal issued its second number in Lisieux on July 30. Its opening paragraph, characteristic of the content of the Journal during the weeks that followed, read: "Be reassured, respectable inhabitants of the countryside; we
will watch over your tranquility, and your homes will be protected." 2;
2,2. Caron, Rnpports des Agents du Mil1istrc de lI ntcricur. I, 2:; 1-:> 5, II, J " - 15, 2.0,)- 10
(reports of Delabarrc, Heudicr, and LcHodey). Sec A. D. Calvados, L I 0 I 6H (Comitc de Sllret"
Cenerale/Cabinet
Noir) for a juru- 2.7,17')3, letter written by a Baveux woman who expressed
precisely the fear reported by LclIodcy.
2.3. A. D. Calvados, Lr o c z.o (Journal de J"Armee des Coles de Cbcrhourg, July 3°,1793).
The loUI'II(11 was edited by J. J. Dercue, who accompanied the "army of pacification" with responsibiliry for the surveillance and reorganization
of locall'0pular
societies. Except for a onemonth hiatus, during which time the army was occupied in the Vendee, the [ournal (on!'lnned
publication until the end of December, 179:;·
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The "army of pacification" arrived in Lisieux the evening of July 28 and
found the town calm. All three section assemblies had unanimously adopted
the new constitution, and the town turned out a fraternal greeting for the
army." Lindet wrote to Paris that the people of Lisieux had only reluctantly
supported the revolt under the considerable pressure of departmental
authorities. Although they had housed the Caen volunteers on their route to
Evreux, few had actively participated
in the insurrection.
Patriotism in
Lisieux remained strong, though republican enthusiasm required revitalization. The most pressing need, however, was to restock the Lisieux grain
market, which had been seriously undersupplied since the enactment of the
maximum. The success of the representatives
in securing supplementary
grain facilitated their political mission in Evreux, Lisieux, and later Caeri."
Encouraging news awaited the representatives
in Lisieux regarding the
current situation in Caen. Earlier reports of the town's preparations
to defend itself gave way to word that Wimpfien had fled, that the administrators
had issued retractions, and that Romme and Prieur once again enjoyed their
freedom. Cause for concern persisted, however. Lindet doubted the sincerity
of the Calvados retractions. Issued only out of fear, they sounded more like
an apology or a defense of past actions than an admission of error or guilt.
In addition, the rebel administrators had incurred "unbelievable expenses,"
draining large sums of money from the public treasury. Lindet considered it
imperative that an accounting of the records be made and that no false assignats be allowed to circulate. He also felt it necessary to replace all local
officials, since the people would certainly no longer tolerate their former
administrators."
As Lindet, DuRoy, and Bonnet prepared to advance from Lisieux to Caen,
so did the people of Caen prepare to receive them. For most of the departmental administrators,
this meant a swift, but discreet, departure from
Caen. Sixteen of the thirty-seven members were present at the July 26 meet24- At least the [ournal of July 30, '793, reported that the army had been well received.
Another account suggests that the reception was not a warm one, but I found no solid evidence
to support this view. Linder, who would have had no reason to deceive or fabricate, consistently
spoke well of the Lisieux citizens and their patriotism ill his letters to Paris. For the contrary
opinion, see Gaston Lavalley, "La Presse en Normandie: Journal de l'Armee des Cotes de Clierbourg," MC1110iresde l'Academic Nationale des Sciences, Arts ct Belles-let/res de Caen (1899),
205-75.
25· A. D. Calvados,
L10l19
(July }1, [793, letter to Carat).
2.6. Ibid. (July 29, '793, letter to Bouchotre, July 3' letter to Audouin; and August I letter
from the three representatives to the Commirree of Public Safety).
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ing for the signing of the formal retraction. By the next day, their numbers
had dwindled to ten, and only five officials attended a session on July 3 I. Of
the nine members of the departmental directory, only four attended a July
30 meeting, and by August 8, only two remained. Those present called on
other administrators
to fill the vacancies on the directory, but no one appeared. All five of the directors who had accompanied the departmental
force to Evreux returned to Caen to sign the retraction, but only Adrien
Thiboult remained at his post as late as July 31. Pierre Jean Leveque never
attended a meeting, Pierre Mesnil attended one, and Hippolyte BougonLongrais and Rene Lenormand attended two apiece. The directory made no
conciliatory overtures to the representatives on mission, concerning itself instead with registering the hundreds of decrees from the Convention that had
been ignored since May 31.27
The Caen district administration
had been less compromised by the revolt, and so its officials had little reason to flee. With the exception of Louis
Caille and Bernard Lequeru, members who had maintained regular attendance during June and] uly continued to attend both the district directory
and the district council meetings. IN Seven of the thirteen administrators
signed a retraction, dated July 2.1 and addressed to the Committee of Public
Safety, emphasizing the adverse circumstances that had prevented them
from actively opposing the insurrection and citing in particular Robert
Tirel's futile objections to the arrest of Romrne and Prieur. Two district officials, Daniel Francois Claude L'honorey and Henri Michel Saillenfest, attended the July 2.1 meeting but did not sign, though L'honorey later signed
the general assembly retraction. Rene Lahaye, the only district administrator other than Caille to play an active role in the revolt, disagreed with his
colleagues over other matters and had not attended a meeting since May
2.9.29 During the last week otjuly, the rest of the council devoted its attention
to the increasingly difficult problem of supplying Caen with grain.

,i

27. A. D. Calvados, LI65 (Registre des proces-verbaux
du Direcroire du Depa rremenr
Caen, 16 mars 1793- 10 septerubre 1793)'
2.8. A. D. Calvados, L3 87 (Rcgisrrc servant a ia transcription des procesverba ux des deliberations du Conseil General du district de Caen, I) janvier 179.\-2.0 avril 1795), and L3R2
(Transcriptions
des proccs-verb.uix
des delIberation~ du Dircctoire du district de Caen, 15 mars
'793-3
fevrier T794). Louis Caille went into hiding for obvious reasons. Lequeru, however,
played no public role in the revolt and may have quit ;Ittt'ndlllg meetings for personal reasons.
He had resigned as council president in mid-May in order to deal with fal1lily business. He quu
attending directory meetings after July 2.9. withour ;IIlY explanation, but continued [0 attend
general council sessions.
V). 1\. D. Calvados,
L)87.

174

PROVINCIAL

POLITICS

IN THE

FRENCH

REVOLUTION

No perceptible change occurred in the pattern of attendance at municipal
council meetings in late July, although the council did not record who was
present between July 20 and August 27. On the latter date, attendance was
normal, with a majority of council members present. On July 25, the municipal council had sent a letter to the representatives on mission along with
its retraction. Like the district administration,
it stressed that the will of the
people had forced it to adhere to the insurrectionary
measures of the general
assembly, an error that by then had become all too clear. The three representatives responded on July 28 with a carefully worded letter addressed to the
municipality. Adopting a reassuring tone, they described their mission as the
peaceful restoration of order and liberty among the people of Caen. A public
letter to the citizens of Caen followed three days later, explaining that the
"army of pacification" must corne to Caen in order to prove to the people
that the Republic had raised its army not to massacre but rather to fraternize, to restore liberty, and to erase traces of the recent aberration in Calvados, These letters produced the desired effect, and on July 31, the municipal council sent four of its members to Lisieux to pledge its cooperation to
the representatives. The municipality offered to greet the deputies with a festive celebration, but Lindet declined, explaining that it would be inappropriate to accept such a welcome from a town that had so recently arrested and
imprisoned two of his colleagues."
Officials in Caen were clearly anxious to forget the past two months and
to return as discreetly as possible to "business as usual." The municipal
council postponed the release of Romme and Prieur from the Chateau for
several days, hoping that public agitation would subside. Finally released on
July 29, Rornrne reported to the Convention one week later that the council
had initially suggested that they be released at night, through a back entrance, in order to avoid attracting a crowd. The two deputies objected emphatically, insisting that only a public exit could begin to atone for the public outrage committed against the National Convention. Their objections
prevailed, and they left the Chateau to the sound of saluting cannons before
the assembled National Guard and a cheering crowd of citizens."
Upon their release, Rornme and Prieur immediately wrote to their col30. A. c:. Caen, 02 (Deliberations
du Corps municipal er du Conseil General de la Commune, 4 janvier 1792- II Germinal all II), and 1.1.\ (Mission Linder, Oudor, DuRoy, Bonner,
juillet 1793-a11 V).
3 1. Rcimpression de lAncien /vfollileur, XVII, 937 (August 6, [793).
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leagues in Lisieux, urging them to come to Caen as soon as possible. Their
letter reported that Caen was quiet and predicted a friendly reception for the
three deputies. They cautioned, however, that the town remained in a state
of shock: "The people appear cold and passive; the municipality shows itself well. Several members of the Departrnent have the air of being greatly
afraid." II
Thus advised, Linder, DuRoy, and Bonnet made the short journey from
Lisieux to Caen on August 3, one day behind the "army of pacification."
They arrived in Caen still unsure of the precise extent of their authority and
responsibilities. The Committee of Public Safety had instructed them to restore order in Calvados and presumably to arrest the guilty. Not until August 6 did the Convention issue a decree authorizing the replacement of
departmental
administrators,
as well as the Caen district and municipal
councils. It also called for the demolition of the dungeon in the Chateau and
the dissolution of the Carabot club. Although official notification of this decree did not reach Caen until August 9, Lindet and DuRoy began to consult
"local citizens known for their patriotism" regarding the appointment of
new administrators
shortly after their arrival. U
The success of all other measures depended on the ability of the representatives on mission to find adequate grain supplies for the local markets. Curiously, the departmental administration had appealed to the minister of the
interior for food supplies late in June, despite its revolt against the central
government and the food boycott directed against Paris. One can scarcely
believe that the administrators
expected a favorable reply. It seems likely
that the Committee of Public Safety and the minister of the interior took all
possible measures during the revolt (as they did in the cases of Bordeaux and
Marseille) to deprive Calvados of grain supplies from Le Havre and Roucn,
as a tactic aimed at undermining the insurrection. Several times in July authorities in Caen had been forced to release military supplies to the hungry
people in order to prevent pillaging of the granaries. Those stores were now
almost exhausted, and armed searches for caches in the surrounding countryside met with only infrequent reward.
In two letters to the Committee of Public Safety, dated August 8 and 9,
Lindet, DuRoy, and Bonnet reported that Cacn, Lisieux, Bayeux, and Falaise
F.
}3.

II).

A. D. Calvudos, L,OlI9
A. D. Calvados, L,65;

(letter ofjuly ',», 179,).
and A. c:. Cacn, Lj(' (Repression,

crc., juilkr

I
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all lacked bread. They charged hoarders and monopolizers with depriving
the population of what had been an abundant harvest in 1792 and issued
proclamations
to the countryside threatening fines and imprisonment
to
farmers who refused to deliver available grain. This brought some grain to
the markets, but the representatives had to turn their efforts elsewhere as
well. On August 18, Lindet and DuRoy announced to the municipal council
that they had procured eight hundred quintals of rye, eight hundred quintals
of wheat, and six hundred quintals of flour, which now awaited shipment in
Le Havre. This provided temporary relief, enough for approximately
ten
days, but the supply in Caen remained precariously low well into September."
As they had done in Evreux and Lisieux, the deputies met with the jacobin club and held public meetings in churches in an attempt to rally patriotism and revive public spirit. Lindet defended the Convention before these
gatherings and denied the existence in Paris of any "disorganizing
party,
known by the name of maratists and anarchists." He even praised Marat;
and on August 7, he published a pamphlet detailing why he had voted on
June 2 for the arrest of the twenty-nine deputies, citing their conduct since
that date as ample proof of their guilt. These efforts produced only a moderate effect. The Journal de l'Armee continued to complain of public apathy
and low attendance at jacobin club meetings.
Even the most ambitious attempt to heal the wounds of federalism met
with only partial success. In conjunction with the municipality, the representatives on mission planned a public fete to celebrate the anniversary of the
August 10 journee, which one year earlier had toppled the monarchy. The
fete included a parade, music, and dancing, and the "army of pacification"
mingled with the citizens of Caen in a festive atmosphere.
Workers had
erected a stage on the prairie, and there the mayor and others addressed the
crowd and exchanged fraternal embraces with DuRoy and Bonnet. In the
midst of the celebration, however, plans went awry. Gilet, the municipal employee in charge of preparations, had been pressed for time and had cut corners by painting over an old banner used at previous public affairs. Unfortunately, it rained on the festival (not unusual in Caen even in August), and
those present watched in dismay as the newly painted letters disappeared,
revealing the slogan, "Vive la Nation, la Loi, et le Roi!" The municipal
34· A. C. Caen, 02; and A.N., AI' 11168, dossier ,)80. See Perrot, Genese d'une ville modcrne, I, 188, for an estimate of Caen grain consumption in '793.
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council strongly reprimanded Cilet and sent an explanation, along with profuse apologies, to Lindet and the others."
More problems grew out of the ceremonies that day. The three representatives were not working well together. Bonnet's family lived in Caen, and
the former mayor, despite his political radicalism, still had friends in town.
DuRoy, from the Eure, had visited Calvados in March on a recruitment mission with Bonnet and also had acquaintances in Caen, The two of them had
been sent to accompany Lindet for precisely that reason-their
familiarity
with local officials would help reassure the understandably
apprehensive
citizenry. But these assets at the same time presented a liability. DuRoy and
Bonnet were not neutral observers and could not dispassionately place responsibility on the shoulders of the apparent leaders of the revolt. This
produced tension among the three; and on August 8, after arguing with
DuRoy, Lindet wrote to Paris requesting his own recall." In this instance,
Bonnet acted as an intermediary, sending his own report of the quarrel to
the Committee of Public Safety and suggesting that Linder's request be ignored. He described Lindet as a difficult nun to work with-very
sensitive
and often resentful of remonstrance-but
he was a hard worker, very capable, and Bonnet felt it would be a great mistake to transfer Lindet just as
he was mastering the local situation. The three temporarily resolved their
differences, and the next day Lindet withdrew his request."
Following the August 10 celebration, however, Bonnet, too, argued with
Lindet. Lindet sent a lengthy report to Paris on August 27, outlining the
problems of the preceding two weeks. Two of Carat's agents, after discreet
investigation, had identified several of the leaders of the revolt. These included Louis Caille ("orateur pathologiste"), Bougon-Longrais
("grand diseur de riens"), Chaix-d'Estanges
("pretre dans route l'acceptation
du
terrne"), Rene Lenormand, Leveque, Barnabe Cauvin (a departmental administrator), and Mauger." Lindet added to these most of the departmental
and district administrators,
a number of Judges, several members of the municipality, and all of the commissioners who had gone to Paris or who had
later been sent to other departments. The result was a list of forty-five to fifty
35. A. C. Caen, 1)2.
36. A.N., AI' II [68, dossier 1375, piece 2.6.
37. A.N., AI' 11169, dossier 1)80, piece 8.
38. Caron, Rapports des Agents du iVlil'1istrc de l'l ntcrieur, ii, 20, 2.12. (reports of Heudier
and LeHodey). The characterizations
in parentheses are those of LcHodcy.
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whom he believed should be arrested. If nothing else, the 1,3 00,000 liures
still missing from the treasury mandated that the guilty be punished.
Lindet presented his list at a meeting with Bonnet, General Sepher, and
several other army officers. DuRoy was out of town at the time. Afterwards
Bonnet spoke privately to Lindet, objecting that his wife would never speak
to him again if they ordered all those arrests! The administrators
were not
guilty, he claimed, only misled. Local officials had fraternally embraced
Bonnet and DuRoy on August 10, in the belief that all had been forgotten.
The deputies would be accused of perfidy if they arrested these officials now,
and Bonnet would not support such an order.
Bonnet further observed that a single representative on mission could not
issue orders. He would willingly sign orders against citizens of the neighboring department of the Manche and finally agreed to the arrest of Cauvin. But
he refused to sign an order for the arrest of Samuel Chatry, who had been a
member of the committee of insurrection and editor of the Calvados newspaper in July. Although Linder would assume personal responsibility for the
necessary, unpleasant measures, he reached the conclusion that neither
Bonnet nor DuRoy would be of any assistance to him in that task. Thus a
stalemate had developed."
Not until early September was this dilemma resolved. On September 7,
the deputy Charles Francois Oudot arrived in Caen, apparently as a replacement for both Bonnet and DuRoy. Together, he and Lindet began to arrest
those most compromised by the events of .Iune and July. However, the monthlong delay increased the difficulty of this task. Many of the administrators
had fled the area or gone into hiding, particularly those departmental
and
district officials who did not live in Caen. Louis Caille, for example, was
never apprehendecl, and Rene Lenormand hid until after Thermidor near
Lenaudieres in the Calvados countrysicle. Lindet did manage to make a few
arrests during August. Those taken included the district administrator
Lahaye, arrested for having led the party that seized Rornrne and Prieur in
Bayeux; Jean Baptiste Leclerc, acri ng depa rtmen ta I p resi den t d uri ng .Iuly and
August; Barnabe Cauvin; Jean Michel Barbot, the Carabot president; and
Gohier de Jumilly, the cure of Saint-Jean, who had played a prominent role in
leading volunteers to Evreux.?"
Arrests increased in September, but ir is impossible in many cases to estab3\1· A.N., AF II ,68, dossier I 3g" piece 4.
40. A. D. Calvados, L I 01 '7 (Bouret and Frem.mger
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lish the exact date of imprisonment."
In the end, the number of men arrested for their alleged participation
in the revolt reached approximately
forty-five, Linder's original estimate. Most of these were administrators,
including fourteen of the sixteen municipal officers (the mayor and procureur
among them). Gabriel Fossey avoided arrest because he had resigned on
May 29; Richard de Jort not only retained his freedom but was appointed
by Lindet to the new municipal council. Of the thirteen district administrators, five went to prison, roughly the number that had continued to
meet during the revolt. Notably absent were Bernard Lequeru, who convinced Lindet of his non participation,
and Thomas Violette, who had remained at his post until the representatives on mission arrived. Noting
Linder's surprise at finding him in his office, Violette had reportedly remarked, "Didn't someone have to stay to turn over the records and the keys?"
Perhaps Violette's courage earned the respect of the deputy and averted his arrest. Thirteen departmental officials joined these nineteen in the Carmelites
prison-again,
the majority of those who had remained at their post during
the revolt. The remaining prisoners included judges, municipal notables,
and leading club members such as Chaix-d'Estanges
and Barbot. Despite
Linder's intention to arrest all those who had acted as commissioners to
Paris or other departments, most of them escaped imprisonment.
Lindet and Oudot remained in Caen until October 30 or 3 J (9 or 10
Brumaire), replaced shortly by the representative
on mission Jacques
Leonard Laplanche, a former priest from Nevers whose Jacobin reputation
preceded him to Caen. Laplanche lived up to expectations. As his first official duty, he raised a force of [,200 men that departed in early November to
battle the Vendee rebels. Esnault noted in his diary that those who had previously marched to Evreux were among the most eager to enroll.":' Indeed, a
group of prisoners arrested by Lindet, including Chaix-d'Estanges,
Le Goupil
Duclos, Leclerc, and Barbot, sought to prove their patriotism to Laplanche
4'. The list of those arrested by Lindet and l.aplanche (who arrived in Caen III late October)
includes the names of only twenty-five people, some of whom were not officials, and for each
one gives the date of arrest. It almost ccrrainly overlooks severed urrcsts ordered by Laplancbe
and Illay have missed a few ordered by Linder as well. A more complete list of prisoners was
prepared after Thermidor.
It contains some three hundred names (only fifty or so arrested for
federalism) and gives dates of entry and exit into the Maison des Carmelites. Almost all ot
these, however, would have been held for an undetermined length of time in the /1111;;;011 darri:
before transfer to the Carmclires-c-hcuce
the impossibility of fixing a precise date of .uresr. 'Th,s
list is locared in Bruch ures Nonnand cs. Cacn S()I.{S ia R';IJO/lIlioll,
I). M. Cucn , R2s. IOn. Ur.
\)'5(,-2.0')·

42.

\.esage (Esn.iuh). , '4·

180

PROVINCIAL

POLITICS

IN THE

FRENCH

REVOLUTION

by petitioning for their release so that they, too, might join the force and
rush to do battle with the enemies of the Republic." Laplanche declined
their generous offer. The volunteer force, having lost not a single man, returned one month later; and Laplanche, anticipating his remaining tasks,
addressed the jacobin club: "Here returns this Montagnard
representative,
the terror of rna/veil/ants and aristocrats, but at the same time the firm supporter of Republicans and true sans-culottes." 44 Laplanche worked with
zeal, replacing suspect or incompetent administrators
and arresting a number of former officials who had escaped the reach of Lindet and Oudot.
While the majority of the forty-five or fifty eventually arrested were in jail
by the end of December, a handful did not enter prison until March, 1794.
After hearing of the release of several municipal officers arrested the previous fall, they turned themselves in, no longer fearful that the guillotine
awaited them and apparently convinced that it would be wiser to suffer
prison now than to risk harsher punishment later as fugitives from the law.
Time proved their judgment correct, for by the end of August, 1794, all had
left the confines of the Carmelites prison and returned to their homes.
Two less fortunate Calvados federalists suffered severer punishments for
their participation in the revolt, though in each case their later actions served
to increase their jeopardy. Bougon-Longrais
fled Caen in early September
when the inevitability of his arrest became clear. Before fleeing, he wrote to
Louis jean Taveau, a Calvados conuentionnel, to request the deputy's intercession on his behalf. He suggested that Taveau approach Danton, whose
ability and honesty Bougon respected. Bougon proclaimed his own innocence, insisting that he had lent his support to the revolt, reluctantly of
course, only after Caille and Chaix-d'Estanges
had publicly labeled him a
maratiste. He later appealed directly to Robert Lindet, again without success. In November, Bougon fell in with a band of Vendean rebels led by the
prince of Talmond. Within two months, Republican troops had apprehended the two. After a quick trial in Rennes, Bougon ascended the scaffold
and ended his days on january 5, 1794:"
Dom Mauger also met his death on the guillotine. Laplanche issued an
order for his arrest in December, but by then, Mauger had long since fled

r

43· A. D. Calvados, LI01 3 I. (Laplanche mission).
44· A. D. Calvados, L r 052.9 (Journal de /' Annee des Cates de Chcrbourg,
December
793).
45· See Grall, "La rres courte carriere d'un procureur general syndic," 333-.34.
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Caen, settling in Saint-Hilaire, not far from Rouen. The agent national of
the district of Yvetot ordered his arrest on March 5, 1794 (15 Ventose II),
after a citizen had denounced Mauger to the local comite de surveillance.
Local authorities ordered his transfer to Paris, where he appeared before the
Revolutionary Tribunal. The court convicted him for his role in the revolt
and for his suspicious behavior since that time. Mauger was executed on
May 13, 1794 (24 Floreal II).'"
Bougon's appeals to Taveau and Lindet and the petition of Le Goupil
Duclos and the other prisoners to Laplanche were not exceptional gestures.
The interrogations and pleas for clemency that followed the arrests fill several cartons in the Calvados archives. The interrogations in particular, conducted by Etienne Hubert, a stern juge de p aix, reveal a great deal about
those questioned and their perceptions of the revolt. All of the eleven individuals for whom interrogation
transcripts remain professed their innocence. The administrators insisted that they had acted on behalf of the people
and that the people had been misled regarding events in Paris. Hubert questioned nearly everyone about instigators and leaders of the revolt and asked
about the origin of letters that reportedly had arrived in Caen in late May
and early June. All of those questioned denied any knowledge of ringleaders
or conspirators, maintaining that the meetings had been public and the decisions shared. Most claimed ignorance of any letters from Paris. Le Goupil
Duclos blamed public newspapers for the widespread misconceptions. Only
Le Carpentier, a Caen notable and leader in the Jacobin club, mentioned
letters from the Calvados deputies to the Convention, noting in particular
one from Doulcet that had been printed and distributed.
Nearly all of these prisoners condemned the nine commissioners sent to
Paris for their volatile report on June 8. Le Goupil Duclos also blamed the
fugitive Girondin deputies for inciting the populace and promoting revolt.
Each of the three departmental administrators questioned stressed that the
general assembly had eclipsed the authority of the departmental council,
leaving them powerless to oppose the insurrection. Many of the eleven took
care not to claim that they had actually opposed particular orders. Rather,
they contended that they had been powerless to do so. Hubert accused
Chaix-d'Estanges
of having been a leader of the revolt, but Chaix replied
that though he had presided over the general assembly during July, the presi-

--
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dent was only the passive organ of the assembly, without even the right to
express his opinion. Unconvinced by Chaix's argument, Laplanche had him
sent to Paris, where he languished in prison until after Thcrrnidor.:"
Letters requesting clemency also inundated the representatives
011 mission. Those already in prison claimed to have only erred, not committed a
crime, and often recounted their records of public service since 1789 in an
effort to demonstrate their patriotism. Rene Lenorrnand, while in hiding,
published his own Precis exact des motifs qui ont determine l'insurrection
du departement du Caluados, et des faits qui l'ont accompagnec, an eightpage pamphlet that recited the events of June and July and emphasized that
those who had marched to Evreux had gone to defend liberty and the unity
of France." A group of Caen citizens published a similar pamphlet ill defense of those arrested." In addition, wives, children, and friends of those
arrested sent their pleas to the deputies. Occasionally, entire villages wrote
on behalf of their native sons. The inhabitants of Douvres, for example,
strongly supported
their representatives,
Saillenfest, Francois Exupere
Meriel, and Jean Jacques Jardin. Some towns, however, took the opportunity to denounce administrators
already arrested for their role in the revolt. The citizens of Audrieu wrote to Romme and Prieur in early August
regarding their mayor Rene Lahaye, who was also a district administrator.
Not only did they charge him with fomenting civil war, but they also accused him of extortion and hoarding. The people of Bucels similarly denounced their mayor, Barnabe Cauvin, for having actively spread the revolt
in his capacity as departmental
administrator.
This accusation contrasted
sharply with Cauvin's own profession of innocence at his interrogation. <l'
Long before most of these former administrators
had been brought to justice, Linder had turned to the task of appointing new officials. He and
DuRoy took responsibility for this chore, which aroused less contention
among the three deputies than did Lindet's desire to imprison the guilty.
They consequently completed the first round of appointments
by midAugust, long before the majority of arrests. In the case of departmental
administrators, the necessity for replacement was obvious. Despite their protestations of innocence, those officials had held positions of authority and
47·
48.
49·
Caen,

A. D. CalvaJos, Lro r zj and L.0136 (inrerrogarions).
A. D. Calvacios, F6369 (Nouvelles Acquisitions).
A. D. Calvados,
1'3172.; and Brochures Normandes.
Cacn SOU5 la Revolution, 13. IvL
Res. I'll. Ik 1:1404I.'
50. A.D. Calvados, 1.,01 '7,1.10122-25
(Ierters addressed ro various represenr.rtives on
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responsibility, had enjoyed public confidence, and could have guided their
constituents away from revolt. In dismissing the district and municipal
councils, Lindet and DuRoy acknowledged that actual complicity had not
yet been demonstrated but stressed that these officials had shown themselves
to be undeserving of public confidence by their passivity and their compliance with the general assembly.
Lindet and DuRoy first announced the appointment of departmental and
district officials. In seeming anticipation of the law of 14 Frimaire II (December 4, 1793), they named only directors and not full councils, though
they did appoint a procureur-syndic
and a procureur-general-syndic,
both
suppressed by the later decree and replaced by agents nationaux, None of
the fourteen men selected had previous administrative experience, even at
the municipal level. Nearly all of the departmental directors came from the
district of Caen, because of the difficulty of quickly obtaining reliable information on individuals from other districts and the necessity of filling the
posts as soon as possible." Five days later, on August J 8, Linder and DuRoy
made public a full slate of new municipal officials, including notables. As
with the other administrations,
they chose men new to public office. Many
of those named had acted as presidents, secretaries, or scrutateurs of the
Caen sectional assemblies that had accepted the new constitution at the end
of July. \2 Only one appointee, Richard de jort, had previously served as a
municipal officer, and one of the new notables, Joseph Pierre Chibourg Ie
ieune, had been preceded in off-iceby his father, who had served as a notable
in 1790.5'
Unfortunately, the appointment of new officials was not a complete success. The people of Caen had witnessed firsthand the liabilities of holding
public office, and many undoubtedly hesitated to expose themselves to such
dangers. All but one of the new district directors assumed their new posts,
but four of the eight departmental directors never attended a meeting, and a
considerable number of municipal officials refused to accept their appointments. Many sent their resignations in writing, most often citing lack of sufficient talent or health problems as the reason for their refusal. Visionimpairing headaches seem to have been a common malady! \,
51. A. O. Calvados, L..6, and [,387.
51.. Transcripts of those assemblies are in A. C. Caen, 144 (Acceptation
rionncl, '793).
". A. C. Caen, 01..
A. O. Calvados, [,.0 •• 8 (Linder mission).
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Even among those who accepted their appointments,
not all were propitious choices. Some proved simply incompetent;
others, politically suspect. Frederic Vaultier complained in his memoirs that since the revolt had
compromised all good patriots in Caen, Lindet had no choice but to select
officials from among the town's petty-bourgeois
royalists, most of them of
mediocre talent. 55 Many were indeed petty-bourgeois,
but few seem to have
been royalist-mediocrity,
rather, being the most common failing. When the
deputy Laplanche arrived in early November, he immediately announced
that he would change all the administrations,
promising to name "honest
shoemakers, tailors, and hatters" to replace the lawyers and other professionals who currently dominated the councils. 56 Laplanche found fewer lawyers in office than he had expected; but in December, after consultation with
the "purified" and once again active Jacobin club, he did replace a number
of officials deemed incompetent or politically unacceptable."
The problem of who would fill public offices persisted in the changing political climate of the year II. Over the next twelve months, four sets of representatives on mission visited Calvados, and each revised in some fashion the
local administrations.
Indeed, it becomes difficult to keep track of who held
office at any given time. One thing, however, is clear. Few of those who first
came to office after July, 1793, enjoyed lengthy careers as public officials,
and many of those dismissed in August by Lindet later returned to replace
the men who had once replaced them.
In the long term, the Terror in Calvados proved to be milder even than
that in the Haute- Vienne. The Limoges Criminal Tribunal sentenced thirteen people to death in early 1794, most of them refractory priests, while in
Calvados the Terror claimed only seven victims. Two principal reasons account for the leniency shown to the Caen federalists. The attitude of the representatives on mission to Calvados played a significant role. Both Bonnet
and DuRoy showed reluctance to deal harshly with the local officials. Lindet,
too, demonstrated moderation, despite his determination
to see the guilty
punished. He clearly believed that harsh repression would not be the most
effective policy in restoring unity to the troubled Republic. While on mission
to Lyon in early June, Lindet had repeatedly written to the Committee of
.I s· Vaulrier,
Souvenirs, 28 .
.16. A. D. Calvados, LlOp.9 (Journal de l'Armee des Cotes de Cberbourg, November 5,
1793)·
57· A. D. Calvados, LI0075 (administrative
personnel), and 1.10128 (Laplanche mission).
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Public Safety that the town still contained many good republicans and that
mediation and negotiation, along with the publication of a constitution,
would provide a resolution to the difficulties." That the Committee could
not, or would not, follow Linder's recommendations
in dealing with Lyon
stands as one of the great tragedies of the Revolution. Linder adopted a similar attitude in Caen, despite pressure from Paris to take more drastic action.
In a letter dated September 9, Xavier Audouin pointed out to Linder that
whereas eight people had just been executed in Rouen for burning a tree of
liberty, none had yet been so punished in Caen, where an entire army of
rebels had gathered."
Linder resisted even that entreaty, as we have seen, but local circumstances must also be credited for rendering violent repression an infeasible
option in Calvados. No organized radical group existed in Caen to push for
harsh punishment or to support it had the representatives on mission chosen
to impose it. The Carabots had joined in the revolt, consistent with their
role as a client group for the merchant elite and the departmental administration. The Jacobin club had severed its ties with the Paris Jacobins and
had grown lethargic since the split. It followed the lead of Louis Caille and
Chaix-d'Estanges
on those rare occasions when it stirred itself to action.
Even as the club revived in the months following the revolt, the only calls for
revolutionary justice came from an outsider, ]. J. Derche, brought to Caen
by Lindet to edit the Journal de l' Armee des Cotes de Cherbourg, Men such
as Charles Aubin, Francois Outin, and Jacques Caroger stepped forward to
fill positions in the local administrations
but showed no desire to persecute
the men they replaced.
The repression and reorganization carried out by representatives on mission
marked both an end and a beginning in Caen and Limoges. Although the
ascendancy of the Girondins had never been complete, their political philosophy was reflected in the relative departmental autonomy that prevailed in
the two years before June, 1793. The dangers of that departmental independence for the new republic became apparent in the revolt that challenged the
authority of the National Convention after the proscriptions of June 2. The
Convention utilized representatives on mission to neutralize those dangers
58. Aulard, Recucil des Actcs du Comit e de Salut PIII,lie, IV, 497,50,),5"2-":,,55',
59. A. D. Calvados, L'0126 (representatives on mission).
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by eliminating "moderate" elements from local administrations.
The law of
14 Frimaire reinforced their efforts by restricting both the size and the responsibilities of departmental
administrations,
in fact rendering them subordinate to the more dependable district councils in the registration of national laws and decrees. The appointment
of agents nationaux, attached to
local administrations,
and the eventual designation of commissaires du directoire executif commenced the consolidation of a centralized government,
a process never entirely halted by either the post-Thermidor
Convention or
the Directory.
In Limoges, this shift constituted not so much a dramatic end as a confirmation of the local political situation. The departmental administration,
extremely cautious and mindful of the law, had been politically dominated
since the summer of 1792 by the more radical municipality and the Limoges
jacobin club. These groups welcomed the revolution of May 31 and prevented the departmental
council from straying into the federalist camp.
Representatives on mission rewarded the loyalty of these groups to the Convention by reinforcing their hold on local politics. Only after Thermidor
would that hold be broken.
The Terror was not bloody in Limoges, but local authorities enthusiastically embraced its principles by imprisoning royalists, former nobles,
and those suspected of inciuisme, particularly former adherents of the moderate Limoges club, the Arnis de la Paix. This spirit extended beyond local
officials and Jacobin club members-most
of the people of Limoges shared
and supported it. After the deputy Cherrier ordered the disarming of local
terrorists in April, 1795, the sections of Limoges vociferously defended
them, eventually refusing to vote on the year III constitution until Cherrier
had rearmed the terrorists. 1>0
In Caen, on the other hand, the months of August and September, 1793,
constituted a definite break with the past. None of the local administrations
had been strong enough in its loyalty to the Convention to actively oppose
the insurrection. Moderates dominated all three councils, and the weak jacobin club offered no restraint on the actions of elected administrators.
Lindet and DuRoy suspended nearly every local official, replacing them with
men new to public office, many of whom lacked the talents or experience
necessary to fulfill their responsibilities.
60. 1\. D. Haurc-Vicnne,
tement de fa Hautc-Vicnne,

L.442 (Constitution
II, 144, 3 r 5-34.
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Linder suggested that the old officials had misled the people, who would
no longer tolerate them in office. Evidence from statements and interrogations made after the revolt tends to confirm this impression. Volunteers for
the march to Paris complained that officials had deceived them, leading
them to believe that they journeyed to Paris to fraternize and join in another
federation. Le Goupil Duclos and others blamed the Calvados commissioners returned from Paris for falsely reporting on the status of the Convention. Even the concerted efforts of the general assembly (dominated by departmental administrators)
to establish belatedly the existence of public
support for its actions points to the absence of that very support.
But while the people of Caen had not supported the insurrectionary intentions of their administrations,
they showed no desire to see them punished
for their actions. In late August, a petition circulating in Caen called for a
general amnesty and a recall of the decree issued against the rebel administrators. Lindet squelched this project, warning the citizenry that such a petition to Paris would enrage the National Convention and undermine the
progress the deputies had achieved thus tar."
Nor did the people of Caen show enthusiasm for the instruments of the
Terror. In October, Linder and Oudot called on section assemblies to elect a
comite de salta public, forerunner of the comite de surveillance. The sections responded by choosing men who had played no active role in the
Revolution, who were mostly too old or indifferent to care one way or the
other. The deputies nullified the elections and appointed a committee themselves, acknowledging that the motivation of the sections had been a desire
for peace and quiet after the recent turbulence but warning them against the
pitfalls of complacency."
Local attitudes did not change, however. The deputies J. Frernanger and
Bouret arrived on mission in late January, 1794, and found the people of
Caen barely in step with the Revolution. Torpor ancllaziness prevailed, they
reported, and the paucity of capable patriots to staff district and municipal
administrations
appalled them. The representatives appealed to Paris for
guidance in reconstituting the councils. People in Caen, they explained, fell
into four categories: (I) Conspirators who had supported Buzot and the
others. Most were in prison, but some had escaped arrest and still lurked
61
Ville de Cacn: Rccucil de pieces relatives ,i 10 Rcoolution,
II. M. Caen, Res. l-n. Hr.
B5X3-(; ,6 (Augusr 2.5, '79." issue of [ournul de lArmcc des Cotes de eherhourg).
62.. A. D. Calvados, L, 0' 'q (repression of federalism).

188

PROVINCIAL

POLITICS

IN THE

FRENCH

REVOLUTION

about. (2) Those misled during the insurrection.
Most had since realized
their error but now played no role in public life, forced from their posts by
revolutionary
committees. They remained eager to serve their country,
though, and the deputies felt that the greatest reserve of talent and wisdom
lay in this group. (3) Good patriots-fewer
in number but long on effort,
though unfortunately short on talent. These were the men currently in office.
(4) Assorted misfits- "les moderes, les insouciants,
les intrigants, les egoistes, les faux parriotes, les hornmes a circonstance, les cameleons du corps
politiques." The bitter enemies of the two middle groups, these types always
tried to sow division."
The dilemma that faced Bouret and Frernanger points again to one of the
reasons for the mildness of repression in Calvados. No organized Jacobin
faction existed in Caen that could step in and capably assume local administrative responsibilities. Bouret and Frernanger wondered if it would not be
advisable to restore to office some individuals from the second group, given
the shortcomings of those in the third. In retrospect, both their assessment
and their recommendation
appear particularly astute, but the Committee of
Public Safety did not agree. After hearing from Paris, the two deputies made
only a few changes in the local administrations.
Most of those previously
appointed by Lindet, Oudot, and Laplanche remained in office.
Bouret and Frernanger did, however, issue one order that eased the stigma
of federalism for the local population. Upon arriving in Caen, the two representatives were swamped by letters from friends and relatives of imprisoned
officials, imploring them to grant the prisoners' release. After consultation
with the district comite de surveillance and the Jacobin club, they ordered
the release of fifty-two prisoners on March 7, 1794 (17 Ventose II), including all of the municipal officers arrested as federalists. The town's joyous
celebration three days later convinced the two deputies that they had made
the right decision and had taken an important step toward healing old
wounds."
The stigma of federalism

was not fully removed

in Calvados

until after

63· A.N., AF I[ '75'\ dossier '435, piece 45.
AF I[ 176, dossier 1448, piece :38; A. C. Caen, 150 (Bouret and Fremauger mission); A. D. Calvados, L, 975 (Cornite de surveillance generale). In a January letter to Paris, the
local comite de surucillancc had lamented that the cl.unor of the people of Caen for the release
of the imprisoned federalists was so great that it was impossible to put the affair behind them.
They suggested that two representatives
on mission be sent to solve the problem. Frernanger
and Bouret arrived shortly thereafter.
64· A.N.,
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Thermidor (July 27, (794). By September, 1794, it had virtually disappeared. Representatives
on mission released nearly all of those arrested.
Many returned to their former positions, and the local administrations once
again resembled those of June, 1793. Le Goupil Duclos sat as mayor of
Caen, and Pierre Jean Leveque soon returned to head the departmental directory. Leveque subsequently served as departmental commissaire du directoire executif from November, 1795, until 1799.
What, then, do the patterns of repression and reorganization tell us about
the federalist insurrection? Both the circumstances of the revolt and the nature of the repression reinforce the impression that the revolt was one of
leaders without followers. In Limoges, because of the well-organized radical
faction in town, this meant that no revolt developed. In Caen, the lack of
popular support guaranteed the failure of the revolt. Representatives on mission and official interrogators
searched in August and Septernber for evidence of a conspiracy, but without success. Although reports from Carat's
agents suggested that the federalist leaders had misled the populace, there
was nothing explicitly devious or conspiratorial
about their actions. They
genuinely believed that their defense of a moderate republic, and of local
autonomy, represented not only their own interests but those of their constituency as well. To a point, they were right-the
people's later defense of
their "misguided" leaders shows the confidence and trust they felt in their
political elite. For the most part, the lower classes of Caen passively followed
those leaders and accepted their dominance in local affairs. Only when their
leaders called upon them to arm themselves and march against the radical
scoundrels in Paris did they refuse to follow. They would not discard their
passivity to actively intervene in national politics, particularly in such a risky
endeavor.
Two factors emerge as crucial, then, in determining the stances of Caen
and Limoges during the federalist revolt. One is the character and identity of
the local political elite (the federalists in Caen) and the manner in which
they controlled local politics. The other is the role of the popular classes in
guiding or influencing the actions of their elected leaders. We now consider
just who those leaders were and explore further the activism of the Limoges
popular classes compared with the passivism of those in Caen.

9
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Six

Behind the Scenes
A Social Analysis of Local Politics

In examining the years 1789 through 1793 in Caen and Limoges, our emphasis thus far has been on events, personalities, and political
chronology. We have seen that the administrators
of Caen and Calvados
placed themselves firmly in the federalist camp in June, 1793, and that Limoges and the Haute- Vienne, though tentatively at first, supported the
Montagnard Convention. Previous chapters have suggested that early events
in the Revolution, economic conditions, and personal ties and relationships
all played a part in determining the actions of each town during this crucial period. Throughout
the Revolution, and particularly during the revolt itself, the Calvados departmental
administration
played a dominant
role in Caen politics, while in Limoges, the Jacobin club and the municipal
council restrained the federalist tendencies of the moderate departmental
administration.
The crucial question that remains unanswered is Why? Why were the
people of Limoges, the menu peuple, able to intervene and influence the decisions of their elected officials, while those in Caen were not? This question
is not easily answered; but by asking a number of other questions, we may
be able to fit the pieces of the puzzle together. First, who were the men that
the people of Calvados and the Haute- Vienne elected to represent their political interests and administer their public needs? From what social milieu
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did they come, what were their occupations,
and-for
those elected in
1792-what
was their political experience? With these questions in mind,
we can trace the political evolution of the departmental, district, and municipal councils from J790 to 1793 in these two departments and towns.
I suggested earlier that the social background of national deputies was less
important than the social fabric of the regions they represented, and this
holds true at the local level as well. We should not expect to see wealthy
merchants occupying every key position in Caen, defending their class interests, or sans-culottes on the Limoges councils defending theirs. We will see,
however, that as a group the administrators
of Calvados reflected the agricultural and commercial character of their region, while in the HauteVienne (the administrative hinterland in Fox's schema), lawyers formed the
dominant group on both the departmental and the Limoges district councils. Contrasts appear at the municipal level as well. In Caen, the commercial elite increasingly came to dominate the municipal council; in Limoges,
the political uproar of 1792 brought to office a municipal council more radical in its political views and more modest in its social background.
The social composition of the administrative councils is instructive, but
those councils did not operate in a vacuum. All the councils met in their
respective departmental
chejs-lieux, Caen and Limoges, and the urban milieu strongly influenced their proceedings. In Caen, in particular, the isolation of poor immigrants in the faubourgs was reflected in the geographical
composition of successive municipal councils. The passivity of the lower
classes was virtually institutionalized
in Caen, where sectional lines appear
to have been drawn to enhance the power of the wealthy elite.
All of these factors together-the
nature of the local economy, social
structures, and urban geography-molded
the political arena in these two
towns. The correlation between urban geography and political geography in
Caen and Limoges is very clear. It is reflected in the composition of the municipal councils, in the interaction between those councils and political
clubs, and even in the revolutionary festivals and processions staged in the
two towns. The impact of these factors is more generally reflected in the nature of revolutionary politics in Calvados and the Haure-Vienne. We return
to the process of revolutionary politics at the end of this chapter, to explore
more systematically the interaction between the various councils, between
them and the clubs, between the councils and their constituents, and be-
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action within its social context.
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scene, and finally to place that inter-

For three years, beginning in late 1790, the departmental councils were the
preeminent administrative bodies in provincial France. Created by the Constituent Assembly, the departmental
administrations
immediately assumed
responsibility for the difficult transition from the old generalites to the new
departernents. This involved the mediation of boundary disputes as well as
the exchange of administrative, judicial, and tax records. It was a process
that brought the councils into contact not only with their neighbors but
with departmental administrators
all over France, beginning a tradition of
consultation and cooperation that would persist until at least June, 1793·
And it stood as a precedent for the exchange of protests and proposals that
took place between the departments following the proscription of the Girondin deputies.
The departmental councils were subordinate in every respect to the National Assembly and the king, and their authority was explicitly restricted to
administrative matters (the collection of taxes, the assurance of an adequate
food supply, the maintenance of a public police force). In practice, however,
that legal restriction was often ignored, and many departmental
councils
issued statements or lodged protests regarding political issues (military recruitment, the fate of the king, the role of Paris in national politics). The
National Convention eventually remedied this tendency with the administrative reorganization that followed the collapse of the federalist revolt. J
In July, 1790, electoral assemblies met in Calvados and the Haute-Vienne
to elect their first departmental councils. As in every other department, they
chose thirty-six administrators
plus a procureur-general-syndic,
theoretically the representative of the king with responsibility for ensuring compliance with the law. The council was elected to a two-year term with half the
members up for reelection every year. In September, 1791, eighteen administrators in each department, chosen by draw, stood for reelection, but in
November, 1792, the Convention ordered a complete renewal of the councils in order to purge them of their royalist elements. One year later, the departmental administrations were reduced to their eight-member directories.
These yearly elections produced few changes in the social character of the
L

Godechot,

Les institutions

de La France, 98-

WI.
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departmental councils. Voters in both Calvados and the Haute- Vienne consistently named respectable, wealthy men to these positions, principally lawyers and rural landowners. No peasants sat on the councils, and of the two
artisan/shopkeepers
elected in the Haute- Vienne in 1792, one rnay in fact
have been a merchant.' Calvados electors named no artisans to their departmental administration.
The nobility fared little better-four
nobles sat on
the 1790 council in Calvados, and three on the Haute-Viennc council of the
same year, with only one member of the second estate on the two subsequent councils in each department.' The character of the departmental administrations was distinctly haut-bourgeois. This is hardly surprising, since
in 1790 and 179 I, one had to pay taxes equivalent to ten days' wages to be
eligible for election to either a departmental or a district council. After August 10, 1792, that requirement was dropped, as was the distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens.
A closer look at the occupational
breakdown of the various councils,
however, reveals some definite contrasts between the successive administrations of Calvados and those of the Haute- Vienne. Tables 5 and 6 compare
the administrations
for the three terms from 1790 through 1793. In both
departments, the councils in all three terms included at least as many members from the legal profession as from any other single occupational category. In the Haute- Vienne administration,
however, the predominance of
the legal profession is particularly striking. Lawyers constituted a majority
in every term, and in the 1792- 1793 term, their numbers grew to twentyone- 57 percent of the membership. In the Calvados administration,
the
number of men with legal training declined from its [790- 179 I peak of
43 percent to 35 percent in the two following terms.
In both departments, rural landowners played a significant role in the administration,
but in the richly agricultural department of Calvados, their
presence on the council was more pronounced. In the Haute- Vienne, landowners never constituted more than 20 percent of the council, and in the
2. Pierre Mourier
p ere, of Limoges, was idenrilied on the otticiul list of dcpu rnueutal administrators as :t IIIjgocial1t. A list of .J;lcobin c1uh members prepared in the year III, however,
describes him as a marchand de bois, and I have chosen to cia,;sify him as such, speculating that
in ,1792 he might have been tempted to exaggerate his st ..HUS ill order to bring it into line with
his new, prestigious position. I have classified marcbands pnrticuliers as shopkeepers, disringuishing them from march ands without designation, whom I have classified as commcrcinl.
,. 111 addition to local almanacs, I have consulted Louis de la Roque and Edou:nd de g,nrhelemy, Catalogue des Gcntilhomnies
en J 7R9 (Paris, 18(,(,), I, for this inform.trion.

TA 13I.E

5 Occupations
[790-1793

of Calvados
(N=37)

Departmental

Administrators,

1790-17911791-17921792-1793
Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Artisan IShopkeepi ng
Military
Other"
Unknown
Nobility"

1
13
3
4
13

16
3
2
14

2
13
3
5
6

2
7
3

.llnclucles bourgeois, vivant de son bien, vivant de son reuenu .
b Nobility is nor treated as an occupation.
Those listed as nobles also appear
the other categories, most often legal.
Note: Appendix II provides a breakdown of occupational
categories.

TA 13l.E

6 Occupations
1790-1793

of Haute- Vienne Departmental
(N=37)
1790-1791

Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Arrisan/Shopkceping
Military
Other"
Unknown
Nobility"

19
3
2
6

4

3
4

in one of

Administrators,

1791-1792

1792-1793

19
4
2
7

21
4
1
3
2

3
2

2
3
1
----_---

.,Includes bourgeois, vivant de 5011 bien, uiuant de son rcuenu,
hNobility is not treated as an occupation. Those listed as nobles also appear
the other categories, mosr often legal.
Note: Appendix II provides a breakdown of occupational
categories.
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1792- 1793 term, after four consecutive years of bad harvest, they dwindled
to 8 percent. Replacing them, to some extent, were men from the liberal
professions, who added to their numbers at each election. Professionals and
lawyers together accounted for nearly 70 percent of the 1792- 1793 administration in the Haute- Vierme.
In Calvados, the apparent decline in landowners from 35 percent in l79] 1792 to 16 percent in 1792-1793
is deceptive. Seven administrators elected
in 1792 did not give an occupation, a much higher number than in previous
years." Six of these men came from small villages, and it would scarcely be
surprising if all six were landowners. Certainly four or five owned land,
which would raise the number of landowners on the 1792- I793 council
close to its level of previous years.
A final significant trend in the Calvados administrations
is the slow, but
steady, increase in the number of administrators
engaged in commerce.
Their numbers are not overwhelming-they
never rival the lawyers or landowners-but
by 1792, they had reached a level of 14 percent, representing a
much stronger force than did merchants on the Haute- Vienne council. In
addition, many of the large landowners on the Calvados council were producing grain for the market and would thus have had a shared interest with
the merchants of Caen and other towns. In the Haute- Vienne, artisans made
at least an entree into departmental
politics in the 1792 elections, again a
contrast with Calvados, where artisans never achieved departmental office.
In sum, from 1790 through 1793, the legal and liberal professions increasingly dominated the Haute- Vicnne administration.
Landowners played
a modest, and decreasing, role on the Haute- Vierme councils. In Calva dos, a
rich grain region, rural landowners rivaled lawyers for dominance in the administration, and those two groups could not ignore the increasing strength
of the commercial contingent among their colleagues.
This contrasting character of the two administrations
is reflected in the
proces-uerbaux of thei r meetings. The Haute- Vienne council clearly appreciated the limitations to its authority and consistently refused to interpret or
modify the law in the course of its daily business. The Haute-Vienne admin4. Officials elected ill '7<)2 ill both dcparunenrs-i-parucularlv
Oil the departmental
.rdminisrr.ition, but Oil municipal and district councils as well-s-were much 1110re rericcnr .ihour r~vealing their occupations than those elected earlier. Whether this was due to a Ie.rr that cerram
professions had now become suspect (farmers cultivating graill might have had reason to be
apprehensive) or to a feeling that one's status as "citizen" W;IS now accepted ;IS more illlporranr
than one's occupational
status is hard to say.
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istrators frequently declared themselves incompetent to "rien changer aux
dispositions de la loi" in response to petitions regarding parents of emigres,
disputes over rentes, and military recruitment. One rarely finds similar reservations expressed in the minutes of the Calvados council, which, less dominated by lawyers, showed a greater willingness to stray from the strict letter
of the law in order to consider what it believed was just or fair. In June,
1793, the Haute-Vienne
council remained cautious in its actions, ever conscious of its constitutional
limitations. By the end of that month, the Calvados administration stood accused before the Convention for exceeding its
authority and violating the law.'
The geographical distribution of the departmental council members may
also have influenced their political character. In Calvados, the electoral
assemblies chose six representatives from each of the six districts, with the
district of Caen enjoying an additional voice in the person of the procureurgeneral-syndic. The Haute- Vienne, represented in Map 4, followed this pattern for the 1790-1791
term, with six delegates from each district and the
procureur-general-syndic
from Limoges; but in subsequent years, the electoral assembly made no attempt to ensure equal representation.
For the
1791- 1792 term, four districts,
including Limoges, each sent seven representatives to the departmental council, while Saint- Yrieix sent only four and
Dorat only five, including the procureur-general-syndic.
The disproportion
became even greater in the 1792-1793
term. The district of Limoges sent
ten men to the departmental council, and the two northern districts of Dorat
and Bellac sent seven and eight men, respectively. The three remaining districts (Saint-] unien, Saint- Yrieix, and Saint-Leonard)
sent four, five, and
three men, respectively, totaling only one-third of the council members. Of
those three districts, two protested the departmental
council's actions in
June, 1793· The Saint- Yrieix district council berated the Haute- Vienne
administrators
for not carrying further their protest of the June 2 proscriptions, while Saint-] unien denounced the department's
support of the
Cote-cl'Or resolution (which called for a united departmental
protest of
5· Sec A. D. Calvados, L189, and A. D. Haure-Vienne,
L56-58,
for the proces-uerbau x of
departmental
council meetings. Lenard Berlansrein makes a similar point in The Barristers of
Toulouse ill the Eighteenth Century (1740-J7?3)
(Baltimore, 1975),142, 17 J. See also Philip
Dawson, Provincial Magistrates and Revolutionary
Politics in France, '789- I 79') (Cambridge, [972). It is interesting to note that lawyers did not dominate local political bodies ill
most of provincial France as they dominated national assemblies. See Lynn A. Hunt, Politics,
Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, T984).
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the factionalism in Paris and declared the departments'
readiness to rebel against despotism). What is remarkable here, however, is the predominance of administrators
from the district of Limoges, most of them from the
town of Limoges itself. They nearly equaled in number the representatives of
the three southern districts combined. The town of Limoges, then, exerted
a greater influence on its departmental
administration
than did the town
of Caen.
The district councils were in most respects the least consequential of the
local administrations
during the first four years of the Revolution. The departmental administration could overturn any decision made by the district
councils, clearly rendering the latter subordinate to the former. The district
councils did enjoy the advantage of closer contact with their constituentsan advantage curtailed, however, by the existence of communal councils,
which intervened between the people and the district offices. When representing demands or grievances of the people, districts generally acted as intermediaries between municipalities and the departmental
council. Thus,
the district councils occupied an ambiguous middle position, restricted in
their actions by the superior authority of the departmental
administration
and removed one step from the voters they represented."
I have not studied in detail the councils of all six districts in these two
departments, but only those of the districts of Caen and Limoges. Beyond
sending an occasional member on to the departmental
administration,
the
councils of the outlying districts had little impact on departmental affairs. In
times of crisis, however, the departmental
authorities often met in union
with the district and municipal councils of the departmental
chef-lieu. The
Caen and Limoges district officials did exercise a continuing influence on
local affairs, and during the crucial months of June and July, 1793, the
Haute- Vienne and Calvados administrations
invited the two district councils to deliberate with them.
As we have seen, the Caen district council as a body was not influential
until the end of the revolt, when it was the first to retract its support of the
insurrection. Several individual administrators,
however, played very active
roles. For instance, Louis Caille, the procureur-syndic,
advocated revolt
6. Codechot ,
ments, the district
the departmental
despite occasional

Les Institutions de fa France, 10 I. - 105. Codechor notes that in some departcouncils acted with considerable independence,
sometimes direcrly rivaling
administration.
This was never the case in Calvados or the Haute- Vienne,
conflicts between departmental
and district authorities.
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against the Convention
rnore aggressively than any other official. Robert
Tirel, on the other hand, spoke out in protest of the decision to arrest Rornme
and Prieur. In Limoges, the district council joined with the municipal council in steering the departmental
administration
away from the federalist
movement. A closer look at the two district councils may help to explain
their divergent conduct at this crucial time.
The number of districts varied from one department to the next, but both
the Haute- Vienne and Calvados were divided into six. Each district elected a
council composed of twelve men plus a procureur-syndic,
the counterpart at
the district level of the procureur-generai-svndir,
The schedule of elections
followed that of the departmental administrations,
with district electoral assemblies naming the first councils in July, 1790. Half the council members
stood for reelection in September, 1791, and in November, 1792, the councils were renewed in their entirety.
The occupational composition of the Caen and Limoges district councils
mirrors the patterns in the respective departmental administrations, as shown
in Tables 7 and 8. In Caen, rural landowners formed the strongest contingent during all three terms from 1790 through 1793, constituting from
30 to 46 percent of the total. As in the Calvados departmental
council, their
apparent decline from the 1791-1792
term to the 1792-1793
term rnight
be diminished by the one official whose occupation is unknown." Lawyers
consistently maintained a strong presence on the district council, declining
only by one in the 1792 elections, when their numbers are equaled by men
from the liberal professions. Professionals exercised a proportionally greater
influence at this level than they did on the departmental
administration.
These three groups taken together-rural
landowners, lawyers, and professionals-never
constituted less than 77 percent of the council members.
Their predominance
came at the expense of the commercial community,
which managed to elect only one merchant to the Caen district council. This
absence of commercial men on the district council is significant, especially
given their increasing strength at the departmental
level and their dominance, as we shall soon see, on the Caen municipal council.
In Limoges, the situation was nearly the reverse. Rural landowners on the
district council never numbered more than three, representing approxi7. Like the majority of departmental
officials whose occupations
I could not determine,
Jean Jacques Bernard l.cqueru, president of the 1792-~3 district council, came from ,\ smal!
village (Ayran, ten to fifteen miles southeast of Caen).

lA B I.E

7 Occupations
1790-1793

of Caen District

Administrators,

(N=13)

1790-1791

1791-1792

1792-1793

I

Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Artisan/Shopkeeping
Military
Other"
Unknown
Nobility"

4
2
1
5

3

4
2
1
6

4
1

includes bourgeois, vivant de 5011 bien, utuant de son reuenu.
Nobility is not treated as an occupation. Those listed as nobles also appear
the other categories, most often legal.
Note: Appendix il provides a breakdown of occupational
categories.

.t

I>

TABLE

8 Occupations
J790-

in one of

of Limoges District Administrators,

1793 (N= 13)

1790-17911791-1792
Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Artisan/Shopkeeping
Military
Other"
Unknown
Nobility"
.~~

----_._

1792-1793

5

6

4

2
2

3

1
3
2

3

2

2
2

2

2

.

., Includes bourgeois, vivant de SOli bien, vivant de son reuenu .
h Nobility
is not treated as an occupation. Those listed as nobles also appear
the other categories, most often legal.
Note: Appendix II provides a breakdown of occupational
categories.
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mately 23 percent of the total. Lawyers dominated the council throughout
the period, composing nearly 50 percent of the 1791- 1792 administration,
though declining to roughly 30 percent the following year. The occupational
picture here resembles that of the Haute-Vicnne departmental administration, except for the virtual absence of professionals. Men from the liberal
professions, a significant force among the departmental officials, did not appear on the Limoges district council until the 1792-1793 term, when one
doctor was elected. Military men filled the void left by the professionals on
the first two councils, giving way in 1792-1793
to artisans and to men
identifying themselves simply as bourgeois.
Comparing the two districts, we see a situation similar to that which characterized the two departmental administrations:
rural landowners predominant on the Caen district council, lawyers enjoying that position in Limoges.
We must once again take note of the overwhelming preponderance of landowners, lawyers, and professionals on the Caen district council. Of the
thirty-nine officials elected to the three consecutive councils, only five came
from occupations outside these three groups, with the occupation of one additional official unknown. In Limoges, the occupations ranged more broadly,
particularly in the 1792-1793 term, when all but two of the eight categories
were represented.
Artisans first sat on the councils of both districts in the 1792-1793 termtwo in Limoges and one in Caen. The increase in artisanal representation at
the district level does not appear large; it is similar to that at the departmental level. Proportionally, however, artisans and shopkeepers enjoyed significantly greater influence on the district councils, which were smaller. That
influence was greatest in Limoges. The only artisan elected to the Caen district council, Francois Jacques Samuel Boiszerard, was a wealthy goldsmith
who lived on the rue Saint-Jean, at the heart of the most prosperous parish
in Caen. His affinity would have been more with his clientele, the Caen social elite, and other merchants than with the majority of artisans. Jean Baptiste Poncet and Jacques Peyrar, the two shopkeepers elected to the Limoges
council, were a marchand de fer and marchand de bois, respectively, and
both lived in the faubourgs of Limoges. They represented a more modest
segment of the artisan/shopkeeper
community than did Boiszerard in Caen.
Though we come to them last, the municipalities were the first local administrations created by the Constituent Assembly. Motivated by the midsummer outbreak of municipal revolutions in most of the major French
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towns, the Assembly moved quickly to institutionalize and bring under control this effervescence of political activity." On December 14, 1789, the deputies passed legislation calling for the election of municipal councils in every
city, town, and village of France. Each commune would also elect a mayor
and a procureur, who acted as legal adviser to the council. The council itself
was composed of two parts: the officiers, who along with the procureur
formed the corps municipal, which met on a daily basis to deal with the
routine business of municipal administration;
and the notables, a group
twice the size of the corps municipal, who together with the officiers composed the conseil general, convened by the mayor on an irregular basis to
address more important matters." The size of the general councils varied according to population. The citizens of Caen elected fifteen officiers, including the procureur, and thirty notables. In Limoges, the council numbered
twelve officiers and twenty-four notables.
Despite their position at the bottom rung of the local administrative hierarchy, the municipal councils, particularly those of the departmental
chefslieux, may have been the most important local administrative bodies. More
than either the district or the departmental councils, the municipal councils
of the chefs-lieux represented a coherent and potent constituency, and they
were the only one of the three councils chosen by direct election. During
periods of political ferment, the populations of the chefs-lieux forcefully expressed their sentiments in both words and action. All three local councils
met in the chef-lieu, and none could ignore, at times of crisis, the pressures
and demands of an often unruly urban population. When grain shortages
occurred, both Caen and Limoges received preferential treatment over other
hungry towns. Indeed, a number of departmental administrations,
including
that of Calvados, considered shifting their meetings to other towns to escape
popular pressure.
The municipal councils often acted as intermediaries between the urban

s. For an excellent discussion of the municipal revolutions, the patriotic committees that
they spawned, and the municipal councils that replaced them, see Lynn A. Hunt, "Committees
and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 178~," Comparative Studies in Society and History. XVIII (July, 1 ~76), .12.1-46. For a discussion of IOG,I administration
in general, see Alfred Cobban, "Local Government during the French Revolution,"
in Alfred Cobban
(ed.), Aspects of the French Revolution (New York, 1968), I I 2- 30.
~. Codeehot, Les Institutions de /a France, 105-106. In Caen, after September, [7~2., the
general council was to meet publicly three times each week. A. C. Cacn, [)2. (Deliberations
du
Corps municipal er du Conseil General de la Commune, 4 janvier '792-11
Germinal an II),
minutes of September r , J 792.
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populace and higher authorities. A council might alternately act as a mouthpiece for the demands of its constituents and as a political thermometer for
the departmental administration.
If one gauges the success of their efforts by
their ability to preserve public order, the municipal councils of Caen and
Limoges were reasonably effective, at least until the debacle of the federalist
revolt produced a total disruption of Caen daily life. The Caen municipal
council must bear at least partial responsibility for this, because of its failure
to impress upon the federalist leaders the lack of popular support for the
proposed march on Paris. Although the majority of the council members did
not actively participate in the revolt, neither did they manifest any concerted
opposition to it. The Limoges municipality, on the other hand, made very
clear its opposition to any departmental protest or resistance. The council
denounced the departmental
administration
for its support of the May 30
Core-dOr
resolution and gave a hostile reception to later couriers from
Lyon and Bordeaux.
The conduct of the two municipal councils was a major factor in determining the political posture of Calvados and the Haute- Vienne after May 3 I, far
more important than that of the district councils. To understand their contrasting attitudes and actions, we must examine the municipal councils
themselves, with an eye not only to the social character of the men in office,
and how that changed over time, but also to the social character of their
constituencies.
The first municipal councils were elected in February, 1790, to a two-year
term. As with the departmental and district administrations,
half the members of the general council stood for reelection each year. An officier could
serve no more than two consecutive terms but could return to the general
council as a notable for a third term and subsequently be elected as an 0((icier again. New elections were held in November or December, 1790, and
thereafter occurred at yearly Intervals until their suspension in J 79). After
the federalist revolt, representatives on mission nominated men to fill vacancies on the councils, usually after consultation with the local Jacobin club
and comite de surveillance. This system prevailed until after Therrnidor.
In Caen, we have five separate councils to consider-February,
1790, November, 1790,1791,1792,
and 1793, the last being the council named by
Lindet and Oudot in August, following the revolt. For Limoges, a sixth
council requires analysis. In August, 1792, the departrnental administration
finally authorized the replacement of Limoges' mayor, Louis Naurissart ,
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who had abandoned his post the previous winter, after the February grain
scandal. The municipal council convened section assemblies, which insisted
that they be permitted to elect an entirely new municipal council, despite the
fact that regularly scheduled elections were barely three months away. The
departmental council acquiesced in the demand, and the sections elected a
full council. Elections in November brought a few additional changes in the
municipal personnel, and this council remained virtually intact until 1794.
The representatives on mission Brival and Lanot named only three new 0(ficiers in September, 1793, two of whom had previously been notables.
In this study of the municipal councils, I have chosen to include only the
corps municipal-the officiers, mayor, and procureur-both
for reasons of
manageability and available data and because this part of the council held
the greatest responsibility and the greatest power in the management of local
affairs.
The occupational composition of the municipal councils in both Caen
and Limoges, shown in Tables 9 and 10, departs radically from the patterns
of the district and departmental
administrations.
Not surprisingly, rural
landowners do not appear on these councils, with the exception of one on
the 1792 council in Limoges, where the lines between city and country were
not as firmly drawn as in Caen. More unexpected is the steadily declining
influence of men with legal training on both town councils. Whereas lawyers
dominated the Haute- Vienne departmental administration
and the Limoges
district council, they quickly became a minor factor in the Limoges municipality. Five lawyers sat on the February, 1790, council, but their numbers
dwindled to three with the next election; and in 1792, only one lawyer, the
procureur, secured election to the council. Lawyers fared somewhat better
in Caen, where their decline began somewhat later. Their numbers peaked at
seven (44 percent of the sixteen-member council) with the second election of
1790, dropped by one the following year, and stood at four (25 percent) in
I792. The council appointed by Lindet and Oudot included only one lawyer, the same number that sat on the Limoges councils of 1792 and I793.
This exclusion of lawyers in Caen seems to have been by design. The representative on mission who followed Lindet and Oudot, Jacques Leonard
Laplanche, explicitly stated his intention to rid local administrations
of "the
men in black coats." JO
JO. A. D. Calvados,
1793)·
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Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Artisan/Shopkeeping
Military
Other
Unknown
Nobility
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(N=16)

1791

1792

4
3

2
2

6

6

2

2

1793

----

----

I

4

7

4

3

6
2
4

2

2

3

1

4
I

4

"

j

2

----------~-------~----------

Note: Appendix

II provides

TABLE 10 Occupations

a breakdown

of Limoges Municipal
February,
1790

Clergy
Legal professions
Liberal professions
Commerce
Rural landowning
Anisan/Shopkeeping
Military
Other
Unknown
Nobility
Note: Appendix

II provides

of occupational

categories,

(N= L3)

Officials, J790-1793

November,
1790

August,
1791

1792

1792

1793

2
7

2
6

I
5
I
4

3
2
5

2
1
7

2
3
5

2

2

2

2

of occupurional

categories,

3
a breakdown

Merchants and artisans, in contrast to lawyers, increased their influence
between 1790 and 1793, Taken together, the electoral success of these two
groups traced a similar pattern in Caen and Limoges. Merchants and artisans in Limoges constituted 46 percent of the February, 1790, council;
grew steadily to reach 69 percent with the 179I elections; slipped slightly in
1792; and returned to the 69-percent level in 1793. An equal number, but a
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smaller proportion, of merchants and artisans sat on the Caen town council.
They accounted for 38 percent of the council members during 1790; slipped
moderately in the November, 1790, elections; but recovered in the 1791
elections and reached a strength of 56 percent in 1792 before declining by
one, to 50 percent, on the council appointed after the revolt.
If we examine merchants and artisans separately, a somewhat different
picture appears. Surprisingly, artisans showed greater strength on the Caen
municipal council than in Limoges. On the I790 and 1791 councils, artisanal strength hovered at around 15 percent in both towns. But on the
1792 Caen council, the number of artisans jumped to six (38 percent), while
in Limoges the number declined slightly before rebounding in 1793. Conversely, merchants and manufacturers
did better in Limoges than in Caen.
Merchants never constituted more than 25 percent of the Caen council,
whereas in Limoges they surpassed 50 percent in 1791 and remained near
that level through the next two years.
One might have expected the patterns to be reversed, for they do not support the traditional interpretation of federalism as a movement of the commercial bourgeoisie. One would not expect a municipal council dominated
by artisans in a federalist town or a council dominated by merchants in a
Jacobin town. A closer look, however, will help untangle this apparent
paradox.
The assignment of occupational
categories to local officials in Limoges
poses certain difficulties, because of their disconcerting
habit of calling
themselves negociants in one year and marchands in another. This was true,
for instance, of six of the seven men on the 1792 council who are classified
as commercial. It is impossible to know if they exaggerated their status in
1792 by calling themselves negociants or were attempting
to paint themselves as good sans-culottes in 1793 by listing themselves as rnarcb ands.
This in itself does not pose a problem for purposes of classification-c-rasrchands are grouped with negociants as commercial ill any case. Those merchants, however, who further qualified their occupation as marchand tanneur or marchand teinturier, for example, are here considered shopkeepers
and are grouped with the artisans. II Some of the merchants on the 1792
1 i. It is difficult to distinguish
wholesale merchants from retail merchants and shopkeepers
in the docurnems of the Revolution. Any criteria will he arbitrary to some extent. Distinguishin¥ between negociantsl marchands (classified as commercial) and nrarchands particuliers (CL1Ssified as shopkeepers) probably leads to a slight inflation of the number of wholesale merchants.
A small merchant might neglect to designate his particular specialty, but a wholesale merchant
would not likely list his occupation as marchand rncrcier, for example. In marking a distinction
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Limoges council very likely belong in this latter category. Only one of the
seven, Joseph Ardant-Masjambost,
can definitely be said to have headed a
substantial commercial enterprise, based on records from the forced loan
of the year IV and the accompanying estimates of family fortunes." None of
the seven, with the possible exception of Ardant-Masjarnbost,
belonged to
the Limoges commercial elite. Not one of them attended the 1789 assembly
of the juridiction consulairc for the election of deputies to the Limoges assembly of the third estate, and none was among the Limoges negociants
asked by the departmental
administration
to form a grain-purchasing consortium in 1791. 1\ To find that commercial elite in public office, one must
look to the 1791 municipality, headed by Louis Naurissart. Seven merchants sat on this council, too, but none of them returned on the 1792 council. In addition to Naurissart, the 1791 council included Gabriel Grellet and
Francois Pouyat. Naurissart, Grellet, and Francois Pouyat's father were all
members of the six-man grain consortium formed just before the 1791 elections. Joseph Petiniaud, another negociant on the 1791 council, had been a
juge consul before 1789. All but Naurissarr voted at the J789 assembly of
the juridictiorz consulaire.
Although men engaged in commerce dominated the 1791 and 1792 municipal councils in Limoges, the character of the councils was very different.
The 1791 council numbered six former Arnis de la Paix (the moderate club
that had challenged the Limoges Jacobins in late 1790), including Naurissart, Grellet, Petiniaud, and Pouyat, In August, 1792, the insistent demands
bet~~~;;-,;'er~l"'nts
and shopkeepers
and grouping
the latter with artisans,
I all' following
the
lead of Maurice
Agulhon,
who makes a similar
disriucrion
between
merchunrs
and slllalllllcrchanrs in Penitents et (ral1cS-HIG(OIlS
de lanciennc Provence, 14R- 5).
'2.. A. D. Hallte- Vicnne. 1.2.52. (an IV, forced loan and list of rich). All seven of the merchants appear
on these lists. Ardant-Masjambost
stands well above the rest Oil both lists, with a
levied "loan"
of >,000 liurcs and an estimated
tortuuc of ',)0,000 liurcs. Two of the other ofjiciers, Gregoire
Louis lsoudct
and Joseph
!.Ires, were levied contributions
of ',000 liures, but
their estimated
fortunes
were considerably
less rh.in Masiarnbosrs,
at ',0,000 and ('0,000
liures, respectively.
Marriul
labrousse
phe was levied a loa II of ')00 liures, bur this figure may
have been revised after his fortune
was estimated
at only,
0,000. Mathieu
Nadaud
brou~ht
up
the rear ill this group,
payillg
2.00 liures 011an estimated
fortune of 9,000, All of these hgures
pale in comparison
with those for Louis Naurissarr
, probably
the richest man ill Lunogcs.
who
was levied ro,ooo
Iiures based on an estimated
fortune
of Hoo,ooo.
The registers
,lid not IIld,care which of those listed had paid this special tax. The figures for esrimarcd
fortune
were belsed

currency valll~Hjon.,
'
r 'I. A. C. Limoges,
AA7 (Assemblee des difterenrs corps de '" ville pour nommer des deputes ;;I'Assemblee
du Tierx-Etar
de [a ville de l.irnoges).
The municipal archives
of Limoges
nrc
split between
the Archives
Municip.rles .ind the ~ibli()theque
Municipnlc. These documents
arc
held at the Hibliot!rcque,
A, D. Haurc- Vienne, LH 50 (documents
pert:rillillg
ro Limoges grall'

Oil 17,)0

supply).
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of the Limoges sections forced that council from office prematurely. Jacobin
club members dominated the next two councils, totaling eleven of thirteen
officiers on both the August and November, I792, councils.
We see, then, that social, economic, and political lines separated the old
commercial elite from the merchants represented by the I792 council. An
incident involving the 1791 grain consortium suggests that the social divisions cut deepest. The departmental directory originally named seven negociants to coordinate the purchase of grain for Limoges. The seventh was Jean
Baptiste Nieaud, mayor of Limoges for the 1790- 179 I term and cofounder
of the Jacobin club. The others, who referred to Nieaud disparagingly as a
teinturier (despite his thriving wool trade and a fortune estimated at 500,000
livres), refused to work with a man "who had so mismanaged the municipal
administration,
and whose principles were in complete opposition to their
own." ,.j They would not accept this "nouveau-riche"
with his unimpressive
family lineage. Nieaud, who had one month earlier been elected to the departmental council, quietly withdrew from the group. His social affinities
lay with the Jacobins, who would one year later dominate local politics.
In Caen, the situation on the 1792 council, with its strong contingent of
artisans, is similarly complicated. A comparison of this council with the
1793 municipality
(appointed by Lindet and Oudot), which also included
six artisans, reveals the danger of accepting occupational categories at face
value. The artisans on the 1792 council included an apothecary, a p arfumeur, and a bijoutier, all catering to the social elite in their trades and all
living in the wealthier, central districts of Caen. A fourth artisan on the
council, David Nicolas, was a marchand mercier with close business and
social ties to Jean Samuel Paisant, a wealthy [abricant en blondes who also
sat on the council. Among the six artisans on the postrevolt council we find,
to be sure, a confiseur and a marchand papetier, both with well-to-do clienteles. But we also find, more characteristically,
a poor uinaigrier, Jean
Cachelou, and the printer for the Jacobin club, Pierre Chalopin fils. As with
the Limoges council, more differences exist between the 1792 and 1793
Caen councils than the tables reveal.
The availability of tax records for both Caen and Limoges lends another
dimension to our analysis of the municipal councils. Several factors render
meaningless any comparison of the tax payments made in one town or de1-4. A. D. Haute- Vienne,
transcription.

L850. The quotation

is Illy own paraphrasing

of a deparrmenr
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partrnent with those in another. The tax rate was not uniform nationwide.
The Constituent Assembly divided the tax burden among the departments
roughly according to the regional distribution of Old Regime taxes. They
made no systematic effort to levy the new taxes equitably, and departmental entreaties resulted in adjustments in 1792 and 1793. Both Caen and
Limoges received rebates after appealing to the Legislative Assembly. Departmental administrations
divided their tax quotas among the districts,
which in turn assigned quotas to the communes, which were then responsible for levying individual taxes. In addition, each municipality had the option of levying a surtax, not to exceed four sous per livre, to defray local
expenses. Within this system, two equally wealthy men in two different
towns, even within the same department, would only by chance have paid
identical taxes. Within a town, however, the tax rates were consistent, and
so we can employ the tax rolls to gauge separately the social evolution of the
Caen and Limoges councils."
The pattern of the contribution mobiliere paid by members of successive
municipal councils followed roughly the same trend in Caen and Limoges.
As Tables I I and 12 show, the mean tax paid by municipal officiers in both
towns gradually, but steadily, declined. The one exception to this trend-the
179 I Limoges council-corresponds
with the political developments of that
1.5. For this study, I used the rolls of the contribution mobilicre, a tax I consider preferable
for two reasons to the contribution fonciere, the other principal revolutionary
tax. First, the
contribution fonciere taxed property; and many of the elected officials at the municipal level,
especially after 179T, did not own property and therefore do not appear on these rolls. Second,
many of those who did own property also owned property outside the town-a
niaison de
Cilmpagne or a rnanoir. Records for these rural cantons have often disappeared,
bur even when
they do exist, the task of scanning them would be enormously time-consuming.
The fact that
S0111eofficials owned land in other departments further complicates rhe task. The contribution
mobiliere, therefore, offers a much 1110reaccessible tax record. And the rolls for Cacn and Limoges are exceptionally complete. Of the 158 officials on the eleven municipal councils under
consideration,
I found tax records for all bur 19, just 12 percent.
The Constituent
Assembly passed legislation for the contribution mobiliere in January,
1791. It was not to be a tax on property like rhe contribution
[onciere, bur the deputies clearly
realized the inadvisabiliry of attempting to levy a tax on income. They settled on rent as the
most visible and most easily verifiable indicator of wealth, and this became the primary base of
the contribution mobiliere. There were other elements to this tax as well. All taxpayers paid a
tax equivalent to three days' wages; those with domestic servants paid an additional imposition, as did those who owned horses or mules. Those with large families were taxed at a lower
rate, while bachelors paid a higher premium. Day laborers and artisans received a tax break,
and citizens who paid a contribution [onciere could deduct that payment from their contribution mobiliere. It should be noted that this nllowancc for deductions would tend to reduce
slightly the contribution
mobiliere of the wealthiest taxpayers, who in most cases would also
have paid a contribution fonciere. See Codecnor, Lcs lnstit utions de la France, 1 _;6-}H.
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Mobiliere

of Caen Municipal

Officials paying:
0-49 livres
50-149 livres
150-499 livres
500-999 liures
1,000 livres and above
Unknown
Mean tax (livres)
Median tax (livres)

12

542
399

1791

1792

3
7
4

9
5

0

I]

0
2
123
74

0

I]

53
39

4
97'
38

J 793

7
3

I

---------

who paid 560 liures tax, the mean ra x for 1793 is

member

Mobillere

of Limoges Municipal

February,
1790
Officials paying:
0-49 livres
50-99 liures
100-249 liures
250-499
livres
500 livres and above
Unknown
Mean tax (/ivres)
Median tax (/iures)

0
3
7
2
2
2
493
261

0

the one council

Contribution

November,
1790

4
3
6
2

--

TABLE

Officials,

(N=16)

February,
1790

'If we exclude
54 liures.

REVOLUTION

3
4

0
4
124
100
-------

November,
1790

4
2
5
0
1

Officials,

1791

August,
1792

3
4
3

I

118

90

J790-1793

150
75
---_._--

(N=13)

1792

10
1

1
0

°
43
27

9

10
2
0
0
0

2
0
0

28

2
27
18

20
~.-'----

1793

()

----_-

year. The municipal elections of 179 I marked the temporary political resurgence of the moderate, wealthy bourgeoisie of Limoges. Louis Naurissart, as mayor, headed a municipality composed of the Limoges commercial
elite. The 1791 council witnessed the nadir of jacobin club influence in municipal affairs and the zenith for supporters of the disbanded Arnis de la
Paix. The tax figures for the 1791 council reflect that political shift.
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A second discrepancy in the general pattern of declining taxes-the
1793
Caen council-is
explained by a statistical quirk rather than a political shift.
The mean for 1793 is distorted by the one officier who paid a tax of 560
livres. If one excludes this figure from the total, the mean tax paid becomes
54 livres, very close to the mean of the previous year. It should also be observed that tax data is missing for four members of this council, more than
for any other Caen council. The occupations of three of these men are also
unknown; the fourth was an artisan. Three of the four were new to politics
in 1793 and disappeared from local politics after the year II. The difficulty in
finding tax information for them stems from a lack of positive identification.
These men were simply not active long enough in local politics to be positively identified. Had tax information
for these men been available, the
mean tax shown for 1793 officiers in Caen would probably be slightly lower
than that for 1792.1(,
For a similar reason, the mean tax paid by the February, 1790, council
members in Limoges was probably higher than that indicated in Table 12.
Again, no tax information could be found for four men. Of these four, one
was a prominent doctor, one was a noble, one was a Petiniaud (a ubiquitous
name on the Limoges rolls) and therefore certainly wealthy, and the fourth
was a former avocat du roi au presidial. If the tax figures for these four men
could be included in the computations, the mean tax shown for that council
would rise to at least the level shown for the 179 I council.
If we examine the median tax in each council, we find a more regular and
consistent downward trend. The median tax in the 1793 Caen council was
slightly lower than that in the 1792. council. In both Caen and Limoges, the
highest median tax was paid in the 1790 council, with the sharpest drop
coming between 1790 and 179 I in Caen and between 179 I and August,
1792., in Limoges. The median tax does, however, underestimate the wealth
16. The process of positively identifying municipal officials was a difficult one. It wassomewhat easier in Limoges, where election results almost always listed the occupations of th~)se
elected. I was also aided in Limoges by the roster of jacobin club members, which listed first
names and occupations and often mentioned the offices held by members. In Caen, I was more
dependent on jury lists (which I also used in Limoges) and certificates of residence. Both of
these sources generally included addresses and occupations. By comparing signatures on these
lists with those on the proces-oerbaux
of council meetings, I could be very confident In my
identifications.
For the 179:, council, this was not always possible, however, since not all members consistently signed the proces-verbaux
and because a few of those appoimed appeared
at only one or two meetings. Some, particularly
among the notables, never accepted their
appointment.
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of the Naurissart municipality in 1791. The mean tax, I believe, represents
more accurately the economic and social character of the Limoges council
of 1791.
Looking again at the two tables, one sees that the gradual decline in tax
paid is paralleled by a shift in the distribution among the five categories.
Although the extremely wealthy never overwhelmingly dominated any council, eight of the sixteen members of the February, 1790, Caen council paid
500 livres or more. Year by year in Caen one sees the largest bloc of officiers
move down one level, until in I792 nine of the sixteen officials paid less than
50 livres tax. In Limoges, the shift was less dramatic-there
was never a
great number of officials in the higher categories-but
in the councils of
1792, one again sees the vast majority of municipal officials paying less than
50 liures tax. Taxpayers in the two highest categories are virtually absent
from the last three councils in both towns.
The declining trend in taxes, along with the occupational
profile of the
councils, suggests a broadening of the social base of local politics in Caen
and Limoges. In Limoges, the legal elite was increasingly excluded from municipal politics. Lawyers in Caen suffered the same fate, but only after the
federalist revolt. In both towns, merchants and artisans combined to dominate the councils from 1791 on, and there appears to have been some shift
away from the commercial elite to less prominent and less wealthy merchants, particularly in Limoges. Taxes paid by council members fell dramatically in Limoges in August, 1792, after the discrediting of the Naurissart municipality. In Caen, the first big drop came between 1790 and 179 I,
probably in part because of the Affair of 84 (the alleged conspiracy of nobles),
which occurred just prior to the 1791 elections. The mean and median taxes
for the 1792 council show a further significant drop.
Although this broadening of local politics occurred in both towns, the
shift was more substantial and carne earlier in Limoges, where it appears to
have affected the local posture toward the federalist revolt. In Caen, on the
other hand, it was the revolt itself (or, more precisely, its repression) that
produced a wholesale change in the municipal council.
Highlighting this contrast is the fact that all but one of the o({iciers who
served on the 1792 council in Caen had previously sat as a notable or 0({icier. In Limoges, only four of those elected in 1792 had experience in municipal politics. Thus, whereas there was still considerable continuity between the 1792 Caen council and earlier municipal administrations,
the
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officials elected in Limoges in 1792 were new to municipal politics and had
very few ties to the haut-bourgeois elite that had dominated Limoges politics during most of the period from 1789 through 179I.
In evaluating the composition of the municipal councils, we can consider
several factors not pertinent to the district and departmental councils, such
as Freemasonry, Protestantism
in Caen, and the impact of Jacobin club
membership (which can be more fully gauged at the municipal level than for
district and departmental
administrations).
An earlier chapter discussed the
role of Freemason lodges in Caen and Limoges at the end of the Old Regime.
The influence of Freemasonry on local politics appears to have declined as
the Revolution progressed. In both Caen and Limoges, the number of Masons on the municipal council peaked in I790-at
five, in each case. Thereafter, their numbers diminished. Only one Mason sat on the 1792 Caen
council, and only two sat on that of Limoges in the same year. This pattern
suggests that the lodges attracted as members men already active in local
affairs in the 1780s. Having fallen inactive after 1789, the lodges did not
enroll the new men drawn into municipal politics in 1791 and 1792. As progressive as the lodges may have been, their role was taken over after 1790 by
the section assemblies and popular societies, associations more in tune with
revolutionary
ideals. Although the lodges themselves fell dormant after
1789, however, their influence clearly did not. The rivalry and opposition
between the two Limoges Freemason lodges seems to have revived in the hostility between the Jacobin club and the Amis de la Paix in 1790 and 1791.
A more intriguing factor in evaluating the nature of Caen politics is the
city's sizable Protestant population. No estimate of this group's numbers on
the eve of the Revolution exists, but an 1820 report to the Calvados prefecture put the Protestant population in Caen at 1,200.17 Although Protestants
could not openly practice their religion until 1787, there was no persecution
of the Protestant population in Caen during the eighteenth century. No
long-standing animosity divided the Protestant and Catholic communities,
as it did in Nimes, for example. IS In fact, a 1788 letter from the Caen mayor
and echeuins to the minister of state referred to Caen Protestants as "that
17. A. D. Calvados, M4886 (Protestant population
in Calvados,
182.0). The only other
large Protestant community in Calvados was in Conde-sur-Noireau,
south of Caen, where 300
to 500 Protestants lived. The prefectural report estimated another 689 Protestants in the district of Caen, principally in Douvres.
18. See Hood, "Protestant-Catholic
Relations," 245-75·
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respectable class of our fellow-citizens" and described them as "a very numerous class, and unquestionably our wealthiest fellow-citizens." '"
A number of Protestants were prominent in Caen, particularly the merchant families, such as Massieu, Chatry, and Signard d'Ouffieres. Protestant
families controlled the most lucrative branches of Caen commerce in the late
eighteenth century. Jean-Claude Perrot has observed that the willingness of
Protestant merchants to secure foreign grain purchases for Caen throughout
the eighteenth century earned them the high esteem of the town elite."
Five Protestants sat on the municipal council of February, 1790. Both
Chatry brothers, as already noted, were elected mayor of Caen early in the
Revolution, though both declined the office. As the Revolution progressed,
fewer Protestants appeared on the municipal council (the officiers of I792
included only one), but the Protestant presence at all levels of local government remained important. Samuel Chatry, a Caen notable in 1792, was demoted to that position simply because he had already served two consecutive terms as an officier, and he remained very active in municipal politics.
His brother, Jean Louis Isaac, sat on the departmental
council from 179I
through I793 and was an extremely conscientious administrator.
Francois
Jacques Samuel Boiszerard, a municipal officer in I790, served as a notable
in 1791 and was promoted to the district council the following year. Pierre
Mesnil, a Caen negociant, was a member of the patriotic committee in 1789,
spent two years on the district council, beginning in 1790, and then joined
the departmental directory for the 1792-I793
term. Gabriel de Cussy, of
course, represented Caen in the Constituent Assembly and two years later
became a Calvados delegate to the National Convention. All of these men
knew each other-they
witnessed each other's marriages and family baptisms-and
most played an active role in the federalist revolt. II The ties
within the Protestant community clearly did not dissolve as the Revolution
19· Sophronyme

Beaujour,

Essai sur l'bistoire

de I'Eglise Reformee

de Caen (Caen,

1877),

490.
. 20. Perrot, Genese d'une ville modcrne,
I, 2 I 2, 465. Perrot notes Signard d'OufJieres in particular as an active grain broker after '750 and credits the Massieu family with relieving the
town in [789. Jean Andre Signard ci'Ouffieres and Jacques Samuel Michel Massicu sat on the
Februnry, '790, municipal council.
. 21.
In I787, Louis XVI declared a policy of tolerance for non-Catholics,
granting them the
right to officially register births, marriages, and deaths, even those that had transpired in previous years. It is in these registers, primarily, that I found the names and relationships
of Caen
Protestants. They are contained in A. D. Calvados, 140-4 I. (Eglise de Caen; Etar civil). The
earliest recorded ncr was dated '739.
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began, but to suggest that Caen's participation in the federalist revolt represented some sort of Protestant conspiracy would be unwarranted.
Protestantism did, however, act as a cohesive force within the Caen commercial
elite, many of whom actively participated in local politics, and also constituted a link between that commercial elite and their coreligionists among
the artisans and shopkeepers of Caen.
The role of the Caen and Limoges Jacobin clubs in municipal politics was
undeniably one of the most important factors during the early years of the
Revolution, and the contrast between the two towns is a sharp one. The limited sources available suggest that the Caen Jacobins were not a dominant
force in local politics, particularly after February, 1792, and the number of
Jacobin club members on the municipal councils reflects this."" Jacobin club
members apparently dominated none of the Caen municipal councils. On
the February, 1790, council, there were no known Jacobins, and only one
club member sat on the next council. The peak of jacobin influence came in
1791, when the officiers elected included three jacobins,
The confrontation
between the club and the departmental administration
in February, 1792,
over the installation of the Criminal Tribunal split the jacobin club, and its
sway over public affairs declined thereafter. Only one Jacobin club member
sat on the 1792 municipal council.
These figures probably slightly underestimate Jacobin strength in Caen
because of the incompleteness of the records. Claude Faucher's arrival in
[791 clearly boosted club membership,
and Esnault complained in his diary
of the excessive influence of the Jacobin club during that year." But the
events of early 1792 undercut Jacobin prestige, and the formation of the
Carabot club further challenged the club's position in Caen. We lack membership rolls for the Carabots, but every indication is that this club functioned in a client relationship to the departmental administration,
requisitioning grain, searching the mail, and leading the volunteers to Evreux. The
Carabot president during much of the revolt, Jean Michel Barbot, often
served as a messenger for municipal officials and worked as a clerk at the
1.'-. A. D. Haute- Viennc,
L8 I 3, contains
a complete
list of the Limoges
[acobir:
dub mcrnbership
from the year Ill. No such list exists for the Caen club, bur rlie Cuen Bibliotucqu«
Municipale
collection
of papers
from the Revolution
includes
a fair number
of Jacobin
c1uh letters
and declarations,
along with a few scattered
proces-ocrlrau x, from which I obtained
the names
of some club members.
A few additional
names turned up rhrougl:
incidental
references
in various archival
documents.
A. C. Cucn, 12.75, contains
papers directly
relating
to the lacobin
club.
2,.

Lesage

(Esnaulr),

5 I -74·
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Tribunal of Commerce, where Samuel Chatry sat as president in 1793. The
Carabots, then, appear never to have constituted an independent source of
popular political pressure, which the Caen Jacobin club had at one time
represented.
One might expect that after the collapse of the revolt the Jacobin club enjoyed a resurgence. But despite the efforts of the representatives on mission
and other Paris Jacobins who accompanied the "army of pacification,"
the
people of Caen showed a strong reluctance to return to the club. Even as late
as December, 1793, the Journal de l'Armee complained about the disappointing turnout at club meetings." Attendance picked up in subsequent
months, but the Jacobin club appears never again to have been a truly vital
force in Caen politics.
The situation in Limoges was quite the reverse. Four future Jacobins sat
on the February, I790, council (the club was not formed until late that
year), and the next council included nine Jacobin club members. In 1791,
men associated with the Amis de la Paix made a concerted effort to regain
control of municipal politics, and the number of Jacobins on the council fell
to four. But on each of the next three councils-August,
1792; 1792; and
1793-eleven
of the thirteen officiers were Jacobin club members, a reflection of the extremely important role played by the Limoges Jacobins in local
affairs. Not only did large numbers of club members sit on each local administrative council in 1793, but the club acted as a watchdog over elected officials and effectively represented the views of the Limoges popular classes.
The striking contrast in Jacobin strength on the municipal councils prevailed at the district and departmental
levels as well. Available evidence
shows sixteen Jacobin club members on the Haute-Vienne
council for the
I792- 1793 term, compared with just nine in Calvados. On the 1792- 1793
Limoges district council, eight of thirteen administrators
belonged to the
jacobin club, while in Caen the number of Jacobins on the district council
appears never to have exceeded two.
One final observation can be made with respect to all three administrations in these departments. Electors in Calvados invariably showed a greater
aversion for Old Regime officials than did Haute-Vienne electors. This contrasting attitude toward men associated with the royal bureaucracy is consistent with the posture of the two departments during the federalist revolt.
24· A. D. Calvados,

L10529 (Journal de l'Armce des Cotes de Cherbourg),
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The demands issued by the Norman federalists embodied their strong objections to the expanding powers of the National Convention (particularly the
Committee of Public Safety) and its emissaries to the departments, the representatives on mission. The federalists similarly denounced the excessive influence of Paris on national politics. What one sees here is a continuing antipathy among the Caen (and Calvados) elite toward the encroachment of
the centralizing state, an antipathy that was equally apparent during the
waning years of the Old Regime. Limoges and the Haute- Vienne, largely because of harsh economic realities, never manifested a comparable resistance
to the central government.
The relative social homogeneity of the departmental and district councils
in these two departments points to the importance of municipal politics in
explaining the divergence in the political postures of Calvados and the
Haute- Vienne in 1793. The character of the municipal councils fluctuated
much more than that of either of the other two councils, and one sees the
introduction of a "popular" element into Limoges politics reflected both in
the municipal officiers elected in 1792 and in the increasing influence of the
Jacobin club. Revolutionary politics was particularly vital in the urban setting, and this relatively simple observation suggests two things. First, the urban setting itself exerted a substantial influence on revolutionary politics.
Second, politics is a process, not a static phenomenon. Exploring the social
dynamics of politics will be more enlightening than examining the social
background of political actors alone. Therefore, we must place the revolutionaries of Caen and Limoges in their contexts by considering the political
geography of the two towns and the nature of the political arena in Calvados
and the Haute-Vienne.
For electoral and judicial purposes, both Caen and Limoges were divided
into sections in late 1790. Municipal authorities created five sections in
Caen and four in Limoges, all roughly equal in population, though differing
in total area." Maps 5 and 6 show the sections of the two towns.
I have located the address, at least the section, for nearly all of the o((iciers
25. A. C. Caen, L3i 5 (Division
de la Ville en cinq sections,
J 7')0).
I found no papers relating to the creation
of sections
in the rather
more disorganized
Limoges
municipal
archives.
However,
the boundaries
of the four sections
have been roughly
traced on a i 7R 5 map 01 Limoges that I obtained
from the departmental
archives.
This map is also included
in Paul Dueollrrieux,

Limoges d'apres ses anciens plans (Limoges,

1
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in Caen and Limoges,

1790-

1793

(N= 16)

February,
1790

November,
1790

J 793

1792

1791

Total

~

.--------

Union
Civisme
Fermere
Liberte
Egalire
Unknown

0
3
8
0
0

Limoges municipal

councils (N = 13)

2
8
2
3
1
0

0
6
4
6
0
0

5

5

2
7

4

5

5

1
0

3
1
2
"----------

"-----

February,
1790
Union
RepubJique
Egalite
Liberte
Unknown

0
6
3
J
3

November,
1790
0

5
5
3
0

1791
0
6
3
3

August,
1792
2
6
2
3
0

28
21
21
3
2

1792

1793

Total

1

0
6
4
2

3
34
22
14

5
5
2
0

in both towns from 1790 through 1793. A glance at Table 13 shows that the
sections were not evenly represented on the municipal councils. In Caen,
sections Union and Egalite were virtually unrepresented.
Nearly 90 officiers
came from the town's three central sections. Within that bloc, section Liberte
dominated the 1790 councils, wi th the edge thereafter shifting to section
Civisme, until the 1793 reorganization balanced the situation somewhat.
This distribution becomes meaningful when related to the social character of Caen's urban geography, a task made possible by two sources: JeanClaude Perrot's masterful study of Caen during the eighteenth century, Genese d'une ville moderne; and the revolutionary
tax rolls for the Caen
sections. Section Liberte, dominant in the 1790 Caen municipal councils,
included the Place de la Liberte (formerly Place Royale), where many of
Caen's wealthiest merchants lived. It contained most of the parish SaintJean, the oldest part of Caen, where the nobility and rich bourgeois had
their hotels and also where most Caen Protestants lived. The Affair of 84, in
November, I791, began with a confrontation
at the church Saint-Jean. On

5
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the rolls of the contribution mobiliere, section Liberte paid 15 1,000 livres,
an average of I I4 livres per entry, both figures at least 50 percent higher
than those of any other section. Adding this to earlier evidence, we would
expect section Liberte to have been dominant during the first years of the
Revolution, and indeed it was.
Section Civisme's ascendancy in the 1791 elections coincides with the socioeconomic evolution of the municipal council. Within this section's boundaries lay the parishes Saint-Etienne, Saint-Sauveur, Notre Dame, and part of
Saint-Pierre, the heart of the commercial and artisanal district of Caen. The
residents of section Civisme paid 97,000 livres into the contribution mobiliere, an average of 59 livres per entry. The difference between this and the
section Liberte average tax closely parallels the drop in the mean tax paid by
municipal council members between 1790 and 1791, the year in which
Civisme replaced Liberte as the dominant section on the council.
The character of these two districts and the relationship between them
had undergone considerable change in the quarter-century before the Revolution. The parish Saint-Jean (section Liberte) had once been more purely
the domain of the nobility and wealthy bourgeois (in the Old Regime sense
of the term). The prosperous commercial enterprises of Caen had grown up
in the parishes Notre Dame and Saint-Pierre (section Civisme), but since
1768, many of the big banking and commercial houses had shifted from
that area to the less congested Place Royale and IIe Saint-jean.P ln the 1790S,
section Civisme was not as wealthy as it once had been, but there remained
strong ties between the retail merchants of that district and the negociants of
section Liberte, as exemplified by the close relationship on the I792 council
between the [abricant Samuel Paisant, of section Liberte, and the marchand
mercier David Nicolas, of section Civisme. The common interests of these
two groups considerably outweighed their differences. The shift in political
influence after 179 I from section Liberte to section Civisme represented a
rejection of the nobility and bourgeois rentiers of the parish Saint-Jean, who
were associated with the Affair of 84, rather than a reaction against the
commercial elite of Caen.
Section Fermete, the third Caen section that was well represented on the
municipal councils, is more difficult to characterize socially. Unlike Liberte
and Civisme, section Ferrnete extended into the faubourgs, and it embraced
within its boundaries one of the poorest areas of Caen, the parish Saint2.6. Perrot,

Genese d'une ville moderne,

I, 52.6.
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Gilles.27 But it also included a sizable part of the parish Saint-Pierre, as well
as an area around the Chateau that, as in most eighteenth-century
French
towns, housed many of the town's lawyers. The section as a whole paid
60,000 livres into the contribution
mobiliere, an average of 43 livres per
entry. The Ferrnere officiers-the
vast majority of whom were lawyers and
artisans-came
from the part of the section near the center of town, and not
from the parish Saint-Gilles.
The last two sections, Union and Egalite, together sent only eight officiers
to the five municipal councils we have considered. Section Union lay entirely
in the faubourg I' Abbe, beyond the Abbaye-aux-Homrnes,
and included another of Caen's poorest neighborhoods,
the parish Saint-Nicolas, The taxpayers of section Union paid only 38,000 livres to the contribution mobiliere, the lowest total among the five sections, for an average of 34 livres per
entry. Section Egalite consisted primarily of the faubourg Vaucelles, made
up of the parishes Vaucelles and Saint-Paix. This was the third of Caen's
poorest districts and even in 1789 was considered the most "revolutionary"
of the town's neighborhoods.
Its border with the parish Saint-Jean may have
contributed to this reputation among the Caen elite. The Orne River separated the two, with VauceIIes on one side and the military garrison protecting Saint-Jean on the other. During the tense days of grain shortage in 1789,
the military governor simply leveled his cannons across the bridge. The fearsome reputation of Vaucelles may have inspired the municipal authorities in
1790 to include a sliver of the parish Saint-Jean in section Egalite. This insurance against the rabble somehow securing election proved effectivethose few officiers who did corne from Egalite lived on the Saint-Jean side of
the river. Section Egalite as a whole paid 53,000 livres into the contribution
mobiliere, 40 livres per entry, just slightly more than the residents of section
Union. The difference is probably due to the inclusion of that small corner of
the parish Saint-Jean.
This pattern of sectional representation takes on more meaning when related to immigration into Caen in the late eighteenth century. As already described, by 1770 the central district of Caen had reached its maximum
population density. After that date, immigrants tended to settle in the faubourgs, forming a ring of relatively poor neighborhoods
around the old city.
Perrot notes that during this same period, "the financial segregation of the
quarters was accentuated; the most capitalistic activities anchored them27·

IIJid., II, 926.
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selves at the heart of the city." 28 It was precisely those central sections that
dominated Caen politics after 1789. As we have seen, the people of the
faubourgs had very little voice on the Caen municipal councils during the
Revolution. Even in the year II, they were largely absent from the council,
though they appeared somewhat more frequently among the notables.
In Limoges, the situation was quite different, and the discrepancies in sectional representation
on the council are explained by other factors. There
was no clear social demarcation between Limoges neighborhoods on the eve
of the Revolution, nor was there such a significant break between the heart
of the city and the faubourgs. Moreover, section boundaries in Limoges radiated out from the center so that all the sections, except Union, contained
both part of the central districts and part of the faubourgs.
In Limoges, then, the pattern of sectional representation does not reflect
the evolution in the municipal council's composition. As Table 13 shows,
men from section Republique consistently outnumbered those from other
sections on the council. Republique included slightly more of the central
town than the other sections and also encompassed much of the commercial
area, though it did not monopolize it. The bustling row of shops along the
rue du Clocher lay in section Egalite, which shared the commercial district
with Republique and consistently sent a strong contingent to the council.
Section Liberte lagged behind these two in its representation, for two possible reasons. It included the faubourgs Montmallier and Saint-Martin, both
more sparsely populated than the other faubourgs. Furthermore, most of
Limoges' lawyers lived in section Liberte, and as we have seen, they fell out
of favor with the voters after 1790. Section Union came in a weak last in
sectional representation, but its position is easily explained. Union consisted
almost entirely of la Cite, the ecclesiastical part of town, which was only
incorporated into Limoges in November, 1791. Not surprisingly, the newcomers were not quickly assimilated into Limoges politics."
This striking contrast in the political geography of Caen and Limoges was
reflected in the public celebrations held in each town during the Revolution.
Mona Ozouf has made a detailed study of the revolutionary fetes of Caen
:>.H. lbid., )26. Tax rolls for the sections are in A. D. Calv.ulos, L)H4~646.
29. Unfortunately,
rhe rolls of the l.imoges contribution mobilierc arc not organized by section, and so I have been unable to carry out the kind of sectional comparison by r.i xes th:lt 1did
for Cacn. Furthermore,
Dnuder is not :IS thorough or :IS insighrful about Limoges :IS Perrot is
about Cucn. I do, however, feel quite confident about the sh:lrp conrrasr in the extent of soci:\1
differentiation
by neighborhood
in the two towns.
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and found that most patriotic processions during the Revolution bypassed
the faubourgs of Caen. Fewer than one-third of the thirty-four processions
traced by Ozouf entered the faubourgs at all. Of these, four were agricultural fetes, three occurred during the year II, and four others were military
parades of the National Guard, very probably sent out to the faubourgs by
municipal authorities as a salutary show of force. In contrast to the processions of the Old Regime, which nearly always finished at the heart of the
parish Saint-Jean (the noble quartier), those of the Revolution generally
headed to the Place de la Liberte, that square fronted by the homes of
wealthy merchants. As if to pay further tribute to commerce as the lifeblood
of the town, the municipal council shifted its meeting place early in the
Revolution from the Abbaye-aux-Hommes
to the church of the Eudistes, on
the west side of the Place de la Liberte. The most common route of the
revolutionary fetes linked the Place de la Liberte to the Place Saint-Pierre,
traversing the two dominant sections in Caen municipal politics and linking the artisanal district to the residential neighborhood
of the hautebourgeoisie. These revolutionary fetes not only reflected the primacy of the
central districts in Caen political life but helped to establish and strengthen
that primacy. 10
In Limoges, the pattern of revolutionary processions was quite different.
Rather than being planned by the departmental
administration
or the municipal council, as early as 179 I the fetes were generally organized by the jacobin club. The parades and celebrations in Limoges had a more spontaneous flavor than those in Caen. Citizens in attendance at public ceremonies
often concluded the affairs with unplanned marches through the streets of
Limoges. In contrast to the fetes in Caen, confined most often to the central
districts, the processions in Limoges generally stretched out to embrace the
faubourgs as well. Thus, one sees an almost perfect symmetry between the
urban geography of municipal politics in Caen and Limoges and the fetes
that gave revolutionary politics its public expression. J I
We shift our attention now from the local elites themselves to the political
arena in which they interacted. How did politics operate in Caen and Li30. Mona Ozouf, "Innovations
et traditions dans les irineraires des fetes revolutionnaires:
I'~xemple de Caen," Ethnologic Francaise, Vll (January, I977), 45-74; Mona Ozouf, La Fete
reuolutionnaim 1789-1799 (Paris, (976), especially .6')-76; M. A. Campion, Les Fetes Nationales ,j Caen sous la Revolution (Caen, r 877).
'
.31. Alfred Fray-Fournier,
Lcs Fetes Nationales et les Ceremonies Ciuiques dans la HauteVtel1l1e pendant la Revolution
(Limoges, 1902.).
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moges during the first four years of the Revolution? The two chefs-lieux are of
primary interest here. Unlike departments
such as the Seine-Inferieure->where Le Havre rivaled ROllen-or
the Bouches-du-Rhone-c-where
Marseille overshadowed Aix-en-Provence-Caen
and Limoges were the unchallenged, supreme towns in their departments. The administrations,
courts,
and popular societies that functioned in those towns dominated departmental politics. By examining their interactions, we will see how some of the
factors analyzed earlier in this chapter came into play. The situation in 1792
and 1793 is of greatest significance to us, but we must consider it in context
and not isolate it from the developments of earlier years.
Let us first consider the administrative corps. The Constituent Assembly
had established a hierarchy of responsibilities and authority among the local
administrations
but had generated no explicit policy regarding cooperation and consultation
among them. Throughout France, the departmental
administrations
tended to meet with the district and municipal councils
of the department
chefs-lieux at times of crisis, and we have seen that
both the Haute-Vienne
and Calvados administrations
did so during June,
1793. But practice during normal times varied, as it did between these two
departments.
There appears to have been much closer contact among the three administrations in the Haute- Vienne than among those III Calvados. Early in
1793, upon observing that the National Guard commander, the district
president, and the Limoges mayor frequently attended departmental meetings, the council formally invited the three to attend all its meetings." The
departmental administration
held public meetings approximately every five
days, and by May, 1793, even the departmental
directory had opened its
meetings to the public."
The Calvados administration
was neither as accessible to its constituents
nor as solicitous of the subordinate councils. There is no evidence that departmental meetings were ever open to the public, though delegations from
the clubs and sections of Caen often gained admission to deliver particular
requests. Nor is there any indication that representatives of the municipal
')2.. A. D. Haute-Vicnne,

L57 (departmental
administration
minutes, February 3, 1793)·
LS7 and l.72. (departmental
directory minutes). Jacobin clubs nationwide mounted a lobbying campaign in [790-9J, calling on the Constirucnr Assembly to
pass legislation requiring that all elected bodies hold public meetings. No such leglslation appeared; hut ill Limoges, the pressure of the jacobin club undoubtedly
influenced the departmental adrninistrarion
in its decision to hold public meetings. Kennedy, The [acobiu Clubs 111
the lrcn ch Reuolution, 215.
:)3. A. D. Hautc-Vienne,
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and district councils regularly attended departmental
meetings. Indeed, in
spring, 1793, the district and the department
clashed over departmental
army recruitment policy, with the district council insisting that the departmental directory had exceeded its authority by changing recruitment procedures. Most communication
among the three administrations
appears to
have passed through the offices of their procureurs:"
There were, of course, less formal ties among the three councils. In Calvados, Jean Louis Isaac Chatry was one of the most diligent departmental
administrators during the I791-1793
terms, and his brother, Samuel, participated on every municipal council in Caen from 1789 through 1793. In
the Haute- Vienne, Jean Baptiste Nieaud moved in 179 I from his post as
mayor of Limoges to a seat on the departmental
administration,
where he
remained through 1793. Nearly all of the departmental
councils included
former district or municipal officials. But if we focus on the I792-1793
term, we see the following: The Calvados departmental
administration
included three members who had served on the Caen district council and three
who had been municipal officials in Caen since 1789. The Haute-Vienne administration included only one former Limoges district official, but seven of
the ten departmental administrators
who lived in the district of Limoges had
at one time been Limoges municipal officials. The contrast between the district councils was less marked. Two of the Caen district administrators
in
the 1792-1793 term had previously been Caen municipal officials, whereas
in Limoges, three of the district administrators
had previously served on the
municipal council.
When we consider all aspects of this analysis together, the contrast between the two departments is striking. The district of Caen sent seven representatives to the Calvados departmental
council, while the district of Limoges placed ten members on the Haute- Vierme council. Of these, only three
of the Caen men had previously served on the municipal council, while
seven of the ten in the Haute- Vienne had at one time sat on the Limoges
municipal council. Taking account also of the closer cooperation among the
three Haute- Vienne adrninistrations
and the greater accessibility of the
Haute- Vienne departmental
council, we can conclude that Limoges exer34· Unfortunately,
the minutes of the departmental
council meetings have disappeared,
so
one cannot say with absolute certainty that district and municipal officials were not in attendance. However, none of the available documentation
(including municipal and district proccsverbaux, miscellaneous
departmental
records, newspapers,
and diaries) suggests rhar they
attcnded.
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than

did Caen.
This conclusion appears even more justified when we consider the contrasting roles played by the local popular societies. The Limoges Jacobin
club remained a vital and active force throughout this period. By 1793,
43 percent of the Haute- Vienne administrators,
62 percent of the Limoges
district administrators,
and 85 percent of the Limoges municipal officiers
Were members of the Limoges Jacobin club. These percentages represent
more than Jacobin strength in local government. They also demonstrate the
extent to which the Jacobin club served as a central political forum, bringing
together men from all levels of local administration
to discuss the contentious issues of the day. The club met at least weekly, and generally more
often, throughout the Revolution, with meetings always open to the public.
The Limoges Jacobins maintained regular contact not only with the Paris Jacobins but with clubs in other cities around the country. Discussions focused
on local and national issues, ranging from the conduct of public officials to
the effectiveness of grain requisitions to reports of political developments
elsewhere in France. Members debated very practical matters as well as
more lofty ideological issues, such as the fate of Louis XVI. Local disputes
and broader political controversies no longer needed to be resolved in confrontations between municipality and district or between club and department. The jacobin club, by 1792, was a common denominator among all
three councils, and club members carried the ]acobin viewpoint back to
their respective administrations."
This kind of political forum did not exist in Caen, at least not by 1793·
The Jacobin club may have served that function in 179 I, but by 1793 it had
ceded its role as the most important club in Caen to the Carabots, a group
more subservient to departmental administrators.
No evidence exists to indicate that the Carabots ever functioned as an independent forum for discussion and debate. Nothing suggests more succinctly the difference between the political philosophy of the Carabots and that of the Limoges
Jacobins than their mottoes. The Carabor banner admonished those who
looked its way, "I'Execution de la Loi ou la Mort," while the Limoges jacobins called out to those who would listen, "Vivre Libre ou Mourir." The
3 5. Michael Kennedy stresses the fact that provincial [acobin clubs "were nerve cclllers for
of news and prop:1g:lllda." Kennedy, TJ;e [acobin Clubs ill the French Rcuolution, 54.
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REVOLUT10N

of Caen and Limoges dur-

ing those critical months of 1793·
The contrast between local politics in Caen and Limoges seems to parallel
the opposition described by Soboul at the national level between moderates
favoring "representative
democracy" and radicals championing "agent democracy." In Cacn, that battle was won by the moderates controlling the
departmental administration,
who insisted on an orderly political arena in
which people would show the prosper respect for and confidence in their
elected representatives. In Limoges, the more radical "agent democracy" triumphed. The people of Limoges repeatedly intervened in the political arena,
both through the Jacobin club and by spontaneous
action, most notably
during the grain incident of February, 1792, and again the next summer,
when the sections of Limoges recalled their elected "agents," the Naurissart
municipal council. Clearly, debates over important issues proceeded in a
very different fashion in these two towns.
The shape of local politics affected not only the definition and resolution
of local issues and concerns but also the relationship between each town and
national affairs. Three different networks of communication
unified the
country during the Revolution. The first of these was the administrative network. The National Assembly and the ministries communicated the business
of government to departmental,
district, and municipal administrations
through official channels. The Jacobin clubs constituted a second unifying
network. The Paris Jacobins reprinted speeches, Jacobin policy statements,
and official minutes from the National Assembly to be sent to affiliated societies all over France. The third network, a less coherent one, consisted of
the numerous newspapers printed in Paris and sent to subscribers in the
provinces. To some extent, there also existed an interdepartmental
network
of communication,
in which departmental administrations
and popular societies corresponded with their counterparts in other departments,
but this
tended to be regional in character and never achieved a truly national dimension. One might also mention personal correspondence,
which was certainly important; but this, as we have seen, often traveled through administrative or Jacobin channels. That which did not is only rarely available today
for inspection.
Local perceptions of national events naturally depended a great deal on
available sources of information. Official communications
were more or less
a constant factor throughout France, except for the extent to which individ-
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Limoges and Caen differed with respect to each of these channels of communication. The National Convention sent the same information to both
dep artments, to b e sure, but the pattern of comrnU11lcat!On
'
'
b erwe'en national
deputies and their constituents was different in the tWOdepartments, at least
in 1792 and 1793. In Calvados, the conventionncls de Cussy, Doulcet,
Dumont, and Lomont sent frequent letters to Caen, but almost always to
administrators
or one of the administrations,
most often the departmental
c ounC!.'I 1'1'us solidified the council's position as the supreme ar
. biIter 0f local
affairs. The sole Montagnard
deputy on the Calvados delegation, Bonnet,
did occasionally write to the Caen Jacobin club, but with limited effect,
given the club's waning influence in 1793. When Bonnet visited Caen III
March, 1793, he spoke to the club and commented that one could always
COunt on "the good people of Vaucelles and the faubourg I'Abbe." 3(, But as
we have seen, those people had very little voice in Caen politics. Furthermore, the Caen Jacobin club had split with the Paris Jacobins in September,
1792, thereby eliminating that source of information
from the capital. The
principal newspaper available in Caen, by virtue of the municipal council's
subscription,
was Gorsas' Le Courrier dans les Departements.
which in
1792 and 1793 presented the Girondin viewpoint.
In Limoges, official channels of communication did not dominate the flow
of information from the capital as much as they did in Caen. The majority of
the Limoges conuentionnels were Girondin supporters, and they did correspond with the departmental administration. But the Montagnard deputies
Bordas and Gay-Vernon frequently wrote to the Limoges Jacobin club, as
did the Jacobin Xavier Audouin. Indeed, Gay-Vernon, undoubtedly the
most prolific correspondent
among the Haute- Vienne deputies, sent nearly
all of his letters to the Jacobin club. The strength and vitality of the Limoges
W

36, Lesage (Esnaulr),
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club and its continued affiliation with the Paris jacobins enabled it to provide an alternative source of information on national issues. In addition to
letters, the club received printed speeches and pronouncements
from the
Paris club, items that presumably no longer went to Caen after its club had
split with the mother society. Finally, there is the question of printed news.
We cannot identify all of the newspapers available. However, in December,
1792, the Limoges jacobins canceled their subscription
to the Gorsas paper,
which played a prominent role in Caen, in favor of a less moderate journal.
The patterns of political interaction described earlier prevailed during the
crisis period of June and july, 1793. In Calvados, the departmental administration dominated the situation. Louis Caille, the district procureur-syrzdic,
and Samuel Charry, the wealthy Caen negociant, did play important leadership roles, but otherwise, departmental officials were most active and prominent during the revolt. A district official, Robert Tirel, voiced the most serious objection to the insurrectionary
measures and was shouted down. The
mayor of Cacn, Le Goupil Duclos, missed the crucial early morning meeting
of June 9 because he had been told that it would not be held until later in the
day. Le Goupil and the rest of the municipal council lent only passive support to the revolt as it developed. The Carabots, following the departmental
lead, provided the core of the expeditionary force to Evreux and carried the
call to arms to the populace. The people of Caen responded by ignoring the
authorities and refusing to enroll in the volunteer force.
From the start, the sections expressed their skepticism of reports from
the capital by insisting that a delegation visit Paris to verify the situation.
The delegation, led by Louis Caille and the departmental
president Rene
Lenorrnand, returned to give an alarming report, later decried by Le Goupil
as misleading and inflammatory. It did, however, convince the section assemblies of the need for drastic action. Thereafter, the departmental council,
now absorbed by the general assembly, did all it could to control the flow of
information from Paris by prohibiting the circulation of any decree issued
by the Convention. Despite these efforts, the Caen sections finally compelled
the general assembly to abandon the revolt, which had collapsed owing to
the lack of any popular support.
In the Haute-Vienne, the revolt collapsed before it could start, largely because of the more open nature of Limoges politics. The departmental administration showed an initial inclination to support the protest against Paris by
its adoption of the Cote-dOr
resolution, but it could not dominate the
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situation as the Calvados departmental
council did. It was precisely during
this period that Jacobin club meetings were most animated and most heavily
attended." The Limoges municipal council and the Jacobin club immediately objected to the departmental
action, and when messengers arrived
from Lyon and the Jura, the municipal council intercepted and denounced
them before they could state their mission to the administration. The departmental council had little choice but to repudiate their entreaties. Alarming
reports did come from the moderate Haute- Vicnne deputies in Paris, but
these were countered by reassuring letters from Bordas and Gay-Vernon. On
the heels of their letters came reports from the Paris Jacobins and the National Convention indicating that the Revolution had once again been defended and that calm had returned to the capital.
We have seen, then, that both the makeup of the local administrations and
the way they interacted (with each other, with their constituents, and with
national deputies) had a major impact on the political stances of Calvados
and the Haure-Vienne in June, 1793. In Calvados, the departmental administration dominated the political arena. The Caen commercial elite played
a strong role in that administration,
which also included many marketoriented rural landowners.
In 1792, the departmental council managed to
undercut the influence of the Caen Jacobins and encouraged the growth of
another club, the Carabors, which stood in a client relationship to the administration. The Caen municipal council, representing primarily the Caen
commercial community, also deferred to or supported the departmental administration in nearly all important matters.
A very different situation prevailed in the Haute- Vienne. Landowners and
merchants constituted
only I I percent of the 1792- I 793 departmental
council, which was dominated instead by lawyers and professionals. The
Haute- Vienne administration
did not monopolize local politics, as did the
Calvados council. The town of Limoges exercised considerable influence on
the departmental
administration,
by virtue of both the seven citizens of Limoges who sat on the council and the vigilance of the Jacobin club and the
municipal council. The Limoges commercial elite was unable to maintain
control of municipal affairs. That elite itself stood divided, as first evidenced
by the 1782 splintering within the Freemason lodge and made very plain by
37· Frny-Fournier,

Le Clulr deslacobins,

xxvi.
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the revolutionary conflict between Jacobins and Amis de la Paix. Large-scale
merchants dominated the Naurissart
municipality, but in August, 1792,
Limoges voters rejected those men. Small-scale merchants and artisans,
most of them club members, subsequently controlled the Limoges council.
The popular classes of Limoges thus exerted greater influence on local
politics (both through the Jacobin club and through the municipal council)
than did the menu peuple of Caen, who remained relatively inert during the
Revolution. This was a crucial factor in June, 1793, for while the popular
classes of Caen did not actively support the federalist revolt, they possessed
no organized medium through which to express their opposition.
As we
have seen, it was concerted popular opposition, voiced by the Limoges municipal council and the Jacobin club, that steered the Haute- Vienne away
from the federalist movement.
The vitality of popular politics in Limoges and the lack of it in Caen
emerge, then, as the chief immediate factors determining the towns' political
stances in June, I793. This raises a fundamental question. Why could the
popular classes of Limoges mobilize and effectively apply pressure to their
elected officials, while the people of Caen could not?
Several factors have already been suggested. The pattern of immigration
into Caen in the eighteenth century left recent immigrants isolated in the
faubourgs, not fully assimilated into Caen's urban life. This contributed to
their passivity during the Revolution. So did the nature of the Caen economy. The overwhelming importance of commerce in Caen left the town's artisan community and commercial workers dependent on the commercial
elite of Caen. This patron-client relationship manifested itself in Caen politics, most prominently in the creation of the Carabot club in 1793. The leniency of the punishment meted out to federalist leaders by Lindet and
Laplanche is further evidence of the importance of the commercial elite,
both to the Caen economy and to Caen politics."
In Limoges, the situation was different. The artisans and workers of Limoges were not isolated in the faubourgs but instead lived nearly side by side
with their social and economic betters. They could not be so easily excluded
38. For a thorough and interesting discussion of patron-client
relationships
and their impact on political behavior, see Ronald Aminzade, "Breaking the Chains of Dependency:
From
Patronage to Class Politics, Toulouse, France, [83°-1872," [ournal of Urban History, III (August, J977), 485- 506; and Ronald Aminzade, Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism:
A Study ol Mid-Ninetcenth-Centurv
Toulouse, France (Albany, 198I), especially 47-68.
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from Limoges political life. In addition, while commerce was important to
the Limoges economy, it was not dominant. Textiles, the construction trades,
and the fledgling porcelain industry all employed a considerable number of
workers. The consecutive poor harvests also played their role. Although
wholesale merchants such as Petiniaud de Beaupeyrat and Naurissart rnay
have been thanked for provisioning the city in J789, the continuing poor
harvests and high prices created an antagonism between the Limoges popular classes and the merchants who seemed to be profiting by their misfortune. This helps to explain the outburst of February, 1792, when the grain
crisis forced Naurissart to flee. But other factors, related to the economy and
the social structure of the two towns, must explain the consistent activism of
the Limoges Jacobin club and the passivity of the people of Caen.
Sustained political activism on the part of the lower classes in Limoges
required both opportunity and capability. Opportunity presented itself when
the split divided the Limoges elite, creating a situation in which rival factions turned to the menu peuple for support in their struggle for political
dominance. The persistent grain problem kept the public mood in Limoges
at a heightened pitch, providing the political motivation for the popular
classes. This is not to say that the popular classes controlled Limoges politics; but so long as they had allies in Paris (in the Paris Jacobin club and the
Montagnard
deputies of the Haute- Vienne), they could not be ignored. In
Caen, no such opportunity for the popular classes existed, because the commercial elite was much more homogeneous
and cohesive. Common economic interests linked landowners and merchants (witness the numerous petitions calling for improvements in the Orne River channel), Protestants and
Catholics, wholesale merchants and shopkeepers. Far from appealing to the
menu peuple for support, the Caen political elite did all it could to control
popular political activity, and no serious grain problem existed to incite
popular unrest.
Similarly, the capability for political activism among the lower classes was
much stronger in Limoges than in Caen. In pan, this was due to the social
geography of the two towns, already discussed. But patterns of sociability
more generally, I would argue, were a crucial factor here. Not only were the
lower classes of Caen dispersed in the faubourgs, they had no popular associations to build on as a base for organizing revolutionary clubs. In Limoges, by contrast, nearly every adult male belonged to a penitent con-
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fraternity at the end of the Old Regime, and the organizational
structures of
those groups carried over to the Jacobin club during the Revolution. Far beyond occasionally rioting in protest of grain prices, then, the Limoges popular classes were capable of sustained political expression that manifested itself at the ballot box in the municipal elections of 1792 and in the political
forum of the Limoges Jacobin club. In 1793, it was this that restrained the
Haute- Vie nne departmental administration
from joining the federalist revolt.

--------

Conclusion

No single factor can adequately explain the federalist revolt in
1793· The proscription
of twenty-nine Girondin deputies triggered resistance in many departments,
but the underlying reasons for the pattern of
revolt run much deeper than the political affiliations between proscribed
deputies and their constituencies. These ties were not unimportant, but the
correlation between federalist departments
and proscribed deputies is a
weak one. Only twelve of the twenty-nine carne from departments that engaged in prolonged resistance to the Montagnard
Convention, and five of
these came from one department,
the Gironde. Six of the thirteen departments that actively revolted against the Montagnard
Convention were not
represented by a single proscribed deputy, while several departments represented by proscribed deputies made little or no protest. Among the deputies excluded on June 2. were two representatives each from the Meurrhe and
the Orne, departrnenrs that protested the May 3 I revolution only by letter.
Another two deputies, A. B. Chambon and B. F. Lidon, came from the
Correze, a department that firmly rejected all entreaties to join in resistance.
The Eure-et-Loir also supported the Monragnard
victory, despite the fact
that Brissot, Lesage, and Petion all represented that department
in the
Convention. I
r. The proscribed deputies and their dcp.urmcnrs are as follows: Barbarotlx (Bouchcs-duRh<me); Bergoeing (Gironde); Bertrand L'Llodiesniere (Orne); Birorre.m (Pyr cnecs-Oricnralcs}:
Boillcau (Yonne): Brissor (Eureer-Loir) ; BUl.Ot (Eure); Ch.imbon (Correzc): Dufrichc-Va lazc
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in determining provincial response to the May 3 I revolution. And the inability of the federalist departments to overturn the victory of the Monta>nards may have been a crucial blow to the immediate prospects for liberal
~emoeracy in France, Certainly, the years following 9 Therrnidor,
when
moderates who had supported the Girondins returned to power in Paris and
the departments, were an exercise in failure for liberal representative democracy, a failure caused in large part by the divisions and bitterness sown in
1793 and the year II.'
The federalist revolt is important to our understanding
of the Revolution
not only because it was a crucial turning point but because it demonstrates
the links between national and local politics in this period. The two inter(O;:;:;;'~Gardien
(Indre-et-Loire);
Censonne (Gironde); Gomaire (Fiuistcrc); Gorsas (Scine-erGise); Grangencuve
(Gironde); Guadet (Gironde);
Henry-Lariviere
(Calvados);
Kervelegan
(Finistere); Lanjuinais (ll1e-et-Vilaine); Lasource (Tarn); Lehardi (Morbihan) ; Lesage (Eure-erLoir); Lidon (Correze); Louver (Loiret) , Mollevaut (Meurrhe); Petion (Eure-et-Loir);
Rabaut
Saint-Etienne (Aube); Salles (Meurthe); Vergniaud (Gironde); Viger (Maine-ct-Loire).
2., SobouI,
The Sans-culottes,
106-1.8,
3. For a discussion of why liberal democracy failed under the Directory, sec Lynn A, Hunt
David Lansky, and Paul Hanson, "The Failure of the Liberal Republic in France, 1795-99;
The Road to Brumaire," Journal of Modern History, Ll (December, 1'979),734- 59,
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acted continually, and while historians have long belabored the predominant influence of Paris on French national culture and politics, it is important to remember that the provinces, or departments, also influenced the
national drama unfolding in Paris. The deputies who voted on the fate of the
king, and who later voted to proscribe twenty-nine of their colleagues, were
products of local politics. The overwhelming majority had experience as
municipal, district, or departmental
administrators:'
To take but two examples, let us consider the cases of Gustave Doulcet de
Pontecoulanr and Leonard Gay-Vernon. Doulcet had been president of the
Calvados departmental
administration
in the 1791-1792
term, during the
turbulent affair of the Criminal Tribunal. In the midst of that affair, Doulcet
denounced the Caen Jacobin club for its unruly intervention in public affairs. He insisted on the need for orderly and informed deliberation by the
elected representatives of the people. Dou1cet carried that attitude to the National Convention, where he joined the Girondin deputies in their support
for representative democracy. In this, he epitomized the general character of
Caen and Calvados politics.
Leonard Gay-Vernon went from the municipal council of la Cite, subsequently absorbed by Limoges, to the Legislative Assembly and then to
the National Convention. He participated in the founding of the Limoges
jacobin club and maintained an active affiliation with the club after his departure to Paris. Gay-Vernon encouraged the club in its political activism,
both in local and national affairs. He had an extreme disregard for individuals and insisted on the accountability
of elected deputies, not only to the
people who elected them but to all the people. In the Convention, GayVernon sat with the Montagnards
and supported their vision of participatory democracy. Although he may not have expressed the views of most
Haute- Vienne administrators,
he did represent the broad, popular character
of Limoges municipal politics.
Doulcet and Gay-Vernon not only illustrate one way in which local politics affected national politics but also point out the difficulty encountered by
historians seeking a social basis for the political division between Girondins
and Montagnards. Both Doulcet and Gay-Vernon came from noble families.
True, Gay-Vernon belonged to a petty noble family, while Doulcer carne
from a prominent family with a centuries-long lineage. But in a statistical
study of the deputies in the National Convention, both would be entered in
4· See Patrick, The Melt of the First French Republic.
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the category labeled "nobility." Overall, one finds very little social distinction between the Girondin deputies and their Montagnard
opponentsboth came essentially from the upper ranks of the third estate and the liberal
nobility.s
For this reason, one cannot seck an explanation for the political divisions
in Paris solely in the social backgrounds of elected deputies. More important
to consider is the social fabric of the regions they represented.
This is not a
deterministic argument that Calvados produced Girondins while the HauteVienne produced Montagnards-that
is clearly not the case. But while other
deputies than Ooulcet and Gay-Vernon might have been chosen as examples
above, the noble Montagnard Bonnet de Meautry from Calvados and the
Girondin lawyer Lesterpt-Beauvais from the Haute- Vienne were neither the
most influential nor the most representative deputies of their departments.
Thus, it is crucial to consider national politics and local politics together, to
find the links and continuities between the two.
That those links and continuities existed, particularly in the spring of
1793, is relatively clear. The political issues then confronting the nation had
confronted local officials in 1791 and 1792, at least in Caen and Limoges.
Most of the deputies in Paris in 1793 had moved up through the ranks of
local administration.
Local clubs and administrative councils inundated the
National Convention with letters and petitions throughout
the winter and
spring of 1793 calling for a constitution and an end to factionalism. Returning the favor, national deputies often lent support by way of letter to their
allies on the local scene.
This study has shed light on each of these areas of interaction between
local and national politics. It has also established and explored the political
contrasts between Caen and Limoges and their relationship
to national
issues. More difficult is establishing the underlying social and economic
forces that produced those political contrasts and divisions. And more difficult still is constructing a logical and consistent interpretive framework that
will make those underlying forces coherent. The conceptual model proposed
by Edward Fox, positing a political dichotomy between the agricultural hinterland and the commercial periphery, does provide such a framework.
The contrasting economies of Caen and Limoges correspond well to the
typology of French towns proposed by Fox. Fox disputes the notion that
the growth of commercial towns and the rise of the monarchy were part
5. Chaumie,

"Lcs Girondins

et les Cents jours,"
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of the same process. Instead, he marks a distinction between commercial
towns and trade towns (which also served as administrative centers), arguing that the monarchy was built on the latter, with commercial towns never
fuliy integrated into the bureaucratic state."
eaen and Limoges clearly do not constitute the "ideal type" of either variety of town, but it would be fair to classify Caen as commercial and Limoges
as a trade, or administrative,
town. Although Caen lay in a rich agricultural
plain (Fox contrasts the commercial economy with the agricultural economy of administrative
towns), commerce spurred the town's growth in the
eighteenth century, and the commercial elite of Caen dominated local affairs
on the eve of the Revolution. Moreover, the agriculture of Calvados was
largely commercial, not subsistence, in character. The Limousin, by contrast, was predominantly
a region of subsistence agriculrure, and Limoges
fits the mold of an administrative
town very well. Representatives of the
monarchy dominated Limoges politics and provided the impetus for local
development. Limoges did engage in trade, some of it at long distance, but
Wholesale commerce did not play the important role that it did in Caen.
This classification of the two towns corresponds with their political orientation at the end of the Old Regime and during the Revolution. Caen, the
commercial town, resisted the encroachments
of the state bureaucracy and
looked toward other commercial communities and its own agricultural hinterland as the sources of its prosperity. The Caen municipal council quarreled with the royal intendants in the 17805, and during the 1792.-1793
term, the Calvados administration
berated the National Convention for neglecting to provide for the defense of its coast, so vital to both the safety and
the economy of the department.
Limoges, the administrative town, named
its grand boulevards for the royal intendants who built them. The Limousin
depended on the monarchy for help in maintaining its roads and for grain to
feed its people. After 1789, the Haute-Vienne
again looked to Paris for
funds to rebuild the fire-ravaged Manigne quarter in Limoges and to purchase the grain that local harvests had failed to produce. The Haute- Vienne
sent two thousand volunteers to assist the Republic in its battle against the
Vcndean rebels, who in J 79 3 threatened areas that supplied the department
with the grain it so badly needed.
Fox's argument holds that the economic role, or function, of a town under
the Old Regime determined its political posture, at least vis-a-vis the stare.
(,. Fox, History ill Geogra nhic l'erspcctiuc,

33- 54·
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His discussion of political life in the two types of towns is explicit. Commercial oligarchies governed the former, generally through compromise and negotiation; hierarchy characterized the administrative towns, with an agent
of the crown in the dominant position."
This analysis is reasonably compatible with the situation in both Caen
and Limoges under the Old Regime. The local elite in Caen resented the interference of royal officials, while in Limoges the intendant assumed the role
of the dominant, and generally accepted, political and administrative
figure.
After 1789, however, it is Limoges that appears to have been more politically democratic than Caen. In Calvados, the duly elected administrative
bodies, particularly the departmental administration,
dominated local politics. In the Haute- Vienne, on the other hand, the Limoges municipal council, and more significantly the Limoges Jacobin club, acted as restraints on
the moderate (even federalist) inclinations of departmental officials and managed to maintain an active political forum.
Does this constitute a flaw in Fox's thesis? Superficially, it would seem to,
but the argument needs only to be refined, not discarded. Fox himself cautions against equating negotiation-minded
commercial communities
with
"democratic"
government. Narrow oligarchies ruled these towns. Indeed,
the hierarchical, administrative
towns often possessed a broader "democratic" base, because agents of the crown frequently favored the lower classes
in their efforts to weaken the influence of the local nobility."
Alexis de Tocqueville, too, addresses the relationship between administrative centralism and democratic government at the local level. He argues that
throughout France, municipal government had "degenerated
into a petty
oligarchy" by the end of the Old Regime. In some towns, the monarchy had
allowed the democratic forms of a bygone era to survive (in the election of
town councils or the periodic convocation of public assemblies, for example), though it seldom invested those forms with any real power or authority." Although Tocqueville may be overestimating
the extent of royal
power, particularly at the periphery of the kingdom, his argument does help
to amplify Fox's thesis. As the power of the monarchy waned after 1789, the
democratic forms that it had fostered quickly took on substance, particu7· Ibid., 55, 56.
8. Ibid."s,
66-Gg.
9. Tocqucville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution,

45- 50.
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larly in a town like Limoges where no homogeneous elite existed that could
capture power for itself. In Caen, on the other hand, the commerCIal oligarchy (whether petty or not) did succeed in capturing power and in stifling a
modest movement toward participatory
democracy. As Tocqueville so aptly
observed, "what perhaps strikes us most in the mentality and behavior of
OUr eighteenth-century
bourgeois is their obvious fear of being assimilated
to the mass of the people, from whose control they strained every effort to
escape." 10 The Caen elite succeeded in this effort, while that of Limoges did
not, and as I argued in the previous chapter, the key to that difference lies in
the social and economic structures of the two towns and regions.
If the Fox/Tocqueville
schema fits Caen and Limoges nicely, how well
does it work in explaining the federalist revolt more generally? Many of the
factors that led Caen toward revolt in June, 1793, hold true for the other
federalist centers as well. Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseille were all commercial cities. All four cities had a proud history of regional independence and
resistance to royal encroachment.
At the most superficial level, then, the federalist revolt conforms to Fox's thesis that the political crisis in 1793 represented a conflict between state centralization and commercial development.
A closer look at the federalist centers should amplify the character of that
opposition.
. In each federalist city, departmental
administrators
took the lead in callmg for resistance to the Montagnard
Convention. Nowhere did the movement enjoy much popular support, although in Lyon the population did
rally behind federalist administrators
after republican armies laid siege to
the city. The federalist leaders in Lyon, however, never succeeded in mobilizmg support for a march on Paris. In Marseille, too, administrators had difficulty enlisting volunteers for the departmental
force, and the movement
quickly collapsed when republican troops arrived on the scene. Rebel leaders in Bordeaux managed to create an armed force only after offering a cash
bonus to "volunteers,"
and that force never stepped beyond the departmental boundaries of the Gironde. II
How were local administrators
able to maintain a posture of resistance to
Paris without the backing of their constituents? We have seen that this was
10.
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This was true of Bordeaux, as well, but not of Lyon and Marseille.
Bordeaux, the Jacobin club had shifted its support to the Girondins
-time after the split between Jacobins and Feuillants in Paris. This is
some
, ,
'
,
.
hardly 5urpnsmg, since the Bordeaux }acobll~ ,club n,umbered among its
founders men such as Vergniaud and Guadet. I'here did extst III Bordeaux
other popular society, the Club National, which supported the Monta:~ards. The Convention looked to thisclub inJuly and August for assistance
in unclerl1l111mg the Bordeaux federalists, But the Club National mcluded
I nl
a small minority of the city's population and did not present a force
~tr~lg enough to actively oppose the revolt as it developed. The majority of
the people of Bordeaux remained politically passive. Alan Forrest describes
a situation in Bordeaux very similar to that in Caen: "Economically,
the
long tradition of commercial dominance in the life of the city had had the
effect of instituting a very stable social structure in which the vast majority
of the inhabitants were dependent for their livelihood, directly or indirectly,
on the buoyancy of overseas trade ....
The high immigrant population
from other areas, men whose aim in Bordeaux was to attain a decent standard of living rather than to win political privileges, probably also helped to
entrench this native conservatism. Apathy remained high and participation
low." 12 Caen's commercial tradition was not as long, or as illustrious, as
Bordeaux's, but the town's prosperity did depend on commerce, and the
large number of recent immigrants in Caen remained politically passive during the Revolution. The social and economic structures of the two towns
seem strikingly similar.
Both Lyon and Marseille, despite their predominantly
commercial role,
also possessed sizable work forces engaged in production. Silk workers and
printers in Lyon had frequently opposed the merchants who controlled their
industries. Marseille, too, contained a considerable number of workers employed in manufacture,
generally living in neighborhoods
apart from the
commercial population. U In both of these cities, an active and organized
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radical movement opposed the moderate elements in control of local politics
during the early years of the Revolution. By early] 793, the jacobin clubs of
Marseille and Lyon had indeed gained control of municipal politics, only to
be defeated by moderates in the weeks before the federalist revolt. The limited success of the federalist movement depended on the neutralization of
Jacobin power in both cities.
In Lyon, that neutralization
came on the very eve of the May 31 revolution in Paris and was due, in part, to the overzealousness of Lyon [acobins.
In early April, 1793, following Durnouriez's treason and the outbreak of the
Vendee revolt, the Rhone-er-Loire formed a committee of public safety, dominated by Lyon jacobins. The jacobin club, led by Marie Joseph Chalier, controlled the Lyon municipal council and in late April and May pushed for the
creation of a revolutionary
army to apprehend hoarders and political suspects. The club achieved this goal, but the moderate departmental administration prevented the creation of a revolutionary tribunal, also advocated
by the Jacobin club as a weapon against hoarders. By mid-May, opposition
to these radical measures began to develop in the Lyon sectional assemblies,
described by C. Riffaterre as poorly attended during this period and controlled by the wealthy bourgeoisie. The sectional assemblies looked to the
departmental
administration
as an ally in their struggle against the Jacobin
club. The administration
maintained a cautious attitude; but on May 27,
Chalier played into the moderates' hands by calling for the execution of sectional leaders. The sections reported this outrage to the representatives on
mission A. F. Gauthier and P. C. Nioche and demanded the suspension of
the municipal council and the arrest of Chalier. Under intense pressure-in
fact, taken prisoner by the sections-the
representatives ordered Chalier's
arrest on May 30, along with the suspension of the municipal council,
thereby neutralizing the Lyon Jacobin club. Sectional assemblies controlled
municipal politics for the next four months. ',1
In Marseille, too, the struggle between moderates and radicals took the
form of opposition between the sectional assemblies and the jacobin club.
Militant Jacobins (primarily professional men, not merchants) had gained
ascendancy in Marseille politics by mid-March, 1793, and had succeeded in
establishing a revolutionary
tribunal. As in Lyon, the Jacobins alienated
many property owners, urban and rural alike, by their advocacy of grain
'4.
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1792- and 1793· Nloderate elements mall1tamed a firm control over deI;;;tmental
and municipal politics. In Marseille and Lyon, however, the
~acobin clubs challenged rhe hold of more moderate local administrators,
ho emerged victorious on the very eve of the May 3 I revolution. Those
wdministrators, and their bourgeois supporters, naturally viewed the victory
a f the Montagnards in Paris as a manifestation at the national level of the
~)acobin menace, whicb they had only just succeeded in quelling at home.
The federalist movement represented III part, then, a contlllued reaction
against popular politics, particularly the agent democracy championed
by
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with varying degrees of difficulty, in defeating Jacobin efforts to control the
local administrations.
Those administrators
viewed the revolution of May
3 I as a violation of national sovereignty by the Parisian crowd, a dangerous
attack on the representative democracy that they espoused.
More than the defense of a political ideology, though, the federalist revolts constituted a defense of regional interests, both political and economic.
The declaration of grievances and demands issued by the federalists gathered in Caen expressed the general motivations of the movement as a whole.
Their demands, though couched in terms that emphasized national unity,
clearly implied a desire for increased departmental independence. The Norman and Breton federalists denounced the activities of the Parisian comites
reuolutionnaires
and demanded the curtailment of section meetings in the
capital. They further demanded the abolition of the [acobin and Cordelier
clubs of Paris.
While the federalist rebels decried the undue influence of Paris on national
politics, they also called for a restriction of the National Convention's responsibilities. Officials in all of the federalist centers particularly resented
the interference of representatives on mission in local affairs. Administrators
in Caen, Lyon, and Marseille complained of the inadequate provisions made
by the Convention for the defense of their departments and clashed with
representatives
on mission over the disposition of military forces. Each
of these four cities had quarreled with the royal intendants of the Old Regime. They scarcely wished to see them now replaced by representatives on
mission.
The economic demands of the federalists in Caen are also illuminating.
Conscious of the need to maintain among the people at least passivity, if not
support, federalist leaders issued no demands for repeal of the maximum,
although it was clearly not popular with the commercial classes. They did,
however, call for an investigation of the huge individual fortunes that had
grown since August ro, insisted on the financial accountability of the municipality of Paris, and called for a reduction in the number of assignats, the
circulation of which was widely believed to have fueled inflation and seriously damaged commerce.
The sum of these demands, characteristic of those issued by the other federalist centers, illustrates the very opposition within France that Edward Fox
has suggested: a conflict between the centralizing state and the commercial
cities of the periphery. The federalists denounced not only the excesses of the
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Paris crowd but also the growing power of the National Convention, particularly the Committee of Public Safety. In 1793, certainly in April and
May, it appeared that the authority of the Convention would be dependent
on the active, and unruly, intervention of the Parisian popular classes, a
situation that officials in the federalist centers viewed as extremely threatening. Moreover, the Jacobin regime and the requisites of the war effort promised economic controls that the commercial elite of the federalist cities did
not welcome and, indeed, felt compelled to resist.
Clearly, more work must be clone before we can conclusively characterize
the federalist movement, and the accompanying Girondin/Montagnard
conflict, as an opposition between the commercial periphery of France and the
administrative hinterland. The case of Rouen stands as a prime example of a
nonfederalist but commercial city that requires further research. Rouen's
sizable population of wage laborers and the city's important administrative
role under the Old Regime may well prove to be key factors in explaining its
political posture. More work must also be done on the complicated situations in Lyon ancl Marseille, and the case of Toulon must be carefully scrutinized before that city is placed either in or out of the federalist camp.
The geography of the federalist revolt, however, does correspond to the
geographical distribution of Girondin strength, and the evidence from Caen
and the other federalist centers does point to the primacy of the commercial
elite in those cities. The federalist revolt should not necessarily be understood as a movement of the commercial bourgeoisie defending its economic
interests, to be sure. But this study does suggest that the social fabric and
economic structures of a town and region are crucial factors in molding the
shape of the local political arena. I am not arguing that economic interests
determine political values but rather that social and economic factors explain both the ability of the Limoges popular classes to intervene politically
in 1793 and the failure of the Caen popular classes to do likewise. And the
manner in which local politics played themselves out in the summer of 1793
had a profound impact on the resolution of the key national political question pointed to by both Tocqueville and Soboul: Who was to participate in
the new political system?
In the end, ironically, the success of the Calvados elite in controlling local
politics and instituting representative democracy contributed to this group's
defeat and loss of power in the slimmer of J 793. The success of the federalist
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revolt depended on the support of those people whom the elite had excluded
from the political arena. The immediate result was a victory for the agent
democracy that the federalists had so long resisted, although that soon degenerated into a virtual jacobin dictatorship.
By 1799, both forms of democracy had proven unmanageable,
and it would be another seventy-five
years before a democratic republic could again take finn root in France.

Appendix I
Demands of the Central Committee
of Resistance to Oppression

1.

Qu'un

Dccret Constitutionnel

assure au Corps legislatif une Garde de-

partementale dans laquelle Paris fournira son contingent.
2.. Que les Tribunes
soient supprimecs, ou du moins soumises ii nne
police tellernenr severe, qu'elles n'osent plus influencer, troubler les Deliberations.
3. Que dans Ie lieu de ses Seances, Ie Corps legislatif ne laisse plus defiler
des Bataillons annes; qu'il ne receive plus de Petitions que par ecrit; qu'un
bon Reglement maintienne entre tous ses Membres Ie respect que se doivent
lTIutuellement les Representants de la Nation.
4. Que les Deputes mis en etat darrestation,
sur le Decret arrachc par
violence, soient rendus ii leurs fonctions, sauf ii soumettre leur conduite aux
Tribunaux, quand i1s auront ere legalement accuses.
5. Qu'un Decret solenncl casse les Corps administratifs de Paris et les Autorites anarchiques connues sous le nom de Comites Revoluriormaires6. Que la Commune de Paris soit divisee en amant de Municipalites
qu'elle a de Tribunaux; que ces Municipalites soient [orrnees incessamment,
et qu'il ne puisse y entrer aucun Mernbre des Administrations
actuelles de
cette Ville.
7. Quc les sections de Paris ne soient plus desorrnais en permanence.
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gens sans aveu.

II
15. Que la Convention divisant enfin les Pouvoirs, se borne 3 ceux qui
apparriennent a une Assernblee legislative.
15bis. Que Ie COImte de salut public wit clepouille de sa Puissance
dictaroriale.
16. Que les Deputes envoyes pres des armees et dans les Departemenrs,
retoUrnent au poste que leur avait assigne la Nation; qu'ils rendent compte
des sornmes qu'i!s ont tOllchees pour leur mission extraordinaire;
que I'on
examine la maniere dont i1s I'ont rernplie, et les motifs des arrestations Cju'ils
ont ordonnees; que leur responsabilite ne soit pas un vain 1110t.
T7. Que I'on donne au COJlseil executif la viglleur necessaire pour faire
marcher Ie Gouvernernent.
III
I. 8. Qu 'une commission
forme d'hoJllmes capables et integres soit chargee
d'examiner les cornptes des anciens Ministres et de la Commune de Paris; de
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Appendix II
occupational

Categories of Elected Officials

The following is neither an exhaustive nor a definitive list
ompilation of the occupations that I encountered among the
but rat er a c
.
.
fL·
Is of Calvados and the Haute- Vienne and the categories in
dec teeI OlllCId
..
which I classified them 111 rhis study.
h

Clergy: chanoine; cure; pretre; v!caire.
Legal professions: avocat; avoue; homme

de loi; juge de paix; lieutenant

general au bailliage;. notarre; procureur..
.
Liberal professions: archltecte; arpenteur; chirurgien; docreur en medecine;
journaliste; maitre de musique; mcdecin, peintre; professeur.
Rural landowners:
agriculteur;
cultivateur;
herbageur;
laboureur;
proprieta ire.
. .
Commerce: banquier; commen;:ant; capitame de navire ; courtier-maritime;
Fabricant; manufacturier; marchand; marchand de dentelles, negociant.
Artisans/Shopkeepers:
apothicaire; aubergiste; bonnetier; cabaretier; cafetier; cartier; chandellier; chaudronnier;
cordonnier; corroyeur; entrepreneur; hodoger; imprimeur; marchand de bois; marchand boucher;
marchand chapelier; marchand cirier; marchand confiseur; marchand
coutelier; marchand epicier , marchand fripier-rapissier; marchand mercier ; marchand papetier; marchand parfumeur;
marchand pelletier;
marchand pharmacien; marchand ranneur; marchand teinturier; mar-
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